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“The iron itself cannot take a stand against the rain, 
and humans are just like iron. If used for work it 
wears off, if lying on the ground, it gets rusted. As 
we ought to fall at the end, it is a hundred times 
better to be worn off than to become rusty.” 
József Eötvös 
Four years ago, the Batthyány Lajos College’s community, operating 
under the aegis of Deák Ferenc Faculty of Law and Political 
Sciences, made a promise to share the Faculty’s most talented 
students’ works with Hungary. To achieve it, we set forth the 
College’s own scientific periodical called Diskurzus, which is 
published annually twice and is electronically accessible for 
everyone. Besides the periodical, the College’s volume study – 
published in every two years – was born, collecting the College 
students’ greater works into one volume. 
On the autumn of 2013, the College had a huge dream and felt 
itself strong enough to share its students’ scientific work not only 
with Hungary but the whole world. The Beloved Reader is holding 
the product of the College community’s sacrificing work and desire 
in his/her hands. 
According to Kunó Klebelsberg: “as regards effect in foreign 
countries, not passive but active language knowledge is needed.” By 
truly agreeing with this thought, with finishing this volume the 
College also proved that its students possess those skills and abilities 
which make them able to succeed in Europe and all over the world, 
as they are hard-working, persistent, humble and most importantly, 
talented. 
Keeping Eötvös’ thoughts in mind, the College has always 
approached scientific questions with professional modesty, and we 
never kept it in secret that we await high professional level from our 
members even when they are students. As this is the aim of talent 
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promotion! Talent must not be left unused, just like iron may not be 
wasted, either. Talent manifests when it gets those aims for which it 
is worth doing something, working. 
Regarding this volume, the aim was to present the College’s 
scientific results in foreign languages, with which we demonstrated 
that we are Hungarian in our way of thinking but we are also connect 
to a greater community, the European Union with thousand threads. 
As the Latin saying goes, quot capita, tot sententiae, bearing this in 
mind, the volume’s scientific results cannot be gathered around one 
thought, their common point is belonging to the College. However, 
this provides possibility for the Beloved Reader to easily find the 
work that suits one’s interests the best. 
Honour and obeisance behoves to the volume’s two professional 
reviewer, Dr. Gábor Hulkó and Dr. Gábor Kecskés, who carried out 
a unique work regarding the studies’ professional proof-reading. 
Sándor Boglár and Orsolya Szalay shall be honoured as well, they 
did the studies’ language supervision. We also say thank you to the 
Emberi Erőforrás Támogatáskezelő and the Hungarian Institute of 
Educational Research and Development, which made it possible to 
publish the volume. Last but not least, we owe special thank for the 
authors, who proved that the Faculty of Law and Political Sciences 
in Győr is the area’s torch sparkling with the most glorious light. 
 dr. János Kálmán 
 editor




How Act C of 2012 Transformed the Regulation of 
Violent Sexual Crimes in Hungary 
1. INTRODUCTION 
After the change of regime, the rather differentiated Hungarian 
governments followed different criminal policies which significantly 
transformed the penal provisions established by Act IV of 1978. As a 
result, Act C of 2012 on Criminal Code was enacted on 1st July 2013. 
This transformation is also due to the accelerating scientific progress 
and the harmonization of law caused by the accession to the 
European Union.1 
How Act C of 2012 transformed the regulation of violent 
sexual crimes 




youth and sexual 
morality 
 
Chapter XX: Offenses 
against children and against 
family law 
Chapter XIX: Sexual 
freedom and sexual offenses 
197. § Rape 
198. § Sexual assault  197. § Sexual violence 
“sexual extortion”  196. § Sexual exploitation 
1. table (edited by the author) 
                                                            
1 Justification of Act C of 2012 on Criminal Code. 
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2. SEXUAL FREEDOM AND SEXUAL OFFENSES AS AN INDEPENDENT 
CHAPTER 
As it can clearly be seen from the table above, the previously 
effective Criminal Code disposed crimes against marriage, family, 
youth and sexual morality in chapter XIV, which was broken down 
into two independent chapters by Act C of 2012: chapter XX ‒ 
offenses against children and family law ‒ and chapter XIX ‒ on 
sexual freedom and sexual offenses. 
The new chapter more specifically expresses the defended legal 
matters because sexual integrity, sexual self-determination and 
sexual freedom appear besides sexual morality as previously 
dominating legal matters, therefore, it not only concentrates on 
public interest but on the private sector, too.2 This can be positively 
interpreted regarding Hungarian legal literature formulated in the 
recent decades, which requires the creation of a new chapter, as 
sexual morality itself is inappropriate as the protected legal interest 
of sexual crimes. 
The modified chapter above was also justified by international 
legislations like the annual Convention in New York in 1950, the 182 
ILO Convention, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, the Lanzarote Convention, the CAHVIO 
Convention and Directive 2011/93/EU of the European Parliament 
and the Council. These documents hold such social and international 
demands among these criminal offenses which emphasize the 
defense of persons under eighteen years of age. Therefore, 
significant changes took place in the structure and content of violent 
sexual crimes, listed under chapter XIX in the new Criminal Code. 
New concepts and new conclusions were formed, creating 
consistency with international terms; such as the factum of sexual 
violence which combines rape and sexual assault, the factum of 
sexual exploitation in order to fix the sanctioning of sexual extortion, 
                                                            
2 Ibid. 
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and the concept of sexual activity which attempts to resolve the 
conceptual problem caused by sexual intercourse and lewd act. 
Criminal offenses under the effective chapter can be put into 
three categories based on their common legal matters: 
1. crimes against sexual freedom, like sexual exploitation and 
sexual violence; 
2. crimes against children’s healthy sexual development like 
sexual abuse, exploitation of child prostitution, and child 
pornography; 
3. and crimes against sexual relationship policies adopted by 
the society like incest, assisting prostitution, living from 
earnings from prostitution, and indecent exposure.3 
3. SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AS NEW STATUTORY PROVISION 
3.1. Legal reasons behind the modification 
Act IV of 1978 penalized rape and sexual assault if sexual 
intercourse or lewd act was realized by violence or imminent duress 
against life or bodily integrity. The legal practice of this period 
certified sexual act as duress if it was implemented by an unqualified 
threat without the voluntary consent of the injured party.4 Legislators 
responded with a new statutory approach to it, called sexual 
exploitation, which punished the so-called sexual extortion more 
severely than before. Therefore, the regulation turned towards a 
different direction which is preferred by domestic and international 
legal aid organizations and associations. 
The creation of sexual exploitation ‒ as a new statutory 
provision ‒ was justified by the Lanzarote Convention and Directive 
                                                            
3 BELOVICS, ERVIN – MOLNÁR, GÁBOR MIKLÓS – SINKU, PÁL: Büntetőjog 
II. Különös rész. A 2012. évi C. törvény alapján [Criminal Law II. – 
Specific Part. Based on Act C of 2012], 2012, HVG-ORAC, Budapest, 172. 
4 Act IV of 1978 on the Criminal Code, Art. 174., Art. 197. para. (1), Art. 
198. para. (1). 
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2011/93/EU of the European Parliament and the Council, and 
declares the following crimes as punishable: 
1. engaging in sexual activity with a person under eighteen 
years of age where coercion, force or threats is used; or 
2. applying abuse based on a recognized position of trust, 
authority or influence over a child, including abuse within 
the family; or 
3. applying abuse in a particularly vulnerable situation of the 
child, notably because of a mental or physical disability or a 
situation of dependence.5 
Directive 2011/93/EU also determines the lowest limit of the 
sentence’s upper limit and places the crime committed to the injury 
of the parties – who do not reach the consent age limit – under severe 
judgment. Consequently, sexual exploitations committed to the 
injury of parties under eighteen and fourteen years of age appear as 
qualified cases in Act C of 2012. Furthermore, if sexual exploitation 
is committed by a family member or against a person who is in the 
care, custody or supervision of or receives medical treatment from 
such family member, or, if abuse is applied based on a recognized 
position of trust, authority or influence over the victim, it is 
considered as a qualified case, as well. The recognized position of 
authority or influence ‒ between the perpetrator and the injured party 
‒ is a newly formulated constituent element which is beyond those 
previously described relationships but is capable of giving rise to 
other personal or appending relations like a cousin or a neighborly 
relation. Additionally, this factum is able to transpose the provisions 
of the CAHVIO Convention as it encompasses every coercive 
behavior that causes the injured party not to consent voluntarily.6 
                                                            
5 The Directive 2011/93/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 13 December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual 
exploitation of children and child pornography, and replacing Council 
Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA (hereinafter: Directive 2011/93/EU), 
Art. 3. para. (5) (III), and the Lanzarote Convention, Art. 18. para. (1) point 
(b). 
6 Justification of Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code. 
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3.2. Detailed examination of the relevant statutory provision 
The protected legal interest behind sexual exploitation is the social 
interest regarding freedom of sexual life of human beings. Sexual 
freedom behooves every living natural person on a basic legal level, 
therefore, the existence of total legal capacity is not a condition of 
passive subjectivity, namely, people over twelve or with diminished 
capacity can become passive subjects of sexual exploitation without 
further restriction. This raises the question: whether the complete 
absence of criminal capacity would impact passive subjectivity of 
sexual exploitation. The answer is no if the injured party is incapable 
of demonstrating consent in relation to sexual activities and sex 
practices. 
Both expressions of criminal conduct are clearly visible from 
the factum of sexual exploitation, namely, the coercion to perform or 
tolerate sexual activities. Sexual act appeared as a new criminal 
concept in Act C of 2012, which means sexual intercourse and any 
gravely indecent and obscene act primarily for sexual purposes, 
intended to simulate or satisfy sexual desire. Besides sexual 
intercourse, it refers to sexual activities which correspond to lewd act 
in the common parlance.7 
In my opinion, ‒ with the creation of this definition ‒ legislators 
solved the conceptual problem caused by sexual intercourse and 
lewd act,8 as sexual intercourse ‒ during the commitment of violent 
sexual crimes ‒ can be interpreted as part of the lewd act and also 
concluded as a criminal conduct. 
One actively cooperates as long as the injured party is forced to 
perform sexual activity. In the case of tolerance, cooperation turns 
into passive conduct. 
                                                            
7 Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code, Art. 459. para. (1) point 27. 
8 NAGY, FERENC ‒ SZOMORA, ZSOLT: A házasság, a család az ifjúság és a 
nemi erkölcs elleni bűncselekmények (Btk. XIV. fejezet) de lege ferenda 
[Crimes Against Connubiality, Family, Youth and Sexual Morality, Chapter 
XIV, De Lege Ferenda], in Büntetőjogi Kodifikáció, Vol. 2. No. 18. (2004) 
18. 
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The factum of sexual exploitation can only be implemented with 
violence or threat. In this case, violence is only factual if it is 
directed against a person or its nature bends will. Threat is to be 
understood as a declaration of intention to cause considerable harm 
so as to make the person who is the target of the threat fearful by 
such declaration.9 The first half of the definition is called the material 
side, while its second half is called the subjective side. As a result, 
the injured party acts contrary to his/her free will.10 
Sexual exploitation is classified as a materialistic criminal 
offense which results in the sexual act itself or the toleration of 
sexual act against the passive subjects’ free will. Perpetrators will be 
held accountable for attempting sexual exploitation if they begin the 
threat without totally performing it. Otherwise, offense is considered 
as consummated. 
The offender of sexual exploitation can be anyone. Complicity 
occurs if the offender, knowingly and voluntarily, helps another 
person to commit the crime. The basic case of sexual exploitation 
may relate to abetting or aiding. This criminal activity can only be 
implemented with the offender’s straight intent.11 
4. SEXUAL VIOLENCE AS NEW STATUTORY PROVISION 
4.1. Legal reasons behind modification 
The re-regulation of rape and sexual assault was necessary because 
Hungary signed the Lanzarote Convention on 29th November 2010, 
and EU Member States accepted Directive 2011/93/EU in December 
2011, which declare the following crimes as punishable: 
1. engaging in sexual activities with a person under eighteen 
years of age where coercion, force or threat is used; or 
                                                            
9 Act C of 2012 Art. 459. para. (1) point 7. 
10 SZOMORA, ZSOLT: Az erőszakos nemi bűncselekmények kényszerítési 
eleméről [Coercion during violent sexual crimes], in Büntetőjogi 
Kodifikáció, Vol. 8. No. 2. (2008) 30. 
11 BELOVICS – MOLNÁR – SINKU: op. cit. 174. 
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2. applying abuse based on a recognized position of trust, 
authority or influence over a child, including abuse within 
the family; or 
3. applying abuse in a particularly vulnerable situation of a 
child, notably because of a mental or physical disability, or a 
situation of dependence.12 
Both legislations use the word child on persons under eighteen 
years of age. Directive 2011/93/EU also determines the lowest limit 
of the sentence's upper limit and it places the crime committed to the 
injury of parties ‒ who do not reach the consent age limit ‒ under 
severe judgment, which is also normative for the Hungarian 
legislation. 
Act IV of 1978 penalized rape and sexual assault if sexual 
intercourse or lewd act was realized by violence or imminent duress 
against life or bodily integrity.13 Over the years this case-law has 
become clearer, which made the interpretation and application of 
duress and qualified threat unified. Therefore, Act C of 2012 
continued to apply it. Accordingly, the basic case of sexual violence 
is committed when the perpetrator uses force or threat against the life 
or bodily integrity of the victim to perform or tolerate sexual act. 
Consequently, sexual exploitations committed to the injury of 
the parties under fourteen and twelve years of age appear as qualified 
cases having regard to Directive 2011/93/EU. Furthermore, a 
qualified case can be realized more than once at the same time.14 
In the case of the previous legislation, sexual relationship 
established with a person under twelve years of age entailed the fact 
of rape or sexual assault. Furthermore, criminal liability was 
established on the fact of seducement in case of victims between 
twelve and fourteen years of age. With the creation of Act C of 2012, 
legislators repealed the presumption, which deemed persons under 
                                                            
12 Directive 2011/93/EU, Art. 3. para. (5) (III), and the Lanzarote 
Convention, Art. 18. para. (1) point b). 
13 Act IV of 1978 on the Criminal Code, Art. 174., Art. 197. para. (1), Art. 
198. para. (1). 
14 Directive 2011/93/EU Art. 3., Art. 5. para. (2)-(3), Art. 6. 
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twelve as incapable of defense. This can be explained by the fact that 
the new Criminal Code explicitly refers to the age of victims. 
Therefore, Act C of 2012 assigns a higher range of punishment to 
sexual violence.15 Namely, legislators solved the dogmatic problem16 
which stemmed from the commitment against victims under twelve. 
In addition, the new Criminal Code punishes the assurance of 
necessary or facilitating conditions of sexual violence regarding its 
seriousness. This primarily involves the preparation of the scene and 
the guaranteeing of narcotics.17 
4.2. Detailed examination of the relevant statutory provision 
The protected legal interest behind sexual violence ‒ similarly to 
sexual exploitation ‒ is the social interest regarding freedom of 
sexual life of human beings. Its passive subject can be anyone 
regardless of age and gender. 
The criminal conduct of sexual violence has two expressions: 
sexual exploitation and consumption for sexual act. Sexual act 
appears as a common element in both expressions. The concept of 
sexual intercourse in criminal context is worth to consider. 
According to previous legislations, sexual intercourse was 
consummated if genital contact occurred with sexual intent.18 This 
approach is no longer maintained. According to the special 
provisions of the new Criminal Code, sexual intercourse can be 
interpreted as part of lewd act and also concluded as a criminal 
conduct. 
Sexual exploitation ‒ as the first expression of the criminal 
offence ‒ can be committed with two interdependent acts, namely, 
with sexual act and coercion. There is an objective and instrumental 
relation between these conducts in which sexual intercourse appears 
as an objective action while coercion appears as an instrumental 
                                                            
15 Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code, Art. 197. 
16 TÓTH: op. cit. 298. 
17 Justification of Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code. 
18 BELOVICS – MOLNÁR – SINKU: op. cit. 177. 
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action. Sexual violence’s second expression is realized by the sexual 
act itself. 
The method of perpetration needs to be evaluated in both 
expressions. Sexual violence is punishable if committed by force or 
threat against life or bodily integrity of the victim or a person is 
exploited who is incapable of self-defense or unable to express 
his/her will for the purpose of sexual act: 
1. Violent conduct shall mean any act of aggression and undue 
influence exerted on a person by the application of physical 
force, even if it does not result in bodily injury. 
2. The concept of threat sets dual barriers in the case of sexual 
violence. It marks those values which threat should be 
directed against and also refers to its direct nature. Namely, 
threat should be directed against the life or bodily integrity of 
the victim and it should be suitable to break victims’ own 
will. By the latter we mean the implication of psychical 
impact which results in the detriment of the victim. 
3. When injured parties are incapable of defense, they are 
unable to perform physical resistance against the attacks 
launched against them. Persons who are temporarily or 
permanently unable to express their resistance fall into this 
category, as well.19 
4. When victims are incapable of exercising free will, they are 
unable to perform resistance physically, which can be 
transitional – for example sleep, faint, intoxication or narco-
sis ‒ and permanent nature ‒ in case of mental incapacity. 
The latter nature can be remedied differentially because the 
victim is capable of exercising free will during his/her 
diminished capacity. Therefore, criminal offence is not 
implemented in case of agreement. In the case of lacking 
criminal capacity the subject under examination is the extent 
of incapability of exercising free will. If injured parties prove 
                                                            
19 Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code, Art. 459. para. (1) point 29. 
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to be capable of exercising free will in respect of sexual 
activity, their consents are legally relevant.20 
Sexual violence should be judged if perpetrators commit a 
sexual act with a person under the age of twelve or force such person 
to perform sexual act. With the creation of Act C of 2012, legislators 
repealed the indisputable presumption which deemed persons under 
twelve as incapable of defense.21 
Sexual violence is classified as a materialistic criminal offense 
which results in sexual activity. Perpetrators can be hold accountable 
for attempting sexual violence if they begin the coercion without 
totally performing it. Art. 197. para. 5 records the preparation of the 
criminal conduct, namely, any person who provides the means 
necessary for or facilitating the commission of sexual violence is 
guilty. This primarily involves the preparation of the scene or the 
guaranteeing of narcotics.22 
The perpetrator of sexual violence can be anyone irrespective of 
gender or sexual capacity. Complicity occurs if the person 
performing the periodic behavior is different from the person 
performing the sexual act. If sexual act is committed by two or more 
people jointly ‒ knowing each other’s activity ‒ they become inde-
pendent perpetrators of sexual violence, namely, it will be judged as 
an aggravating circumstance.23 Sexual violence ‒ similarly to sexual 
exploitation ‒ can only be implemented with the perpetrator’s 
straight intent. 
The aggravating circumstances of sexual violence can be found 
under Art. 197. para. 3 and 4. The penalty is more severe if sexual 
violence is committed: 
1. against a person under the age of eighteen; or 
2. by a family member or against a person who is in the care, 
custody or supervision of or receives medical treatment from 
                                                            
20 BELOVICS – MOLNÁR – SINKU: op. cit. 178. 
21 Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code, Art. 197. para. (2). 
22 Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code, Art. 197. para. (5). 
23 Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code, Art. 197. para. (3) point c). 
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such family member, or if abuse is based on a recognized 
position of trust, authority or influence over the victim, or 
3. by more than one person on the same occasion,24 in full 
knowledge of each other’s acts;25 or 
4. by a family member or against a person who is in the care, 
custody or supervision of or receives medical treatment from 
such family member, or if abuse is based on a recognized 
position of trust, authority or influence over the victim, or by 
more than one person on the same occasion, in full 
knowledge of each other’s acts against a person under the 
age of twelve; or26 
5. by a family member or against a person who is in the care, 
custody or supervision of or receives medical treatment from 
such family member, or if abuse is based on a recognized 
position of trust, authority or influence over the victim, or by 
more than one person on the same occasion, in full 
knowledge of each other’s acts against a person who has 
reached the age of fourteen.27 
The counting of sexual violence adjusts to the number of 
victims. In other words, multiple sexual activities performed by the 
same perpetrator at the same time against the same victim forms a 
natural union, while a sexual act performed with unified 
determination in different times against the same victim eventuates 
cumulativeness. 
Sexual violence can be judged in a conglomeration with sexual 
exploitation if the perpetrator continues to perform sexual activities 
with the victim who became twelve years of age. Formal deficiency 
forms if the perpetrator violates the victim’s personal freedom during 
sexual violence but if it is separated in time and space, accumulation 
should be judged. Simple factor merges into the basic factum every 
                                                            
24 Bkv. 27. 
25 Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code, Art. 197. para. (3). 
26 BELOVICS – MOLNÁR – SINKU: op. cit. 180. 
27 Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code, Art. 197. para. (4). 
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time, if it was committed as the result of sexual violence.28 
Aggravated factor is recognized as an exception, which accumulates 
with sexual violence. Homicide committed with malice aforethought 
or with malicious motive should be judged if homicide takes place in 
the course of sexual violence. Mortality caused by factor should be 
judged in accumulation with sexual violence, if the result occurs by 
the negligence of the perpetrator. 
5. THE PROBLEM OF THE OPERATIVE REGULATION 
The previous legislation penalized rape and sexual assault within the 
context of violent sexual crimes to which Hungarian legal literature 
responded with strong criticism. This criticism included the 
unsuitable legal matter of violent sexual crimes, the statutory 
indeterminacy of sexual intercourse, incorrect formulation of lewd 
act, passive subjectivity of persons under twelve years of age, 
concentration of factums, and modification of the chapter.29 
In my opinion, Act C of 2012 can be positively interpreted 
based on the critics mentioned above. Namely, the operative 
Criminal Code penalizes violent sexual crimes under a new and 
independent chapter. The new Chapter more specifically expresses 
the defended legal interests because sexual integrity, sexual self-
determination and sexual freedom appear besides sexual morality as 
the previously dominating legal interest.30 New concepts and new 
conclusion of facts were formed, creating consistency with 
international terms such as the fact of sexual violence which 
combines rape and sexual assault, the fact of sexual exploitation in 
order to fix the sanctioning of sexual extortion, and the concept of 
                                                            
28 Bkv. 34. 
29 TÓTH, ÁRON LÁSZLÓ: A nemi erkölcs ellen erőszakos bűncselekmények 
hatályos szabályozásával kapcsolatos néhány problémáról [A few problems 
connected to the current legal regulation of violent crimes against sexual 
morals], in Iustum, Aequum, Salutare, Vol. 3. No. 4. (2007) 235. 
30 Justification of Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code. 
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sexual activity, which resolves the conceptual problem caused by 
sexual intercourse and lewd act. During the detailed examination of 
violent sexual crimes I noticed the following problem. 
The perpetrator of sexual exploitation uses violence or threat – 
under the statutory definition of duress31 –, which causes the victim 
to perform or tolerate sexual act.32 This factum also appears in the 
first expression of the criminal conduct of sexual violence as 
legislators bound the mode of perpetration to violence and limited 
threat.33 
Therefore, the problem of operative regulation is the duplication 
of violence as the mode of perpetration. In my opinion, this will be a 
key problem of judicial discretion in the future because legal 
separation of the examined criminal conducts raises further 
questions. 
Proposal to solve the existing problem of the operative 
regulation 
Sexual exploitation 
196. § (1) Any person 
who forces another 
person to perform or 
tolerate sexual activities 
is guilty of felony. 
 
196. § (1) Any person who 
threatens another person to 
perform or tolerate sexual 
activities is guilty of felony. 
2. table (edited by the author) 
By making the statutory definition of sexual exploitation more 
specific, it can solve the dogmatic problem shown above. Namely, 
emphasizing threat on which sexual extortion is based and neglecting 
violence. My train of thought is based on the fact that perpetrators 
psychologically ‒ instead of physically ‒ influence victims during 
sexual extortion. 
                                                            
31 Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code, Art. 195. 
32 Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code, Art. 196. para. (1). 
33 Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code, Art. 197. para. (1) point a). 
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Csaba ERDŐS  
Hungarian Parliamentary Law under the Control of 
the Strasbourg Court 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Hungarian Parliamentary Law has been totally renewed in the 
last few years: on 1st January 2012, the new constitution – the so-
called Basic Law – came into effect. After the enforcement of the 
Basic Law, other sources of parliamentary law were also remade: a 
brand new act on Parliament1 was passed and Standing Orders2 were 
shortened due to the Parliament Act. 
The Parliament Act regulates the parliamentary discipline law in 
detail and it ensures new and broad competences in this field for the 
speaker,3 the president of the Parliament (hereinafter: President) and 
for the plenary seat of the Parliament. In 2012 and 2013, disciplinary 
instruments were applied several times. 
Other fields of parliamentary law were affected by the 
renovation of sources of parliamentary law but there a lot of 
institutions and issues operated similarly to the former regulation. 
One of these characteristics is the lack of legal control over the 
parliamentary decisions. For example, the decisions of the speaker or 
the president and the single – non-normative – resolutions of the 
Parliament shall not be questioned from legal point of view. 
                                                            
1 Act XXXVI of 2012 on the National Assembly (hereinafter: Parliament 
Act). 
2 Resolution 46/1994 OGY on several rules of standing orders (hereinafter: 
Standing Orders). 
3 For the sake of convenience “speaker” means the person who leads the 
plenary seat. According to the Parliament Act speaker shall be the president 
of the Parliament and the vice-presidents of the Parliament. 
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Although, there is a political control – the affirmation of plenary seat 
– against several decisions of the speaker or the president but in these 
cases the Parliament’s decision is also devoid of any type of legal 
control: the Parliament’s decision is the final one. The lack of the 
legal control is really interesting in those cases when the Parliament, 
speaker or the president shall apply – and not make – the law: for 
example decisions made in the field of disciplinary law. For 
imposing a disciplinary sanction, the Parliament (speaker or the 
President) shall collate Parliament Act’s norms and the behaviour of 
a Member of the Parliament (hereinafter: MP) and decide whether the 
regulation and the facts shall indicate the imposition of a sanction. 
From this point of view, the speaker’s and the Parliament’s decision-
creating is analogical with a judicial decision-creating. 
In the last four years, the inner-parliamentary “political” control 
of the speaker’s or president’s decisions was affectless due to the 
two-third majority of the governmental coalition. According to the 
common political power relations of parliamentarism, the Hungarian 
parliamentary law’s only political “brake” is the two-third majority 
in several decisions: in a typical situation the governmental side does 
not have a two-third majority, so this type of majority shall function 
as a special veto right for the opposition. 
The new disciplinary competences, the lack of legal control 
mechanism (constitutional court’s and the “ordinary” judicial 
process) over several parliamentary decisions4 and the two-third 
parliamentary majority of the government indicate that oppositional 
MPs look for an alternative legal control forum and they found it in 
                                                            
4 The lack of legal control mechanism over parliamentary operation is an 
old debt of the Hungarian parliamentary law. In his 2008 book, Péter Smuk 
emphasizes that the Hungarian law does not take any sanction because of 
the violation of the Standing Orders and he depicts this phenomenon as a 
general problem. SMUK, PÉTER: Ellenzéki jogok a parlamenti jogban 
[Oppositional Rights in the Parliamentary Law], 2008, Gondolat, Budapest, 
138. See also Lajos Csörgits’s recension on this book: CSÖRGITS, LAJOS: 
Smuk Péter: Ellenzéki jogok a parlamenti jogban [Smuk Péter: 
Oppositional Rights in the Parliamentary Law], in Jog-Állam-Politika, Vol. 
3. No. 1. (2011) 138. 
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the Strasbourg European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter: ECtHR 
or Court). This paper tries to show three applications concerning 
parliamentary cases received before the ECtHR. The Court still does 
not decide on the applications but it found them admissible. For this 
reason this paper also tries to deduce the expected decision of the 
Court via its former case-law. 
Constitutional law – and within the parliamentary law – was 
used to be mentioned as the most national branches or fields of law. 
Because of this, the effect of an international forum – the Strasbourg 
Court – is really important for the Parliament’s autonomy. 
2. SUMMARY OF THE APPLICATIONS 
2.1. Szanyi v. Hungary 
At a plenary session on 18 March 2013 an oppositional MP Tibor 
Szanyi – a member of the Magyar Szocialista Párt (Hungarian 
Socialist Party) – showed his middle figure, in the course of his 
speech, to the members of the right-wing party called Jobbik. Ten 
days later he was fined HUF 131.140 for using a blatantly offensive 
expression. The same MP submitted an interpellation request 
addressed to the Minister of National Development which was 
denied by the speaker on 6 May 2013. The applicant submitted a 
further interpellation request on the same topic, which was again 
dismissed by the Speaker on 27 May 2013. The reason of the 
speaker’s decisions was that the interpellations hurt the prestige of 
the Parliament because of their content.5 
The legal ground of the decisions was the general commitment 
of the Commission for Constitutional, Justice and Procedural Affairs 
No. 22/2010-2014. (1 October 2012) AIÜB. It declares: “for the 
President, practicing the right ensured in Article 97, paragraph 4 of 
the Standing Orders – on denying proposals – is established with that 
                                                            
5 Application no. 35493/13. Avalible at: HUDOC database of the ECtHR: 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx#{%22fulltext%22:[%2
235493%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-138867%22]} [cit. 2014-03-27]. 
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if the proposal is inappropriate for negotiation and decision-making. 
Negotiating proposals of obviously frivolous and offensive content is 
incompatible with the Parliament’s reputation. Denying such 
proposals is the right and obligation of the Speaker, based on 
Parliamentary act Article 2. (1).” According to the above mentioned 
part of the Standing Orders: “the speaker shall deny proposals of 
inadequate form.” Hence, it is significant to note that the committee's 
resolution extended the speaker’s sphere of competence for the 
content investigation of proposals. 
2.2. Karácsony and Others v. Hungary 
At a plenary session on 30 April 2013, during a voting process, the 
Gergely Karácsony and Péter Szilágyi – two MPs, members of the 
oppositional party called “Lehet Más a Politika” (hereinafter: LMP) 
– showed a billboard in the session hall displaying the text “You 
steal, you cheat, you lie.” On 13 May 2013 the Parliament fined Mr. 
Karácsony HUF 50.000 and Mr. Szilágyi approximately HUF 
185.000 for seriously disrupting the proceedings of Parliament. 
On 21 May 2013 during a plenary voting, two other MPs of 
LMP – Dávid Dorosz and Rebeka Katalin Szabó – presented a 
billboard with the text “Here operates the National Tobacco Mafia”. 
On 27 May 2013 they were fined HUF 70.000 each for seriously 
disrupting the plenary proceedings.6 
2.3. Szél and Others v. Hungary7  
The final voting of the bill on the turnover of agricultural lands and 
forestry holdings which provoked great political turbulence was held 
on 21st June 2013. During the course of the voting, a few 
oppositional MPs who are members of the LMP – Bernadett Szél, 
                                                            
6 Application no. 42461/13. Available at: HUDOC database of the ECtHR: 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx#{%22fulltext%22:[%2
242461%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-138866%22]} [cit. 2014-03-27].  
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Ágnes Osztolykán and Szilvia Lengyel – used a megaphone and 
expanded posters, furthermore, brought soil in front of the president 
in a small golden wheelbarrow.8 Due to this, the speaker suggested to 
decrease those three representatives’ honorarium by one-third (HUF 
130.000-155.000), which suggestion was accepted by the 
Parliament.9  
2.4. Legal aspects of the complaints 
Hungarian legislature does not provide any kind of legal remedy 
neither with the speaker’s decision of denying interpellation, nor 
against disciplinary sanctions. Hence, representatives turned to 
ECtHR in all three cases and named Articles 10 and 13 of ECHR as 
the basis of their complaints. The first one protects the freedom of 
expression, the latter one protects right for an effective legal remedy. 
Furthermore applications cite Article 14, because they state that 
measures targeted them as oppositional MPs, constituting 
discrimination on the ground of political affiliation, in breach of 
Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 10.  
3. EXPECTED DECISION OF THE STRASBOURG COURT  
3.1. Freedom of expression 
Second point of Article 10 contains the reasons for restriction of the 
freedom of expression: “The exercise of these freedoms, since it 
carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such 
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by 
law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of na-
                                                            
8 Available at: Parliamentary Journal: http://www.parlament.hu/internet 
/plsql/ogy_naplo.naplo_fadat_aktus?p_ckl=39&p_uln=292&p_felsz=63&p
_felszig=65&p_aktus=30 [cit. 2014-03-27]. 
9 Proposal No. H/11658. See website of the Parliament: http://www.parl 
ament.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_irom.irom_adat?p_ckl=39&p_izon=11658 [cit. 
2014-03-27] and the Parliamentary Journal: http://www. parlament.hu 
/internet/plsql/ogy_naplo.naplo_fadat_aktus?p_ckl=39&p_uln=293&p_fels
z=78&p_felszig=80&p_aktus=24 [cit. 2014-03-27]. 
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tional security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention 
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the 
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining 
the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” The Court examines 
other questions concerning the admissibility of the restriction. The 
restriction shall meet all of the following requirements: 
1. the restriction shall be based on an act; 
2. the intervention shall tend to an aim listed above and; 
3. it must be necessary in a democratic society. It has no 
general interpretation, the Court shall decide regarding all 
circumstances of the given case. But the Court always 
demands that the intervention shall  
a) serve a factual and powerful public interest and 
b) be proportional.10 
The disciplinary sanctions adhere to the strict test’s point a) that is, to 
the regulation equal to acts, as their formation is based on 
Parliamentary Acts. At the same time, the speaker denying inter-
pellation only rests on a committee resolution lacking obligatory po-
wer. This scarcely corresponds to ECTHR’s notion of law – which is 
used in wide interpretation – : “…in practice, every public act is 
regarded as law”.11  
As regards point b), we can state that with contrast to courts, the 
maintenance of parliamentary bodies’ prestige is not present in the 
indications of limitation. The efficiency of referring to the 
“protection of others’ rights” can be questioned as well, as appoin-
ting such rights of other people which would have been wounded by 
using posters is complicated, especially if we take permissive rules 
of judging politically exposed persons into consideration. 
The requirement of cogent public good written in point c) is 
realized, as parliamentary work free of disruption – and efficient – is 
by no means can be regarded as such. However, it is worth taking it 
                                                            
10 See GRÁD, ANDRÁS – WELLER, MÓNIKA: A strasbourgi emberi jogi 
bíráskodás kézikönyve [Handbook of the Jurisdiction of the Strasbourg 
Court of Human Rights], 2011, HVG-Orac, Budapest, 449, 546. 
11 Ibid. 449. 
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into consideration that representative’s freedom of communication is 
generally strictly protected by ECTHR: “While freedom of 
expression is important for everybody, it is especially so for an 
elected representative of the people. He represents his electorate, 
draws attention to their preoccupations and defends their interests. 
Accordingly, interferences with the freedom of expression of an 
opposition member of parliament, like the applicant, call for the 
closest scrutiny on the part of the Court.”12 The case – in which 
declaration was born – was proposed to ECTHR by a Spanish ex-
representative, as he was condemned because in an article he was 
saying strict charges of terrorism regarding the Spanish government, 
upon which the Senate terminated his parliamentary immunity, and 
the court sentenced him for contravening the government.13 Hence, it 
is visible that the case of LMP representatives and the Costello vs. 
Spain case – in which ECTHR declared Spain’s violation of 
agreement – varies in many cases such as representative behaviour 
and the type of the applied legal consequence, however, its general 
statements are of orientation nature.  
3.2. Right to an effective remedy 
According to Article 13 of ECHR, the right to an effective remedy 
means: “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this 
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a 
national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been 
committed by persons acting in an official capacity.” Generally, all 
such legal relations give basis to the applicability of Article 13 of 
ECHR, in which ECHR’s violation comes up but for its remedy, the 
national law does not provide a forum. 
                                                            
12 Castells v. Spain judgement of 23 April 1992, Series A no. 236-B section 
42. 
13 For a detailed summary of Castells v. Spain see: VÁCZI, PÉTER: 
Képviselői szólásszabadság és mentelmi jog [MP’s Freedom of Expression 
and immunity], in SZENTE, ZOLTÁN (ed.): Applicatio est vita regulae. 
Nemzetközi jogesetek a parlamenti jog köréből [International Cases from 
the Field of Parliamentary Law], 2013, Universitas, Győr, 121-126. 
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The likelihood of the grievance of ECHR’s other articles itself 
gives basis to Article 13’ call: “actual grievance of another article is 
not a precondition of a successful citation of Article 13, instead, if 
this citation from another article is substantive, is connected to 
question under the effect of the Agreement and is not clearly 
incompatible with the Agreement, and not clearly causeless, 
suffices.”14 
If EHCR really declares right for legal remedy as a compulsory 
requirement, it also means the relevant decrease of parliamentary 
autonomy. However, it is a question that how right for efficient legal 
remedy appears in EHCR’s case law and whether we could regard 
parliamentary decisions as exceptions. 
The practice of ECtHR does not leave any doubt about that 
Hungarian law violates Article 13 of EHCR with that it does not 
ensure opportunity for legal remedy against parliamentary actions 
causing the violation of EHCR: “If a person does not have the 
possibility for any kind of legal remedy in connection with a 
substantive case from the point of view of the Agreement, this 
undoubtedly goes together with the violation of Article 13 (compare 
with for instance Halford v. the United Kingdom judgement of 25 
June 1997, Reports 1997-III., p. 1004, and Wood v. the United 
Kingdom judgement of 16 November 2004, no. 23414/02). The 
practice would be the same as well, if the unappealable supremacy 
decision originates from a sovereign prince, himself (compare with 
Wille v. Liechtenstein judgement of 28 October 1999, no. 
29396/95).”15 
The Wille v. Liechtenstein case is especially important for us, as 
political discretion appears in it, which is on the one hand, 
characteristic of a parliamentary session, on the other hand, the 
parliament’s provisional right for its members. Let us briefly 
investigate the Wille case’s facts and the Court’s decisions. 
The applicant, Dr. Herbert Wille, was the member (deputy head) 
of the Liechtenstein government in the beginning of the 1990’s. In 
1992, a controversy arose between His Serene Highness Prince 
                                                            
14 GRÁD – WELLER: op. cit. 621. 
15 Ibid. 624. 
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Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein (“the Prince”) and the Liechtenstein 
government on political competences in connection with the 
plebiscite on the question of Liechtenstein’s accession to the 
European Economic Area. The applicant had not stood for re-
election in May 1993, and he was appointed President of the 
Liechtenstein Administrative Court. On 16 February 1995, in the 
context of a series of lectures on questions of constitutional 
jurisdiction and fundamental rights, the applicant gave a public 
lecture at the Liechtenstein-Institut, a research institute, on the 
“Nature and Functions of the Liechtenstein Constitutional Court”. 
During the course of the lecture, the applicant expressed the view 
that the Constitutional Court was competent to decide on the 
“interpretation of the Constitution in case of disagreement between 
the Prince (government) and the Diet”. On the next day, a newspaper 
published an article on the lecture given by the applicant, mentioning 
his views on the competences of the Constitutional Court.  
The Prince sent a letter to Mr. Wille and expressed his 
disapprobation because of Mr. Wille’s views on the role of the 
Constitutional Court: “Unfortunately, I following the publication of 
the report in the Liechtensteiner Volksblatt had to realise that you 
still did not consider yourself bound by the Constitution and held 
views that were clearly in violation of both the spirit and the letter 
thereof. […]. In my eyes, your attitude, Dr Wille, makes you 
unsuitable for public office. I do not intend to get involved in a long 
public or private debate with you, but I should like to inform you in 
good time that I shall not appoint you again to a public office should 
you be proposed by the Diet or any other body.”16 After the letter, 
there were several bouts between the Prince and Mr. Wille but their 
relationship became really harsh when Mr. Wille’s term of office as a 
judge expired. On 14 April 1997, the Liechtenstein Diet decided to 
propose the applicant again as President of the Administrative Court. 
In a letter of 17 April 1997 to the President of the Diet, the Prince 
refused to accept the proposed appointment. He explained that, 
considering his experiences with Mr Wille, he had become 
convinced that Mr Wille did not feel bound by the Liechtenstein 
                                                            
16 Quotation from the Prince’s letter. 
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Constitution. In these circumstances, he would be failing in his duties 
as head of State if he were to appoint Mr Wille as President of the 
Administrative Court. After the Prince’s decision, Mr. Wille 
appealed to the ECtHR.17 
The Court stated that the Prince violated Mr. Wille’s right to 
free expression declared by Article 10 of ECHR. After the 
declaration of the violation of Article 10, the Court dealt with the 
right to effective remedy declared in Article 13. The ECtHR 
examined the Liechtenstein statute law – especially the Constitution 
– and case law of the Constitutional Court and appointed that there 
was no effective national remedy against the decision of the Prince.18 
The ECtHR knew the discretional character of the Prince’s 
decision and the nature of the Prince’s legal status but the Court did 
not let to fault the defence of the ECHR. What is more the Court 
examined rules of the constitution, which are situated on the highest 
level of the national legal system. 
Hence, the Wille-case – mutatis mutandis – should be 
instructive for the Hungarian Parliament’s autonomy because it 
shows that exercising discretional competences does not mean an 
exception of the right to the effective remedy. 
3.3. Prohibition of discrimination 
Maybe it is the hardest challenge to forecast the Court’s decision on 
the breach of Article 14. The Parliament’s operation is based on the 
contradiction of the governmental and oppositional factions. Since 
parliaments are political entities this type of contradiction must be 
political, too. In such an environment the discrimination on political 
belief is unavoidable. On the other hand there is the legal demand of 
the president’s and speaker’s impartiality: the speaker shall rule the 
plenary sessions impartially and president shall exercise its 
competences impartially, too.19 It means that they shall apply the 
same way the rules on interpellation and discipline law to the 
governmental and oppositional MPs. Aside from the rejection of the 
                                                            
17 The case’s facts were based on articles 6-22 of the Court’s judgement. 
18 Paragraphs 71-78 of the Court’s judgement. 
19 Parliament Act Art. 2. para. (2) point f) and Art. 3. para. (1). 
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interpellation – which is the sole competence of the President – 
disciplinary measures (imposing fines) are applied by the plenary 
session, the President shall only suggest the application of a measure. 
Due to the principle of free mandate, there shall be no legal demand 
for the vote of an MP, what is more, an MP can be partial – therefore 
nobody can enforce an “impartial” “non-discriminative” decision 
from the plenary session.  
In the second section of the ECtHR’s process the Court asked in 
all three cases whether “only opposition members were subjected to 
disciplinary measures and restrictions due to the content of their 
statements?” It shows that the Court will back away from its former 
decision, because in Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (No. 1.) 
the Court declared that the fact, that no sanction was taken against 
another subject – which is in a similar situation – is not sufficient 
evidence of constituting of discrimination.20 This case is really 
important for us, because this declaration was made concerning 
discrimination on the ground of political affiliation, in breach of 
Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 10. 
The question of the Court creates a difficult situation for the 
Government because no governmental MP was subjected to 
disciplinary measures. Does it mean at once that the Parliament’s 
practice of disciplinary law is discriminative? As if the Court does 
not pay attention to the chance that governmental MPs did not 
commit any disciplinary fault. 
It is worthy to note that the reception of the complaints show 
that the prohibition of discrimination is a general demand which shall 
be applied in the field of parliamentary law – despite of the principle 
of free mandate. 
                                                            
20 “The fact that no steps were taken against other newspapers, for example 
the Daily Mail, is not sufficient evidence that the injunction granted against 
Times Newspapers Ltd. constituted discrimination contrary to Article 14 
(Art. 14).” Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (No. 1.) Paragraph 71. 
Avaliable at: HUDOC Database of the ECtHR: http://hudoc.echr. 
coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx#{%22fulltext%22:[%22sunday%20time
s%20v%20United%20Kingdom%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-57584 %2 
2]} [cit. 2014-03-27]. See also: GRÁD – WELLER: op. cit. 677. 
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4. SUMMARY 
The role of international law in constitutional law is really 
questionable, and in the field of parliamentary law is much more 
doubtful, because parliaments are both political and legal entities and 
therefore their operation is special. Despite of these the Court seems 
to apply the “general” requirements to the parliamentary operation, 
leastways Castells v. Spain and Wille v. Liechtenstein cases point to 
this direction. Furthermore the question that the Court asked in the 
Hungarian cases also shows that the Court is disposed to put across 
the demand of the prohibition of discrimination, too.  
Summing up all the facts and conclusions listed above, it seems 
that the ECtHR may become the strongest restrictor of the Hungarian 
Parliament – and therefore each national parliament of the member 
states of ECHR – several complaints concerning parliamentary law 
were admitted by ECtHR and it shows the importance of the 
international law’s effect on the national parliaments’ autonomy. I 
think that the three complaints from Hungary will also strengthen the 
influence of the Court to the operation of the national parliaments. 
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State and its Defence as Historical Constellation –
Thoughts on the Historical Improvement of Modern 
States’ Armed Defence with Regards to Carl 
Schmitt’s Tropes of Total State and Total War 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The – more and more intervening – state of nowadays is in a strong 
constraint of institutionalization, especially in the field of defence. 
During the last one and a half – two decades states’ defence has 
undergone significant changes and especially intense differentiation. 
Of course, one cannot forget that utilizing the above mentioned ones, 
threat and danger-types have significantly changed compared to 
earlier times. All these have to be treated in a way that solutions have 
to correspond to the condition system of the rule of law, and modern 
states and societies with their defence reaction shall not violate those 
principles and criteria which protection they shall perform. 
This institutionalization constraint concerns every state. It 
concerns those who previously had sophisticated, or at least well-
structured defence system, and those who previously did not really 
                                                            
1 The study exclusively presents the writer’s point of view; those cannot be 
regarded as standpoints of the institution where the writer is employed. 
The writer’s research was conducted among the frames of the National 
Program of Excellence – a convergence program, an important project for 
developing and operating a system that ensures personal support for 
national students and researchers; identification nr. TÁMOP-4.2.4.A/2-
11/1-2012-0001. The project is being realized with the support of the 
European Union, with the European Social Fund’s co-financing.  
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have differentiated defence system. In the case of Hungary, the 
differentiation of the state’s armed defence became stronger at the 
end of the 19th century, and together with shorter or longer periods of 
silence, it went on until the end of the 20th century,2 and was 
strengthened by a newer transformational, re-imaginational 
tendency3 during the last few years. 
However, these changes happened and have been happening in 
such a way that first at the turn of the 19-20th century, then at the turn 
of the 20-21st century it could again be said that states’ defence and 
their intervening nature caused serious counter-feelings with regards 
to principles and budget, too. On the one hand, their bases are given 
by the extremes of the 20th century; on the other hand, people – and 
legal science – only deal with the importance of defence when it is 
already too late. Armed defence institutions become important when 
not preparation and prevention, but reaction is needed because the 
attack against the state and society has already happened.  
This tendency was strengthened by the endeavours of the 
market-centred neoliberal age which intended to lay off the state and 
– besides great powers – its interfering ability. We can say that this 
neoliberal ethos has already failed by now, and unfortunately besides 
                                                            
2 Were formed in this period: (1) Besides the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy’s 
common army, the Imperial and Royal army as military and police force; 
(2) gendarmerie, as half-military protection of law and order. Individual (3) 
(state) police, (4) custom service, (5) border police then border service and 
(6) various exploratory and preventive bodies started to develop these times. 
Besides, existing institutions also started to reorganize or differentiate, 
especially in the 20th century. Such were (7) guards, (8) directly elected 
chamber guards, and (9) slowly organizing political polices, then 
institutionalized secret services. 
3 Besides renaming and restructuring various secret services, the Counter 
Terrorism Centre, and the independent National Protective Service of the 
Police was formed in the previous years in order to accomplish anti-
corruption tasks. Besides these, regarding historical traditions as priority, 
Guard of the National Assembly of Hungary was set up to protect 
legislation. 
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economic events its failure was accompanied by such attacks as the 
terror attacks and cyber-crimes at the beginning of the 21st century.  
In spite of these, I still believe that the re-imagination of defence 
and intervention has only started in an ambivalent way and the fact 
that the historical and theoretical analysis of defence shows 
insufficiencies plays a significant part in it. Hence, in this study I 
intend to review the improvement of states’ armed defence from 
historical and theoretical point of view, referring to Carl Schmitt’s 
topes on total state and total war. I trust that the analysis of historical 
improvement can shed light on new ideas and findings, and these 
will be able to support the actual reform and strengthening of states’ 
defence apparatus. 
2. STATE MODELS AND HISTORICAL DYNAMICS 
Our historical experiences show that significant historical changes 
and turning points rewrote our picture and concepts of state from 
time to time. This change is followed by political and legal sciences 
via working out state models.  
The focal point of model change is the change in power. Change 
in the method of practising the power and among those who possess 
power, gradually alters the structure of politics and state, and 
together with this legal regulation, which has significant structural 
and functional impacts on states’ defence system, too. 
Studying this is significant from multiple points of view. On the 
one hand, power shifts are of cyclic nature and did not cease together 
with the end of the cold war, which is well presented by the liberal 
power change which caught privatisation revolution to life and its 
failure.4 On the other hand, adequate historical interpretation is by all 
                                                            
4 This also defines our present for instance via making it possible to 
outsource certain national functions of violence to the private sector. I 
believe that this is such a change in a state’s armed defence which partly 
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means necessary to properly interpret, and for the future, to rethink 
these processes and the main problems of the question of armed 
defence in general. However, as a starting point we also have to 
rethink the relation between state and violence, and the historical 
improvement of national violence.  
Defining the concept of state is an especially diverse and 
polemic question. Still, I personally believe that the concept of the 
state has such an element, which stands beyond all disputes. This is 
being the legalized and institutionalized violence. This was the most 
plastically portrayed by Max Weber as the monopoly of legitimate 
physical violence. However, it can be seen that political-military 
fight and together with it violence is a historically immanent part of 
the state,5 hence, the state is unimaginable without violence and 
processes of threat via constraint. It would be ideal and necessary 
that states’ basis was not violence, but everyday reality requires this 
base, which has been justified by philosophical views on humans and 
human society from ancient times until present day.  
Hence, from institutional and anthropological point of view, 
violence is a basic conceptual element of states. The state maintains 
society’s order with its threatening authorities that apply violence, 
hence, with justified and legal violence. We could also say that states 
use qualified violence in order to fight against illegal violence 
attacking their society. Hence, states’ situation is paradox: violence 
is at the same time, reason and consequence of their existence, of 
course, not in identical quality, nature and extent. 
On the basis of this, we can justify the following statement: 
armed bodies are the national existence’s most basic self-maintained 
                                                                                                                              
sacrificed legal improvement’s certain innovations on the altar of unsure 
budget advantages and political aims. 
5 This is partly justified Braudel’s thought: It is indeed a wonderful history 
which is strongly connected to people’s work, and to the really slow 
advancement achieved in connection with outer atmosphere and fight 
against themselves. See BRAUDEL, FERNAND: A kapitalizmus dinamikája 
[The Dynamics of Capitalism], 2008, Európa Könyvkiadó, Budapest. 
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and defence institutions; with which states are able to stop unlimited 
and arbitrary violence, let it be external or internal nature. 
Qualified national violence practised by those armed institutions 
that became fundamental via this way changes through the course of 
history, especially regarding states’ power analysis. In inglorious 
historical times states’ bodies of violence overstep their original 
tasks and become arbitrary. Its reason is that national bodies of 
violence are closely related to the respective power constellation and 
in many historical changes they transmit the replaced old system’s 
practice simply with altered indication, to the command of the new 
order.6 It also comes from this that the state, more exactly the state 
model’s change always goes hand in hand with the changes of 
national violence apparatus and qualified violence. We could also 
say that without the change of national bodies of violence and 
qualified violence historical change of an era cannot be imaginable. 
This statement is supported by the fact that modern states and 
war also became total. States’ armed bodies first were nothing else 
but armies used to maintain inner order, mainly carrying out 
offensive violence. With time, institutional dimension of national 
violence differentiated, and besides armies purely protective bodies 
were formed. However, emphasis was for a long time laid on 
offensive characteristics. The great change was brought about in the 
19-20th century, when nations’ offensive nature turned towards 
defensive behaviour, then, by the end of the 20th century defence 
became the primary function. For the great change, two significant 
elements were needed in the context of historical improvement, 
                                                            
6 Quoting Francois Furet – Quinet’s thoughts – referring to the French 
revolution he emphasizes that violence has accompanied transformation all 
the way through and it is only by whom and how violence is used that 
changes …revolution in the phase of terror, uses absolutism’s authoritarian 
practice with the well-tries excuse, which also made good service at times 
of absolute monarchy. Heirs automatically step in the place of ancestors: in 
the person of Robespierre Richelieu reborn. See FURET, FRANCOIS: A 
forradalomról [About the Revolution], 2006, Európa Kiadó, Budapest. 
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which Schmitt’s political theory described with the formula of states’ 
becoming total and the tot war. Their combined effect was what 
rewrote states’ armed defence, and upon which we ought to ask the 
following question: is defence total? 
3. ARMED DEFENCE AS HISTORICAL CONSTELLATION 
Armed defence bodies of a state and their ability can be regarded as a 
sensitive question in politics and political and legal sciences, as 
numerous historical examples are known regarding powerful national 
armed bodies’ degradation. However, we must not forget: defence 
apparatus – in many cases – became dangerous when politics and via 
it national decision-making and operation failed, as well. 
With regards to states’ armed defence system, the oldest 
institution is undoubtedly the army, which most stronger and stabile 
form was a well-trained, optimal number ‘professional’ force even in 
the early centuries of history.7 This variant’s early, most improved 
version was given by the Roman army who followed the Mariam 
reforms. This model was formed with the crisis of the republic, when 
those processes already became visible which led to the total 
transformation of states. The reform of the army originated from the 
intensification of social problems and the erosion of the political 
system’s processes that strengthened each other, which, with the 
growing need for expansion, lead the Roman state to civil war, then 
to the monopoly of power and imperial existence. 
At this point, with regards to ‘professional’ Roman legions, 
political philosophies’ significance must be emphasized. One 
example is Plato’s theory described in his work, entitled State. In this 
work condition of stability, professional nature and adequate number 
                                                            
7 Peter Harclerode regards the Assyrian army dated back to 1250 BC., then 
following those Greek continental groups as one of the first ones. See 
HARCLERODE, PETER: A háború eszközei [The Instruments of War], 2002, 
Magyar Könyvklub, Budapest, 9-10. 
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can be found.8 I believe that Plato’s thoughts, as soon as with 
Grecian mediation were partly realized in the Roman army, vivified 
history’s most well-known and most significant army, giving new 
meaning to imperial conception and to the age of empires. 
Together with the fall of the Roman Empire this knowledge 
became overshadowed9 for a long time. Avoiding the expression of 
the “Dark Ages” it can surely be said that well-organized, permanent, 
regular forces were overshadowed for a while. The time of military 
democracies10 was followed by the age of warrior nobles11 known as 
                                                            
8 The concept of permanent defence forces can be shown in his views 
regarding guards and the exact expectations referring to them. Regarding 
“professional” nature, he writes that everyone shall have one profession, 
then thinks it further under title “Defence of states’ area: professional 
armies”. Here, he emphasizes that guards have soldiering as their 
profession, their only profession. We can find assistance on these forces’ 
adequate size under title “What size should a state be?” and under title 
“war”. In these commentaries he says that a state’s size is determined by its 
ability to maintain unity: it can only be that size with which it is still unite. 
Nevertheless, the state – taking all possibilities into consideration – must 
possess a ready-to-fight, permanent army, which pre-condition besides 
adequate preparation are: worked-out training, education and organization. 
PLATON: Az állam [The State], 2008, Cartaphilus Kiadó, Budapest, 65-78., 
92-93., 103-107., 132-141., 201-209., 249-254. 
9 For Europe, the most well-known and feared exception from this tendency 
was the Turkish Empire’s army with janissaries.  
10 On the institution of military democracy Morgan H. Lewis’s views can be 
regarded as decisive, which is also regarded as significant according to 
domestic history of law. Its essential is that – not only regarding nomad 
peoples – it is based on the majority principle of actual power, most of 
which consists of armed, soldiering men who ensure their people’s 
existence through various great military ventures. See LEWIS, MORGAN H.: 
Ancient society, 1877, Charles H. Kerr & Company, Chicago. 
11 As this is also explained in connection with Hungary in Werbőczy’s 
Tripartitium in thoughts on nobility’s origin. See Werbőczy István 
hármaskönyve [Tripartitum], 2006, Farkas Lőrincz Imre Kiadó, Budapest, 
73-74. 
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the nation’s offspring, then noble armies,12 but mostly the 
periodically employed mercenaries’ age. Then the institution of 
mercenaries – together with the cerebral rediscovering of Rena-
issance – extorted the re-imagination of the state and its defence 
system.  
Niccolo Machiavelli can be regarded as a significant thinker in 
this period, who, besides modern political philosophy, wrote nume-
rous significant writings in connection with protection of states – in a 
perhaps derogatory forgotten way. Machiavelli wrote disapprovingly 
about mercenaries13 in his work, entitled The Prince, and emphasized 
that “no principality is secure without having its own forces; it is 
entirely dependent on good fortune, not having the valour which in 
adversity would defend it.”14 Additionally, a unique and again 
                                                            
12 If we also look at the political transformations that stand behind the 
change of army-model, change is clearly understandable. After the fall of 
the Roman Empire Europe became wandering people’s road and battlefield, 
in which state-social system armed men as political nation form the army. 
After settling down, this model cannot be held onto with the lack of 
movement and threat, and because of the urge to produce. Together with the 
material and political differentiation of society armed nobility became the 
base of armies, which status interest was to maintain its influence that is 
status quo through soldiering. And when the improvement of production 
and technology, and population increase made it necessary and reasonable, 
direct nobility soldiering was replaced by armies. Mercenaries made them 
stop because of two reasons. On the one hand, the strengthening of the 
ruler’s power opened way to professional mercenaries against nobility 
armies that undermined power, on the other hand, noble’s power endeavors 
raised the significance of rentable army-knowledge. 
13 “Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds 
his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for they 
are disunited, ambitious and without discipline, unfaithful, valiant before 
friends, cowardly before enemies; they have neither the fear of God nor 
fidelity to men, and destruction is deferred only so long as attack is; for in 
peace one is robbed by them, and in war by the enemy.” See MACHIAVELLI, 
NICCOLO: A fejedelem [The Prince], 2006, Cartaphilus Kiadó, Budapest, 61. 
14 MACHIAVELLI: op. cit. (2006) 71. 
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misunderstood thinker in his work written to Lorenzo de’ Medici 
carefully described that he can only regard am army recruited from 
his own people, citizens, subject as his strength, and everything else 
is just army of mercenaries or assistant army,15 which significant 
application shall be avoided. In his work written on the art of war he 
overstepped the analysis of defence force on the part of building 
power. He wrote down basic – superior to his age – views on the 
importance and regulation of armies,16 and also on their employment 
in wars. Of course, these were not fully realized for centuries; still, 
they signalled the innovation that replaced mercenaries. 
The turning point started in the 17-18th century, when the 
Europe of absolute monarchies started to replace mercenaries with 
permanent armies. Maybe in this context as well we can say that the 
year of 1648, the Peace of Westphalia is a key element – though, not 
without antecedents.17 Besides the age of nation states, it opened the 
                                                            
15 Ibid. 71. 
16 Its example can be found in the introductory thoughts written in his work, 
entitled The Art of War as he writes down his specific, even today advisable 
and suitable for reception thoughts on the relation between civil and 
military life, and on the importance of rules. As he says: “But if they should 
consider the ancient institutions, they would not find matter more united, 
more in conformity, and which, of necessity, should be like to each other as 
much as these (civilian and military); for in all the arts that are established 
in a society for the sake of the common good of men, all those institutions 
created to (make people) live in fear of the laws and of God would be in 
vain, if their defense had not been provided for and which, if well arranged, 
will maintain not only these, but also those that are not well established. 
And so (on the contrary), good institutions without the help of the military 
are not much differently disordered than the habitation of a superb and regal 
palace, which, even though adorned with jewels and gold, if it is not roofed 
over will not have anything to protect it from the rain.” MACHIAVELLI, 
NICCOLO: A háború művészete [The Art of War], 2001, Szukits Kiadó, 
Szeged, 6. 
17 For instance in Hungarian relation – just like in various European states – 
transformation of armies had already been considered at the end of the 16th 
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first era of the new organization of armies finishing with the Great 
French Revolution. “In order to protect political power it became 
necessary and was sufficient to have an army which was kept armed 
even at times of peace, which was greater in number, much more 
armed and supplied, providing primary support for the central 
power. Hence, its presence characterized European defence in the 
given one and a half centuries.”18 
That time, Great European nations started to reorganize their 
armies following the model of French absolutism. “Regarding 
Habsburg rulers’ politics, the end of the XVII. and the beginning of 
the XVIII. century meant the transition from an army used according 
to momentarily needs to an army formed according to coherent 
basis.”19 However, it did not happen otherwise among great powers 
and empires defining that certain age, either. For instance, Prussia, 
Europe’s soldier state put on its “new clothes” at that time,20 as 
defence revolution appeared in Sweden and slowly in Russia, too. 
                                                                                                                              
century. “The country’s desperate state made legislative bodies finally think 
and act. And really, parliaments’ activities between the ages of 1593-1604 
did left results and traces. The thought of national permanent army was 
formed then, and after a century a new army was formed from the seed.” 
BORS, JÁNOS: Az állandó hadsereg kérdése Magyarországon 1593-tól 1715-
ig [The Questions of a Regular Army in Hungary between 1593 and 1715], 
in Hadtörténelmi Közlemények, No. 8. (1895) 98. 
18 ZACHAR, JÓZSEF: Habsburg-uralom, állandó hadsereg és magyarság 
1683-1792 [Habsburg Domination, Regular Army and Hungarians 1683-
1792], 2004, Zrínyi Kiadó, Budapest, 9. 
19 SZABÓ, DEZSŐ: Az állandó hadsereg beczikkelyezésének története III. 
Károly korában [The History of the Regulation of the Regular Army III. In 
the Age of Charles], in Hadtörténelmi Közlemények, No. 11. (1910) 23. 
20 Regiments’ >>nationalization<< – as we can call previous mercenary 
paradises’ cease – were done during the time of the first Prussian king…” 
writes Ottokeinz on the formation of Prussian military state and Prussian 
defense. ROCHOL, OTTOHEINZ: Az állandó hadsereg mint a feudális reakció 
támasza [The Regular Army as the Support of the Feudal Reaction], in 
Hadtörétnelmi Közlemények, No. 3-4., (1954) 134. 
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Together with the formation of permanent armies, their 
technical and military training brought about a new revolution in the 
age. Empires’ armies underwent other significant changes. Training, 
discipline, mechanic tactics and making artillery as an art brought 
such changes that warfare of the 18th century did not remind to the 
chaos of war, to the age of experimentation in the 16th and 17th 
centuries.21 These times gave the opening of an era in which 
Clausewitz’s views on war became fundamental, and which was only 
parted from the age of total war’s era with the lack of extreme 
emotional badinage.  
The 18th century’s permanent armies – maybe we can say that 
after Rome, again – vivified a new social layer and a new profession 
which were not less or not more than the elements with special status 
of absolute monarchies’ centralized state apparatus. These armies 
were the nature of empires, mostly mixed nationalities, and their 
functioning was only the interest of the empire. 
After the organizational replacement of mercenaries, then the 
inner restructuring of forces it was another turning point that the pay-
centred old … was replaced with something else. And this new was 
nothing else but the ideal of national armies. It came the era of 
national armies, revealing together with the French Revolution then 
with Napoleon’s armies, moving towards general national service. In 
this, soldiers were taken over not only by pay, discipline and 
existential opportunities, but also by emotional feelings towards their 
own nation and by the dedication coming from this.22 
                                                            
21 KEEGAN, JOHN: A hadviselés története [The History of Belligerency], 
2004, Corvina Kiadó, Budapest, 338. 
22 The model’s base was laid down by Napoleon, when besides permanent 
and professional army he called French people to war on the principles of 
volunteering then compulsory military service for the cause of the nation 
and accomplished “regular army and National Guard’s unites’ merge into 
one brigade in two to one proportion in order to increase volunteers’ 
number with professional soldiers. Hence, a completely new army was 
formed.” See KEEGAN: op. cit. 343. From this type of army a permanent 
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Afterwards, by the end of the 19th century, nationalism became 
integrated in Europe’s nation states, and even great powers operating 
as empires – like the English Crown or the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy – within imperial defence became open towards the partly 
national-principled organisation of armies,23 and towards the partial 
acceptation of nations’ endeavours to do so. Concerning our topic, to 
this temporal picture covering the whole of Europe we must add that 
European states growing nationalism naturally fed militarism, 
successes of imperialist politics fed nationalism.24 
Hence, the (nation) state of the beginning of the 20th century, 
from military point of view rose as the result of a long improvement, 
and showed something new: national army and defence monopoly 
based on the civil era’s general national service. However, by that 
time it was not only the warfare that had been transformed but the 
state itself, too. As nodes of the national defence’s improvements 
that I have previously presented all coincided with the key-points of 
the nation’s improvement and change. Its 20th century culmination is 
what brought new in quality in the whole of the nation’s 
phenomenon system; those two phenomena which were marked by 
Carl Schmitt as total state and total war. 
4. TOTAL STATE AND TOTAL WAR ON THE PAGES OF HISTORY 
Hence, total state is implicitly the result of historical improvement. 
This model is the state which was formed by the end of the 19th and 
                                                                                                                              
national armies’ need and age and the nation and war’s total transformation 
was only one step away – an episode rich in revolutions and neoabsolutist 
endeavors. 
23 Besides mutual army, Hungarian Royal Army and Landwehr’s formation 
exemplified this in the Monarchy, while in the case of the British Monarchy 
it is worth commemorating on the organization of national and colonial 
formations. 
24 KEEGAN: op. cit. 349. 
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the beginning of the 20th century, which has its roots in centralizing 
and professionalizing absolutist state, and also which replaced 
previous census, classifying liberal schemes that restricted social 
subsystems. In this new model “The equation state = politics 
becomes erroneous and deceptive at exactly the moment when state 
and society penetrate each other. What had been up to that point 
affairs of state became thereby social matters, and, vice versa, what 
had been purely social matters become affairs of state-as must 
necessarily occur in a democratically organized unit.”25 
Hence, total states’ base is the democratizing modern nation 
state, which has to live together with the empires and the empirical 
thought, and which is at the same time also a living opposition to 
empires. I personally believe that this democratizing nation state 
model was a necessary consequence of all those historical 
improvements which undermined empires on the level of society. 
However, we also have to see that this kind of state’s totality lies in 
that “A definition of the political can be obtained only by discovering 
and defining the specifically political categories. In contrast to the 
various relatively independent endeavours of human thought and The 
Concept of the Political action, particularly the moral, aesthetic, and 
economic, the political has its own criteria which express themselves 
in a characteristic way. The political must therefore rest on its own 
ultimate distinctions, to which all action with a specifically political 
meaning can be traced.”26 
Hence, the state with its own power and model change – as 
action – necessarily went through the same path as protection and 
defence – as reaction. Their modern improvement really started with 
the centralization of absolutism, then gained real followings with 
nationalization and decentralization, and finally, by the beginning of 
the 20th century a new, comprehensive, so to say covering 
everything, hence, total model was realized. 
                                                            
25 SCHMITT, CARL: A politikai fogalma [The Concept of the Political], 2002, 
Osiris – Pallas Studio – Attraktor, Budapest, 16. 
26 Ibid. 16. 
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In total states – where a completely new, trained, permanent, 
loyal, professional armed violence apparatus is given – nearly all 
questions are of political nature with which national intervention’s 
area is also significantly widened. Schmitt also highlights that it is 
the state’s competency – in order to protect itself – to determine who 
is considered as friend and enemy, and how to proceed with the latter 
one. However, this competency’s realization requires inevitable 
increase in one’s defence system when most questions become of 
political nature, and dangerous behaviours belonging to the enemy 
can appear in most social subsystem. This can lead to the functional 
and structural differentiation of the armed violence’s apparatus, as 
different proceedings shall be applied with inner and outer enemies, 
hence, differently trained and equipped bodies are necessary. 
As Schmitt says: “The endeavour of a normal state consists 
above all in assuring total peace within the state and its territory. To 
create tranquillity, security, and order and thereby establish the 
normal situation is the prerequisite for legal norms to be valid.”27 
However, a total state has to create such a structure for this which is 
suitable for fulfilling all these requirements. This also goes together 
not only with the above mentioned differentiation but also with the 
re-imagination of tools, which already became enabled to outgrow 
the total state itself with decisions made in the political zone. In this 
view, we must mention internment which started as protectional 
isolation, parallel partisan methods of fighting and war that became 
total.  
Armed activities’ omnipresent nature and asymmetric warfare’s 
new age as direct preview of the total war appeared at the end of the 
19th century, together with total – English, Spanish, German, French, 
etc. – states. In this age warfare happened between those countries 
whose armies could not be compared to each other. Its classic 
example was the colonial wars, described in Schmitt’s classify-
                                                            
27 SCHMITT: op. cit. (2002) 31. 
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cation.28 Here, irregular partisans staying away from classic war 
scenes, supported by civil citizens fought against colonial armies in 
order to obstruct and democratize colonial armies. 
However, the support of civil citizens necessarily expands war 
to civil citizens themselves, which, in the early times was realized in 
“safety” measures and called the institution of internal camps to 
life.29 Hence, with this, war leaves behind its former classic nature 
and expands to the previously militarily directly not involved 
atmosphere, the civil citizens, which means nothing else than the first 
step towards total war.30 
However, at this point I must highlight the fact that they 
strengthened unknown – and by nowadays diverse and strengthened 
– forms in the asymmetric warfare of nations and armies, one of 
which is partisan31 warfare. This is nothing else but counter-effect on 
the warfare expanded to civil citizens.  
                                                            
28 In Schmitt’s work written on partisan theory he differentiated classic 
European – as today we would say symmetric – interstate war; civil war; 
and colonial war. See SCHMITT: op. cit. (2002) 109-110. 
29 Regarding these, referring to Joël Kotek and Pierre Rigoulot’s work we 
have to note that internal camps were formed well after real totalitarian war 
and totalitarianisms, and even well after these – today – they exist. See 
KOTEK, JOEL – RIGOULOT, PIERRE: A táborok évszázada. Fogva tartás, 
koncentrálás, megsemmisítés a radikális bűn száz éve [The Century of the 
Camps], 2005, Nagyvilág Kiadó, Budapest. 
30 Of course, we cannot negate that it had already been occurred that civil 
society suffered wars in the form of looting and other insults, however, the 
tendency appearing together with the end of the 19th century - what are 
realized as internal camps the most plastically – strongly differ from these 
phenomena, as on the one hand it means systematic interfere, on the other, 
hand armies realize these as part of military strategy.  
31 Carl Schmitt fully discusses this question in this work entitled Theory of 
Partisan, in which he historically introduces then compares theoretical 
approach of war positions this to phenomenon, presenting its notional origin 
and theoretical improvement. 
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One of the most well-known manifestations of partisan warfare 
in history was the Spanish resistance against Napoleon’s armies. 
Schmitt as well starts his investigation from here, which is especially 
understandable if we take those notes into consideration according to 
which less than fifty thousand guerrillas could tie down more than 
twenty-five thousand regular soldiers on that area. 
What characterized this form? Most simply it was being outside 
of the law as classic international law did not recognize partisans as 
warfare parties, hence, in their relations institutions restricting 
modern wars did not prevail. It therefore follows what Schmitt 
correctly noted: “The modern partisan expects neither justice nor 
mercy from his enemy. He has turned away from the conventional 
enmity of the contained war and given himself up to another – the 
real – enmity that rises through terror and counter-terror, up to 
annihilation.”32 
Together with the existence and especially with the spread of 
partisans two things must be noted. On the one hand, to the fact that 
they stood outside of the law and to that the actual feud heightening 
until annulment as Schmitt clearly described resulted in total 
resistance which did not know limits and conventions, only 
efficiency and reaching the wished result. On the other hand, we also 
have to pay attention to that in historical examples nations could not 
efficiency act against partisans, which gave area to that view which 
referring to Napoleon’s command to Lefévre general in September 
1813 states that: “you have to fight like a partisan wherever there 
are partisans”.33 
This latter one, as a base of reference, with no doubt means that 
against partisans wars leave their previous processes, that is, with the 
gradual totalization of wars nations’ system of tools was widened in 
a way that with this a nation’s armed character was necessarily 
strengthened as specially trained forces were needed in this armies, 
in defence and in political advert, as well. 
                                                            
32 SCHMITT: op. cit. (2002) 109. 
33 Ibid. 111. 
State and its Defence as Historical Constellation – Thoughts on the 
Historical Improvement of Modern States’ Armed Defence with Regards to 
Carl Schmitt’s Tropes of Total State and Total War 
55 
However, the situation is different in the case of total war. As 
long as total states stepped out as a result of a few centuries’ 
historical improvement – we could also say that as a result of 
democratization – total war was nothing else but the result of a series 
of decisions made in the area of politics formed in a few decades, of 
which only partial historical pre-improvement can be discovered.34 
The picture of total war appears in places where in order to tackle 
armed resistance civil citizens are also involved in direct martial 
operations.35 It therefore explicitly comes that: 
1. the meaning of differentiation between hinterland and 
battlefield ceases to exist; 
2. and wars are fought on the ground, in the air and on water at 
the same time, forgetting about civil participants and using 
every resource in order to annihilate the enemy. 
Of course, total war necessarily arose from the revolution of 
defence, from the improvement of technology and also partly from 
the state becoming total. However, we must not forget that their 
exploitation was defined by decisions in the power area of politics, 
hence, by human nature. People of the 20th century threw out a whole 
range of law improvements’ results of the previous centuries for the 
throne of power. Realizations of total war – that is world wars – 
threw away the value of rationality, sophisticated rules of law and 
created wars as games of zero value.  
The realization of total war is a tragedy because of its 
limitations, while from the point of view of law, it is an inductive 
effect. Totalitarianism, which twisted total state and realized total 
war, pointed out numerous guarantee absences in the area of law. 
During the cold war these were slowly – in a lopsided way – 
                                                            
34 Theoretical and practical modes of war’ improvement against partisans 
from the end of the 18th until the 20th century can be listed here. See 
SCHMITT: op. cit. (2002) 124-162. 
35 This period, as I have already mentioned it in connection with camps, 
starts with the end of the 19th century. Previously, example can only be 
found in tools of terror against wars with partisans. 
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supplied by the states. By nowadays these are improved legal 
guarantees and the whole spectrum of rule of law what grew out of 
disgraceful historical experiences. However, history produces newer 
and newer open questions, among which there are the anticipation of 
an outbreak of a new total war and the strengthening of strange forms 
coming from asymmetric warfare (partisanism, guerrilla activity, 
terrorism, etc…) as factors forcing defence’s continuous renewal and 
re-imagination. 
5. TOTAL STATE – TOTAL DEFENCE? 
When interpreting Schmitt’s total state and total war, we have to 
investigate their relation to each other in order to find the answer to 
the following question: Does totalitarian state have total defence, 
too? 
As I have previously highlighted, from political point of view 
there are no “neutral” questions in a total state, hence, the nation’s 
political nature covers every relation. Besides, total war means 
nothing else but that war goes on in every possible area and coming 
from its nature, the hinterland-battlefield duality loses its importance, 
and every possible resource is needed to be used in order to win. 
Referring to the latest challenges we can say that resistance and 
attacks against states and societies have become total, hence, it uses 
every tool – civil and military as well – and expands to every 
conditions of life. The question is open: how can total state and total 
war be connected besides those wars are fought by the states. 
It is Schmitt himself who provides answer to this question in 
relation to sovereignty when he notes that “Sovereign is he who 
decides on the exception”.36 The unique condition’s institution is 
what connects total state with total war, and which also opens ways 
                                                            
36 SCHMITT, CARL: Politikai teológia [Political Theology], 1992, Az ELTE 
Állam- és Jogtudományi Kar TEMPUS Összehasonlító Jogi Kultúrák 
projektumának kiadványa, Budapest, 1. 
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towards the question of total defence. From historical perspective, 
unique condition is nothing else but a period in a nation’s life which 
goes together with interstate war, civil war or expanded confusion, 
suspends normal – peacetime – legal order’s rules and makes the 
introduction of special legal order necessary in order to quickly and 
effectively neutralize threat. 
Hence, total war itself is a unique condition, the majority and 
the origin of armed defensive organizations’ that came to life as a 
result of long historical improvement are connected to this 
institution, and most of these are meant for carrying out attacks.37 
However, this period, as its name suggests, too, is unique, and it is 
foreseeable – especially in view of modern differentiation of a 
nation’s armed organizations of violence – that institutions organized 
to handle these cannot function in normal conditions or only very 
restrictively. 
Hence, states always need bodies guaranteeing the application 
of qualified violence, hence, such institutions’ maintenance and 
operation is necessary under normal condition as well, however, with 
mostly protectional functions. Their task is to identify, anticipate, 
avert and neutralize attacks. Without these, guaranteeing a normal 
state’s performance would be impossible, that is maintaining 
satisfaction, order, safety and peace. 
However, determining what can be considered as attack in 
normal condition is a political question, and as we know, there are no 
politically neutral ones in a total state. Therefore, in a total state in 
case of normal condition total defence functions, which, regarding 
political identification of attacks, their anticipation, avert and 
neutralization is total, covers every aspect, as it can apply adequate 
activity in every possible relation adhering to legal order. 
This preposition can be especially justified these days when 
historical improvement has completely modified the range of attacks. 
Nowadays, those are not classic, symmetric interstate wars that mean 
                                                            
37 Which is even true if a war starts with an attack as very likely the 
indispensable counter-attack is by no doubt an attacking behavior.  
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the most dangerous attack factor in state relations but international 
terrorism, arms trade, international organized crime, failed nations 
and cyber-threats. In their – many times interrelated – danger zone 
defence has to operate in a new way, which mode simultaneously 
ensures the best possible effect rate in the protection of citizens and 
the justice of legal nation. 
These forms of threat – even if such tendency can be found in 
world politics – cannot be identified with times of war as their 
realizers usually cannot be substituted in the role scheme of interstate 
or civil war, moreover, these are mostly internal security questions 
which are realized not mainly as permanent, systematic and open 
hostility but as hardly localizable and identifiable, sparse attacks. 
New threats abuse guarantees and possibilities provided by normal 
condition, guaranteed legal institutions provided by the normal legal 
order and technical possibilities provided by civil life to the most 
extreme. 
This can only be fought against if the sovereign determines 
action’s way and mode – in a judicious way but with ensuring 
guarantees – in a wide circle and ensures adequate organizational, 
personal and material conditions for it that is, it totalizes defence.  
All in all, I believe that a total state’s defence is total, as all 
mentionable relations and circumstances may gain relevance 
regarding measures, and this tendency is not only justified by the 
nature and historical root of a total state but the age’s challenges, as 
well. Besides, we must not forget that defence institutions have 
significant tasks at the time of special condition as well, and they 
always have to be ready to fulfil these, which needs innovation, 
preparation at times of peace, too. However, total defence does not 
mean that a defence system can be invested with over-power, as 
based on historical experiences it is not the characteristics of a total 
state but of totalitarian regimes.  
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Aspects for the Establishment of More Efficient 
Communications Consumer Protection  
1. INTRODUCTION 
“Those enterprises which make those television programs accessible 
or ensure the usage of telephone or Internet access (that is, so called 
electronic communications service providers) have become integral 
parts of our lives. We cannot really find such consumers in Hungary 
who would not use some kind of electronic communications service, 
hence, consumer protection has an especially significant role in this 
area.”1 
First of all, let us practice some self-criticism: clearly, we 
consume practically everything, especially what is fashionable, 
multifunctional, intelligent/smart (even more than us) broadband or 
is made according to the latest technology. We are as greedy as 
uninformed and incautious, hence, later (to a great extent) 
complainant. “Informed customers” demand is a category repeated 
till boredom in relation to general consumer protection and together 
with it in all of its specific branches. Strategies and projects worked 
out for this objective are mostly high quality and catchy works, 
however, their realization is less developed. More precisely, the 
effect of becoming informed consumers fails to succeed, which main 
reason, I believe, is that there are not any adequate communication 
channels for the information’s transmission. 
With writing this study, my main objective is to call the 
attention to problems and represent the legal relations’ subjects in 
                                                            
1 Electronic communication (telecommunication), http://nfh.hu/magyar/hasz 
nos/hirkozles [cit. 2014-01-01]. 
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their natural light, point out their mistakes and last but not least, find 
appreciable (and effective) solutions. 
Besides that in many cases (contractual) legal relation is already 
wrong at the starting point, during its accomplishment (provision, 
requisitions of services) we can find sources of conflicts and areas of 
injuries. We can mainly trace them in billing disagreements, 
increasing tariffs, quality of services and in their contents, one-sided 
(provider) modification of contracts, terminations, limitation of 
services, handling of complaints, troubleshooting, etc. After the 
inconveniences, the following question comes up: who should 
complainants turn to, through what kind of process can they get 
“gratification”, or which bodies, authorities are entitled to remedy 
consumer complaints? 
Most answers can be found in the legislation, in SCCs (Standard 
Contractual Clauses), therefore, these are not unanswered questions, 
only their public knowledge is missing. Our task is to somehow 
inform the public on this extremely important information and create 
general practices from them such as the application of TANTUSZ-
program, the process which precedes and helps purchase, hence, in 
one word; we need to create informed customers! I would like to 
suggest such strategies which do not regard the above mentioned 
objectives as utopia but with simple and greatly aimed solutions can 
even achieve them! 
However, we must not forget one thing (it may seem obvious 
but still…) consumer protection is mainly intended to create a 
balance system between the market relation’s two parties; the 
consumer and the producer-retailer (in our case, communications 
provider) so that consumers have their optimal decision opportunities 
and their interests are realized in the most efficient way. This 
supportive-assisting function is tried to be carried out with the help 
of education, the right to be informed and the right to legal 
protection, the right to legal remedy and law enforcement,2 however, 
                                                            
2 FAZEKAS, JUDIT: Fogyasztóvédelmi jog, 2007, Complex Kiadó, Budapest, 
71. 
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it always supposes a circumspect, deliberately acting consumer who 
wants to get information. 
2. FOUNDATION 
2.1. Communications and consumer protection – encounter of 
legal areas3 
At first, we have to give a definition to communications as a whole: 
we can understand it as a general definition, a generic term which 
includes various forms of the transmission, storage and processing of 
news and information, hence telecommunications services (including 
public and private, wired and mobile telephones and data transfer), 
radio and television broadcast, program distribution and program 
division and postal services.4 Among the frames of my current study, 
I mainly concentrate on electronic communications, which can be 
defined as the followings: 
Electronic communications service is a service mostly done for 
somebody else for a remuneration, which service fully or partly 
consists of the transmission of signals (signaling, writing, motion, 
sound, etc.) through electronic communications networks5 and where 
                                                            
3 Consumer protection aspects of communications regulation have been 
dealt with since telecommunication act was enacted in 1993, these two 
areas’ mutual set as a special cooperation area is part of the scientific work 
dealing with communications administration – says Koppányi Szabolcs, 
who described the mutual regulation objective and authorities’ way of 
cooperation. See KOPPÁNYI, SZABOLCS: Hírközlési jog az európai 
közösségben és Magyarországon [Communications Law in the European 
Community and in Hungary], 2003, Osiris, Budapest, 326-329. 
4 GERENCSÉR, BALÁZS: Elektronikus kommunikáció [Electronic 
Communication], available at: http://diakvallalkozas.ktk.nyme.hu/INFOM 
AN/comm.html [cit. 2014-01-01]. 
5 Electronic communications networks are such equipment and other 
resources which serve for the controlling of transmission systems and 
signals which make transmission of signals possible between given 
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it is understandable, also of its control.67 The activity ensures the 
transmission of the above mentioned signals8 through electronic 
communications networks to one or more consumers. Regarding its 
essence, it is some kind of a mediator activity.  
Electronic communications services can be divided into three 
big categories: 
1. telephone service (localized to a place – wired and mobile); 
2. radio and television broadcast, program distribution and 
program division; 
3. internet access service. 
The three great mobile phone companies (T-Mobile, Telenor 
and Vodafone) together with cable television companies, companies 
providing satellite broadcast, enterprises providing wired phone and 
internet subscription, furthermore, providers performing IP-based 
(Internet-Protocol)9 telephone service or program distribution10 
belong to the group of the most well-known electronic 
communications providers. 
It marks the importance of cooperation between electronic 
communications and consumer protection that the act on electronic 
communications lists among its key concepts, if not marks the 
protection of consumer interests as the most important issue in 
connection with its relationship held with all members of the 
                                                                                                                              
endpoints through cables, electromagnet way, hence, satellite networks, 
wired and mobile networks below the ground, cable television services. 
6 Act C of 2003 on electronic communications (hereinafter: Eht.) Art. 188. 
para. 13. 
7 Content service or services practicing editorial control on such contents 
and enterprises providing mobile-service and electronic commerce are not 
classified as electronic communications services. 
8 In case of phones sounds, in case of television picture and sounds, in case 
of Internet, volumes of data. 
9 IP is a standard ensuring the communication of intersections connected to 
the Internet (computers, network tools, webcameras, etc.). 
10 Circle of electronic communications services. Available at: http://www. 
nfh.hu/magyar/hasznos/hirkozles/hirkozles_2/hirkozles1.html [cit. 2014-01-
01]. 
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communications market: in relation to the existence of services 
according to entitlement, free choice among services and service 
providers, public visibility of services and resorting to them on the 
smallest available price and highest quality, providing up-to-date 
information and protection of consumers’ interests from service 
providers.11 
The most important body which is responsible for the 
coordination and controlling of communications (and media) – and 
the protection of consumer interests – is the National Media and 
Infocommunications Authority – Hungary (I am going to mention it 
in detail in chapter III on the proceeding authority.) Let us see the 
other half! 
Consumer protection is an emphasized, horizontal area of the 
economic policy and primarily aims at creating balance between 
consumers and sellers of products so that consumers’ rights are 
realized to the fullest possible extent, more precisely, validation of 
consumer interests is ensured in front of manufacturers, retailers and 
service providers.12 The legal area was comprehensively regulated in 
Act CLV of 1997, which, according to the consumer protection 
policy of the European Union, marks those five principles which are 
cardinal points of consumer interests’ protection. These are the 
followings: protection of consumers’ health, safety and economic 
interests, providing information and education for consumers, 
justification of consumer needs and finally, consumer 
representation.13 
Mainly the Hungarian Authority for Consumer Protection 
(HACP) and its regional branches are responsible for carrying out 
                                                            
11 Eht. Art. 2. point b). 
12 Description of consumer protection authority. Available at: http://www 
.nfh.hu/magyar/informaciok/bemutatkozas [cit. 2014-01-01]. 
13 Website of the Ministry of Social Affair and Labor. Available at: 
http://www.szmm.gov.hu/main.php?folderID=1139&articleID=32432&ctag
=articlelist&iid=1 [cit. 2014-01-01]. 
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consumer protection tasks. Among its spheres of competences14 it 
proceeds in frames of other services in case of consumer trespasses 
related to communications services: 
1. operating customer service; 
2. process and handling subscription bill complaints on the side 
of service providers; 
3. bill content; 
4. among regulations referring to information of subscribers 
from service providers. 
The investigation of requirements referring to the content of 
SCCs and unique subscription contracts, the revision of SCCs do not 
belong to HACP’s sphere of competence.15 These tasks are carried 
out by the Department of Communications Supervision of National 
Media and Infocommunications Authority – Hungary (NMIAH), for 
which they sign a cooperation agreement which is annually revised 
by the authorities. 
The increased need of consumer protection is justified by two 
things in the sphere of communications: on the one hand, the 
information asymmetry between the parties, on the other hand, or 
strongly connecting to it, the vulnerability of consumers in the 
following relations: in this sharp market race service providers are 
developing more and more complex, complicated products (roaming 
tariffs), which essence, economic and legal background and possible 
risks (for instance consequences of breaching loyalty contracts) are 
not understandable by general consumers; not transparent pricing and 
costs; inadequate information of consumers (not clearly 
understandable, deliberately misunderstandable information suitable 
for deceit, withholding of risks or simply lack of giving 
                                                            
14 Introducing Hungarian Authority for Consumer Protection, available at: 
http://www.nfh.hu/magyar/informaciok/bemutatkozas [cit. 2014-01-01]. 
15 Consumer Protection Inspectorates’ spheres of competence, available at: 
http://www.nfh.hu/magyar/informaciok/ellenorzes [cit. 2014-01-01]. 
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information).16 Having regard to these circumstances, too, we 
investigate these two legal fields’ mutual set.  
The Parties signed the cooperation agreement in January 2008 
based on provisions of Eht.,17 in this study I am reviewing the 
priorities of the authorities’ cooperative work based on the currently 
operative – 4th June 2012 – cooperation. They set mutual tasks 
according to five principles:18 providing information, consultation; 
mutual action for protecting consumer rights; authority decisions, 
sending summaries, providing information on authority decisions; 
providing information for the public and consumers; keeping 
contacts. 
Criticism formed in connection with the Agreement: there are 
only a few obligations and many possibilities! Concretely fixed 
obligations would be necessary for flexible, still, coordinated work, 
furthermore, strictly demarked tasks and spheres of competences, 
procedural entitlements, compulsory consultations and inspections 
are needed. 
As regards the mutual sending of revision plans, I do not believe 
that it is by all means necessary as they can influence each other’s 
practice. It is more practical if both authorities carry out the revision 
process according to their own practice – because they investigate 
upon their own perspectives – and they inform each other on its 
results and consequences, implying obligatory consultation 
                                                            
16 VERES, ZOLTÁN: A pénzügyi fogyasztóvédelem alapjai [The Basis of the 
Financial Consumer Protection] (manusscript), 2012, Budapest, 3. In the 
referenced source's ternary listing the Author marks persistence of 
information asymmetry in financial sphere and consumer vulnerability. I 
believe that the mentioned problem issues succeed in the field of 
communications market, as well. 
17 Eht. Art. 21. rules on the cooperation requirements of the two authorities 
in issues relating to the electronic communications market and services 
connected to the information society’s services and cases related to 
consumers. 
18 Cooperation Agreement, available at: http://www.nfh.hu/data/cms699 
03/NMHH_honlapra.pdf [cit. 2014-01-01]. 
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afterwards. Ideas coming from different aspects can lead to more 
worked-out results.  
Disadvantageous consequences of the lack of concrete 
distribution of spheres of competences are shown in practice, too, 
especially in the case of complaints regarding billing. Approximate 
anchorage of the two authorities’ spheres of competences is futile, 
demarcation is not obvious.  
The result will be the back and forth movement of complaints – 
besides the mutual information of customers – which, in a not 
condemned way will result in the decrease of consumer trust towards 
the authorities. 
2.2. Subjects of legal relation 
Differentiation among consumers-subscribers-users with regards to 
person, objective and contractual relation: 
Consumer, whether we refer to wider or narrower subjects’ 
circle, can only be a natural person19 who resorts to services for 
private aims. In consequence, besides being natural persons, both 
subscribers and users can be legal persons, economic companies or 
other organizations without having legal personality, who, besides 
private aims can proceed for business aims, too. What serves as the 
differentiation of the last two categories is the contractual legal 
relation which is exclusively the inherent of subscriber nature. The 
user only uses, resorts to the given electronic communications 
service. In most cases, the two categories of course overlap each 
other. We can see that in this circle the user is the smallest subjective 
category. 
Service providers: Those enterprises belong to the circle of 
electronic communications services which provide and carry out 
phone service (wired and mobile), Internet service and radio-
                                                            
19 In case of accomplishing the contract and besides it breaching obligations 
connected to the quality of the service, it became possible for small and 
mid-enterprises to have that type of protection for which customers are 
entitled to. 
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television division,20 broadcast21 and distribution.22 The list of 
service providers is incredibly long23 (currently there are 917 
operating/active service providers in Hungary), based on their size 
and income, they present a really wide scale. 
Among service providers, we must mention universal electronic 
communications service providers and (JPE) providers possessing 
significant market strength. 
3. CONSUMER PROTECTION IN COMMUNICATIONS 
Consumer protection tasks connected to communications are mostly 
carried out by the Department of Communications Supervision but 
the Media- and Communications Commissioner also has significant 
part in the area (true, with a unique legal status). Previously (before 
2010), the remedy of allegation of injuries based on incoming 
complaints was the task of RCCR. 
The first and most important body is the National Media and 
Infocommunications Authority – Hungary, which is a self-regulatory 
body existing since 11st August 2011, based on Act LXXXII of 2010 
on modifying acts that regulate media and communications.  
But before investigating the now existing institution, it is worth 
looking at the precursor institution called National Communications 
                                                            
20 During program distribution, signals produced by the service provider get 
to radio and television broadcast channels and program division networks 
through wired (cable) networks, furthermore above ground or satellite 
systems in unchanged content. 
21 Broadcast is a one-sided telecommunications process carried out by 
above ground or satellite systems for transmitting sounds, pictures and other 
signals. 
22 Simultaneous, unchanged transmission of produced broadcasting signals 
to the receiver in an electronic way. (Communications-statistical database.) 
Available at: http://webext.nmhh.hu//hirk_stat/definiciok.nhh?&fejezet=8 
&nyelv=0 [cit. 2014-01-01]. 
23 List of service providers: http://webext.nmhh.hu/hir_szolg/app/search.jsp 
[cit. 2014-01-01]. 
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Authority (NCA), which, besides the protection of interests, 
formation and maintenance of efficient competition and supervision 
of service providers’ lawful behavior, also laid significant 
importance on consumer information as the first (preventive) aspect 
of protection of interests, which is especially significant from our 
theme’s point of view. In the frame of this strategy, various 
educational, informational materials have been published, just like 
Raising consumer consciousness in electronic communications 
markets24 or What, where, how? Useful information on 
communications services and consumer rights.25 The establishment 
of TANTUSZ portal was significant. It is a (still actively) working, 
continuously updated information website which helps users in 
choosing the most advantageous mobile-, wired-, Internet or cable 
TV service based on individual consumer habits. It provides 
information on roaming prices and offers of companies providing 
broadband Internet-access. Hence, the search engine of the portal 
concentrates on two main areas: tariff comparison and service 
location. Making authorities’ customer service modernization, 
protection against accidental roaming, web information on service 
providers’ quality traits, free-access spam-filter programs and 
softwares for the detection of spy-programs available is not 
negligible, either. The ideas and their realization is praiseworthy, 
very spectacular, easily understandable and direct, with one 
deficiency (which was the obstacle of reaching the final aim): it was 
not “advertised”. Only few percentages of people visited the website 
of the authority and few people knew where to get information from. 
Knowing all these, let us see how the prosecutor works! 
In its communications-controlling activity NMIAH controls the 
appointed certificate organization, carries out general control and 
market control in the area of electronic communications, makes 
annual inspection and supervision plans, then, after carrying out the 
                                                            
24 See http://nmhh.hu/dokumentum/1747/fogy_tudatossag_kiadvany_v5 
.pdf [cit. 2014-01-01]. 
25 See http://nmhh.hu/dokumentum/537/nmhh_mitholhogyan_tajekoztatoki 
advany_web.pdf [cit. 2014-01-01]. 
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investigation, makes an account on their results, calculates and 
“collects” supervision charges and calls then obligates service 
providers to fulfil their data-providing obligations. Building 
authorization means a separate part of its tasks, during which it 
carries out procedures of inspection of constructions and 
authorization procedures. Regarding our study, market inspection26 
and its general inspection procedures have great significance as they 
(may) greatly affect consumer-, subscriber-, user rights.  
Authority procedures based on requests are complaint 
handlings’ “most efficient methods”. (After the service provider has 
previously fulfilled27 its tasks regarding the investigation of 
consumer complaints and announcements.2829) The service provider 
has 30 days to investigate written consumer requests. It is obliged to 
send the result of the investigation to the client in written form, in 
case of rejection, explain it. If the service provider very likely 
violated rules on electronic communications or SCS, the consumer, 
in form of a request, can turn to the Authority for carrying out 
authority inspection procedure. If the client’s request adheres to the 
                                                            
26 Market inspection aims at the controlling and enforcement of defined and 
undertaken obligations in legal provisions referring to electronic 
communications, authority provisions, directly applicable EU acts, general 
contractual conditions. See http://nmhh.hu/cikk/727/Tajekoztato_az_ elektr 
onikus_hirkozlesi_piacfelugyeleti_eljarasrol [cit. 2014-01-01]. 
27 In case of bug reports, the fastest solution is when the complainant’s 
announcement is made to the service provider’s customer service on their 
bug report number, with providing identification client number. The service 
provider is obliged to investigate the problem within 48 hours and inform 
the subscriber on the modes of fixing the problem.  
28 Eht. Art. 138. 
29 It is the service provider’s legal obligation to operate a dial-up customer 
service with personal availability and Internet accessibility for the handling 
of subscriber and user announcements, investigating and remedying 
complaints. Subscribers have to be informed on the conditions and modes of 
complaints and announcements, deadline of investigation and in case of 
settlement of disputes, consumer protection bodies, authorities and courts 
that have the right to carry out procedures.  
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formal and content obligations (one has to hand in the request 
exclusively in writing or through client portal, on such form or blank 
of the Authority which was especially written for this aim,30 
obligatory contents of the requests besides clients’ identification data 
and the description of the grievance), a first instance procedure starts 
according to the rules of Ket., during which procedure the requester 
is regarded as a client, hence, clients’ rights and obligations behoove 
to them.31 The fee of the communications general authority 
procedure is 3000 Ft32 which has to be paid via transfer before 
handing in the request. The authority’s administration deadline 
according to main rule is 45 days, which, in a reasonable case, can be 
extended with 30 days at one time.33 
The authority, during the application of legal consequences has 
to follow the principles of equal treatment, gradual steps and 
proportionality. As a legal consequence, it orders service providers to 
cease and stay away from unlawful behavior and to attest legitimate 
behavior. The Authority can ban the certification of unlawful 
behavior, it can determine obligations, apply further legal 
consequences or enter into authority contracts. As the most important 
(and most frequently applied) sanction, it can determine fines 
according to conditions set in law, however, in every case it has to be 
in the value which is suitable for the retention of further unlawful 
acts.34 
The client has the right to appeal35 against the first instant 
authority decision of the Authority (exclusively those who 
participated in the first instance case) to the President, who, based on 
                                                            
30 Eht. Art. 32. 
31 See http://nmhh.hu/cikk/2788/Hogyan_nyujthat_be_kerelmet [cit. 2014-
01-01]. 
32 5/2011. (X. 6.) NMIA regulation on administration service fees and 
modes of payment of the National Media and Infocommunications 
Authority - Hungary’s certain procedures, Art. 9. 
33 Eht. Art. 31. para. (1)-(2). 
34 Eht. Art. 48-49. 
35 Eht. Art. 44. para. (1)-(2). 
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Mttv. 112. § (2),36 delegated second instant authority decisions’ 
power to the vice-president, and in whose name the second instance 
decision-preparing department acts. The investigation of resolutions 
made here can be requested with an action from the court carrying 
out administration tasks, for which only the Metropolitan Court of 
Budapest is competent. In the contentious procedure the Authority is 
represented by the NMIAH’s directorate of law.  
With market inspection procedures started upon requests, hence, 
in connection with the handling of complaints, the question whether 
real legal remedy, therefore, insuring the possibility of appealing 
within the Authority is really needed or not may arise. With taking 
the published resolutions into account, in most cases confirmation 
and the request’s rejection, in certain cases confirmation but 
(confirming certain points of the request or regardless of appealing) 
alteration of the first instance resolutions (in one or two cases 
obligatory/calling orders such as appointing delivering delegate in 
case of foreign service provider) were born. Order for starting a new 
process barely happens/has happened. That is exactly why it is 
questionable that whether besides making the process longer, it 
substantively contributes to the successful carrying out of the case or 
not. Perhaps the “dropping” of second instance, hence, real legal 
remedy (appeal) against Authority resolutions could be advisable, 
hereby making direct court investigation possible with regards to 
market inspection procedures started upon requests. This solution is 
not without precedent, the then Hungarian Financial Supervisory 
Authority’s (HFSA) authority procedure operated in similar one 
instance procedure, against its resolutions court investigation could 
be used. One the one hand, this solution would be reasonable in order 
to simplify procedures, on the other hand, it would serve the decrease 
of second instances’ workload. 
Readers surely recognize the relevant difference between the 
two authorities’ (precedent and successor) description. This is not by 
chance. Obviously – as being a public administration authority –, the 
                                                            
36 Act CLXXXV of 2010 on media services and public communication 
(hereinafter: Mttv.). 
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carrying out of investigation procedures and the handling of 
complaints meant integrant, if not the most important parts of NCA’s 
tasks but besides these (as the brochure on raising consumer 
consciousness shows, too) improving consumer protection was its 
strategy’s priority, as well. Compared to this, we can feel recoil in 
the present situation. Besides that both the Authority, the President 
and the Media- and Communications Commissioner are the 
committed invokers of consumer protection, their manifestation in 
the outside world is not seen (enough). What has happened? Where 
have the previous ambitions and objectives gone? Unfortunately, we 
cannot say that compliance is the reason of the relative “silence”. It 
is sad that the program set forth by NCA has not found followers. 
The Media- and Communications Commissioner’s (regarding its 
legal status it is important that it does not have own authority 
competence or licences, one acts as official of the authority) status 
was created by Mttv. The need for this unique communications 
consumer protection-type carrying out of tasks and building out 
organizational frames for this is determined in the European 
Community’s frame regulation system on electronic communi-
cations, too. Hence, not only national needs but the obligation of law 
harmonization also justified the formation of this institution. The 
Representative of the Communications Consumer Rights’ (RCCR) 
mainly used “soft-law” tools in carrying out his/her activity: s/he 
cooperated and signed agreements with service providers, published 
offers, did mediator activities between the service provider and the 
user, in justified cases turned to the public with market phenomenon, 
problems and their solutions in order to provide more effective 
information.37 In short, one operated as informational and 
connectional centre between consumers, subscribers and other 
market parties that is service providers, authorities and other civil 
organizations. The representative could operate ex officio in cases of 
                                                            
37 ARANYOSNÉ BÖRCS, JANKA – LAPSÁNSZKY, ANDRÁS – SPAKEVICS, 
SÁNDOR: A hírközlési igazgatás kézikönyve [Handbook of the 
Communications Administration], 2010, Complex Kiadó Jogi, Budapest, 
401-402. 
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complaints and recognition of unlawfulness. The representative was 
obliged to investigate requests handed to him and to apply actions 
regarded as expedient. He especially put emphasis on the information 
of consumers and expressed it in many calls and work plans which 
contained relevant parts of his program. 
The Commissioner’s dual spheres of activity – coming from its 
name, too – follows NMIAH’s dual system. On the one hand, he 
proceeds in consumer grievances of electronic communications 
services and press and media services, and in connection with 
consumer information, too. His processes can only be started upon 
complaints and in subjects of such behaviour which are connected to 
providing electronic communications services, cases which are not 
regarded as the breaking of service rules and do not belong to the 
spheres of competences of the Media Council, the President or the 
Authority, but cause or can cause acknowledgeable grievance of 
users, subscribers, consumers who resort to services.38 
We have to make an important differentiation between the two 
service branches as significant differences can be seen regarding 
authority tools applied during the handling of complaints (it has 
stronger entitlements in the communications branch). Hereby, we 
have to mention Resolution nr. 165/2011. (XII. 20.) AB, which is 
responsible for the inequality of procedural entitlements in the two 
areas of administration. According to the original regulation, the 
Commissioner had the same spheres of competences with relation to 
press and media services, could use the same authority tools 
(obligation to provide data, carrying out conciliation procedures, 
concluding agreements, making reports, determining fines) as in the 
communications branch. However, proponents wanted the annulment 
of the regulation because of violating constitutional requirements on 
the limitation of opinion and freedom of press. The Constitutional 
Court ruled that the Commissioner had such spheres of competences 
with which he could even investigate questions belonging to the 
sphere of editorial freedom. Behind his procedure the possibility of 
authority action and constraint is always there which means the 
                                                            
38 Mttv. Art. 140. para. (1). 
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limitation of the freedom of press. Relative provisions have been 
annulled, hence, furthermore it is only represented in the field of 
media administration as an institution having mediation part, 
cooperating with service providers.39 Knowing this, we can question 
the efficiency of the “2 in 1” concept. I believe that the previous 
RCCR perfectly fulfilled the role what it was meant for, regarding 
the handling of consumer complaints, information programs and 
media representation (interviews, ask-answer in chat), they would 
have only had to work on increasing efficiency. The plan to realize 
this kind of protection in a contracted status on the field of media 
administration, as we could see, bumped into constitutional limits, 
resolutions referring to this were annulled by the Constitutional 
Court. Hence, we can experience it in the current situation that plans 
wanted to be achieved through contraction could not be realized but 
resulted in “regression” on the field of communications, too. From 
this point of view, we can talk about a quite disadvantageous 
organizational action. As a further problem, (deficiency), the 
disregard of the already well-known “information strategy” can be 
mentioned. It is a great mistake as we could see that they created the 
starting points and via carrying them on, the objectives could be 
realized. It would need to use those tools that are applied by service 
providers! NMIAH could call consumers’ attention to be mindful, to 
the existence and applicational advantages of TANTUSZ portal and 
locations of other information. Although previous projects could 
have been perfect regarding their form and content, they did not 
reach consumers. Using media could be the most useful and efficient 
tool.  
                                                            
39 OROSI, RENÁTA: manuscript on the Commissioner. 
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4. PROBLEM MAP: MOST FREQUENT CONSUMER COMPLAINTS AND 
GRIEVANCES (AND STEPS TAKEN FOR THEIR SOLUTION, 
PREVENTION) 
The majority of consumer complaints come from the unmatched 
relation system. Dominant participants of communications services’ 
markets are obviously the well-known giant service providers whose 
most important interest lies in maintaining, widening the circle of 
clients and increasing income. They try to achieve it with greatly 
constructed marketing, colourful advertisements, imaginative tariff-
names (Mozaik, Like, Fun, Kaméleon, Red, etc.) untransparent 
discount-sets (and hidden real tariffs and band widths). The tight 
competition’s and overbidding’s disadvantageous consequences 
however come quickly, mainly on the disadvantage of consumers. 
According to applications sent to RCCR (2009), the most 
frequent problems are the followings:40 excuses in connection with 
Unique Subscriber Contracts and SCCs; complaints questioning 
adequate billing; unwanted incoming premium SMSs; questions on 
the pricing of mobile phone internet access; unintentional roaming; 
troubleshooting time; broad widths (data traffic speed); verbal 
entering into contract; clauses of loyalty contracts. Because of 
content limitations we are dealing with subscriber contracts among 
the above listed items. 
4.1. Complaints in connection with SCC and Unique Subscriber 
Contracts, anomalies of loyalty contracts 
We regard this category as the most comprehensive because it means 
the hotbed of most complaints.41 It is obvious that contractual 
freedom based on juxtaposition has serious violations in such 
                                                            
40 ARANYOSNÉ – LAPSÁNSZKY – SPAKEVICS: op. cit. 313-315. 
41 See LAPSÁNSZKY, ANDRÁS: Hírközlési igazgatás [Communications 
Administration], in LAPSÁNSZKY, ANDRÁS (ed.): Közigazgatási jog – 
Fejezetek szakigazgatásaink köréből II. [Administrative Law – Chapters of 
Sectoral Administrative Law], 2013, Complex Kiadó, Budapest, 258. 
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markets where services are massively resorted to and legal relations 
are created just like assembly line made mass production (the market 
of communications is typically like this!). “Customers” sign pre-
constructed contracts (written by service providers), hence, 
consensus is made via that subscribers’ accept the given conditions. 
This unequal situation – on the reason of civil protection (and 
obligation of legal harmony) – prompts law-makers to limit, regulate 
contractual conditions, have regulations on content and formal 
elements and determine the conditions of entering into, modifying or 
ceasing contracts. Law-makers partly fulfil it in form of acts (Eht.), 
partly via authorizing the President of NMIAH in form of provisions 
[6/2011 (X. 6.)]. 
Hence, resorting to services by all means lies on signing the 
subscriber contract, which always consists of a unique subscriber 
contract (can be entered into verbally, in written form or with 
behaviour referring to it) and SCCs in written form. We are talking 
about such civil law contracts which important elements are 
determined by rules referring to electronic communications and 
parties can only deviate from this with the same intention in unique 
subscriber contracts for the advantage of subscribers.42  
SCC: The service provider providing subscriber services is by 
all means obliged to make a SCC referring to the given 
communications service, announce it to the Authority and make it 
accessible for public. It has to be easily understandable, consistent 
and transparent, advocating clients’ appropriate gaining of 
information. It is an important regulation that they have to send the 
unified, modified SCC to the Authority 30 days before the 
modification enters into force and have to inform clients on all 
modifications. 
The Supervisory Department carries out investigation activity in 
relation to all SCCs, which, according to given criteria, happens via 
preserving around 140 important content elements; as regards acts, 
                                                            
42 Ibid. 353. 
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relating regulations of Eht. and 6/2011. NMIAH regulation43 gives 
directions. Formal and content regulations also belong to the 
requirements. In the subject of SCC investigation the Authority rules 
in orders and calls service providers’ attention to modify, delete or 
supplement the disapproved points. With this activity, the 
organization carries out preventive activity as it goes ahead of 
grievances via the early cease of service providers’ trespasses.  
In connection with SCC, I would like to call the attention to one 
more thing; this is being the fixed form of possibilities and 
conditions of one-sided modification of contracts from the part of 
service providers. Eht’s adhering regulation would assist the solution 
to the problem, which lists those cases in Art. 132. para. (2) when 
service providers may modify subscription contracts covering unique 
subscriber contracts in a one-sided way. Among these, points b) and 
c)44 give reasons for misunderstanding, widened interpretation in 
many cases. Regarding that in most cases one-sided modification of 
contracts manifests in the increase of tariffs, reasonably leading to 
lots of consumer complaints. Service providers as significant 
changes due to previously not seen circumstances “try” the most 
various reasons in order to legalize their one-sided modifications: 
decline in economic life, inflation, unexpected costs, technology- and 
system innovation constraint in order to keep the pace of the race, 
significant decrease in certain tariffs’ subscriber number, hence, 
specific costs of tariff-maintenance’s inevitable increase, 
introduction of telecommunications tax, etc. The Authority rejects 
appeals based on these arguments saying that all circumstances can 
be foreseen, costs and risks can be calculated, hence, these are not 
reasons for one-sided modification. Service providers consider the 
Authority’s such behaviour as clearing places of regulations, saying 
that they do not have consistent argument to which they can correlate 
based on which the nature of significant change in circumstances 
                                                            
43 6/2011. (X. 6.) NMIAH regulation on rules of electronic communications 
subscriber contracts’ detailed rules (hereinafter: Eszr.). 
44 b) Legal changes or authority decision. c) Significant changes in 
circumstances not seen at the time of entering into contract. 
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(clausula rebis sic stantibus) can be determined, hence, in practice, it 
seems that service providers are continually trying and the Authority 
rejects them in all cases (‘guess what’ phenomenon). To this, 
NMIAH’s answer is that the nature of significant change cannot be 
taxatively determined as all cases have to be separately investigated, 
all cases can set new, relevant circumstances, what is a significant 
element is that circumstances have to be not foreseeable, unavoidable 
and directly have to refer to a legal relation. However, consistent 
law-making and law-application desires the so-called reason-list, 
which would lay down those cases to which (and only to them) they 
can advert as reasons of one-sided modification of contracts. The 
existence of reason-list is not without antecedent, in the financial 
sphere the Bank Behaviour Codex45 of 2009 has similar content, 
which is also substantively applied. Regarding that service providers 
do not always leave the rejection of appeals without a word and ask 
for court revision, sooner or later an accepted court practice will be 
formed which will concretize the nature of significant change in 
circumstances, (too). 
Taking the broad content of SCC and its complicated legal 
language into consideration, it would be desirable to oblige certain 
service providers to issue a SCC extract. The idea is not new,46 it can 
be traced on some service providers’ website, however, based on 
individual experiences, these cannot be found in any service 
providers’ stores, even if its role in customers’ information cannot be 
doubted. The 6-7 pages long extract would definitely reduce the 
number of complaints with its most important points – rights and 
obligations – of conclusion, entering into, modifying, ceasing 
contracts, tariffs and loyalty contracts. 
Even issuing a chart containing certain points of SCC or the 
given service providers’ tariff options (and their most important 
                                                            
45 See http://www.mkb.hu/dl/media//group_463afc792a1fd/item_2545.pdf 
[cit. 2014-01-01]. 
46 16/2003 (XII. 27.) IHM regulation (repealed) Art. 4. para. (4) ascertains 
that the service provider is obliged to prepare its extract number determined 
in SCC. 
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points) as “General brochure prior to entering into loyalty contract”47 
would also serve consumers’ choice. 
As regards unique subscriber contracts, usually entering into 
contract verbally or via such behaviour’s disadvantages cause the 
complaints. Entering into contract verbally can be regarded as 
complete on the day of the phone call, however, regarding the short 
time of consideration and interpretation, the subscriber can cease the 
contract without reasoning within 8 days with such constraint that if 
before the expire of withdrawal period the service provider started 
the compliance with the consent of the subscriber, the right of 
withdrawal cannot be practised.48 Entering into contract with implied 
conduct (real act), is significant in connection with supplementary 
services or increased charge services in the field of communications, 
hence, it supposes a subscriber contract on an already existing 
electronic communications service.49 Displeasing situations can be 
avoided with the extreme attention of subscribers. 
Lawmakers tend to regulate the cessation of contracts via 
termination having regard to the formation of balance situation. They 
fulfil this in such a way that they ensure the maximum of 8 days (or 
even immediately) termination period for customers without legal 
consequences and reasoning with regards to all three types of 
termination groups (general-, one-sided contract modification-, and 
exceptional termination). This right behoves service providers in all 
cases besides their justification obligation and with longer deadline 
(60 or 15 days). The right of termination’s content is different with 
relation to determined and indeterminate contracts in all termination 
groups.  
Loyalty contracts: We are talking about such clauses of 
subscriber contracts upon which the service provider gives such 
                                                            
47 The idea of applying an information chart comes from the financial 
sector, too, based on Act CLXII. annex nr. 1 of 2009 on credit provided for 
customers. 
48 17/1999. (II. 5.) Government decree Art. 5. point a). 
49 ARANYOSNÉ – LAPSÁNSZKY – SPAKEVICS: op. cit. 370-373. 
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discounts50 for customers having regard to that he/she assumes such 
obligations51 during the period of using the service which 
infringement is followed by determined legal consequences set in the 
contract. Discounts relating to loyalty contracts encourage consumers 
to choose without thinking, however, it is worth knowing what we 
undertake with the (mostly two-year) commitment: by all means 
more limited procedural possibilities regarding the termination of the 
contractual legal relation. The fix period subscriber contract ceases 
with the expiry date of the given contract, prior to this, subscribers 
can only use extraordinary termination if the service provider has not 
repaired the announced default belonging to its sphere of interest 
within 30 days, or if one-sided contract modification contains 
disadvantageous consequences on the part of the subscriber.52 In this 
case service providers are not entitled to claim the so far used 
discounts. Regarding subscriber termination of other fix period 
contracts before the expiry date, the used discounts can be claimed 
by the service provider but they cannot apply any other 
disadvantageous legal consequences.53 
                                                            
50 Total or partial release of enrolment fee, discount of subscription fee in 
comparison with indeterminate contract, discount relinquishment or selling 
of terminal equipment needed for the requisition of service is considered to 
be reduction. 
51 Obligations in particular: based on reasons coming from their own 
interests, subscribers do not start the termination of the contract, suspension 
of service, such modification of the contract which is not made possible by 
the clause within loyalty time; with their contract breaching behaviour they 
do not form a legal basis for the service provider’s termination or the 
service’s limitation. 
52 However, if the modification of the contract does not affect the resorted 
reduction, the subscriber is not entitled to terminate it without 
disadvantageous legal consequence. If the modification affects the discount 
and the subscriber terminates the contract, the service provider can legally 
demand the so far used discounts.  
53 How to terminate subscriber contracts? See http://nmhh.hu/cikk/2757/ 
Hogyan_mondhatja_fel_az_elofizetoi_szerzodeset [cit. 2014-01-01]. 
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5. INCREASING CONSUMER CONSCIOUSNESS: PROVIDING 
INFORMATION, COMPARISON AND CHOICE 
According to results of the latest researches, conscious customer 
index shows gradual increase, which is the result of more 
circumspect choice, successful validation of guarantee rights; at the 
same time, regarding the areas of exact knowledge of consumer 
rights and particularly raising consumer consciousness, we have a lot 
more to accomplish. The expectation and need for the latter one is 
like an untouchable crust that surrounds us, it means a pressure on 
us. In many cases we even know what we should do, however, in 
practice we “do not have time” to adhere to this and we only strive to 
satisfy our need for service (and follow fashion) at the least possible 
price. This kind of consumer angle is well-known by service 
providers, who tailor their marketing activity accordingly. By all 
means we shall handle over-reduced prices with scepticism, let us 
have suspicion regarding their real nature. The procedure of 
“deceptive behaviour” is always service providers’ unique tool, 
which cannot be even regarded as unlawful as it presumes consumer 
thinking! For more efficient “increase of consciousness”, hence for 
the incitement of consideration and comparison we have to apply 
similar modes of service providers’, we have to make conclusions 
from actual consumer behaviour and emerging consumer trends and 
work out prevention strategies based on this. 
Consumer trends, consumer behaviours: We basically have to 
focus on weak points, appoint wrong consumer behaviour types and 
via reflecting to those, appoint directions of correct thinking and 
behaviour. Whilst carrying out information programs, the focus point 
should basically be on the requisition of media with well-structured, 
colourful, direct, awareness raising sentences constructed with nice 
background music, we have to manipulatively effect consumers 
using marketing strategies, just like service providers (if we cannot 
walk other ways). When working out the program, we have to take 
the umbrella term of consumer category’s nature into consideration, 
ergo that we aim at a relatively heterogenic group regarding their 
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personality, social situation and age, as well. Obviously, tailor-made 
programs cannot be worked out but forming projects according to 
categories in various styles could be effective. At the time of 
working out of strategies, we have to pay special attention to 
functional consumption54 and call the attention of customers to 
emotional consumption’s55 dangers, and the consequences of self-
expressive, symbolic, “grandiose”, offers lacking practicality.  
Consumer practice of Germany with relation co 
communications: first of all, we have to note that such central 
comparing and search system like TANTUSZ portal that covers all 
electronic communications services and service providers does not 
exist in Germany. General consumer protection portals56 (subject to 
payment of a fee) and smaller, freely accessible private portals57 give 
assistance for consumers who want to be informed in choosing the 
most suitable “package” for themselves. The general practice is that 
they read more free portals, gain information about the most suitable 
tariffs, services, then compare the given results and choose. 
Optimization is a general practice in Germany, programs’ utilization 
is very high, regardless of possible consequences. 
                                                            
54 Rationally explainable consumption, purchasing such products, using 
such services which do not necessarily need explanation, regarding it is a 
phenomenon accepted on the given social-economic level. Using telephone 
and Internet services - regarded as primary from our point of view - can be 
listed here.  
55 Symbolic consumption (which can be self-calming or self-expressive). 
See TÖRŐCSIK, MÁRIA: Fogyasztói magatartás – Insight, trendek, vásárlók 
[Consumer Behaviour – Insight, Trends, Buyers], 2011, Akadémiai Kiadó, 
Budapest. 
56 See http://www.verbraucherzentrale.de/ and http://www.test.de/ [cit. 
2014-01-01]. 
57 Most advantageous offers given by these pages always have to be handled 
with precaution as there is no guarantee regarding their independency. It is 
possible that service providers who advertise on the given website pay extra 
for the website’s operator after signed loyalty contracts. 




What shall that nation do which basically has different temperament, 
follows other forms of behaviour and thinks differently? As a 
consumer, it shall learn, get information, change behaviour, use 
assisting applications and last but not least, bear its own interests in 
mind! As a national, consumer protection body (NMIAH, HACP, 
Media- and Communications Commissioner, civil organizations) it 
shall do everything in order to artificially supplement its 
inefficiencies, educate, improve consumer consciousness, on the 
other hand, supervise, regulate its behaviour in its dominant position, 
oblige service providers to respect consumer rights and aim at 
efficient, quick and satisfactory remedy of possible grievances, and 
last but not least, create balance in the imbalanced power-relation! 
Let us not forget: consumers are the incentives of the 
communications market’s improvement! Hence, their protection, 
information, education, and ensuring their right for remedy, 
recovery, representation of interests, hence, achieving satisfaction is 
everyone’s interest, besides, it is a national objective58 set in the 
Basic Law! 
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Through the “Lenses” of the High Representative – 
Staffing Issues of the EEAS Review 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Establishing the position of High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy2 and the formation of the 
European diplomatic board built around this new position, namely 
the European External Action Service3 are the most significant 
achievements among the amendments of the Treaty of Lisbon 
(entered into force on 1st December 2009). These reforms of the 
Treaty of Lisbon creates such conditions for the European Union that 
enables the EU’s more unified and more efficient appearance on 
international area4 and makes possible to ensure the unified 
representation and predomination of the European Union’s values 
and interests. 
Forasmuch as that the European External Action Service 
(hereinafter: EEAS) is an EU organization without traditions, and 
seeing also the internal and external challenges during the formation 
                                                            
1 This research was supported by the European Union and the State of 
Hungary, co-financed by the European Social Fund in the framework of 
TÁMOP-4.2.4.A/2-11/1-2012-0001 ‘National Excellence Program’. 
2 The Treaty on European Union (hereinafter: TEU), Art. 18. 
3 Art. 27. para. (3) TEU. 
4 With this the Treaty of Lisbon tries to fulfill the conditions written in 
Laeken declaration which set off the European constitutional process. See 
Laeken Declaration On The Future Of The European Union, Chapter 1. 
Available at: http://european-convention.eu.int/pdf/LKNEN.pdf [cit. 2013-
12-13]. 
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of the organisation, the Council Decision which serves as the legal 
basis for EEAS under the “Final and general provisions” in its 
Article 13 lays down that “by mid-2013, the High Representative 
shall provide a review of the organisation and functioning of the 
EEAS…”5 Therefore, regarding the number of proposals, 
recommendations and analyses referring to the review of the 
organisation, and also the organisation of several conferences, think-
thanks, discussion forums and meetings in the theme of the EEAS’ 
review during the last year, 2013 can be proven fruitful year. The 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy submitted the official document concerning the review of 
EEAS’ structure and operation in July 2013.6 
This study aims at examining the EEAS Review based on the 
official document written by the High Representative regarding the 
review of EEAS, in particular with personnel issues of the 
organisation. Before analysing the review and future directions and 
reforms defined in the official report, it is important to glance at the 
institution of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, which was also a substantial amendment 
introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon besides the EEAS. This new post 
made necessary to establish the EEAS, because of the complexity of 
tasks and competences exercised by the High Representative. 
Furthermore, it is worth writing some details about the main 
characteristics and specialties of the organisation. Then, in the 
second chapter of this study, it recalls the staffing issues of the 
EEAS, which existed as relevant problems and questionable case at 
the time of setting up and creating practices of the operation of the 
Service. Following the reviving of the initial sceptic voices, the 
“staff” of the currently viable organization is surveyed and then the 
                                                            
5 2010/427/EU Council decision (26th July 2010) establishing the 
organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service 
(hereinafter: 2010/427/EU Council decision) Art. 13. para. (3). 
6 European External Action Service – EEAS Review, 2013 (hereinafter: 
EEAS Review, 2013). Available at: http://eeas. europa.eu/library/publica 
tions/2013/3/2013_eeas_review_en.pdf [cit. 2014-12-02]. 
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Heads of Delegations come to the foreground regarding EU 
delegations in the view of the revision document written by the High 
Representative. Finally, the current theme under investigation closes 
with thoughts affecting EU Special Representatives. 
2. THE EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE IN A NUTSHELL 
2.1. Lady with “many hats”7 – The necessity for setting up EEAS 
Regarding the Common Foreign and Security Policy, it is significant 
that the Treaty of Lisbon created the position of the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
as an institutional innovation, which ensures the EU’s more effective 
and more unified action on global level, creating a new frame for the 
EU’s external representation.8 The basic aim of creating this position 
is to ensure the EU image’s more unified international 
representation, and with respect to the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, it is to avoid the possible parallel carrying out of work in 
                                                            
7 Many studies use the English “hat” word referring to the HR tasks and 
his/her various positions. According to my opinion it would be 
inappropriate to refer to the marker “hat” with a definite number. Opinions 
considering “the number of hats” split in special literature, as well. 
8 Taking content limitations into account and considering current study’s 
essential theme, detailed analysis of the High Representative is not carried 
out. The introduction of this position is only narrowed down to the most 
essential issues and to those which are the most relevant connecting to my 
current theme. See further: GÖMBÖS, CSILLA: Egység az átláthatat-
lanságban? Az EU megerősített nemzetközi szerepvállalása, különös 
tekintettel a külügyi és biztonságpolitikai főképviselőre és az Európai 
Külügyi Szolgálatra [Unity in Untransparency? The EU’s Strengthened 
Participation, Especially Regarding the High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy and the External Action Service], in FARKAS, 
ÁDÁM – NÉMETH, IMRE (ed.): Optimi Nostri, Díjnyertes Állam- és 
Jogtudományi Dolgozatok, Nr. 1. (2013) 45-60. 
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institutions.9 The person of the High Representative merged two 
previous positions connected to the external actions: High 
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (Mrs. /Mr. 
CFSP) held by the Secretary General of the Council, introduced by 
the Amsterdam Treaty, dealing with second pillar issues, which was 
held by Javier Solana de Madriga, former NATO Secretary General10 
until 2009, and the position of commissioner regarding the cases 
attached to the first pillar, namely the Commission’s foreign affairs 
issues.  
Hence, due to the institutional merge the two previous positions, 
the competences regarding Foreign Affairs and Security Policy are 
concentrated in the tenure of the High Representative. Furthermore, 
the holder of this position has to cope with more tasks and duties at 
the same time. On the one hand, the person in charge fills the 
position of commissioner dealing with the Commission’s foreign 
affairs, and as the vice president of the Commission is responsible 
for the realisation of activities connected to this institution’s foreign 
affairs. On the other hand, the holder of this position is also 
responsible for managing various activities connected to foreign 
affairs and for the implementation of decisions; and is entitled to 
                                                            
9 The new position created by the Treaty of Lisbon is currently held by 
Baroness Catherine Ashton, who was appointed on 19th November 2009, 
with qualified majority of the Council, in harmony with the President of the 
Commission, for the period of the Commission’s current time in office that 
is, having mandate for the period of five years. “The European Council, 
acting by a qualified majority, with the agreement of the President of the 
Commission, shall appoint the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The European Council may end his 
term of office by the same procedure.” Art. 18. (1) TEU. 
10 Mr CFSP primarily assisted the Council’s work on the field of Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy; held responsibility for political and diplomatic 
relations, and missions of Foreign and Security Policy, and, he/she appeared 
in political dialogues conducted with foreign partners. See KENDE, TAMÁS – 
SZŰCS, TAMÁS – JENEY, PETRA (ed.): Európai közjog és politika [European 
Public Law and Policy], 2007, CompLex Kiadó, Budapest, 411-412. 
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ensure the harmony and coordination of the EU’s foreign activity.11 
This includes the harmonisation of Commission members’ activity 
among each other and of further elements connected to the foreign 
policy, covering intergovernmental issues as well.12 
Being connected to the European Commission, the High 
Representative is also strongly involved into the work of the Council 
of the European Union. As the HR ensures the continuance and 
coherence of work in the field of the EU’s foreign affairs, s/he 
possesses common mandate of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
in the European Council. The Treaty of Lisbon modified the system, 
functions and operation of the rotating Presidency of the Council; 
hence, the competence of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy got out 
from the rotating Presidency’s direct control, which is already 
managed by the High Representative and the permanent President of 
the European Council.13 
Whereas, among the foreign ministers abolished the rotating 
presidency, accompanied by previously forming a single ministerial 
panel General and External Relations Council parted the General 
Affairs Council and Foreign Affairs Council. Thus the High 
Representative heads the Foreign Affairs Council on a permanent 
basis adapted from previous functions the Minister for attending the 
Council Presidency Member. Although, the Member State given 
rotating president of the Council had a lot of positive elements 
regarding its own national policy of foreign affairs because of its 
role, changes not mean “loss of power” regarding the trio of 
presidency. Changes shall much more be referred to as a certain kind 
                                                            
11 Art. 18. para. (2) and para. (4) TEU. 
12 GASPERS, JAN: The quest for European foreign policy consistency and the 
Treaty of Lisbon, 2008, available at: http://www.sbc.katowice.pl/Cont 
ent/11990/gaspers.pdf [cit. 2014-01-10] 22-24. 
13 The introduction of the position of the President of the European Council 
is also the reform of the Treaty of Lisbon. See further: Article 15 TEU and 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter: TFEU) Art. 
235-236. See also GÖMBÖS: op. cit. 
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of emphasis shift – regarding more efficient supply of activities of 
foreign affairs.14 
Between the High Representative and the permanent President 
of the European Council tasks and competences connecting to the 
EU’s foreign actions share; however, the Treaty of Lisbon does not 
dispose on the exact share between these two positions, making the 
foreign representation of the EU problematic. It is difficult to 
determine which position’s performance is needed in certain cases. 
The President of the European Council primarily deals with the 
representation of foreign affairs, while the HR – as the first diplomat 
of the EU – manages the common foreign and security policy 
through diplomatic service (EEAS) exercising the right to propose 
with respect to this field, and based on the authorisation of the 
Council, the HR puts into effect certain implementing powers as 
well. “The High Representative shall represent the Union for matters 
relating to the common foreign and security policy. He shall conduct 
political dialogue with third parties on the Union’s behalf and shall 
express the Union’s position in international organisations and at 
international conferences.”15 The practice of nowadays is especially 
important in order to avoid anomalies coming from the clash of the 
two new positions’ competences referring to the foreign politics of 
the EU, and in order to bridge possible conflicting competences, and 
to realise gradually the demarcation of these evolving positions.  
However, the Council’s central position in the Union’s decision 
making has not been degraded after the Treaty of Lisbon, neither in 
the formation of foreign policy, the only change is that the High 
Representative also joins this process.16 “The High Representative of 
                                                            
14 HORVÁTHY, BALÁZS: Az EU-elnökség intézménye [The Institution of the 
EU Presidency] in VÖRÖS, IMRE (ed.): Az EU-elnökség. Jogi, szervezeti és 
tudománypolitikai vetületek [The EU Presidency. Aspects of Law, 
Organisation and Science Policy], 2010, Complex Kiadó, Budapest, 68. 
15 Art. 27. para. (2) TEU. 
16 Regarding the Union’s common foreign and security policy’s decision 
making process, the Treaty of Lisbon basically did not bring about 
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the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who shall chair 
the Foreign Affairs Council, shall contribute through his proposals 
to the development of the common foreign and security policy and 
shall ensure implementation of the decisions adopted by the 
European Council and the Council”.17 Consequently we have been 
facing a very interesting institutional construction, as in the Council 
the Foreign Affairs Council which is led by him is the one decides on 
the High Representative’s suggestions on common foreign and 
security policy, and finally, the Council shall authorise the High 
Representative to implement the decisions. Hence, it is reasonably 
assumable that a kind of decision-making monopoly is concentrated 
in the hands of the High Representative regarding the Union’s 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 
Such combination of tasks – “quasi hats” – allocate the holder 
of this position to important institutional functions as it provides the 
High Representative opportunity to move between the EU’s 
supranational and intergovernmental structures – hence, having the 
opportunity to create a new “centrum of power” in the EU.18 
2.2. The key features and characteristics of the new diplomatic 
service 
The High Representative needs help during ones activity due to the 
complexity of one’s competences and having regard to their 
complexity and diversity. “In fulfilling his mandate, the High 
Representative shall be assisted by a European External Action 
Service. This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic 
services of the Member States and shall comprise officials from 
relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and 
                                                                                                                              
substantive changes. The leading position of the European Council and the 
Council of the European Union, and the unanimous decision remained. 
17 Art. 27. para. (1) TEU. 
18 GÁLIK ZOLTÁN: A Lisszaboni Szerződés: politikai integráció vagy 
integrálódó politika? [The Treaty of Lisbon: political integration or 
integration policy?], in Külügyi Intézet, Gyorselemzések, 2010, http://www. 
kulugyiintezet. hu/indexphp?menu=26&gyors=2038 [cit. 2014-02-01]. 
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of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national 
diplomatic services of the Member States….”19 Help given to the 
High Representative mainly manifests in harmonisation of the 
foreign EU actions, making political suggestions, and 
implementation. Hence, this service makes it possible that the High 
Representative does not have to rely on Member States while 
carrying out tasks connected to foreign affairs. Events, diplomatic 
meetings, successful negotiations of the past years can be regarded as 
undoubted evidences regarding how important role EEAS played a 
significant part in that the High Representative could successfully 
and effectively realize the first steps of the foreign political frame’s 
practical realization under the aegis of the Treaty of Lisbon.20 
Furthermore, providing help for the High Representative’s work and 
assisting the President of the European Council, the President of the 
Commission and its members in their tasks connected to foreign 
affairs, the EEAS is able to create some kind of coherence on the 
field of the EU’s foreign relations in order to enable the EU’s foreign 
policy to have much more effective realisation, more unified and 
more successful foreign performance. This can primarily be 
understated that with the formation of EEAS the EU’s most 
significant foreign policy activity is concentrated in one organisation. 
However, several reforms are needed to resettle EEAS the only 
organization responsible for foreign policy; still, this institutional 
reform means a significant step ahead on the road of political 
integration.  
Besides the above mentioned significance of EEAS, it shall be 
recognised that with the formation of this service the EU’s system of 
institutions widens. However, this kind of expansion is inherent in 
the integration process, which resulted in that the level under EU 
                                                            
19 Art. 27. para. (3) TEU. 
20 To get to know all these activities, mapping, detailed investigation of 
information found on the website of the organisation in question is an 
excellent tool. See European External Action Service, Publications and 
Documents, available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/publications-and-docum 
ents/index_en.htm [cit. 2014-02-01]. 
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institutions, the diffuse system of Union offices and agencies has 
already been formed by now.21 The newly formed EEAS can be 
listed as part of this level under institutions.  
The Treaty of Lisbon does not intend to settle the organisation 
and concrete operation of the apparatus built around the High 
Representative in detail, it only mentions the bases of the service in 
one article and entrusts its detailed description to the High 
Representative:“…The organisation and functioning of the European 
External Action Service shall be established by a decision of the 
Council. The Council shall act on a proposal from the High 
Representative after consulting the European Parliament and after 
obtaining the consent of the Commission.”22 This decision was born 
on 26th July 2010 after prolonged meetings, and as the result of 
meetings rich in compromises and debates. This Council decision 
fully rules on the organisation during 13 Articles. Pursuant this 
decision the EEAS is the EU’s sui generis organization possessing 
own individual budget, which neither belongs to the General 
Secretariat of the Council, nor to the Commission. However, EEAS 
only operates under the lead of the High Representative, helps him in 
fulfilling ones assignments, and at the same time helps the President 
of the European Council, the President of the Commission and the 
Commission in tasks relating to foreign affairs.23  
EEAS has its own budget which, in a way, impairs control over 
the organisation, providing the EEAS significant independence and 
advantages resulting from that in its operation and carrying out of 
tasks.24 Considering the budget of the EEAS, it has to take principles 
of budgetary efficiency and budgetary neutrality into account. In 
spite of that the EU’s foreign policy only forms the small part of 
whole EU’s budget, the EEAS can work mostly successful in this 
                                                            
21 KÁLMÁN, JÁNOS: Az európai ügynökségek és a Meroni-doktrína 
[European Agencies and the Meroni-doctrine], in De iurisprudentia et iure 
publico, Vol. 7. No. 3. (2013). 
22 Art. 27. para. (3) TEU. 
23 2010/421/EU Council decision, Art. 1-2. 
24 2010/421/EU Council decision, Art. 8. 
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policy. Available reducing sources can significantly weaken EEAS’s 
successful operation; the best possible grouping of available sources 
requires careful attention. If we investigate the EU’s annual budget 
we get to the conclusion that the costs spent on the EU’s global 
actions only take a few percentage of it, of which costs of common 
foreign affairs and security policy again is only a small part; hence, 
the cost paid for EEAS. For instance, EEAS’s budget in 2011 was 
476 billion Euros, which was an insignificant part of the EU’s annual 
budget (141.9 billion Euros), and the increase of EEAS’s budget to 
23.5 billion Euros (5% increase) provoked Member States’ 
displeasure.25 From the 2013 Union budget (150.9 billion Euros) the 
9.6 billion Euros allocated for the service of the EU’s global action 
only meant 6% of the EU’s annual budget, out of which we get even 
worse numbers regarding EEAS’s budget.26 These numbers 
undoubtedly justify that even though EEAS has its own budget; 
efficient management of available limited resources provides great 
challenge for this organisation. 
Regarding the subject of present study, the personnel and 
organisational structure of the EEAS should be emphasised, as well. 
Although, the best way of representing these elements is if they are 
investigated in the light of the review, hence contributing to the more 
obvious comparison of initial and current situations. 
                                                            
25 On EEAS’ 2011 budget see further: European External Action Service, 
2011 Annual Activity Report, 2012, available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/ 
background/docs/20121017_eeas_aar_2011_en.pdf [cit. 2013-12-30]. 
26 EU budget 2013: investing in growth and jobs, 2013, Luxembourg, 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/publications/2013/ 
budget_folder/KV3012856ENC_web.pdf [cit. 2013-12-30]. See further on 
EEAS’ 2012 budget: European External Action Service, 2012 Annual 
Activity Report, 2013, available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/back ground/docs/ 
eeas_aar_2012_en.pdf [cit. 2013-12-30]. 
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3. REVIEW OF EEAS’ PERSONNEL ISSUES 
It would be a right question that why it is necessary to carry out a 
review reform only three years after forming the Service, especially 
because the establishment of this diplomatic service was a significant 
institutional reform regarding integration and its diplomatic matters. 
The “obligate” revision – and in doing so, the formulation, 
envisagement of reforms referring to various areas of the 
organisation, and the schedule of their realisation – was primarily 
necessary because of the several challenges coming up at the 
formation of the service. Mainly initial questions connected to the 
personnel what could be answered with difficulty meant a great 
challenge, therefore, it is not surprising that the EEAS revision 
mainly concentrates on personnel issues. 
In the introduction of the official document of the EEAS review 
written by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy by July 2013, it can clearly be seen that its most 
important elements are neighbourhood policy, comprehensive 
approach – which ensures Union action in all issues related to 
foreign policy –, and those international questions in which the EU 
can fulfil a leading role. Making these priorities conscious is 
inevitable to make the EU’s interests, values and those tools visible 
that make response to global challenges possible.27 From the above-
mentioned areas and tasks can also clearly be seen where and during 
which provisioning EEAS’ activity is indispensable and 
unquestionable. However, for making its work indispensable in these 
areas, it significantly contributed that elements essential for the 
operation of the organization were realized at the time of its 
formation. Among others, it was obvious that an adequately 
regulated, efficient and last but not least transparent inner system 
                                                            
27 LARIVÉ, H. A. MAXIME: Reflections on the EEAS review (2013), avilable 
at: http://foreignpolicyblogs.com /2013/08/22/reflections-on-the-eeas-revie 
w/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=reflec tions-on-the-
eeas -review [cit. 2013-12-20]. 
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with well qualified, loyal personnel having professional experience 
was necessary in order to form a previously not existing, completely 
new organizational structure and confirm its stability. Thus, at the 
formation of EEAS great emphasis was put on its organisational 
structure and personnel issues. 
3.1. Recruiting the EEAS’ staff – From initial scepticism to present 
professionalism 
EEAS has a very “sophisticated”,28 combined organisation system 
divided into multi-level stages and complex staff, upon which it can 
be reasonably said that this organisation’s bureaucratic culture is 
complex and diverse. At the formation of the organization those 
sceptic voices appeared that the Union’s bureaucracy and together 
with it the number of officials and civil servants would also increase. 
According to early approximations, the staff’s number of this 
organization could be even 5-6000. This number does not necessarily 
mean an oversized bureaucratic apparatus as even Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of a big state has thousands of personnel staff. For 
example, Germany’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ personnel consists 
of 13 600 people.29 Even though the growing of the EU’s 
bureaucratic apparatus is not a real fear as the personnel formation of 
the organisation mainly happened via regrouping and transfer of 
people from other institutions. Hence, two-third of EEAS’s staff 
comes from employees of the Commission’s certain directorates and 
the Council Secretariat, the rest one-third consists of officers and 
diplomats sent from Member States. The schedule of replacements 
connecting to the staff was set to 1st January 2011 by a Council 
                                                            
28 O’ SULLIVAN, DAVID: The EEAS, national foreign services and the future 
of European diplomacy (2012), available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/spee 
ches/060912_dos_epc_seminar.pdf [cit. 2014-01-04] 3. 
29 BROK, ELMAR: Prejudices, Challenges and Potential: an Impartial 
Analysis of the European External Action Service (2011), available at: 
http://www.robert-schuman.eu/doc/questions_europe/qe-199-en.pdf [cit. 
2012-10-04] 5. 
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decision.30 All three personnel segments carry out determined, 
special tasks and are concerned with their share of relevant agenda. 
It emerged as a cardinal question regarding personnel issues that 
upon which competences will be important to send people to the 
organisation of EEAS from the Commission, the Council and 
Member States. Because they expressed their disappointment that 
Member States’ ministry officials would get into EEAS without 
going through that filter they had to get over in order to fill their 
position in the European Union. Furthermore, at the dawn of the 
formation of the organisation, more Member States expressed their 
fears regarding adequate Member States’ representation.31 
Furthermore, later joined Member States mostly feared that earlier 
joined Member States with greater influence could represent 
themselves in greater number in the new European diplomatic 
organisation.32 Regulation on national and sex ratio also resulted in 
displeasure with filling up the staff.  
Determining the process referring to the selection of EEAS’s 
personnel and the task of working out mobility question were 
incumbent on the High Representative, and these procedural 
regulations were laid down in the Council decision. Hence, 
“recruiting” EEAS’ staff was realised based on all these regulations. 
Among others, for instance the fact that besides the professional 
experience the principle of geographical and gender-balance was also 
highlighted, serves to resolve the fears.33  
Knowing the above mentioned problems and questions, the 
review presents on the whole a positive picture about the personnel 
                                                            
30 2010/421/EU Council Decision, Art. 6-7. Furthermore 2010/421/EU 
Council Decision, Art. 7. para. (1) and para. (4). 
31 TRAYNER, JAN: Germany and France dispute Lady Ashton’s ‘excessive’ 
EU powers (2011), available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world /2010/ 
feb/28/germany-france-dispute-ashton-european-powers [cit. 2013-10-05]. 
32 The EU’s new diplomatic service (2010), available at: http://www.eur 
activ.com/future-eu/eus-new-diplomatic-service-linksdossier-309484 [cit. 
2012-09-28]. 
33 2010/427/EU Council Decision, Art. 6. para. (6). 
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issues of the EEAS. This document lays down that the recruiting of 
the EEAS’ staff which is by now 3 417 people happens in a 
transparent process in accordance with34 Article 6 of the Council 
Decision. This means that the recruiting process based on merits 
whilst ensuring adequate geographical and gender balance and 
appropriate substantive representation of Member States in the 
EEAS. Referring to anxieties of the newly joined Member States 
(2004), it can be regarded as a positive thing that while at first they 
were indeed underrepresented regarding personnel joining EEAS 
from the Commission and the Council’s General Secretariat, 
according to present situation, 12 Member States that joined in 2004 
fill in 17.2% of official positions of the establishment plan, and 14% 
of heads of delegation positions are filled in by citizens from newly 
joined Member States.35  
Further cardinal point of the EEAS’ personnel issues is to reach 
gender balance in the service (in the centre in Brussels as well as in 
EU delegations). Achieving these expectations is the High 
Representative’ strong commitment, however, attracting highly-
trained (well qualified) women labour force to senior position raises 
a problem.36 Hence, escalating work which aims at improving 
balance among gender, and taking down possible obstacles that stand 
in the way of women’s professional advancement is formulated as a 
suggestion. Attempt to achieve balance in the organisation cannot 
only be seen regarding gender-balanced and adequate geographical 
representation, as EEAS also aims at decreasing imbalance in the 
number of positions in the Brussels centre and delegations.  
At the formation of the organisation a further problem was that 
how those cases could be remedied in which such professional 
knowledge was needed that EEAS only partially had or did not have 
at all. The solution is obvious: EEAS can apply so called seconded 
                                                            
34 Ibid. 
35 EEAS Review, 2013, 14. 
36 At present, 18% of full leading positions is occupied by women.  
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national experts from Member States.37 Detailed rules regulate on 
these experts’ tasks, period and place of secondment, rights and 
obligations. EEAS has to ensure the principle of equal treatment 
among temporary employees coming from Member States and 
permanent officials (employed for undefined period) in a way that 
EEAS’ whole personnel number’s 60 percent must come from 
permanent officials.  
Though, the revision document only mentions EPSO’s 
competitive examination38 in a short substation, which is hiring equal 
to entering and is part of EEAS’ personnel policy in order to ensure 
permanent officials’ next generation supply. With special regards to 
EEAS personnel’s “varied” combination, EEAS bureaucrats’ high 
level, in the long run common training would be a profitable and 
welcoming solution – which would need continuous consultation 
with Member States and various training providers from higher 
education. As its by-product, even the European identity’s 
strengthening could be expected, as well. The above mentioned 
suggestion would especially be significant regarding that from July 
2013 (besides the European Commission, General Secretariat of the 
Council and Member States’ diplomatic services) other Union 
institutions’ officials have also had the possibility to fill in EEAS 
positions – taking the above already mentioned selection elements 
into account.  
According to my opinion, from certain aspects EEAS could 
profit from professionals and officials coming from the two Union 
institutions and Member States as they supposedly possess the 
appropriate professional experience which adequate integration could 
multiply efficient work. Although, there is a threat that diplomats 
coming from various Member States have difficulties to separate 
themselves from their own national interests. In order to avoid that 
                                                            
37 2012/C 12/04 Decision of the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (23rd March 2011) on determining rules 
referring to seconded national professional to European External Action 
Service.  
38 EPSO: European Personnel Selection Office. 
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threat, the Council Decision determines in a separate chapter that 
“The staff of the EEAS shall carry out their duties and conduct 
themselves solely with the interests of the Union in mind.”39 All these 
expectations guaranteeing that during carrying out the tasks of 
organization, foreign policy elements coherently formulated by the 
Member States are realized – hence contributing to the smooth, clear 
implementation of the EU’s foreign policy. 
Furthermore, as regards personnel resources, there is a possible 
chance to develop a real European diplomatic culture. A younger 
generation building a career in foreign policy, possessing national 
and at the same time EU diplomatic knowledge will be able to 
understand practical relevancies of Member States’ and the EU’s 
global appearances. And they can later apply in order to serve a 
European level, a real European diplomatic culture’s formation.40 
Furthermore, this could even mean the laying down of a European 
identity’s foundation stone. 
3.2. Central administration of the EEAS 
The main arrangements on “Brussels diplomatic bureaucracy’s 
directorate” are contained in Article 4 of July 2010 Council 
Decision. The leadership of the EEAS has plural representation; on 
the one hand, there are four components in the Members of the 
EEAS Corporate Board: Executive Secretary General responsible for 
daily issues, Chief Operating Officer primarily dealing with 
budgetary and personnel administration, and the two Deputy 
Secretary-Generals – Deputy Secretary General for Political Affairs 
and Deputy Secretary General for Inter-institutional Affairs. 
Furthermore, it includes Managing Directors responsible for unique 
geographical and thematic spheres of competences, General of the 
European Union Military Staff, and director of departments of 
                                                            
39 2010/421/EU Council Decision, Art. 6. para. (4). 
40 GRAHAM, AVERY: The EU’s External Action Service: new actor on the 
scene, 2011. http://epceu.webhosting. be/documents/uploads/pub_1223_the 
_european_external_action_service_-_new_actor_on_the_scene.pdf [cit. 
2013-12-30] 1. 
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Common Foreign and Security Policy.41 With the fact that the High 
Representative could select his “team” himself, the still-evolving 
structure’s efficient operation seems to be proved – hence 
contributing to the realisation of the EU’s coherent foreign action. 
However, it comes up as a question whether in reality a multi-person 
leadership like that is required to the service or not. If we take the 
operation of organisation, its structure’s complexity, and the 
complexity of tasks carried out by it as a base, the leadership’s such 
fragmentation is nearly unquestionable. However, limited budget 
available for EEAS, furthermore, concentrated supervision of tasks 
require the logical distribution and dissipation of human resources. 
Thus, the High Representative posits in the document on the 
EEAS revision that in the future it is really unnecessary the parallel 
holding of positions of Executive Secretary General and Chief 
Operating Officer. As regarding the streamline operation of the 
organisation it would be satisfied to merge these two positions in a 
single post of Secretary General. All these would happen with that 
the Secretary General still having his/her own right to select the 
deputy Secretary General him/herself. The established appropriation 
of decreasing the number of Managing Directors standing at the top 
of institutions can also be traced in the document. 42 Although, it is 
true that the rationalisation of EEAS’ top leaders’ structure is only 
considered as a medium-term suggestion in the review document on 
EEAS made by the High Representative.  
3.3. Union delegations 
Besides central administration in Brussels, EEAS’ other main 
components are the delegations carrying out representation in third-
countries and international organisations.43 At the time of the review 
the personnel number of the EEAS has already been mentioned 
(3 147 people), out of which only 1 457 people belong to the centre 
                                                            
41 Diagram of the EEAS’system. Available at: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/ 
background/docs/organisation_en.pdf [cit. 2014-01-30]. 
42 EEAS Review, 2013, 18. 
43 2010/427/EU Council Decision, Art. 1. para. (4) and Art. 4. 
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in Brussels, while 1 960 people work at EU delegations. 
Additionally, about 3 500 Commission employees work at EU 
delegations.44 These EU delegations had belonged to the European 
Commission until the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force. However, 
in Article 221 para. (2) of the Treaty on Functioning of the European 
Union says that “Union delegations shall be placed under the 
authority of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy”. Furthermore, in Article 5 of the 2010 Council 
Decision of establishing the organisation and functioning of the 
EEAS, regulations on delegations can also be found. As a 
consequence of this, during the investigation of delegations, having 
regard to the efficient and timely implementation of the EU’s foreign 
policy, it is important to note the fact that according to the Council 
Decision they can get orders from the Commission, the EEAS and 
the High Representative, as well; which can clearly be regarded as 
the cost of foreign performance capacity. Hence, as delegations mean 
such areas where competences overlapping one another can happen 
occur, it is worth further revising them in the future.  
Focusing on the personnel issues of the delegations, the review 
made by the High Representative drew the attention to the followings 
in relation to heads45 of delegations directing the delegations’ whole 
personnel. Following the change of the rotating presidency’s role46 
                                                            
44 The Union foreign representation system consists of 139 Union 
delegations in 163 third-countries and international organisations, which 
represents that the EU thrives to achieve a completely globally covered 
system. See further: EEAS Review, 2013, 6. and 10-11. At the distribution 
of personnel among the centre and the delegations imbalance can be 
explored, this mainly comes from that at the time of filling up the personnel 
they put more emphasis on the strengthening of delegations. The remedy of 
this problem in the future will be done by a – a still waiting to be worked 
out – new rotational and mobilization policy. See EEAS Review, 2013, 14. 
45 Most important characteristics of Heads of delegations’. See 
2010/427/Council Decision, Art. 5. and EEAS Review, 2013, 17. 
46 This is relevant in a way that rotating presidency had significant role in 
carrying out Union representing tasks in third-countries before the Treaty of 
Lisbon. 
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after the Lisbon Treaty, Union delegations took over the role of the 
rotating presidency in Union representations, hence, the cooperation 
with Member States has more emphasis, which is shown in regular 
(at least monthly) meetings on the level of head of delegations. It 
might be an interesting question that, mainly because of regular 
operational evaluations and administrative and financial 
investigations, how much the full defencelessness of the heads of 
delegations for the High Representative and the Secretary General 
hardens the effective and smooth coordination of delegations. 
However, the fragmentation of leaders of delegations would not be 
successful, either as the fact that orders get to delegations through 
leaders undoubtedly serves efficient work.47 Furthermore, regarding 
Union delegations’ personnel issues, it can be a question whether, as 
the aim is broadening the number of Union delegations to achieve a 
more extended global coverage in the future, these new delegations’ 
personnel will be realised through newer regroupings, or newer 
quotas will be distributed for these delegations, supposedly to the 
disadvantage of other institutions’ personnel.  
3.4. EU Special Representatives48 
Finally, the problem of EUSRs cannot be left without attention 
regarding the personnel issues of EEAS. The Council formed this 
position in relation to concrete crises and/or situations at times when 
back then EU delegations belonged to the Commission, but instead 
of delegations, they mainly stood in strong connection with Member 
States with the intermediation of Political and Security Committee. 
However, with the Treaty of Lisbon, the system of 139 Union 
delegations fell49 under the direction of the High Representative; 
hence, EUSRs (at present 12) form indispensable parts of EEAS.50 
As for the future, EUSRs whole integration into EEAS is formulated 
as a suggestion in such a way so that at the same time their strong 
                                                            
47 EEAS Review, 2013, 15-19. 
48 Hereinafter: EUSRs. 
49 Art. 221. TFEU. 
50 Art. 33. TEU. 
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connection with Member States remains. According to a further 
short-term suggestion in connection with reviewing of the EUSRs’ 
role it is also formed: “Review EUSR mandates and role, to closer 
integrate them into EEAS structures. Revisit the Council guidelines 
on the appointment, mandate and financing of EUSRs.” There is 
another suggestion among medium-term recommendations which 
says the creating a shared services centre to provide logistical, 
procurement and administrative support for all Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and EUSRs.51  
4. FINAL THOUGHTS 
The European External Action Service has proved in its nearly three-
year existence that as the EU’s new diplomatic organisation it 
brought a positive shift towards realising the EU’s more unified and 
more efficient foreign action. It can be said that it plays a central role 
in that the EU can ensure its most efficient performance in questions 
requiring global cooperation. This is confirmed by the document 
proposed by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy in July 2013, which provides an overall 
picture on the system and operation of the EEAS so far, and forms 
short- and mid-term suggestions for the future regarding the system 
and operation of the organisation. However, current study primarily 
emphasises the human resources policy of the service based on and 
in the light of the EEAS Review. It looks back to personnel issues, 
one of the cardinal segments encompassing the formation of the 
service, then it elaborates on and reveals how personnel questions 
creating problems at the formation of the organisation have been 
solved and what kind of suggestions shall serve as solutions for 
problems connected to human resources in the future. The current 
revision document perfectly represents that scrupulously worked-out 
and realised human resource policy has far from negligible 
significance, especially, if it regards an apparatus of thousands. As 
                                                            
51 EEAS Review, 2013, 5, 16, and 18. 
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with a well-organised and coordinated bureaucratic apparatus, EEAS 
could have much more efficient operation than before. Furthermore, 
the High Representative’s revision document is a perfect rehearsal 
for the Organisation’s total reformation in 2014, to such an extent 
that at that time the High Representative will have to come out with 
reform suggestions regarding the whole Council Decision on the 
organization and operation of the EEAS.52 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The meaning of the word ‘media’ is quite widespread nowadays. 
Earlier we could associate it with television, radio, the press, but in 
this century it is impossible to give a correct definition of the word 
‘media’. Thanks to the rapid improvement of technology it has 
further meanings. On the one hand, it means mass media and 
platforms but on the other hand, it means the institutions that manage 
them. Because of this massive improvement in every field of the 
media, law had to be refreshed in order to be effective. The results of 
the legislation were two new acts in the field of media law. These are 
Act CLXXXV of 2010 on Media Services and Mass Media and Act 
CIV of 2010 on Freedom of the Press and Fundamental Rules of 
Media Content. This is also known as “the Media Constitution”. 
Effective regulation on this field is essential. Media is different from 
any other kind of service. It is used for creating cohesion in the 
society. It helps to settle battles between members of the community 
and to spread national and international culture.1 We cannot talk 
about it as a unified, integrated law or codex because the regulation 
includes constitutional, criminal, civil and administrative elements, 
too. The media law is a quasi branch of law because it is a complex, 
heterogene field that changes quickly. 
                                                            
1 KOLTAY, ANDRÁS – NYAKAS, LEVENTE (ed.): A magyar és európai 
médiajog [The Hungarian and the European Media Law], 2012, Complex 
Kiadó, Budapest, 32. 
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In this short essay, I am going to write about commercials, their 
effect on people, but mostly about a newly integrated improvement 
called ‘product placement’. 
A wider category is called ‘embedded advertising’ in legal 
literature. However, in order to be punctual, I have to emphasize that 
there are two different parts: product placement and product 
integration. The first one is a visual or sounding reference of a 
product, brand or service, while integration means when it is really 
integrated into the programme.2 As far as I am concerned, these two 
types are not separated in everyday life. Embedded advertising 
mostly appears in movies and series but nowadays it is not so strange 
if we meet this type of advertising in music clips, novels or computer 
games.  
Consumers today experience more advertising messages than 
they experienced at any other times in history. This phenomenon is 
known as “ad creep”.3 It is normal that people are not patient and 
disrelish commercials, so advertisers and advertising messages have 
to change policy. Facilities of modern technology make it possible to 
record programmes and play them later. That time it is easy to leave 
commercials out. And I have not mentioned online sites – where 
movies can be watched without interruption –, or downloading, so 
far. In the case of commercial channels income from advertisers 
means almost everything for them in order to exist. They need to find 
a compromise. That is why product placement came to mind. 
Erwin Ephron says that the paradox of product placement is: If 
you notice it, it is bad, but if you don’t, it is worthless. The essence 
of product placement can be found in this short sentence. It should 
not be ostentatious but surely it has no sense if nobody recognizes it. 
Gabor Fabricius, creative chief of Republic of Art agency has a 
humorous thesis about good product placement. He says that good 
                                                            
2 FUJAWA, JENNIFER: FCC’s Sponsorship Identification Rules. Ineffective 
Regulation of Embedded Advertising in Today’s Media, in Federal 
Communications Law Journal, Vol. 64. Issue 3. (2012) 551. 
3 SAID, ZAHR: Embedded Advertising and the Venture Consumer, in North 
Carolina Law Review, Vol. 89. Issue 1. (2010) 115. 
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product placement is when you feel the product; logo etc. is only 
accidentally there but you – the viewer – are so clever and skillful to 
notice that, for instance, they use Nokia.4 
Product placement in Hungary is a new implementation that is 
why I picked this topic for this article. When I started the 
examination more phenomena could have been noticed. Firstly, in 
my opinion, the number of warning signs was sometimes massively 
increased without any real product placement. This led me to the 
question: how strict our regulation is regarding this topic? Moreover, 
I would have liked to separate two really similar subjects which are 
product placement and sponsorship. In my opinion, this could be the 
reason of unnecessary warning signs because media services are 
more careful instead of being forced to pay fines. 
At first, I am going to mention Hungarian regulation including 
European Union suggestions and at the end I am going to give some 
details about the new co-regulation system that our country applies. 
2. PRODUCT PLACEMENT IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 
At first, the Union chose the policy to let national laws create their 
own regulation. However, because of technical improvement it 
changed its mind. Today, it has a balancing regulation suggestion; 
advertisers, media services and firms were taken into consideration. 
Audiovisual Media Services (AMS) Directive of European 
Parliament and Council on 10th March 2010 suggested member states 
to provide audiovisual media in their country. This Directive aims at 
producing a framework for cross-border audiovisual media services 
in order to strengthen internal programme production and 
distribution market and to guarantee conditions of fair competition. 
The Directive gives a certain definition of product placement under 
                                                            
4 PAPP-VÁRY, ÁRPÁD: Product placement Reklám a filmekben, 
számítógépes játékokban és a szórakoztatóipar más területein [Product 
Placement – Advertising in Movies, Computer Games and Other Areas of 
the Entertainment Business], 2008, Századvég BKF, Budapest, 42. 
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point ‘m’. It means any form of audiovisual commercial 
communication consisting of the inclusion of or reference to a 
product, service or trade mark which is featured within a programme, 
in return for payment or similar consideration.5 It should be allowed 
under certain circumstances, unless a Member State decides 
otherwise. However, where product placement is surreptitious it 
should be prohibited. The principle of separation should not prevent 
the use of new advertising techniques. The definition of product 
placement laid down in this Directive should cover any form of 
audiovisual commercial communication consisting of the inclusion 
of or reference to a product, a service or a trade mark which is 
featured within a programme in return of payment or similar 
consideration. Product placement should, in principle, be prohibited. 
However, derogations are appropriate for some kinds of programme, 
on the basis of a positive list. 
3. MEDIA LEGISLATION IN HUNGARY 
As I have mentioned it before, product placement has only been an 
element of the legal system since 2010. Act CLXXXV of 2010 on 
Media Services and Mass Media includes and regulates this. Earlier, 
it was not equal to the suggestions of the EU because it was only 
allowed for example in fictional movies, however, it was mostly 
banned.6 The complete ban resulted in a chaotic situation so the 
former Media Authority (ORTT) allowed product placement in some 
cases in its Resolution nr. 258/1997 (XI. 5.).7 According to a survey 
                                                            
5 The Audiovisual Media Services (AMS) Directive of European Parliament 
and of the Council of 10 March 2010. 
6 Act I of 1996 on Radio and Television Broadcasting Art. 10. para. (5). 
7 Art. 2. point a) Product placement is allowed only in fictional movies, free 
and only until it is lifelike. 
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from 86 advertising firms, 30% ordered product placement before the 
new regulation and 70% was clearly aware of the illegal act.8 
It is risky that some provisions of the Directive are applied to 
online media content too, which can negatively affect sponsorship.9 
The two directors of commercial TVs in Hungary agreed with the 
decision of the new regulation. It was necessary to do this in order to 
keep balance between them because if it broke, Hungarian media 
would collapse.10 
Act CLXXXV of 2010 on Media Services and Mass Media 
specialize the regulation in Art. 30-31. 
3.1. Permission or prohibition 
Product placement is prohibited. By way of derogation from the first 
sentence, product placement can be admissible in the following 
cases: in cinematographic works, films and series made for 
audiovisual media services, sports programmes and light 
entertainment programmes or where there is no payment but the 
provision of certain goods or services is free of charge such as 
                                                            
8 For the exact diagram: N. N: Látja? Nem látja? Na látja!: Tabutéma a 
product placement [Do You See? Don’t You See? You See! The Product 
Placement as a tabu], in Kreatív: marketingkommunikációs szaklap, Vol. 
12. No. 3. (2003) 19. 
9 POLYÁK, GÁBOR: A médiapiac szabályozása az új médiatörvényben [The 
Regulation of the Media Market in the New Media Act], in Médiakutató 
Jog rovat, 2011 Spring http://mediakutato.hu/cikk/2011_01_tavasz/03_ 
mediapiac_szabalyozasai/01.html?q=term%C3%A9kelhelyez%C3%A9s#te
rm%C3%A9kelhelyez%C3%A9s [cit. 2013-11-27]. 
10 LAMPÉ, ÁGNES: Médiaszabályozás: pró és kontra Simon Éva, Széky 
János, Hanák András, Polyák Gábor, Koltay András, Nyakas Levente és 
Lapsánszky András a 2010‐es médiatörvény‐csomagról [Media Regulation 
Pro and Con. Éva Simon, János Széky, András, Hanák, Gábor Polyák, 
András Koltay, Levente Nyakas and András Lapsánszky about the Media 
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production props and prizes, with a view to their inclusion in a 
programme. As for the first case, it is not allowed in children’s 
programmes. The Act does not explain what light entertainment 
programmes are but in my opinion a taxative enumeration would be 
impossible. There are special requirements that programmes have to 
meet, like their content and, in the case of television broadcasting, 
their scheduling must in no circumstance be influenced in such a way 
as to affect the responsibility and editorial independence of the media 
service provider; they must not directly encourage the purchase or 
rental of goods or services, viewers have to be clearly informed 
about the existence of product placement. Programmes containing 
product placement must appropriately be identified at the beginning 
and the end of the programme, and when a programme resumes after 
an advertising break, too, in order to avoid any confusion on the part 
of the viewer. By way of exception, it can be left out if the 
programme in question has neither been produced nor commissioned 
by the media service provider itself or a company affiliated to the 
media service provider. 
It is restricted to use product placement in news, political 
programees, especially programmes for minors under the age of 14, 
religious or ecclestic or reports on national celebrations, or official 
events. In any event, programmes must not contain product 
placement of: tobacco products, cigarettes or product placement from 
undertakings whose principal activity is manufacturing or selling of 
cigarettes and other tobacco products; specific medicinal products or 
medical treatments available only on prescription, any gambling 
services for which a state tax authority’s permission is needed, and 
products that may not be advertised pursuant to this Act or other 
pieces of legislation. 
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National Media and Infocommunications Authority and the 
Media Council approved a recommendation about further rules 
which helps to understand the Act and its regulations.11 It is 
contained in this chart, which helps to understand where the use of 
product placement is allowed: 
1. Schedule. 
                                                            
11 Available at: http://mediatorveny.hu/dokumentum/557/product_place 
ment_Rec_EN_130111.pdf [cit. 2013-11-27]. 
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4. CO-REGULATION 
The co-regulation system of the Media Act provides an opportunity 
for self-regulatory organizations to participate in the arrangement of 
cases falling under the competence of the Media Council. It is based 
on the principle of subsidiarity. Self regulation was a basic but 
existed field in the media sector, however, the Authority wanted to 
improve it. This, compared to other types of self-regulations found in 
other sectors and administrative areas (e.g. alternative dispute 
resolution procedures such as conciliation or mediation) is a stronger 
– the strongest possible and still constitutional – authorization. In 
order to achieve the best results, the Authority cooperates with media 
providers, subsidiary media service providers, publishers, 
broadcasters, intermediary service organizations, and professional 
self-regulation of alternative dispute resolving forums. In my 
opinion, it is a really good decision. It helps to solve problems 
together and the Authority has less burden. 
The tasks were split between four professional self-regulating 
organizations: Önszabályozó Reklámtestület (ÖRT), Magyar 
Lapkiadók Egyesülete (MLE), Magyarországi Tartalomszolgáltatók 
Egyesülete (MTE), és a Magyar Elektronikus Műsorszolgáltatók 
Egyesülete (MEME).  
The supervision of the effective and fair use of product 
placement is the task of MEME. 
They signed an administrative contract and there is a codex 
which details the rules of supervision and processes. This 
organization does advertising revenue surveys every year. The 
subject of 2012 was product placement. The diagram below shows 
that incomes from commercials have a decreasing tendency year by 
year, but in this situation, the number of product placement 
increases.  
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1. Figure: Television advertising revenue by type of 
advertisement.12  
4.1. Magyar Elektronikus Műsorszolgáltatók Egyesülete13 
In this article MEME is important because its task is to supervise 
product placement. Purposes of the organization include developing 
ethics and professionalism in work. Its main task is to consult and 
make recommendations in order to take part in legislation and 
economic decisions, reviews and revision. Moreover, it has been 
doing surveys since 2005 under the name of Reklámtorta 
(Commercial Cake). Once or twice a year a slice of interesting 
information is published with researches and surveys.14 
From March of 2012, the head of the organization has been 
Krisztián Kovács. Member can be any public or commercial 
                                                            
12 See http://www.memeinfo.hu/system/files/attachments/reklamtorta_2012 
_2_28_eng_final_v3.pdf [cit. 2013-11-27]. 
13 MEME’s Basic Code of Rules. Available at: www.memeinfo.hu/system/ 
files/alapszabaly_alairt.pdf [cit. 2013-11-27]. 
14 MEME posts the results of its surveys every year under this name. 
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television or radio, or a person who is related to the field of media 
and accepts behavior charter as obligatory.15 Membership is 
voluntary and starts by submitting a written acception. Media 
Authority provides them money to cover co-regulative process. It 
consist one normative and other special allowance.16 
4.1.1. The contract 
It was signed by Levente B. Málnay (MEME) and Annamária Szalai 
(Media Council) on 20th July 2011. The original contract was 
amended on 19th September 2012. Its legacy is based on the 
Behaviour Conduct. The self-regulatory body is not be deemed as an 
administrative authority, or a subject of the system of public 
administration under this authorization.  
The authorization covers the handling of individual cases related 
to undertakings under the scope of the Code, the settlement of 
disagreements and legal disputes – involving the scope of the 
authorization – between undertakings under the scope of the Code, 
and the supervision of the operation and conduct of undertakings 
under the scope of the Code in relation to the authorization. Under 
the administrative contract, Media Council and the self-regulatory 
body can agree on joint performance of tasks and implementing 
principles of activity and service development, programmes of public 
concern not regulated in legislation but closely linked to media 
administration and media policy, and any other objectives related to 
the media. MEME’s authorization includes exercising supervision 
regarding compliance with Articles 14-19 and some parts of Article 
20 of Press Freedom Act, or any of those provisions in relation to 
online press products or on-demand media services.  
                                                            
15 For members of the organisation, see http://www.memeinfo.hu/tagjaink 
[cit. 2013-11-27]. 
16 For exact prices and support, see http://mediatanacs.hu/dokumentu 
m/153678/meme_szerzodes_egyseges_szerkezet_120912.pdf [cit. 2013-11-
27]. 
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4.1.2. Code of Conduct17 
It details the parts of authorization and product placement settled in 
Article 15. 
The rules are balanced with the media Act. It informs us about 
the deliberation e.x. the impact of acts and processes that should be 
taken into consideration. Moreover, society and people’s reputation 
is also important.  
The second part of the Code contains the details of the 
regulatory process. If acts of the Code are broken a 3-member-
comitee is formed to analyze the situation. One of them is a legal 
expert. Two types of committees can be formed: case by case or 
permanent. The procedure can be started upon request or after a 
special supervision ex officio. It is not public and charges have to be 
paid in order to get it started. The person whose rights or legitimate 
interests are compromised by the media content can turn to the media 
service provider and give in his/her request within 30 days. If the 
request is rejected or left without an answer co-regulation can be 
requested within 15 days. 
Possible consequences of the procedures: 
1.  If the request of the first instance is punctual, the co-
regulation organization can call the media service provider to 
make an agreement with the requester within 3 days. If not, 
it has 3 days to make its defense, collect and submit its 
evidences. 
2. If the provider changes or erases the questioned content, 
moreover, promises not to continue that behavior, the 
organization cancels the procedure. 
3. The decision can contain the consequences below: 
a) if it is needed, the organization makes the provider 
change or stop its behavior and demands in integrum 
restitution; 
                                                            
17 See http://mediatanacs.hu/dokumentum/153678/meme_szerzodes_egyseg 
es_szerkezet_120912.pdf [cit. 2013-11-27]. 
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b) the organization can make the provider to give 
compensation equal to the law breaking e.x. that the 
compensation shall be public; 
c) the provider can be forced to provide non-material 
compensation, the payment of the procedure charges, 
or other expenses; 
d) it can withdraw the right to be connected to the 
organization during other procedure for a certain time 
– in that case it will be under the supervision of the 
Media Authority. 
The committee can apply more consequences from the above 
mentioned. 15 days are provided for the possible remedy. The Media 
Council’s supervision can be required. 
5. BLURRED LINES AND DE LEGE FERENDA SUGGESTIONS 
In this chapter I will try to clear the blurred line regarding 
regulations. Some definitions are really similar but mean different 
things. It is easy to mix them because the differences are not well-
stated. 
In Article 1 of Chapter 1 of the AMS Directive we can find 
sponsorship among the Definitions. It means any contribution made 
by public or private undertakings or natural persons not engaged in 
providing audiovisual media services or in the production of 
audiovisual works, to the financing of audiovisual media services or 
programmes with a view to promote their name, trade mark, image, 
activities or products. In my opinion, there are two main differences 
to show which are not clear enough. The first one is the purpose of 
money, the payment. In case of product placement, the purpose is to 
have the product appear in the movie, series etc. On the other hand, 
in the case of sponsorship, they sponsor the whole Programme or 
movie in order to provide promotional service. The other difference 
is the result of the impact and how they try to achieve it. When we 
speak about product placement, the brand, the product is integrated 
into the programme, into the plot, while if it is sponsorship, it can be 
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shown during the programme but never as a part of it. The decisive 
criterion distinguishing sponsorship from product placement is the 
fact that in product placement the reference to a product is built into 
the action of the programme. In contrast, sponsor references may be 
shown during a programme but are not part of the plot. 
The division of editor work and commercial can be felt in the 
case of sponsorship, while product placement is not so strict in that 
case. It has its own rules; it cannot be regulated as other sideway 
commercial types.  
Naturally, it cannot be said that these two institutions exist 
without the other. They both can appear in the same programme even 
with the same product. In Hungary, sponsorship and product 
placement is allowed together even if the sponsor and the product 
placer is the same person, firm; and the product, brand, service or 
logo is the same. In France, there are stricter rules in this case so the 
sponsored product cannot be shown as product placement in the 
same programme. 
As far as I am concerned, the most contentious part of this topic 
is the difference between product placement and surreptitious 
commercial communication. The line is really thin and now, when 
product placement is legally allowed it is easy to make mistakes. Act 
CIV of 2010 on the Freedom of the Press and the Fundamental Rules 
of Media Content in Article 20 states that no surreptitious 
commercial communication may be published in media content. It 
happens when product placement has bigger emphasis than it is 
needed. According to the Recommendation of the Media Council, 
programmes containing product placement may not call for the 
purchase or rental of a product or the use of a service in direct 
manner. Such a “direct call” is any – verbal or visual – intentional 
and clear appeal to purchase, promote or use the product or service 
that is the subject of product placement, especially, the 
communication of the following information in the programme: 
1. publication of commercial availability and price of the 
product/service; 
2. communication of properties/advantages of the 
product/service; 
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3. publication of slogan of the product/service; 
4. mentioning of statements from the product/service’s 
advertisement.  
Programmes containing product placement may not give any 
unjustified emphasis for the product so displayed which, otherwise, 
does not stem from the content of the programme flow.  
Undeniably, there are common roots with surreptitious 
advertising, however, it cannot be said that product placement is a 
surreptitious advertising with a warning call. My questions were 
clarified at the end of my research and a survey conducted in 
commercial channels proved that there are many unnecessary 
precaution warnings without real product placement. I believe that 
the main problem is the lack of information. People are not informed 
enough about the laws and opportunities. Detailed and systematic 
information should be provided for people to work effectively 
because without this the innovative plan of co-regulation will not 
work. It also might be possible that the co-regulatory system – which 
has not been built up in practice overseas – would be given more 
room, the self-regulatory framework would be provided by the law, 
but the content could be created by those organizations. The self-
regulatory organizations are intended to serve utility and involve 
substantial deregulation. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
All in all, product placement is much more popular among producers 
because its effectiveness is better than that of traditional 
commercials’. Because viewers meet products which they choose, it 
is much more likely to accept the commercial and the impression 
will be favorable.18 With the alternative ways of media consumption 
(e.x. DVR) making new ways, product placements will inevitably 
                                                            
18 BEASLEY, ROBERT C.: Royalty Free Permissions for Use of Licensed 
Products in TV or Movie Productions, in Licensing Journal, Vol. 2. Issue 5 
(2006) 37. 
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grow because of their “win win win” nature across relevant 
industries. As Jay May, founder of Feature This! suggested, the 
production of a show or movie (or video game) wins because it gets 
brands for free and can greatly reduce production budgets. Clients 
win because of the relatively inexpensive branding of their product 
(and in some cases, to a very targeted audience [i.e., teen movies]), 
and product placement agency wins as they get paid for bringing the 
parties together.19 
According to the survey of Sonda Ipsos Zrt., 17% of Hungarian 
viewers see brand products every day and the typical age is between 
20-29. It was made in 2011 so I am sure that the numbers are even 
higher now. 
Scott Donaton, a U.S. marketing communications magazine’s 
columnist drew attention to the fact that beside product placement, 
there are still other options for advertising to survive. For example 
BMW’s short film series combine the content and the brand. In the 
20-minute “mini-cinemas” the company’s directors hired famous 
people to promote brands. The innovative solution was not left 
without success; at the International Advertising Festival in Cannes 
they got a Titanium Lion prize.20 We can state that Hungarian 
regulation is in an extremely early stage of development and there is 
a long way ahead of us that began in 2011.  
Finally, I want to mention an American movie entitled the 
Joneses.21 It is about a family who moves into a high income suburb 
under the pretense of being a typical family who lives the American 
dream. In reality, Kate is the leader of a team of stealth marketers, 
professional salespeople who disguise product placement as a daily 
routine. Their clothing, accessories, furniture, and even food are 
                                                            
19 LA FERLE, CARRIE – EDWARDS, STEVEN M.: Product Placement. How 
Brands Appear on Television, in Journal of Advertising, Vol. 35, No. 4 
(2006) 84. 
20 MÁRK, SZONJA: Unalmas product placement [Boring Product Placement], 
in Kreatív: marketingkommunikációs szaklap, Vol. 14. No. 4. (2005) 8. 
21 See http://www.imdb.com/media/rm3528560384/tt1285309 [cit. 2013-11-
27]. 
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carefully planned and stocked by various companies to create 
visibility in a desirable consumer market. The movie is a double 
twist; there are double embedded advertisings while in such a story it 
is impossible to leave products out. Is this just irony and caricature of 
the present situation or do advertisers’ rule the media in reality? 
I will leave this question open because it really makes us think. 
We can conclude that commercials will never vanish, just transform 
and adapt to the new inventions. 
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István HORVÁTH 
Bitcoin’s Role and Position in Financial Relations 
of the 21st Century 
“Wealth is not important, only independence is.” 
André Kostolany 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The use of Bitcoin as currency, – even in this early stage – is some 
kind of pioneer behavior. It only happens because this kind of civil 
initiation has officially been recognized and has an exchange rate to 
USD. But does official recognition matter? Is it needed for the new 
currency to work or is it some kind of disadvantage for the creators 
of this type of money? 
Is the state putting out his “well-wisher” influence to make the 
entry into business easier or to create a new source of income? I am 
looking for an answer to the following question: Can we bypass the 
state in money creation and if we can for how long can we do this? 
What can be the effects of the rise of Bitcoin? 
“As self-professed »digital skeptic« David Golumbia explains, 
Bitcoin is more accurately understood as an ideology than as »cash 
for the internet,« another conceptual shortcut offered by 
proponents.”1 
                                                            
1 Bitcoin: The Cryptopolitics of Cryptocurrencies, Harvard University Press 
Blog. Available at: http://harvardpress.typepad.com/hup_publicity/2014/02/ 
bitcoin-the-cryptopolitics-of-cryptocurrencies-david-golumbia.html [cit. 
2014-02-28]. 
Bitcoin’s Role and Position in Financial Relations of the 21st Century 
129 
2. POSSIBLE CAUSES OF NON-STATE MONETARY EMISSION 
In Hungary, only The Central Bank of Hungary has the right to issue 
currency and every other country has his/her own institutes ruled by 
the law. Yet, citizens try to find other ways to issue money or be 
more independent, which appears more and more in this economic 
situation. 
2.1. Independent currencies – Economic stimulance or 
independence? 
“The bigger part of money is not issued by the State. The previous 
hypothesis was only true for cash. The much larger amount of money 
on bank accounts is the key to the problem. It makes inflation but it 
does not appear on the revenue side of the budget, it does not 
decrease taxes. This one, the 5% reserve ratio is a great magic trick, 
it is the »money multiplier«. It was found out for delusion. It seems 
that emission is in the hands of the State but – as numbers show – it 
does not help the budget, only private parties.”2 
This process led to the emergence of today’s crisis. Since there 
are no reserves behind money, no warrants, if the system collapses 
there will be no one to be asked and no one to stand in the gap. Of 
course – as a last resort – the state is there but may the state be held 
responsible for wealth which was not created by him/her. 
It is a bit like the owners’ responsibility in Hungarian civil 
relations. If the tenant causes damage to a third person, the owner 
can be sued because of the interest of the third party. And how 
internal relationship is held by the owner and the tenant is 
unimportant for outside observers. But is this approach good on 
global scale? I cannot answer this but in my opinion, the 
interpolation process does not result in automatic usability. In fact, 
the current economic situation seems to confirm that this is a 
destructive effect on global palette. 
                                                            
2 Available at: http://rrr100.wikispaces.com/MaganPenzkibocsatas [cit. 
2013-11-10]. 
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2.2. Is absolute privilege of issuing money needed? 
The State’s opinion is certainly yes. This is supported by the fact that 
the U.S. government, in addition to pushing against online piracy, 
immediately went face to face with Bitcoin. The argument is: it is an 
untraceable type of money which is not issued under the State’s 
control and can easily become a black market currency and the tool 
of money laundering. In addition, some U.S. senators said that if 
Bitcoin would reach a critical mass, it could jeopardize the authority 
of the government.  
The initiative does not seem to be able to be successive but it 
already has an example of the U.S. government shutting down a 
quasi-money called E-Gold.3 
3. WHAT MAKES MONEY? 
“Money appears in very different forms in various ages and takes 
countless shapes in these times because of the symbolic and social 
relations by its essence, which is defined by the era and financial 
conditions in a frame. Without social community, there is no money. 
Anybody can experience it when one gets to a country where 
Hungarian currency is not recognized or not recognized as a vain 
attempt to carry out transactions – Forint banknotes are only a piece 
of coloured paper. In contrast, we can use an internationally 
recognized credit card to purchase goods and services.”4 
An object or symbol that performs functions defined within the 
community can be considered as money. The common division of 
these functions are: 
1. value measurement; 
2. traffic tool; 
                                                            
3 CHEREDAR, TOM: Forget piracy, U.S. government is going after Bitcoin. 
Available at: http://venturebeat.com/2011/06/08/government-crackdown-
on-bitcoin/ [cit. 2013-11-10]. 
4 BOD, PÉTER ÁKOS: A pénz világa – a világ pénze [The Money’s World – 
the World’s Money], 2003, KJK-KERSZÖV Jogi és Üzleti Kiadó, 
Budapest, 47. 
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3. tool of payment; 
4. accumulation (savings, treasure) tool. 
The State can only consider “money” as currency if each of 
these four functions is completely satisfied. There may be, however, 
a species of money, cash equivalents and quasi-money, which can 
fulfill certain tasks but not others. Hungarian Forint – although, all 
four functions are completely performed within our borders –
internationally no longer serves everywhere as money by definition. 
“As an economist puts it, »In post-Keynesian monetary theory 
money is anything that will settle a legal contractual obligation. And 
by the civil law of contracts, the government determines what settles 
a legal monetary contractual obligation.« This is the fundamental 
point, critical to all monetary theory, that Bitcoin advocates seem 
unable or unwilling to recognize (and admittedly it is what was until 
now a fairly arcane point of economic theory): the State decides what 
money is, and no assertion otherwise by individuals or groups can 
change that – only the law can.”5 
3.1. Currency Substitution 
There are hundreds of communities around the world whose 
members are only affected by a limited extent of inflation. They do 
not use money but also run an extensive service exchange system. 
The more narrowly interpreted “classical barter” is a trade 
exchange: exchange of goods is not related to money, exchange is a 
simple naturalistic transaction. Goods are usually only associated 
with quantities: one trader sells a specified quantity of goods to 
another trader and it accepts goods in exchange, as well. The 
transaction type is named after the English word around the world.6 
The system worked out by a personal trainer in Canada in the 
early 1980s. The Scottish born Michael Linton found that although 
some people would have offered assistance works for him, if the 
person just had not wanted to be trained, he would have been unable 
                                                            
5 CHEREDAR: op cit. 
6 TÖRZSÖK ÉVA: Barterügylet: Üzlet pénz nélkül? [Barter Agreement? 
Business without Money?], 1993, KJK-KERSZÖV Jogi és Üzleti Kiadó, 
Budapest, 92. 
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to offset. He thought that if he takes a bigger community as a base 
and includes a wide range of services, sooner or later he would have 
somewhere to place his service. He should not have to “repay” the 
same person who provided assistance but through the cycle, we all 
win. Not to mention the fact that these are not only professions that 
come to mind but for example coaching, car repair, child care, letter 
writing and painting, as well. Who knows what else may be needed. 
Linton called his invention Local Exchange and Trading System 
(LETS). 
LETS networks use interest-free local credits, so direct swaps 
are not needed to be made. For instance, a member may earn credit 
by doing childcare (as said) for one person and spend it later on 
carpentry with another person in the same network. In LETS, unlike 
other local currencies, no script is issued, rather transactions are 
recorded in a central location open to all members. As credit is 
issued by the network members for the benefit of the members 
themselves, LETS is considered to be a mutual credit system. Hence, 
no real money is involved, a unit of account, however, must be used. 
This virtual money – which is just information, a credit on the 
account of members –has a variety of names around the world. 
Canada seems to stick to the local money they call Calgary or 
Toronto –which is dollar, in Bath, Great Britain, however, it is called 
Oliver. In Bristol it is called “Thanks”, and the largest LETS 
organization that works with thousands of members in Sidney uses 
the name “Eco”.  
Since the eighties, there has been a modified version, called 
time. The British and the Americans use it and call it “Time Money” 
or “Hours”. In the UK 80 time banks operate, in the United States 
250 organizations like this are held accountable. The initial “favour 
banks” first spread in the southern neighbour of Canada, then quickly 
New Zealand and Australia and it reached Europe, as well. Only 
Netherlands has 100 “favour banks”. 
Most of the quasi money is actually invisible or is only a credit, 
in some places, however, a note was drawn. 
The amount of these local currencies should not be regulated 
from outside because just as much favour money is created as much 
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is needed. No interest and no inflation affects is, except if local 
money is bounded to the State currency. 
Community strengthening by currency substitution: 
1. Actually, not replacing but complementing the currency, 
however, it works in times of recession and high 
unemployment, too. 
2. Character and self-improvement – it seems that community 
needs us. 
3. It encourages responsibility as business partners are 
members of a community. 
4. It is built on local needs. 
5. The community develops skills, resources, community 
strength.7 
3.2. Quasi money in Hungary 
Today’s economic life has been declining and further decline is 
projected. This case made a difficult position for small and medium 
enterprises and private individuals. In the current economic situation, 
businesses and individuals have to operate with relatively high prices 
and with less availability from the right amount of medium of 
exchange (quasi money). 
The use of quasi money in the market increases the amount of 
free exchange (operators are replacing their working capital with 
money substitutes to transact some of their accounts with each other, 
and working capital tied as deposit increases financial institutions’ 
lending capacity), this may improve the liquidity position of 
businesses, hence, demands and satisfaction of needs and capacity 
utilization can be achieved at a higher level, and with this result more 
local services and trade scan come off. 
The initiatives that were recently launched in Hungary in order 
to vivify local currencies and community life use different routes but 
have similar difficulties.8 
                                                            
7 Szívességbankok [Favour Banks]. Available at: http://www.slideshare 
.net/helyipenzek/szvessgbankok-intzmnyestett-kalka-8559607 [cit. 2013-
11-08] 4. 
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3.2.1. “Kékfrank” 
Money: a measure of value, payroll and a store of value. And a 
bogeyman as well, causing all the wrong things. Of course, not 
money in itself is the problem but anomalies and features resulted 
from the incompatibility of the compound money’s characteristics. 
After all, if you withdraw it from the market, it cannot be a medium. 
However, money is needed, no one can dispute its role in economic 
life, only its functions need to be revaluated.9 
This has recently been made by the “Ha-Mi-Összefogunk 
Európai Szövetkezet”, which issued “Kékfrank” voucher. The new 
kind of cash equivalent was introduced in the districts of Sopron and 
its vicinity in the cross-border as well, with the aim of revitalizing 
the economy. 
“Kékfrank” is a quasi-money but can be regarded as local. 
“Kékrank” voucher allows payoff among the members of the civil 
law partnership without the official currency (HUF), and the inventor 
hopes that it will move the economy. 
3.2.2. “Pilisi korona” 
“Pilisi korona” is a virtual exchange tool related to Piliscsaba and its 
surrounding area, which proceeds through a local association but 
membership is not a prerequisite to become a service provider in the 
“exchange club” network ran by the organization. The system 
basically consists of individuals, and exchange funds – products and 
services available for “pilisi korona” – are also out of this circle. 
200-250 people are currently in the system, however, it is true that 
not everyone is active. “Pilisi korona”-s turnover is a storage facility 
                                                                                                                              
8 Helyi piac, közösségi értékteremtés – működik az érme [Local Market, 
Communal Value Creation – the Coin is Working]. Available at: 
http://www.gondola.hu/cikkek/68252 [cit. 2013-11-10]. 
9 ZAGYVA, GABRIELLA: Kékfrank. Available at: http://humusz.hu/kukabuv 
ar/kekfrank [cit. 2013-11-10]. 
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which directly connects the swap of the voucher to the exchange of 
objects and services.10 
3.2.3. “ÉrMe-bankó” 
“ÉrMe-bankó” is not money, it is only a discount ticket. Companies 
belonging to the “ÉrMe” business networks – which is considered as 
reliable and honest by the organization –received the “ÉrMe-bankó 
accepter place” status, they undertook to give (at least) 10 percent 
discount from products and services paid with the ticket.Tickets were 
printed in groups of 10, their value equals to 10 euros (or 
approximately three thousand HUF). This means that the ticket can 
be effectively used if the value of the purchase is at least 30 thousand 
Forints (HUF). This is not a problem because most of the tickets are 
used by firms in business-to-business relations. Primarily, companies 
acquire it themselves (for 50 thousand HUF annual registration fee) 
but an amount is given to wider circle of “ÉrMe club” members as 
well, and as payment for volunteers. Now, the first year of 
implementation is beyond the coins, while the network has printed 
about half of the 100 thousand bills.11 
3.2.4. “Balatoni Korona” 
The Balaton regions’ money substitute ticket was released in 22nd 
March 2012 by Tibor Navracsics, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister 
of Public Administration and Justice. 
“Balatoni Korona” is the first system that works with majority 
government involvement. The issuer of the voucher is “Balatoni 
Korona” Ltd., which consists of seven municipalities: Veszprém, 
Várpalota, Balatonfüred, Balatonalmádi, Litér, Tihany and 
Nemesvámos together with County Chamber of Industry and Kinizsi 
Bank.  
The local currency is designed to boost the economy in the 
region, plus, it is a source of liquidity to ensure financial market 
                                                            
10 Helyi piac, közösségi értékteremtés – működik az érme [Local Market, 
Communal Value Creation – the Coin is Working]. Available at: http:// 
www. gondola.hu/cikkek/68252 [cit. 2013-11-10]. 
11 Ibid. 
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participants. It is planned that within one – one and half years, there 
are going to be about three hundred locations in the region where 
they will have to accept the payment with “Balatoni Korona”.12 
4. BITCOIN 
4.1. Definition, BitCoin Mining 
As we have seen before, we cannot count the number of alternative 
financial systems, virtual currencies or digital cash.13 
Bitcoin system’s mode of operation is unique compared to 
direct competitors and has reached a critical mass, when we need to 
deal with it. Uniqueness is because of what, for the first time, it is 
worth considering what differentiates it from any other digital 
currencies: 
1. There is no one behind it: no multinational companies, well-
known banks, not even a country. It is an independent, open, 
decentralized international system. 
2. It is well documented, transparent, it has a public protocol, 
its client software is an open source, its database is 
distributed and the connection to the system is peer-to-peer. 
3. Those are not the individual transactions which are 
confidential but the true identity of users. Instead of names 
and account numbers, here we only find long, nonsensical 
addresses composed of numbers, which can vary by 
transaction. Users can hardly be traceable or can be even 
completely anonymous within the system. 
4. Bitcoins (as known as BTC) may be obtained in several other 
ways as well: 
a) We can provide a service if we sell a product for BTC. 
                                                            
12 Bevezették a Balatoni Korona utalványt [The Balaton Korona Bill has 
established]. Available at: http://www.metropol.hu/gazdasag/cikk/863118 
[cit. 2013-11-10]. 
13 Flattr, metacurrency, Open Bank Project, Ripple, virtual currencies of 
video games (most well known is the Second Life’s Linden Dollar), and the 
PayPal. 
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b) We can buy BitCoin for dollar, euro or pound from 
one of the international retailers (e.g. Hill Trade, 
Britcoin, MtGox). 
c) We can “mine” Bitcoin either individually or in 
association with others if we have an appropriate 
hardware and can pay the electricity bill.14 
“A number of people have tried to identify the creator of Bitcoin 
– so far without success. Satoshi Nakamoto, after having published 
the foundations of a revolutionary electronic transaction management 
system in mid-2010, disappeared from the Internet. His published 
writings including typical British and distinctively American 
formulations of words, so many people suspect that behind the 
pseudonym there is actually a group of mathematicians, hackers and 
programmers.”15 The system was found out in a way that when we 
are engaged in the operation, we can earn Bitcoins. 
Bitcoin is interesting because it is a completely digital currency 
only existing on computers. In order to use it, we do not need 
anything else, we just have to download the client software, which is 
actually a digital wallet. 
4.1.1. How does mining work? 
“Mining is a distributed consensus system that is used to confirm 
waiting transactions by including them in the block chain. It enforces 
a chronological order in the block chain, protects the neutrality of the 
network, and allows different computers to agree on the state of the 
system. To be confirmed, transactions must be packed in a block that 
fits very strict cryptographic rules that will be verified by the 
network. These rules prevent previous blocks from being modified 
because doing so would invalidate all following blocks. Mining also 
creates the equivalent of a competitive lottery that prevents any 
individual from easily adding new blocks consecutively in the block 
chain. This way, no individuals can control what is included in the 
                                                            
14 See http://bitcoins.hu/index.htm [cit. 2013-11-05]. 
15 HARANGOZÓ, CSONGOR: Megéri-e bitcoint bányászni? [Is it Worth to 
Mine Bitcoin?]. Available at: http://www.chiponline.hu/2013/07/09/megeri-
e-bitcoint-banyaszni/ [cit. 2013-11-05]. 
Bitcoin’s Role and Position in Financial Relations of the 21st Century 
138 
block chain or replace parts of the block chain to roll back their own 
spends.”16 After we have joined, the only thing left for us is to leave 
the PC on and run the program. 
4.2. The road, its current position 
Without the usual fundamental factors of traditional foreign 
currencies, most Bitcoin exchange rates are affected by news, 
rumours, current state of battle with regulators, closing a BTC 
exchange or re-opening or starting a new Bitcoin start-up. Overall, 
demand for the virtual currency spectacularly runs up when the focus 
of attention in international media is on Bitcoin. 
On 29th October 2013, the first BTC Exchange called Coin floor 
opened in London. Initially, only British and European customers 
could trade with this virtual money.17 
In the Dutch EMG Factors bar guests may pay with Bitcoin, no 
wallet, only a phone is needed. In order to provide guests with a 
virtual currency to pay certain sums, specially invented POS18 
terminals were installed in the place. Customers select what they 
want to drink, scan the corresponding QR code with their phone and 
the purchase is carried out.  
While it was not the Dutch Bitcoin POS system which was the 
first one in the world and the currency was first not used for real-
time, personal pay, this could be a leading practice, since the special 
NUVOPOS terminal can be introduced anywhere in the future.19 
“In Canada, people have been able to use the world’s first 
Bitcoin ATM, through it they can switch BTC to real money and 
vice versa. The vending machine has been installed in downtown 
Vancouver by Robocoin on which ten thousand dollars in cash flow 
                                                            
16 How does Bitcoin work? Available at: https://bitcoin.org/en/how-it-works 
[cit. 2013-11-05]. 
17 FALEY, STEPHEN: New UK Bitcoin exchange to bar clients, in Financial 
Times. Available at: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8223d270-3fe3-11e3-
a890-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2jmdJa3Ku [cit. 2013-11-05]. 
18 Point of Sale. 
19 Bitcoin – mobile payment. Available at: http://nuvopos.com/bitcoin/ [cit. 
2013-11-05]. 
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occurred during the first 81 transactions. The daily transaction limit 
is 3000 dollar now.”20 
After two huge rallies, the currency has worth more than 800$ 
for a single unit. This means that roughly 60 times more one than a 
year ago. According to many, Bitcoin is overpriced and worthless but 
as Bank of America analysts say, its fair value is around 1,300$. 
Although, it is still mainly considered as an investment, long term 
daily use of accounting unit may mean the fundamentals, which can 
make the virtual financial system viable. The world’s regulators 
increasingly monitor the independent virtual money: some countries 
prohibit its usage, others see the potential.21 
Russian authorities have issued warnings against using Bitcoin, 
saying the virtual currency could be used for money laundering or 
financing terrorism and that treating it as a parallel currency is 
illegal. »Systems for anonymous payments and cyber currencies that 
have gained considerable circulation – including the most well-
known Bitcoin – are money substitutes and cannot be used by 
individuals or legal entities, « the Russian Prosecutor General’s 
Office said on 6th February. It added that Russian law stipulates that 
ruble is the sole official currency and the introduction of any other 
monetary unit or substitute was illegal. On 27th January, Russia’s 
central bank also said that Bitcoin trade was highly speculative and 
the unit carried a big risk of losing value. 
Bitcoin community in the United States is far more developed 
than the one in Russia, it has already come under intense scrutiny as 
                                                            
20 Itt az első Bitcoin ATM [Here is the First Bitcoin ATM]. Available at: 
http://hu.socialdaily.com/articles/2013/10/31/itt-az-elso-bitcoin-atm [cit. 
2013-11-05]. 
21 TURZÓ, ÁDÁM PÁL: Felemelkedőben a virtuális pénzügyi rendszer? [Is 
the Virtual Financial System Rising?]. Available at: http://www.portfolio 
.hu/vallalatok/felemelkedoben_a_virtualis_penzugyi_rendszer.193436.html 
[cit. 2014-01-04]. 
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authorities crack down on illegal activity carried out using digital 
currency.”22 
4.3. How secure it is? 
Bitcoin was not designed for large institutions and central banks do 
not have influence over it. Hence, Bitcoin can flow freely between 
users’ machines. We will save the bank commissions, transfers are 
fast and we can only make transactions from our digital wallet, we 
do not need to be afraid from a government or a financial institution 
to lock our money. Of course, Bitcoins can be stolen, so we need to 
take care of them just like traditional physical funds. The only 
problem is that the value of Bitcoins fluctuates very frequently. In 
January 2013, they gave14 dollars for one unit, on 10th April when 
the rate peaked, this amount was 266 dollars, then suddenly it 
plunged to 50. On02/11/2014 it moves around 750 dollars. 
The Bitcoin story has only begun. Well-known investment 
gurus such as the Winklevoss brothers believe in the future of digital 
currencies. In the previous quarter, a total of seven major 
investments were made in America by venture capital investors in 
the value of 12 million dollars, which amount is much higher 
compared to the period preceding the quarter of a 2 million 
investment.23 
Bitcoin’s theoretical and mathematical foundations are laid 
down very well, they are stable and reliable. The identification of 
account holders, transactions, logging and monitoring is made with 
known, well-established, – currently – unhackable cryptographic 
methods.24 
For example, to use someone’s private signature key for 
transactions – to transfer Bitcoins to our account– a 48 digit number 
needs to be found out. The used algorithms, data storage methods, 
network protocols are tested and there are proven solutions or great 
                                                            
22 Russian authorities say Bitcoin is illegal. Available at: http://www.busi 
nessinsider.com/russian-authorities-say-bitcoin-is-illegal-2014-2 [cit. 2014-
02-10]. 
23 TURZÓ: op. cit. 
24 SHA-256, RIPEDM-160, ECDSA. 
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innovations. The system is pretty well protected against DoS attacks, 
for example if someone wants to transfer very small amounts, he has 
to pay much higher transaction fees (0.01 BTC), so it would be very 
expensive for a large scale attack. 
Safety of the infrastructure is more problematic, the services are 
not integral parts of the system. More pools (= mining companies) 
have also been down for hours or days because of attacks, most 
recently, the largest Bitcoin exchange (MtGox) users’ access data 
was stolen by hackers. With time, of course, it gets better from this 
point of view, users learn from their mistakes and will prefer a more 
reliable service.25 
The European Banking Authority (EBA) have issued a warning 
to highlight the possible risks people may face when buying, holding 
or trading virtual currencies such as Bitcoin. Virtual currencies 
continue to hit the headlines and are enjoying increasing popularity.  
However, you need to be aware of the risks associated with 
virtual currencies, including losing your money. No specific 
regulatory protections exist that would cover you for losses if a 
platform that exchanges or holds your virtual currencies fails or goes 
out of business.26 
For example MtGox, the big Japan-based exchange, is 
temporarily halting all withdrawals as it faces technical issues. They 
sent a note to clients. They cannot serve so many various 
withdrawals at the current technical level and it is said that the 
system needs to be in a static state for a while. They temporarily 
pause all withdrawal requests. Because of this, the exchange rate of 
Bitcoin made a huge fall from 780 dollars to about 670 dollars on 2nd 
February 2014.27 
                                                            
25 See http://bitcoins.hu/index.htm [cit. 2013-11-05]. 
26 EBA warns consumers on virtual currencies. Available at: http://www. 
eba.europa.eu/-/eba-warns-consumers-on-virtual-currencies [cit. 2014-02-
07]. 
27 Russian authorities say Bitcoin is illegal. Available at: http://www.busi 
nessinsider.com/russian-authorities-say-bitcoin-is-illegal-2014-2 [cit. 2014-
02-10]. 
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There is no doubt that mining is not so big of a deal than before 
but with relatively little energy and cash investments a high profit 
can be generated and because it is independent from any state, – 
there are no charged commissions, taxes–it is a good way of wealth 
accumulation and storage or it can be when the market becomes 
stabilized. 
4.3.1. What does this financial security mean? Best way of 
treasuring? 
The best object for saving is preserving quality for a long time. What 
belongs to the essence of savings is when the market operator does 
not immediately want to trade his wares or income to goods or 
activities of others but wants to retain the ability to consume later. 
The question is how much this saving tool will be worth later, 
whether it actually retains its value or not. In traditional societies 
there are stable exchange rates of commodity money but it may vary 
depending on the nature of abundance and scarcity of the chosen 
wares. The value of saving (accumulation) tool should not fluctuate 
in addition to physical characteristics of the device.28 
Since the U.S. Securities Commission (SEC) announced that 
Bitcoin is a currency, U.S. regulators are dealing more and more with 
it. It can be used as money; goods and services can be bought for it 
and it can be changed to another currency such as dollar, Japanese 
yen, euro and Yuan. The only limit is in the few accept places. 
Despite the high exchange rate and volatility, a crowd of “early 
adopter” merchants have joined the Bitcoin accepting network. In 
addition to the estimated tens of thousands of online traders, now 
some physical traders accept it, as well. Collection sites– 
coinmap.org – info says that there are nearly 2,200 shops around the 
world where we can pay with Bitcoin; in Hungary there are 6 places 
which are not online merchant or service providers. In Hungary, a 
dentist, an exhibition hall, three hotels and a server provider accept 
payment in Bitcoin. 
                                                            
28 BOD: op. cit. 50. 
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4.3.2. Risks 29 
The EBA has identified several characteristics and risks that people 
should be aware of when buying, holding, or trading virtual 
currencies.  
You may lose your money on the exchange platform. If an 
exchange platform loses any money or fails, there is no specific legal 
protection – for example through a deposit guarantee scheme – that 
covers you for losses arising from any funds you may have held on 
the exchange platform, even when the exchange is registered with a 
national authority.  
Your money may be stolen from your digital wallet.30 Once you 
have bought virtual currency it is stored in a ‘digital wallet’, on a 
computer, laptop or smart phone. In addition, if you lose the key or 
password to your digital wallet, your virtual currency may be lost. 
When using virtual currencies as a means to pay for goods and 
services you are not protected by any refund rights under EU law 
offered, for example, for transfers from a conventional bank or other 
payment account. Unauthorized or incorrect debits from digital 
wallet can therefore not usually be reversed. 
You should be aware that holding virtual currencies may have 
tax implications, such as value added tax or capital gains tax. You 
should consider whether tax liabilities apply in your country when 
using virtual currencies.3132 
                                                            
29 EBA warns consumers on virtual currencies. Available at: http://www. 
eba.europa.eu/-/eba-warns-consumers-on-virtual-currencies [cit. 2014-02-
07]. 
30 This is the reason of the shutting down of Flexcoin – a Canadian Bitcoin 
stock exchange – on March 3. 
31 The Japanese government will set rules for trading Bitcoins, defining the 
virtual tender not as a currency but as a commodity akin to gold. 
Significantly, the guidelines will call for taxing Bitcoin transactions. 
Purchases made in Bitcoins will be subject to Japan’s consumption tax, 
which is set to rise to 8% on April 1. Trading gains will be taxed, and 
companies will need to pay tax on revenue earned from Bitcoin 
transactions. But enforcement could prove difficult, as tax authorities will 
have to track down users. 
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5. FUTURE OF BITCOIN (AND QUASI MONEY), CONCLUSIONS33 
5.1. Bitcoin helps average people 
According to Wences Casares’s – growing up in Argentina – 
opinion, the same thing happens today as it happened in Argentina 
back then. People are desperately looking for a tool, a reserve to 
preserve or transfer their money into and for something which will 
not lose its value and the government cannot take it away. One of 
these tools can be Bitcoin. Casares, among other banking 
professionals, agrees that this money can be a tool that will help 
restore damaged and compromised Latin American and Asian banks. 
5.2. Bitcoin is too complicated and will remain the same for some 
time 
Mike Hearn – Google engineer – develops applications for Bitcoin in 
20 percent of his time. He and Bennett Hoffman – former Microsoft 
Engineer – agree that the system that creates Bitcoin is stable and 
secure but for the average user it is too complicated and it surely will 
be like that for some time. 
5.3. Bitcoin will be regulated 
The U.S. Department of the Interior seized the locked property of the 
owner of MtGox – the largest Bitcoin exchange –, saying that the 
stock market and the “money” indicate serious security risks and 
support black economy. 
Surprisingly, Bitcoin supporters welcomed the government’s 
increasing intervention. The Ribbit Capital – one of the major 
Bitcoin investors – says that the regulation is not only inevitable but 
also desirable. Other Bitcoin Funds also stated that they are less 
                                                                                                                              
32 Japan to regulate Bitcoin trades, impose taxes. Available at: 
http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/Japan-to-regulate-
Bitcoin-trades-impose-taxes [cit. 2014-03-06]. 
33 The three futures of Bitcoin: Three predictions form experts. Available at: 
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-05-20/the-future-of-bitcoin-
three-predictions-from-experts#p1 [cit. 2013-11-08]. 
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attracted by the more liberal ideas and imagine rational and well-
defined rules for the new currency. 
The virtual currencies volatility is raising a vicious circle 
problem: it is considered by many as a serious impediment to the 
widespread of Bitcoin adoption but the hectic movement of price 
scan be reduced trough its spread in everyday usage, thus, 
confirming Bitcoin’s accounting unit role, which is perhaps the most 
important foundation. A much more liquid exchange market would 
also help in the treatment of this problem. 
In the long term, widespread everyday usage can guarantee the 
rise of Bitcoin along with a virtual, independent financial system. 
While many governments do not like the spread of Bitcoin and 
its popularity, Singapore tax authorities have decided to recognize 
the virtual money. They released a clever booklet for Bitcoin traders 
about how to manage tax obligations in that regard.34 
The tax office gives comprehensive and detailed information on 
how to manage profits, trading and tax. Singapore-based Bitcoin 
broker, Coin Republic welcomed this guide, which means that at 
least they are aware of their obligations. 
For example, if we pay for a product or a service with Bitcoin, 
we need to pay tax. Bitcoin trade also generates, as well as in stock, 
so you have to pay the usual taxes after that. 
“Nobel Laureate economist Robert Shiller is on a panel at 
Davos about digital trends in financial markets. Almost immediately 
he started talking about Bitcoin. He says that he finds it to be an 
»inspiration« because of the computer science. But he is not into it as 
an economic advance. As a currency, he says it is a return to the 
Dark Ages.”35 
                                                            
34 Singapore Tax Authorities (IRAS) Recognize Bitcoin and Gives Guidance. 
Available at: http://coinrepublic.com/singapore-tax-authorities-iras-recog 
nize-bitcoin-and-gives-guidance/ [cit. 2014-01-08]. 
35 WEISENTHAL, JOE: Robert Schiller: Bitcoin is an amazing example of a 
bubble. Available at: http://www.businessinsider.com/robert-shiller-bitcoin-
2014-1 [cit. 2014-01-24]. 
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The International Regulation of Private Security 
Providers – a Brief Analysis 
1. INTRODUCTIONS 
“Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one 
holds his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor 
safe; for they are disunited, ambitious and without discipline, 
unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies…”1 – 
writes Machiavelli in his groundbreaking work, The Prince, giving 
substratum to numerous thinkers of contemporary international 
literature, who are concerned with the outsourcing of military and 
security activities.2 However, reality requires unfolding another side 
of the question, namely that private security providers do not follow 
the heritage of mercenaries. By national financing, they end such 
conflicts that must not unfold.3 To be faced with this, the present 
study is intended to lay down that the private military and security 
contractors (hereinafter: private security providers) shall not be 
considered in the terms of public international law, as mercenaries 
because they only meet the definition’s – which is hard law in the 
                                                            
1 MACHIAVELLI, NICCOLÓ: The Prince, 2008, Sterling Publishing, New 
York, 120. 
2 See GULAM, HYDER: The rise and rise of Private Military Companies. 
Available at: http://media.peaceopstraining.org/theses/gulam.pdf [cit. 2014-
03-12] 3. 
3 BEUTEL, M. DEE: Private Military Companies: Their emergence, 
importance, a call for global regulation (thesis). Available at: http:// 
princess.digitalfreaks.org/thesis/beutelmdthesis.pdf [cit. 2014-03-12] 10. 
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context of international treaties4 – conjunctive conditions a few 
times.5 So they are not mercenaries in terms of public international 
law but Machiavelli’s thoughts could be word-paint in connection 
with private security providers. 
The last decades have seen an enormous explosion in the use of 
private security providers by governments, industry, the United 
Nations and humanitarian organizations.6 Meanwhile, the 
                                                            
4 Three international treaties deal with the notion of mercenaries: 1.) 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 
Geneva, 1977, UN Reg. No. 17512.; 2.) Organization of African Unity 
Convention for the elimination of mercenarism in Africa, Libreville, 1977, 
UN Reg. No. I-25573.; and 3.) International Convention Against the 
Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, New York, 1989. 
december 4., UN Reg. No. 37789. that was meant to be universal. 
5 For more details, see KÁLMÁN, JÁNOS: Mercenaries reloaded? 
Applicability of the notion of ‘mercenaries’ in relation to private military 
companies and their employees, in Acta Juridica Hungarica, Vol. 54. No. 4. 
(2013) 367-383. 
6 “The expansion was in large part a byproduct of the post-Cold War peace 
dividend. The downsizing of national militaries increased the supply of 
soldiers-for-hire. Equally important, the end of the Cold War and 
dissolution of the Soviet Union did not bring about an end to international 
conflict. Forces to confront new, unfamiliar threats, nations that had 
downsized their militaries suddenly found themselves shorthanded. They 
needed to supplement their now-modest, in-house capabilities.” See 
MICHAELS, JON D.: Private Military Firms, the American Precedent, and the 
Arab Spring, in Stanford Journal of International Law, Vol. 48. No. 2. 
(2012) 280. See for more details FARKAS, ÁDÁM – HORVÁTH, LÍVIA: 
Zuhanó pályán csúcsra járatva? Gondolatok a védelmi tevékenységek 
kiszervezésének történetiségéről [Some Thoughts on the History of Security 
Outsourcing], in De iurisprudentia et iure publico, Vol. 7. No. 3. (2013) 25-
43.; FARKAS, ÁDÁM: A régi és az új harca: a védelmi tevékenységek 
kiszervezése [The Struggle Between Old and New: The Outsourcing of 
Defence], in Közjogi Szemle, Vol. 6. No. 2. (2013) and FARKAS, ÁDÁM: A 
védelmi tevékenységek kiszervezésének elméleti és felelősségi 
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accountability of these companies and their personnel – not to 
mention states’ responsibility – for violations of human rights, such 
as the Blackwater massacre in Nisour Square7 and the torture of 
detainees in Abu Ghraib8 have not kept pace. This clearly shows that 
this subject is critical and problematical in various relations. 
Let us not forget that the claim to legitimate violence has long 
been understood to be the exclusive domain of states, as the German 
sociologist, philosopher, and political economist, Max Weber 
defined the state as an entity which successfully claims the 
“monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
territory”.9 Mercenaries and private security companies challenge 
this neat schema, a challenge that has achieved greater significance 
due to the rise in the usage of private forces following the end of 
Cold War.10 
Taking the abovementioned phenomena into consideration, this 
study briefly analyses the existing but deficiant international 
regulation of private security providers (2. Regulations of public 
international law – hard law) and the increasing non-binding 
regulations (3. “Regulations” of international soft law). The 
international community to protect human rights should regulate this 
area of warfare not only at the field of soft law but at the field of 
public international law, as well as at the field of domestic law. This 
                                                                                                                              
alapproblémái [Theoretical Problems and Responsibility Issues of Defence 
Outsourcing], in Közjogi Szemle, Vol. 6. No. 4. (2013). 
7 See TIEFER, CHARLES: No More Nisour Squares: Legal Control of Private 
Security Contractors in Iraq and After, in Oregon Law Review, Vol. 88. No. 
3. (2009) 745-775. 
8 See AMANN, DIANE MARIE: Abu Ghraib, in University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review, Vol. 153. (2005) 2085-2141. 
9 WEBER, MAX: The vocation lectures, 2004, Hackett Publishing, 
Indianapolis, 33. 
10 CHESTERMAN, SIMON – LEBNARDT, CHIA: Form mercenaries to market: 
The rise and regulation of private military companies (Introduction), in 
Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series Working Paper, No. 07-
09. (2007) 1. 
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paper indicates the most important parts of the potential international 
regulation (4. Back to public international law). 
2. REGULATIONS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW – HARD LAW 
Some researchers suggested that private security providers function 
in the “grey area” of public international law.11 Under “grey area” 
they meant that private security providers’ operation is partly 
regulated and partly they operate freely. This conclusion is simply 
false if we systematically analyse the regulations of public 
international law. The regulation of private military providers rests 
on two pillars: a.) international human rights law and b.) 
international humanitarian law. International human rights law and 
international humanitarian law (hereinafter: IHL) are two distinct but 
complementary bodies of international law. IHL is applied in armed 
conflicts, while human rights law is applied at all times, either in 
times of peace or war. 
Obviously, there is no – at the present – specific international 
legal regime for the regulation of private security providers. Thus, 
when considering existing regulations of public international law, the 
following distinction should be drawn. “On the one hand, it has to be 
taken into account to what extent the current international legal 
regime contains principles and rules that may directly or indirectly 
affect the use of private military companies in certain cases. Only 
then, on the other hand, after having ascertained existing standards, 
can the development and enhancement of these legal regimes be 
tackled successfully, not only on international level but also by 
                                                            
11 See LIU, HIN-YAN: Leashing the Corporate Dogs of War: The Legal 
Implications of the Modern Private Military Company, in Journal of 
Conflict & Security Law Vol. 15. Issue 1. (2010) 159.; CRAWFORD, EMILY: 
The Civil-Military Interface in 21st Century Armed Conflict – Private 
Military Contractors and the Principle of Distinction, in Sydney Law School 
Research Paper, No. 11/45. (2011) 3. 
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incorporating general international legal standards into more detailed 
national legislation.”12 
With no claim of being exhaustive, some of the most important 
international regulations are emphasized in detail, which can refer to 
private security providers. 
First of all, at the field of international human rights, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereinafter: UDHR) shall 
be firstly highlighted. UDHR, which was adopted by the UN General 
Assembly on 10 December 1948,13 is generally and widely 
considered to be the foundation of international human rights law. 
Though it seems non-binding because it was adopted by a General 
Assembly resolution, the vast majority of the UDHR’s articles have 
customary law effect, and that is the reason it is often referenced as 
the authoritative legal source and a constraint on private behaviour. 
This argumentation closely interlinks a number of articles relevant to 
private security services, including Article 3 (right to life), Article 5 
(prohibition on torture), Article 7 (equal protection under the law), 
Article 9 (prohibition on arbitrary arrest and detention), Article 10 
(fair and public hearing) and Article 11 (1) (presumption of 
innocence), as well. 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights14 
(hereinafter: ICCPR),15 commits signatory states to respect the 
classical civil and political rights of individuals. These classical 
rights include the right to life (Art. 6.), prohibition of torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Art. 7) right to 
liberty and security (Art. 9.) and equality before courts and tribunals 
(Art. 14.). These rights could be violated by any agents or company 
employees providing military or security services, including private 
security providers. The Optional Protocol to ICCPR, also adopted in 
                                                            
12 KEES, ALEXANDER: Regulation of Private Military Companies, in 
Goettingen Journal of International Law, Vol. 3. No. 1. (2011) 201. 
13 UN Resolution A/RES/217 (III). 
14 Adopted in 1966 and entered into force on 23 March 1976. 
15 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, New York, 16 
December 1966, UN Reg. No. 14668. 
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1966, sets up systems for the Human Rights Committee to receive 
and consider claims from individuals who may be victims of human 
rights violations by any signatory states. In connection with private 
security providers, the Human Rights Committee expressed that “the 
State is, thus, responsible for ensuring that delegated activities are 
carried out in full conformity with its international obligations, 
particularly human rights obligations.”16 
Some international human law treaties on special regulatory 
areas should be mentioned, while the international regulation of 
private military providers shall be analysed. The Convention Against 
Torture (hereinafter: CAT),17 prohibits the use of torture or any other 
inhuman or degrading treatment in attempting to obtain information 
from a suspect. According to Art. 2. of CAT, each State Party shall 
take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures 
to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction, so 
CAT demands national regulation. It is one of the most important 
declarations to be observed by military and security officials in the 
exercise of their duty and accountability. CAT established the 
Committee Against Torture, which can consider individual 
complaints and complaints about torture from one state about 
another. Just to give an example regarding the role of the Committee, 
it investigated the torture of detainees in Abu Ghraib,18 which was 
also subject to investigation and judicial procedure in the United 
States. Finally, the study mentions the International Convention for 
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance 
                                                            
16 International Legal Protection of Human Rights in Armed Conflict, 
United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissions, New York 
and Geneva, 2011, available at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Public 
ations/HR_in_armed_conflict.pdf [cit. 2014-03-12] 3. 
17 Adopted in 1984, entered into force in 1987. 
18 Shadow Report – Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 27 July 2007. Available at: 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CAT/Shared%20Documents/AUS/INT_ 
CAT_NGO_AUS_40_8014_E.pdf [cit. 2014-03-12]. 
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(hereinafter: Convention),19 which was adopted both by the Human 
Rights Council and the UN General Assembly by consensus in 2006 
and entered into force in December 2010. According to Art. 1. of the 
Convention, no one shall be subjected to enforced disappearance. 
Thus, the Convention identifies enforced disappearance as a self-
standing human rights violation, prohibits secret detention and 
establishes the rights of families to get information about what has 
happened to their relatives and about the location of their relatives 
who have been detained. States being part of the Convention must 
incorporate a specific crime of enforced disappearance into their 
national laws, investigate complaints and reports of enforced 
disappearance and bring those responsible to justice.20 
International humanitarian law – as the other pillar of 
international regulation of private security providers – is a set of 
rules which seek, for humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects of 
armed conflicts. The Hague Conventions of 1907 were among the 
first formal statements of laws of war and war crimes. The Hague 
Convention on Neutral Powers21 restricts neutral states from 
providing either direct or indirect assistance to warring states; in 
particular, belligerents cannot move troops or convoys or either 
munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral state 
(Art. 2.), neither corps of combatants can be formed nor recruiting 
agencies can be opened in the territory of a neutral state (Art. 4.). In 
this context, the term ‘combatants’ does not have the same meaning 
as in – later mentioned – Geneva Conventions of 1949. It is a much 
broader term; therefore, this provision can also apply for the case of 
                                                            
19 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance. New York, 20 December 2006. UN Reg. No. 48088. 
20 See http://psm.du.edu/international_regulation/generally_applicable_inter 
national_law.html [cit. 2014-03-12]. 
21 Hague Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral 
Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land. Hague, 18 October 1907. 
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private security providers’.22 In accordance with Art. 5., neutral 
states are obliged to prevent and punish “acts in violation of its 
neutrality unless the said acts have been committed on its own 
territory”. According to Art. 6., neutral states can only escape from 
the responsibility if people from their territory are “crossing the 
frontier separately to offer their services to one of the belligerents.” It 
has been suggested that the Hague Convention thus prevents states 
from allowing private military and security firms to incorporate or 
operate from their territory. 
The core regulation of private military providers in the field of 
IHL is based on the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two 
Additional Protocols of 1977. The Geneva Conventions separate 
combatants from civilians and protects those who do not or no longer 
directly participate in hostilities: civilians and people taken captive in 
military conflicts (prisoners of war). The debate is going on in 
literature whether private military providers are lawful or unlawful 
combatants (mercenaries) or whether they are civilians under the 
Geneva Conventions.23 The question cannot be satisfactorily 
answered and this ambiguous situation shall not allowable in armed 
conflicts. Today, most parts of the Geneva Conventions and their 
Additional Protocols are regarded as customary international law 
binding on all states and all parties of conflicts, including private 
security providers operating in the conflict zone. 
The International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, 
Financing and Training of Mercenaries was adopted by UN General 
Assembly in 1989 and came into force in 2001. This Convention 
tries to give a broader concept of mercenaries than the Additional 
                                                            
22 VÉGH, KÁROLY: ‘Warriors for Hire?’ – Private Military Contractors and 
the International Law of Armed Conflicts, in Miskolc Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 5. No. 1. (2008). 
23 See RIDLON, DANIEL P.: Contractors or illegal combatants? The status of 
armed contractors in Iraq, in Air Force Law Review, Vol. 62. (2008) 192-
253. and KIDANE, WON: The status of private military contractors under 
international humanitarian law, in Denver Journal of International Law & 
Policy, Vol. 38. (2010) 361-420. 
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Protocol I., the Convention criminalizes their use and prohibits states 
from recruiting, using, financing or training mercenaries. The 
Convention is not self-executing and requires transformation into 
national legislation.  
Finally, even though it is not an international treaty, the Draft 
Articles of State Responsibility shall be emphasized which were 
adopted by the International Law Commission (ILC) in 2001. 
According to Art. 5. of the Draft Articles, “the conduct of a person or 
entity which is not an organ of the State under article 4 but which is 
empowered by the law of that State to exercise element if the 
governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State under 
international law, provided the person or entity is acting in that 
capacity in the particular instance.” Thus, if a State avails services of 
private security providers, it is responsible for the acts that private 
security providers commit. 
To summarize the abovementioned treaties and draft articles, we 
cannot accept the theory that private security providers operate in a 
grey zone but it is true that private security providers’ operation zone 
is not clearly defined by international legal norms. The regulations 
of international human law and international humanitarian law exist 
and also refer to private security providers. The main problem is that 
in default of a specific legal regime, limits and guidelines for the use 
of private security providers or contractors have to be deducted from 
the abovementioned general international treaties. Such rules are not 
only those that reserve certain functions explicitly for state organs 
but in other cases, states may have to exercise ‘due diligence’ in a 
way that a private security provider must be supervised by state 
organs. The problem is that it is up to states and their national 
administration to implement these general rules by adopting effective 
legislative and administrative measures that govern the use of private 
security providers in detail.24 In spite of the necessity of national 
regulation, we can say that it barely exists. As Maidment says, states 
have to face with the major risks of inadequacy, inapplicability and 
ineffectiveness of the domestic regulation of the private security 
                                                            
24 KEES: op. cit. 201. 
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industry.25 Since private security providers are much more 
complicated than a simple armament sale, they should have a more 
detailed process for the approval of their contracts.26 
The Human Rights Council, which is the successor of the UN 
Commission on Human Rights, established in 2006, realized this 
problem and in 2010 it adopted resolution 15/2627 by which it 
decided “to establish an open-ended intergovernmental working 
group with the mandate to consider the possibility of elaborating an 
international regulatory framework, including, inter alia, the option 
of elaborating a legally binding instrument on the regulation, 
monitoring and oversight of the activities of private military and 
security companies, including their accountability, taking into 
consideration the principles, main elements and draft text as 
proposed by the Working Group28 on the use of mercenaries as a 
means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the 
right of peoples to self-determination.”29 
                                                            
25 MAIDMENT, ERICA: New legal aspects of Canadian involvement in the 
private military industry, in Canadian Law Library Review, Vol. 35. No. 2. 
(2010) 72. 
26 BEUTEL: op. cit. 42. 
27 Open-ended intergovernmental working group to consider the possibility 
of elaborating an international regulatory framework on the regulation, 
monitoring and oversight of the activities of private military and security 
companies. A/HRC/RES/15/26. 
28 The Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating 
human rights and impeding the exercise of the rights of peoples to self-
determination (hereinafter: Working Group) was established in July 2005, 
pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 2005/2. It succeeded 
the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the use of mercenaries, which had 
been in existence since 1987 and was serviced by Mr. Enrique Bernales 
Ballesteros (Peru) from 1987 to 2004 and Ms. Shaista Shameem (Fiji). 
29 A/HRC/RES/15/26. point 4. 
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3. “REGULATIONS” OF INTERNATIONAL SOFT LAW 
As this short outline illustrates, international human law and IHL 
provides a regulatory framework for private security providers and 
their employees but no detailed regime exists – in public 
international law – which could ensure law enforcement, imple-
mentation of international law, transparency of private security 
providers and mostly the oversight mechanism over their operation. 
To face with the increase in the use of private security providers 
(Afghanistan, Iraq, Arab Spring, etc.), the rise of injury of rights by 
the operation of private security providers and the absence of 
detailed international regulations, in recent years, significant efforts 
have been taken to enhance the regulatory framework applicable to 
private security providers and their employees. These efforts have 
taken place at international, domestic, industry and company levels – 
leading to the emergence of a disorganized and decentralized 
regulatory framework.30 Few have sought to understand, analyse or 
assess the regulatory framework applicable to the private security 
and military industry.31  
In this paper, the author would like to analyse only one direction 
of this decentralized regulatory framework. This is a very practical 
process which was launched by the Swiss government and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (hereinafter: ICRC) in 
2006 which is called as the Swiss Initiative. The Swiss Initiative 
                                                            
30 RICHEMOND-BARAK, DAPHNÉ: Regulating War: A Taxonomy in Global 
Administrative Law, in European Journal of International Law, Vol. 22. 
No. 4. (2011) 1028. 
31 DE NEVERS, RENÉE: (Self) Regulating War?: Voluntary Regulation and 
the Private Security Industry, in Security Studies, Vol. 18. No. 3. (2009) 
479-516; and COCKAYNE, JAMES: Regulating private military and security 
companies: The content, negotiation, weaknesses and promise of the 
Montreux Document, in Journal of Conflict & Security Law, Vol. 13. No. 4. 
(2009) 401-428. 
The International Regulation of Private Security Providers – a Brief 
Analysis 
159 
started with the Montreux Document,32 continued with the 
International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers 
(hereinafter: ICoC)33 and was completed with the establishment of 
the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service 
Providers’ Association (hereinafter: ICoCA).34 
3.1. The Montreux Document 
The Montreux Document – as it is mentioned before – is the result of 
an initiative launched jointly by Switzerland and the ICRC. The 
drafting of the Montreux Document was based on the work of four 
intergovernmental meetings which took place between January 2006 
and September 2008. 
The Montreux Document provides the clearest statement to date 
legal norms and business administrative and regulatory practices that 
shape the relationship between states and private security providers.35 
The Montreux Document was developed with the participation of 
governmental experts and representatives of civil society and the 
private military and security industry also consulted in it. Currently, 
there are 50 states36 that support the Montreux Document,37 17 states 
jointly finalised the document on the occasion of a concluding 
                                                            
32 The Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations 
and Good Practices for States related to Operations of Private Military and 
Security Companies during Armed Conflict (hereinafter: Montreux 
Document) adopted on September 17, 2008 and presented the UN General 
Assembly, see A/63/467-S/2008/636. Available at: http://www.icrc.org/eng 
/resources/documents/misc/montreux-document-170908.htm [cit. 2014-03-
12]. 
33 Available at: http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/INTERNATIONAL_CO 
DE_OF_CONDUCT_Final_without_Company_Names.pdf [cit. 2014-03-
12]. 
34 Available at: http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/ICoC_Articles_of _Associ 
ation.pdf [cit. 2014-03-12]. 
35 COCKAYNE: op. cit. 402.  
36 See Figure 1. 
37 The last three states that joint to the Montreux Document are: Czech 
Republic, Luxemburg and Japan. 
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meeting in Montreux, Switzerland, on 17 September 2008.38 It has to 
be mentioned that besides states, the European Union, the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization also joined the Montreux Document. 
The preface of the Montreux Document makes it clear that 
certain well-established rules of international law apply to states in 
their relations with private military and security companies and their 
operation during armed conflict, in particular under IHL and human 
rights law. The Montreux Document recalls existing legal obligations 
of states and private security providers and their personnel (Part 
One) and provides states with good practices to promote compliance 
with IHL and human rights law during armed conflicts (Part Two). 
Furthermore, the preface suggests that the Montreux Document is not 
a legally binding instrument and does not affect existing obligations 
of states under customary international law and under international 
agreements. The Montreux Document should therefore not be 
interpreted as limiting, prejudicing or enhancing in any manner 
existing obligations under international law, or as creating or 
developing new obligations under international law. 
So, the Montreux Document is built on two pillars, each with 
different status, sources and scope. On one hand, Part One provides 
a conservative statement of lex lata, so this part summarizes the 
pertinent international legal obligations relating to private security 
providers. It has a narrow scope because it refers to the operation of 
private security providers during armed conflicts and was drafted 
relying on traditional international law sources.39 It is very important 
that the statements are drawn from various IHL and human rights 
agreements and customary international law. Each state is 
responsible for complying with the obligations it undertook pursuant 
to international agreements to which it is a party, subject to any 
reservations, understandings and declarations made as well as to 
                                                            
38 Afghanistan, Angola, Australia, Austria, Canada, China, France, 
Germany, Iraq, Poland, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, Ukraine and United States of America. 
39 COCKAYNE: op. cit. 404-405. 
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customary international law. Part One ascertains the obligations of 
contracting states,40 territorial states,41 home states,42 all other states43 
and even private security providers and their employees.44 On the 
other hand, Part Two only reflects ‘good practice’ and not law. The 
good practices are intended, inter alia, to assist states to implement 
their obligations under IHL and human rights law.45 It provides a 
non-exhaustive compendium of illustrative good practice for states 
discharging their existing legal obligations that is why it has a much 
more expansive scope.46 
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in its 
Recommendation 1858 (2009) recommends that the Committee of 
                                                            
40 E.g. contracting states are responsible to implement their obligations 
under international human rights law, including by adopting such legislative 
and other measures as may be necessary to give to these obligations. To this 
end they have the obligation, in specific circumstances, to take appropriate 
measures to prevent, investigate and provide effective remedies for relevant 
misconduct of PMSC’s and their personnel. 
41 E.g. territorial state have an obligation, within their power, to ensure 
respect for international humanitarian law by PMSC’s operating on their 
territory. 
42 E.g. home state have an obligation to enact any legislation necessary to 
provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be 
committed, grave breach of the Geneva Conventions and, where applicable, 
Additional Protocol I., and have an obligation to search for persons alleged 
to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches 
and bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before their own 
courts. 
43 E.g. all other states have an obligation, within their power, to ensure 
respect for international humanitarian law. 
44 E.g. the status of the personnel of PMSC’s is determined by international 
humanitarian law, on a case by case basis, in particular according to the 
nature and circumstances of the functions in which they are involved. 
45 E.g. determination of services; procedure for the selection and contracting 
of private security providers; criteria for the selection of private security 
providers; terms of contract; monitoring compliance and ensuring 
accountability. 
46 COCKAYNE: op. cit. 405. 
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Ministers, on behalf of the Council of Europe, shall support the 
Montreux Document, which sums up legal obligations under existing 
international law and best practices related to PMSCs’ activities and 
calls on member states that have not already done so, to endorse it.47 
The Working Group has welcomed the effort to clarify states’ 
commitments in international law and good practices related to 
operations of private security providers and considered the Montreux 
Document useful in recalling existing obligations of states under IHL 
and international human rights law.48 The Working Group believes, 
however, that the Montreux Document failed to address the 
regulatory gap in the responsibility of states with respect to the 
conduct of private security providers and their employees. One of the 
problems is that the initiative only represents part of the wide 
spectrum of countries and their approaches. The Swiss Initiative has 
not been as broad a consultative process as it is required under the 
UN system. For example, states form Latin America and the 
Caribbean region did not participate in work and the unbalanced 
representation of Western Group States denotes the heavy 
involvement of countries where most of the security industry 
originates and operates form. Neither UN departments, nor the 
Working Group took part in the initiative. Another problem is that 
the Montreux Document places heavier burden of responsibility on 
“territorial states” (states where private security providers operate) 
than on “contracting states” or “home states” from where these 
companies originate from or where they operate. Furthermore, there 
are no provisions in the Montreux Document referring to that states 
should strengthen government standards for procurement, 
                                                            
47 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1858 
(2009) Private military and security firms and erosion of the state monopoly 
on the use of force. 
48 RONA, GABOR: A tour de horizon of issues on the agenda of the 
Mercenaries Working Group, in Minnesota Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 22. No. 2. (2013) 336. 
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contracting and management of private security providers and 
security industry backed by an effective reporting mechanism.49 
Not just the Working Group but key NGO’s, who were involved 
in the process, raised certain concerns. E.g. the Amnesty 
International stated that some relevant and well-established 
propositions of international human rights law were not fully 
reflected in the Montreux Document, including states’ obligation to 
protect and apply the standards of ‘due diligence’.50 
Despite of the critics, by interpreting and applying existing 
international legal obligations to private security providers, the 
Montreux Document began to extract them from their not clearly 
defined operation zone and served as an exemplar for the 
interpretation of other existing laws. 
3.2. ICoC and ICoCA 
In response to industry demands – building on the foundation of the 
Montreux Document – to develop international standards for private 
security providers, the Swiss government and the ICRC launched 
another initiative to develop an International Code of Conduct for 
Private Security Service Providers which articulates clear standards 
for private security providers based on international human rights 
law and IHL, as well as to develop an independent oversight and 
compliance mechanism to provide effective sanctions when they 
breach ICoC.51 The ICoC was signed by 58 private security providers 
                                                            
49 Report of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of 
violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to 
self-determination. UN Doc. A/HRC/10/14 (21 Jan. 2009) 42-48. 
50 See Amnesty International Public Statement on the Montreux Document 
on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States 
related to the Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during 
Armed Conflict. Available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ 
IOR30/010/2008/en/5bca5962-99de-11dd-bf88-f59215f3db50/ior30010200 
8en.pdf [cit. 2014-03-12]. 
51 BUZATU, ANNE-MARIE – BUCKLAND, BENJAMIN S.: Private military & 
security companies: Future challenges in security governance, in DCAF 
Horizon 2015 Working paper, No. 3. (2010) 23. 
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from fifteen countries at a signing ceremony in Geneva on 9 
November 2010. By signing it, companies publicly affirmed their 
responsibility to respect the human rights of, and to fulfil 
humanitarian responsibilities towards all those affected by their 
business activities. According to the Preamble, signature of the ICoC 
is the first step in a process towards full compliance. Signatory 
companies need to: (1) establish and/or demonstrate internal 
processes to meet the requirements of the Code’s principles and 
standards deriving from the Code; and (2) once the governance and 
oversight mechanism is established, become certified by and submit 
to ongoing independent auditing and verification by that mechanism. 
Companies having signed it undertake to be transparent regarding 
their progress towards implementing the Code’s principles and the 
standards deriving from the Code. 
The ICoC sets-out human rights based principles for the 
responsible provision of private security services. These include 
rules for the use of force; detention; prohibition of torture or other 
cruel or degrading treatment or punishment; human trafficking and 
other human rights abuses; prohibition of slavery and forced labour; 
prohibition on the worst forms of child labour; discrimination etc. 
and specific commitments regarding the management and 
governance of companies, including how they select and vet 
personnel and subcontractors; training of personnel; manage 
weapons and handle grievances internally.  
ICoC has proved to be popular in the industry and on 10 April 
2014, 708 companies have signed onto it.52 While the number of the 
signatory companies in itself a significant accomplishment, the 
process of translating the ICoC’s principles into enforceable 
standards has just begun. From the beginning, the ICoC process 
foresaw the establishment of an independent mechanism for 
governance and oversight. 
                                                            
52 See Figure 2. and see The International Code of Conduct for Private 
Security Service Providers Signatory Companies. Available at: http://www 
.icoc-psp.org/uploads/Signatory_Companies_-_September_2013_-_Compos 
ite_List-1.pdf [cit. 2014-03-12]. 
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To have power in the “norms” of ICoC, at September 2013, the 
International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service 
Providers’ Association was established. The purpose of this 
Association is to promote, govern and oversee the implementation of 
ICoC and to promote the responsible provision of security services 
and respect for human rights and national and international law in 
accordance with ICoC.  
Membership in ICoCA shall be divided into three membership 
categories reflecting stakeholder pillars: Private Security Companies 
and Private Security Service Providers pillar, civil society 
organization pillar and the government pillar.53 Private security 
providers shall be eligible for membership upon certification under 
ICoCA’s treaty Article 11. 
According to Article 11, ICoCA shall be responsible for 
certifying under ICoC that a company’s systems and policies meet 
the Code’s principles and the standards deriving from the Code and 
that a company is undergoing monitoring, auditing and verification, 
including in the field. ICoCA shall be responsible for exercising 
oversight of Member companies’ performance under the ICoC, 
including thorough external monitoring, reporting and a process to 
address alleged violations of the code. If ICoCA determines that 
corrective action is required to remedy non-compliance with the 
ICoC, ICoCA shall request a Member company to take corrective 
action within a specific time period. Should a Member company fail 
to take reasonable corrective action within the period specified by 
ICoCA, or fail to act in good faith in accordance with these Articles, 
then ICoCA shall initiate suspension proceedings in accordance with 
these Articles. In the compliance process, if, after further 
consultation with the complainant and the Member company, ICoCA 
considers that the Member company has failed to take reasonable 
corrective action within a specified period or cooperate in good faith 
                                                            
53 The ICoCA comprises 6 states (Australia, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom and United States of America), 150 companies, and 13 
civil society organizations. 
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in accordance with this Article, it shall take action, which may 
include suspension or termination of membership. 
If we analyse international processes – which were mainly 
influenced by the Swiss Initiative – we can say that ICoC is a very 
successful attempt regarding the regulation of private security 
providers. Much more successful than UN’s draft regulation,54 which 
contains very far-reaching obligations and restrictions for states that 
exceed current standards under international law. “It seeks to extend 
existing legal obligations and to increase restrictions. As far as it 
restricts the use of private contractors, this approach seems to be in 
conflict with the actual practice and the evident opinion of a large 
number of states regarding that the employment of contractors is 
generally a sovereign decision of the state.”55 
Even if the legal nature of ICoC is only considered to be an 
international soft law, major clients of private security contractors 
have already begun to reference the Code in their contracts. The UN 
Security Management System’s ‘Guidelines on the Use of Armed 
Security Services from Private Security Companies’56 makes 
mandatory requirement for possible selection regarding that private 
security providers must be member companies in ICoC. States are 
also beginning to incorporate ICoC into national legislation. The 
Swiss Parliament considered a draft Federal Act on Private Security 
Services Provided Abroad (hereinafter: Draft Act) in 2013.57 Art. 7 
of the Draft Act regulate the adherence to the International Code of 
Conduct for Private Security Service Providers. This Article says that 
companies shall have an obligation to become signatories to ICoC. 
                                                            
54 Draft of a possible Convention on Private Military and Security 
Companies (PMSCs) for consideration and action by the Human Rights 
Council. UN Doc. A/HRC/WG.10/1/2. 
55 KEES: op. cit. 211. 
56 Available at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Mercenaries/WG/ 
StudyPMSC/GuidelinesOnUseOf ArmedSecurityServices.pdf [cit. 2014-03-
12]. 
57 See http://www.ejpd.admin.ch/content/dam/data/sicherheit/gesetzgebung 
/sicherheitsfirmen/entw-e.pdf [cit. 2014-03-12]. 
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Furthermore, according to Art. 14, the competent authority shall 
prohibit in full or in part the exercise of an activity by a company 
that does not comply with the provisions of ICoC. Recently, also the 
US Department of State indicated that “(a)s long as the ICoC process 
moves forward as expected and the association attracts significant 
industry participation, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) 
anticipates incorporating membership in the ICoC Association as a 
requirement in the bidding process for the successor contract to the 
Worldwide Protective Services (WPS) program.”58 In light of these, 
the present study must conclude that legally non-binding nature of 
ICoC is starting to change and, as its rules become a reference point 
to the states, it evolves into harder international law. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
According to Buzatu and Buckland, “(i)n times of increasing security 
threats – both public and private – which affect states and a multitude 
of private actors as well as decreasing state capacity to meet those 
threats, the trends to use private military and security companies will 
likely continue to increase and shape international security. In 
defiance of the traditional paradigm of state-centric security, these 
private security actors pose real challenges to effective regulation of 
their services, particularly accountability for violations of human 
rights and remedies to victims.”59 While the Montreux Document, 
the ICoC and the ICoCA are important initiatives, these do not 
address the key issue of accountability and responsibility. As a non-
governmental instrument which is not legally-binding and is not 
backed by State criminal and administrative sanctions, it cannot 
address the essential human rights issues of accountability for private 
security providers and their employees who commit human rights 
and IHL abuses.  
                                                            
58 See http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/08/213212.htm [cit. 2014-03-
12]. 
59 BUZATU – BUCKLAND: op. cit. 24. 
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As we could see, the legally non-binding nature of ICoC is 
starting to change and evolve into harder international law. In my 
interpretation, the regulations of ICoC – in the long term – could 
transfer into new international regulations, most likely in the form of 
a new international convention. This future convention suggests 
initiatives to private security providers to formulate an industry-wide 
legally binding code of conduct, which would set appropriate human 
rights perspective, standards and guidelines, with punitive measures. 
According to this convention, every state must review their legal 
system and have to implement the conventions’ regulation into their 
domestic law. This convention should establish an agency, which 
role would be to monitor private security contractors’ operation and 
the conventions’ implementation in domestic law, also its role would 
be to set up an international register. It would be important to 
consider that the abuses of IHL and international human law by 
private security providers shall be placed under the jurisdiction of 
International Criminal Court. 
Unfortunately, reality suggests another direction. In the 
foreseeable future the establishment of an international binding 
instrument that regulates the abovementioned themes in detail is 
unlikely. That is why the implementation and further specification of 
requirements imposed by international law should be achieved in 
domestic law, mainly regarding administrative, civil and of course, 
criminal law. In this context, the role of the European Union should 













Figure 1. Participating States of the Montreux Document60 
 
Figure 2. Number of ICoC Signatory Company Headquarters per 
Country61 
                                                            
60 Available at: http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/intla/humlaw/ 
pse/parsta.html [cit. 2014-03-12]. 
The International Regulation of Private Security Providers – a Brief 
Analysis 
170 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Books, chapters in a book, articles 
[1] AMANN, DIANE MARIE: Abu Ghraib, in University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review, Vol. 153. (2005). 
[2] BUZATU, ANNE-MARIE – BUCKLAND, BENJAMIN S.: Private military & 
security companies: Future challenges in security governance, in 
DCAF Horizon 2015 Working paper, No. 3. (2010). 
[3] CHESTERMAN, SIMON – LEBNARDT, CHIA: Form mercenaries to 
market: The rise and regulation of private military companies 
(Introduction), in Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series 
Working Paper, No. 07-09. (2007). 
[4] COCKAYNE, JAMES: Regulating private military and security 
companies: The content, negotiation, weaknesses and promise of the 
Montreux Document, in Journal of Conflict & Security Law, Vol. 13. 
No. 4. (2009). 
[5] CRAWFORD, EMILY: The Civil-Military Interface in 21st Century 
Armed Conflict – Private Military Contractors and the Principle of 
Distinction, in Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 11/45. (2011) 
[6] DE NEVERS, RENÉE: (Self) Regulating War?: Voluntary Regulation and 
the Private Security Industry, in Security Studies, Vol. 18. No. 3. 
(2009). 
[7] FARKAS, ÁDÁM: A régi és az új harca: a védelmi tevékenységek 
kiszervezése [The Struggle Between Old and New: The Outsourcing 
of Defence], in Közjogi Szemle, Vol. 6. No. 2. (2013). 
[8] FARKAS, ÁDÁM: A védelmi tevékenységek kiszervezésének elméleti és 
felelősségi alapproblémái [Theoretical Problems and Responsibility 
Issues of Defence Outsourcing], in Közjogi Szemle, Vol. 6. No. 4. 
(2013). 
[9] FARKAS, ÁDÁM – HORVÁTH, LÍVIA: Zuhanó pályán csúcsra járatva? 
Gondolatok a védelmi tevékenységek kiszervezésének történetiségéről 
[Some Thoughts on the History of Security Outsourcing], in De 
iurisprudentia et iure publico, Vol. 7. No. 3. (2013). 
                                                                                                                              
61 Updated 1 February 2013, available at: http://www.icoc-psp.org/ [cit. 
2014-03-12].) 
The International Regulation of Private Security Providers – a Brief 
Analysis 
171 
[10] KÁLMÁN, JÁNOS: Mercenaries reloaded? Applicability of the notion of 
‘mercenaries’ in relation to private military companies and their 
employees, in Acta Juridica Hungarica, Vol. 54. No. 4. (2013). 
[11] KEES, ALEXANDER: Regulation of Private Military Companies, in 
Goettingen Journal of International Law, Vol. 3. No. 1. (2011). 
[12] KIDANE, WON: The status of private military contractors under 
international humanitarian law, in Denver Journal of International 
Law & Policy, Vol. 38. (2010). 
[13] LIU, HIN-YAN: Leashing the Corporate Dogs of War: The Legal 
Implications of the Modern Private Military Company, in Journal of 
Conflict & Security Law, Vol. 15. Issue 1. (2010). 
[14] MACHIAVELLI, NICCOLÓ: The Prince, 2008, Sterling Publishing, New 
York. 
[15] MAIDMENT, ERICA: New legal aspects of Canadian involvement in the 
private military industry, in Canadian Law Library Review, Vol. 35. 
No. 2. (2010). 
[16] MICHAELS, JON D.: Private Military Firms, the American Precedent, 
and the Arab Spring, in Stanford Journal of International Law, Vol. 
48. No. 2. (2012). 
[17] RICHEMOND-BARAK, DAPHNÉ: Regulating War: A Taxonomy in 
Global Administrative Law, in European Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 22. No. 4. (2011). 
[18] RIDLON, DANIEL P.: Contractors or illegal combatants? The status of 
armed contractors in Iraq, in Air Force Law Review, Vol. 62. (2008). 
[19] RONA, GABOR: A tour de horizon of issues on the agenda of the 
Mercenaries Working Group, in Minnesota Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 22. No. 2. (2013). 
[20] TIEFER, CHARLES: No More Nisour Squares: Legal Control of Private 
Security Contractors in Iraq and After, in Oregon Law Review, Vol. 
88. No. 3. (2009). 
[21] VÉGH, KÁROLY: ‘Warriors for Hire?’ – Private Military Contractors 
and the International Law of Armed Conflicts, in Miskolc Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 5. No. 1. (2008). 
[22] WEBER, MAX: The vocation lectures, 2004, Hackett Publishing, 
Indianapolis. 
Electronic sources 
[1] Amnesty International Public Statement on the Montreux Document on 
Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for 
The International Regulation of Private Security Providers – a Brief 
Analysis 
172 
States related to the Operations of Private Military and Security 
Companies during Armed Conflict. Available at: http://www.amnesty. 
org/en/library/asset/ IOR30/010/2008/en/5bca5962-99de-11dd-bf88-
f59215f3db50/ior30010200 8en.pdf [cit. 2014-03-12]. 
[2] BEUTEL, M. DEE: Private Military Companies: Their emergence, 
importance, a call for global regulation (thesis). Available at: 
http://princess.digitalfreaks.org/thesis/beutelmdthesis.pdf [cit. 2014-
03-12]. 
[3] Guidelines on the Use of Armed Security Services from Private 
Security Companies. Available at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents 
/Issues/Mercenaries/WG/ StudyPMSC/GuidelinesOnUseOf ArmedSec 
urityServices.pdf [cit. 2014-03-12]. 
[4] GULAM, HYDER: The rise and rise of Private Military Companies. 
Available at: http://media.peaceopstraining.org/theses/gulam.pdf [cit. 
2014-03-12]. 
[5] International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers 
Available at: http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/INTERNATIONAL_ 
CODE_OF_CONDUCT_Final_without_Company_Names.pdf [cit. 
2014-03-12]. 
[6] International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’ 
Association. Available at: http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/ICoC 
_Articles_of _Associ ation.pdf [cit. 2014-03-12]. 
[7] International Legal Protection of Human Rights in Armed Conflict, 
United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissions, New 
York and Geneva, 2011, available at: http://www.ohchr.org/Docume 
nts/Public ations/HR_in_armed_conflict.pdf [cit. 2014-03-12]. 
[8] Shadow Report – Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 27 July 2007. 
Available at: http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CAT/Shared%20 
Documents /AUS /INT_CAT_NGO_AUS_40_8014_E.pdf [cit. 2014-
03-12]. 
[9] The Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations 
and Good Practices for States related to Operations of Private 
Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict. Available at: 
http://www.icrc.org/eng /resources/documents/misc/montreux-docum 
ent-170908.htm [cit. 2014-03-12]. 




[1] Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts, Geneva, 1977, UN Reg. No. 17512. 
[2] Draft of a possible Convention on Private Military and Security 
Companies (PMSCs) for consideration and action by the Human 
Rights Council. UN Doc. A/HRC/WG.10/1/2. 
[3] Federal Act on Private Security Services Provided Abroad. Available 
at: http://www.ejpd.admin.ch/content/dam/data/sicherheit/gesetzge 
bung /sicherheitsfirmen/entw-e.pdf [cit. 2014-03-12]. 
[4] Hague Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral 
Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land. Hague, 18 October 1907. 
[5] International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and 
Training of Mercenaries, New York, 1989. december 4., UN Reg. No. 
37789. 
[6] International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance. New York, 20 December 2006. UN Reg. No. 
48088. 
[7] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, New York, 16 
December 1966, UN Reg. No. 14668. 
[8] Organization of African Unity Convention for the elimination of 
mercenarism in Africa, Libreville, 1977, UN Reg. No. I-25573. 
 
Posterior Norm Control in Hungary after the Abolition of Actio Popularis 
174 
Roland KELEMEN 
Posterior Norm Control in Hungary after the 
Abolition of Actio Popularis 
“The commission of the Constitutional 
Court cannot be judged alone, based only 
on the statutory list. The determinant factor 
is the method of the commission’s practice, 
and it depends on a lot of legislative 
condition and on the purpose of the 
court.”1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Act No. XXXII. 1989 on the Constitutional Court, which came into 
force on 30th October 1989, called an institute to life which had not 
had previous model in our public law arrangement. Previously, the 
Administrative Court (founded on 1st January 1897) had provided 
constitution-jurisdiction part functions, and after that the 
Constitutional Law Council, which was attached to the 
Constitutional Law in 1983, evoked in 1984, but none of these 
organizations were a concrete constitutional balance of the 
Parliament. 
The Hungarian Constitutional Court (hereinafter referred to as 
CC) became more than a constitutional balance because of its 
activism in the early years; it determined the developmental direction 
of legal fields with certain decisions, and it contributed to the 
                                                            
1 SÓLYOM, LÁSZLÓ: Az alkotmánybíráskodás kezdetei Magyarországon 
[The Beginning of Constitution-jurisdiction], 1999, Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 
163. 
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expansion of the previous contents of many constitutional institutions 
as well. The institution of actio popularis rendered indispensable 
assistance for this, which made the CC suitable for removing anti-
constitutional legal sources from the Hungarian legal system, and it 
provided the opportunity to take actions against the new rules, which 
were in opposition with the idea of constitutionality. 
However, there were many critiques against the CC’s practice 
and also against actio popularis. According to Gábor Halmai, the CC 
overrode its commission in many cases, and they interpreted laws in 
force to everybody2 instead of the Constitution, while Tamás Lábady 
said that the ‘blindly torpedoed popular petitions’3 created gaps in 
many cases in the legal system. Beyond this, the institution of actio 
popularis causes a large amount of cases. Also, it was phrased as 
critique that the CC missed the authority of proposing concrete norm 
control.  
The Fundamental Law, which was accepted in 2012, and the 
new Constitutional Court Act (hereinafter referred to as New CC 
Act) remedied this insufficiency and summoned the real institution 
of constitutional complaints. Because of the abolition of the actio 
popularis special constitutional complaints and the actions of 
Ombudsman were also included into the regulation. The increase of 
the authority taxation – as László Sólyom explicated4 – does not 
automatically mean authority increase because it is influenced by 
regulatory environment as well as the self-understanding of judges in 
association with authorities. Because of that, it is questionable 
whether the newly created system can serve the constitutional state 
as effectively as the previous one. The other pending question is 
                                                            
2 HALMAI, GÁBOR: Hans Kelsen és a magyar Alkotmánybíróság [Hans 
Kelsen and the Hungarian Constitutional Court], in CS. KISS, LAJOS (ed.): 
Hans Kelsen jogtudománya [Jurisprudence of Hans Kelsen], 2007, 
Gondolat Kiadó, Budapest, 480. 
3 LÁBADY, TAMÁS: A populáris akció és az egyéni jogvédelem biztosítása 
az alkotmánybírósági eljárásban [Ensuring Popular Action and Individual 
Legal Defense in Constitutional Court Process], in Magyar Jog, Vol. 38. 
No. 7. (1991) 388. 
4 SÓLYOM: op. cit. 163. 
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whether the actions of Ombudsman and the special constitutional law 
complaints can be capable of substituting actio popularis, or the 
abolition of the institute would cause irretrievable constitutional 
deficit.  
I would like to provide answers for these questions by 
introducing the current Hungarian and international regulations and 
the recommendations of the Venice Commission. 
2. LAW REGULATION AND CRITIQUES OF THE POSTERIOR NORM 
CONTROL 
The laws5 codified in 2011 brought significant changes regarding CC 
regulations. The regulations of the CC are in the State Organization 
part of the Fundamental Law. Article 24, Paragraph 2 of the 
Fundamental Law – not exhaustively, but with stating the main 
authorities – establishes that the other tasks and authorities can be 
provided by the Fundamental Law and the cardinal only Acts to 
eliminate authority problems of the Constitution which allowed for 
surplus laws to give or revoke authorities from the CC.6  
The list of authorities was contributed with the institute of real 
constitutional complaint. With this, the constituent provided the 
opportunity for the citizens to take actions against anti-constitutional 
judicial decisions. Besides, the constituent marked the followings as 
conditions: “the possibilities for legal remedy have already been 
exhausted by the petitioner or no possibility for legal remedy is 
available for him or her”7, in addition: “the CC shall admit 
constitutional complaints if a conflict with the Fundamental Law 
significantly affects the judicial decision, or the case raises 
constitutional law issues of fundamental importance.”8 The principal 
constitutional law issues like minimal admission were not 
determined, the CC judges the applications included in bills from 
                                                            
5 It applies to the Fundamental Law and the New CC Act. 
6 The Fundamental Law of Hungary, Art. 24. para. (2) point g). 
7 Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court Art. 27. point b). 
8 New CC Act, Art. 29. 
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case to case. In my opinion the CC should explicate what this 
admission criterion means – even in adjudication. It would be 
necessary because of three reasons: (1) The rule for the CC’s 
procedure determines it as a base case of challenge;9 (2) within the 
meaning of Art. 28 of the New CC Act it had to be applied in the 
case of every citizen complaint [also in the case of constitutional 
complaints based on Art. 26 para. (1)-(2)]; (3) it had to be predictable 
for citizens that the CC would accept their complaint. The difficulty 
of judging this criterion can be indicated by the fact that the CC has 
not been able to establish a unified, debate-free practice in the last 
nearly one and a half years, as in rejecting complaints the contents of 
minority opinions10 and parallel explanations11 are demonstrating the 
lack of consensus. Béla Pokol’s and Péter Paczolay’s minority 
opinions are very important from these, which perfectly reveal the 
previously explained problems. According to Béla Pokol’s 
standpoint, the court violates the criminal law’s nullum crimen sine 
lege principle and Article XXVIII., Art. 4 of the Fundamental Law as 
well, when they extensively interpret Art. 216 para. 1 of the Criminal 
Code – Any person who vandalizes a historic monument which is in 
his possession, commits a felony offense – with punishing passive 
behaviour, hence, courts are violating principal rights, which makes 
the questionable applications a principal constitutional issue.12 
Also troubling the CC’s practice – which narrowly defines the 
admission criteria of special constitutional complaints – István 
Stumpf wanted to indicate this in his minority opinion when he 
                                                            
9 1/2012. (I. 3) Decision about the procedure of the Constitutional Court, 
Art. 30. para. 2 point a). 
10 3227/2012. (IX. 28.) CC Decision, Minority opinion of Dr. András Holló 
and Dr. Miklós Lévay, 3023/2012. (VI. 21.) CC Decision, Minority opinion 
of Dr. Miklós Lévay, 3077/2012. (VII. 26.) CC Decision, Minority opinion 
of Dr. Péter Paczolay and Dr. Béla Pokol, 3264/2012. (X. 4.) CC Decision, 
Minority opinion of Dr. István Stumpf. 
11 3012/2012. (VI. 21.) CC Decision, parallel explanation of Dr. László 
Kiss, 3074/2012. (VII. 26.) CC Decision, parallel explanation of Dr. András 
Holló. 
12 3077/2012. (VII. 26.) CC Decision, Minority opinion of Dr. Béla Pokol 
and Dr. Péter Paczolay. 
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explained that the CC is causing and maintaining a constitutional 
deficit when it requires the factual and codified 180 days. In his 
opinion the situation can be remedied if the substantial chance of a 
legal injury was enough reason for admission, or the 180 days could 
be calculated from the time when the public act comes into force.13 
The Venice Commission’s standpoint also highlights this in the case 
of Section 26 “…an exception for the exhaustion of legal remedies 
should be provided for all cases where adhering to this rule could 
cause irreparable damage to the individual.”14 So the institute could 
realize its original purpose – the partial substitution of actio popularis 
– if the CC ignored these authorities’ practice15 of the German CC 
and rendered his authority on expanded way. 
From 1st January 2012, the Fundamental Law wanted to narrow 
down the range of posterior norm control promoters to the quarter of 
the parliamentarians. The Constituent had asked for the Venice 
Commission’s opinion before the rule was codified. In his report the 
Commission highlighted that “the availability of an actio popularis in 
matters of constitutionality cannot be regarded as a European 
standard.”,16 also “the actio popularis is not requisite in a 
democratic state.”17 At the same time, they recommended the 
initiation of another channel to the Constituent and they mentioned 
the Ombudsman action18 as an example, which was included in the 
final version of the Fundamental Law because of this. The 
Ombudsman action was definitely needful against its many argued 
                                                            
13 3264/2012. (X. 4.) CC Decision, Minority opinion of Dr. István Stumpf. 
14 European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice 
Commission) Opinion no. 665/2012, Draft Opinion on Act CLI of 2011 on 
the Constitutional Court of Hungary, 8. 
15 KELEMEN, KATALIN: Van még pálya (A magyar Alkotmánybíróság 
hatásköreiben bekövetkező változásokról) [There is still path (about the 
authority changes of the Hungarian Constitutional Court)], in 
Fundamentum, Vol. 15. No. 4. (2011) 90. 
16 European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice 
Commission) Opinion no.614/2011. Opinion on the three legal question 
arising in the process of drafting the new Constitution of Hungary, 14. 
17 Venice Commission Opinion no 665/2012. 12. 
18 Venice Commission Opinion no 614/2011. 17. 
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elements, because the other two petitioners are definitely political 
actors, so their mere petitioner existence would politically transform 
every CC Decisions directed to posterior norm control. In the 
followings I would like to introduce these channels, highlighting the 
corner regulation points of each channel.  
The government as a constituent considered a European 
standard, but in my opinion it is very difficult to imagine that it 
initiates a procedure against a law accepted by underlying 
parliamentary majority, which has been proved by the practice of the 
last two years. 
The Fundamental Law meant a sharp change compared to the 
former regulation, because until 2012, even a single parliamentarian 
could initiate a posterior norm control, while in accordance with the 
regulations in force an application of the quarter of the 
parliamentarians is required. As the table below reveals, it is only in 
Belgium and Austria19 where they have more difficult procedure for 
parliamentarians to address the CC than in Hungary. In Germany – 
similarly to Hungary – the support of the quarter of the 
parliamentarians to initiate a posterior norm control procedure is also 
required. However, in Germany the governments and Constitutional 
Courts of the federated states can initiate the start of this type of 
procedure. Also, it is clearly visible that the one-fifths regulation is 
considered as a European standard. In Hungary the problem is that it 
is hardly imaginable in the case of two-thirds parliamentary majority 
that members of the opposition can stand into a camp to have the 
necessary quarter of the mandates, so it seems like a sleeping 
institution. This confirms that ,,the government’s politican merger 
with the legislative power is a fact also admitted by the CC.”20 
 
                                                            
19 Where the governments of federal provinces and the CC can initiate a 
process ex officio. 
20 SMUK, PÉTER: A politikai zsákmányelv alkotmányos korlátai [The 
Political Principle of Booty’s Contitutional Limitations], in Jog-Állam-
Politika, Vol. 2. No. 4. (2010) 7. 
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1. table (edited by the author) 
After the effective date of the Fundamental Law it was actually 
the Ombudsman Channel which was active but in that case the 
legislator made a mistake in that he did not regulate the mode of the 
authority’s practice. Therefore, this task is the actual commissioner’s 
duty. The possible forms of interpretations are: (1) postman role, (2) 
                                                            
21 The Fundamental Law of Hungary, Art. 24. para. (2) point e). 
22 Constitution of Belgium, Art. 4. 
23 Constitution of Ukraine Art. 150. 
24 Constitution of Slovak Republic Art. 130. para. (1). 
25 Constitution of Lithuania Art. 106. 
26 Constitutional Court Act of Latvia Art. 17. para. (1). 
27 Constitution of Poland Art. 191. para. (1) point a). 
28 Constitutional Court Act of Czech Republic Art. 64. para. (1). 
29 Constitution of Bulgaria Art. 150. 
30 Constitution of Federal Republic of Germany Art. 93. para. (1). 
31 FAVOREU, LOUIS: Az alkotmánybíróságok [Constitutional Courts], in 
PACZOLAY, PÉTER (ed.): Alkotmánybíráskodás, alkotmányértelmezés 
[Constitution-jurisdiction, Constitution-interpretation], 1995, ELTE, 
Budapest, 75. 
32 Ibid. 113. 
Required mandates for posterior norm control 
Examined country Required rate or mandates % 
Hungary21 1/4 25 
Belgium22 House of Commons 1/3 33 
Ukraine23 45 10 
Slovak Republic24 1/5 20 
Lithuania25 1/5 20 
Latvia26 20 20 
Poland27 Szejm 50, Senate 30 10,8 & 30 
Czech Republic28 House of Commons 41, Senate 17 20,5 & 21 
Bulgaria29 1/5 20 
FR of Germany30 1/4 25 
Austria31 1/3 33 
Spain32 Congress 50, Senate 50 14,3 & 19 
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narrowly or (3) widely interpreted authority. The postman role would 
be unreasonable from many viewpoints. At first, the New CC Act’s 
ministerial explanation concludes that “… a commissioner’s 
application cannot mean the transmission of the incoming 
complaints, which would mean the return of the annulated authority 
of actio popularis into the legal system.”33 In addition “… the 
transmission of these complaints without any filter is a legal 
nonsense... primarily not... the preservation of the ombudsman’s 
professional prestige justify...” but “the adopted applications with 
conflicting content are forcing the institute into a schizophrenic 
situation.”34 
In the case of the narrowly interpreted authority the 
ombudsman’s action would not be more than a concrete norm 
control. Although, it would not mean that an ombudsman’s act in his 
original function, or being detached from a concrete case could not 
initiate a posterior norm control procedure – according to the Venice 
Commission’s standpoint it is considered as a European standard that 
in Europe it is only in Estonia and Ukraine where widely authorized 
ombudsman institute exists.35 However, this is the only channel 
which is useable for citizens to initiate posterior norm control, so it is 
necessary that the ombudsman can widely interpret his authority. 
However, it has many problems as well; the first I would mention is 
that “ombudsman has discretion in terms of the method of managing 
complaints asking for posterior norm control procedure.”36 But it 
could offend citizens’ ideological freedom in many cases; just think 
of euthanasia or abortion.  
                                                            
33 The Minister’s Explanation of the New CC Act, 26. 
34 LÁPOSSY, ATTILA: Popularis akcióból ombudsamani akció? [Ombudsman 
action from a popular action?], in Magyar Közigazgatás, Vol. 1. No. 3. 
(2011) 121. 
35 Venice Commission Opinion no 614/2011. 17. 
36 LÁPOSSY, ATTILA: Közvetve és közvetlenül: az alapvető jogok biztosának 
indítványozási jogköre az alkotmánybíráskodás és alapjogvédelem 
szemszögéből [Directly and indirectly: the initiative authority of the 
Commissioner for Fundamental Rights from the aspects of constitution-
jurisdiction and fundamental law protection], in Kodifikáció és 
közigazgatás, Vol. 1. No. 2. (2012) 41. 
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But beyond the ombudsman’s discretion it is also necessary for 
citizens to know the cases which could be interiorized by the 
institute. That is why they created those aspects (in the shape of 
normative orders) which make the initiation of the posterior norm 
control reasonable. These aspects are reasonable if “(1) 
constitutionally qualm raises related in the enforcement of 
fundamental rights, constitutional principles and claims determined 
in the Fundamental Law, (2) there is an injury in the fundamental 
rights of people in particularly protected groups or there is an injury 
in the right for healthy environment (3) extreme weight in the 
violence of fundamental rights, (4) the number of injured people 
justify it”.37 These aspects give enough insight for the citizens and 
the future ombudsman, so they can predict the correct handling of a 
petition. But this is a legislative instruction, so it also depends on the 
Commissioner of Fundamental Rights whether he feels it normative 
or not. Because of this, I consider it necessary to legally regulate the 
method of practicing this authority, even by the takeover of 
ombudsman’s instructions, as this institution is not capable of 
building a constitutional control on it because of the lack of 
guarantee rules – even if it seems that they interpret their role as I 
have written above.  
The other significant problem is the question of the 
compatibility of ombudsman’s action and the principle ombudsman 
tasks, because the previous authority is only an additional license but 
it could implicate that the completion of his main tasks is disturbed. 
According to Attila Lápossy, the ombudsman action in the aspect of 
the main functions of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights is 
“official and public service legal practice, compared to the 
examination of activities based on complaints is an additional, 
incremental license”.38 If we examine the statistics, we can see that 
there were 32439 incoming posterior norm control applications to the 
                                                            
37 The 7th section of the 2/2012 (I. 20.) Commissioner of Fundamental 
Rights directive about the professional rules and methods of the CFR’s 
examination. 
38 LÁPOSSY: op. cit. (2012) 5. 
39 Report of the ombudsman. 
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ombudsman until 15th July 2012, but there were 46640 to the CC 
(thereof 413 constitutional complaints). So it is clearly visible that 
half of the entire cases were transferred to the Fundamental Rights. 
From the statistics it is also obvious that only the ombudsman 
initiated posterior norm control procedure in 2012, which confirms 
the inactivity of the other two channels. “The petitioner’s loneliness 
is regrettable, because the involving of other technically prepared 
petitioners would effectively increase the authorities’ 
accessibility.”41  
I would like to determine these potential petitioners’ range with 
an outlook to the regulation of foreign countries. It can be definitely 
stated that there are no more channel models in Europe than the 
model established by actio popularis, but it has to be considered that 
Poland – where the similar system is missing – provides the same 
number of access. As illustrated, the current model is situated in the 
lower regions, even Romania has less channels than Hungary (the 
prosecutor and the court forms a channel in the table), but the range 
of the posterior norm control’s initiators is very wide (7 accessibility 
channels). However, in the Czech Republic, where also three 
channels are available, one of them is the ex officio, so the CC can 
initiate his process. There is one more channel in Germany and 
Austria but this number covers a much higher quality, because in 
these countries the federal governments are forming powerful 
constitutional balance with their possibility to turn for the CC, 
moreover, in Austria the CC has the right to officially conduct such 
procedures. The case of Slovakia is different, because a self-
government organization cannot turn to the CC there, but the 
President of the Supreme Committee and the Supreme Prosecutor 
can do it, so the members of the legislation can initiate a process 
easier. The number of accessibility channels is extremely high in 
Poland, Bulgaria and Latvia. In these countries the local 
governments, the President of the Supreme Committee, the Supreme 
Prosecutor and the ombudsman can also initiate a procedure.  
                                                            
40 Statistics of the CC’s available at: http://www.mkab.hu /letoltesek/ 
stat_2012_1fev.pdf [cit. 2013-11-04]. 
41 LÁPOSSY: op. cit. (2012) 40. 
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The table’s data shows that the possible channels are: (1) ex 
officio; (2) President of the Republic; (3) Leaders of the judiciary’s 
supreme organisation; (4) Local government organization. This four 
can be found in most of the European countries as posterior norm 
control initiators, and these can be considered as European standards. 
Sometimes it occurs that one of them is missing but they try to 
replace it with a more powerful channel (for example ex officio). In 
Poland the civil sector (churches, trade unions in the cases affected to 
them) also appears among the initiators, however, in a limited way. 
The ex officio suggestion would not be a good idea in Hungary 
because the CC suffered from critiques due to their activism in the 
90s, so they probably would not undertake the critiques associated 
with this authority. The President can be a possible solution, but one 
of his primary duties is to establish the national unity, so he should 
not have to make political decisions. However, it would be a realistic 
channel if the High Court and the Supreme Prosecutor had possibility 
to initiate in relation to their authority and function. Similarly, the 
local governments’ possibility for posterior norm control would be a 
good solution.  
In March 2013, the Fundamental Law – realizing this fact – 
expanded the petitioners’ range with the President of the High Court 
and the Supreme Prosecutor. He wanted to remedy the problems 
outlined above so that “the judiciary can fulfil its constitution-
protective role better.”42 This modification was welcomed because 
the new channels can decrease the ombudsman’s occupation and can 
make the protection of the Fundamental Law better guaranteed. 
However, in my opinion they had to record that a norm control could 
be initiated in accordance with functional and jurisdictional issues 
only, because it would not be fortunate if the two initiators were 
attacked from political circles, accusing them with partiality of a 
political faction. I think the range of initiators would be complete if 
the local governments could initiate a posterior norm control in 
accordance with cases related to their authority. The ombudsman’s 
occupation could be decreased if the civil sector was involved in the 
range of initiators, even following the Polish example with the 
                                                            
42 Explanation of the Fundamental Law’s fourth modification, 23. 
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provided possibility of initiation to churches and trade unions (of 
course in issues accordance with their case only). But it should be 
noted that in Hungary the trade union movement is not as powerful 
as it is in Poland. In the case of churches the fact that their approved 
ecclesial existence depends on parliamentary confirmation could 
limit their activity in these situations.  
The development of accessibility channels in the aspect of 
posterior norm control 




Poland52 + + + + + - + + 7 
Bulgaria53 - + + + + - + + 6 
Latvia54 - + + + + - + + 6 
Ukraine55 - + - + + - + + 5 
Slovakia56 - + + + + - + - 4 
Austria57 - - - + - + + + 4 
Germany58 - - + + - - + + 4 
Czech 
Republic59 - + - + - + - - 3 
Lithuania60 - + - + - - + - 3 
                                                            
43 C: Civil. 
44 PR: President of the Republic. 
45 G: Government. 
46 P: Parliament. 
47 O: Ombudsman. 
48 EX: Ex officio. 
49 PH-SP: President of the High Court – Supreme Prosecutor. 
50 OLG: Organs of the local government. 
51 ∑: Number of the Access Channels. 
52 Constitution of Poland Art. 191. para. (1) point a). 
53 Constitution of Bulgaria Art. 150. 
54 Constitutional Court Act of Latvia Art. 17. para. (1). 
55 Constitution of Ukraine Art. 150. para. (1). 
56 Constitution of Slovak Republic Art. 130. para. (1). 
57 FAVOREU op. cit. 75-76. 
58 Constitution of Federal Republic of Germany Art. 93. para. (2). 
59 Constitutional Court Act of Czech Republic Art. 64. para. (1). 
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Hungary61 - - + + + - - - 3 
F. Law 
Modification 462 - - + + + - + - 4 
Romania63 - - - + - - + - 2 
1. table (edited by the author) 
3. SUMMARY 
Through the institute of actio popularis the CC (established in 1989) 
seemed to have the full scale of continentally known constitutional 
authorities. But this authority taxation was not complete because 
there was not any possibility for citizens to turn to the CC in the case 
of their individual law injury. Because of this the institute was one-
sided regarding the jurisdiction side. The solution could be the 
establishment of the German-type institution of constitutional law 
complaints.  
The Fundamental Law healed this one-sidedness of authority, at 
least in the aspect of taxation. But in practice it became one-sided 
again in the aspect of the CC’s authority. In practice this one-
sidedness was caused by the small number of posterior norm 
control’s initiators and the regulations obliged on them. To try to 
heal this problem, in February 2013, the Constituent introduced two 
new channels, but in practice there was no essential change because 
the rules applying to the other three channels were not modified. In 
the new regulation entering into force in 2012, it was salutary that 
the Fundamental Law stated the CC’s authorities, and a public act, 
which was on lower level than the cardinal law could not give or 
revoke authority to the CC. 
The special constitutional complaint is what the legislator 
dedicates to substitute actio popularis but the CC narrowly interprets 
the admission procedure’s rules (following the German 
                                                                                                                              
60 Constitution of Lithuania Art. 106. 
61 Fundamental Law of Hungary, Art. 24. para. (2) point e). 
62 Fundamental Law’s fourth modification. 
63 Constitution of Romania Art. 146. 
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Constitutional Court’s practice in similar cases), so the institute is 
inappropriate for the purpose the legislator meant. As István Stumpf 
highlighted that in his minority opinion, the legal institution can only 
reach the desired purpose if it is more easily interpreted – no need for 
direct legal injury, or the 180 days time limit had to be counted from 
the date when the public act comes into force. The modification of 
the petitioners’ range of posterior norm control is one of the most 
argued parts of the new regulation, because with the abolition of 
actio popularis the legislator determines the possible petitioners’ 
range very narrowly. Based on the international practice, this 
regulation is an accepted European standard, but in my opinion it 
would be a better solution to introduce a filter mechanism in the first 
round and eliminate the institute definitively when the amount of the 
incoming applications to the CC is unmanageable. In the current 
regulatory environment the best solution would be the involvement 
of new channels. 
In my opinion to solve these defects, the regulation should be 
modified in the following ways: (1) The special constitutional 
complaints should be regulated as the chance of legal injury was 
enough to accept the application, and the 180 days time limit had to 
be counted from the date when the public act comes into force. (2) 
The legislator should re-control the regulations related to posterior 
norm control petitioners in accordance with the following: a) The 
ombudsman’s initiative authority has to be incorporated into a law; 
b) Decrease the number of parliamentarians who have the right of 
initiation from one-fourth to one-fifth; c) Expand the range of 
petitioners to the local governments in issues affecting their 
authority; d) Modify the President of the High Court and the 
Supreme Prosecutor’s initiative authority for that they can turn to the 
CC in issues related with their task or authority, because in other 
cases their application could get a political tone. With these steps the 
problems named in this study could be remedied. 
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Review on the Role of Green Technologies in 
Hungarian Policies Concerning Sustainability1 
1. INTRODUCTION - WHAT IS SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT? 
In the last years and decades the concept of sustainable development 
has progressively come into the foreground, which resulted in that 
sustainable development is an inevitable common pillar of technical, 
economic and social sciences. Sustainable development is a goal and 
also a tool in the scope of the welfare of human mankind. This paper 
would like to lighten up some cornerstones of the Hungarian 
regulation regarding sustainable development. Furthermore, the 
study focuses on green innovation2 and green technology, and 
introduces key Hungarian action plans and national strategies 
concerning sustainable development. 
                                                            
1 This research was supported by the European Union and the State of 
Hungary, co-financed by the European Social Fund in the framework of 
TÁMOP-4.2.4.A/ 2-11/1-2012-0001 ‘National Excellence Program’. 
2 Under the term innovation this study means the Schumpeterian 
interpretation, i.e. such new combination of existing materials and forces in 
the economy which create new consumer demands and habits. In this sense, 
innovation is not a response for demand because it is so new that it basically 
changes our needs. Innovation alters our values what we have already got 
used to. Schumpeter defines five territories of innovation: (1) new goods or 
improvement quality of existing goods, (2) new processes in the industry, 
(3) new market, (4) conquering new resources independently from their 
previous existent and (5) establishment of a new organization. See 
SCHUMPETER, JOSEPH A.: A gazdasági fejlődés elmélete [The Theory of 
Economic Development], 1980, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 
Budapest, 110-111. 
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First of all, it is worth mentioning briefly why green technology 
and protection of the environment is important within the concept of 
sustainable development. From 5th to 16th June 1972, United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment was held in Stockholm, 
which was the first international summit where issues regarding 
protection of the environment were in the foreground. The result of 
the conference was the adoption of The Stockholm Declaration on 
the Human Environment, consisting of 26 principles connecting to 
the environment.3 At the same time, the United Nations (hereinafter: 
UN) created the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), the 
main task was the protection of human environment through global 
supporting programs. These were the first steps in the path of the 
concept of sustainable development; however, the notion itself was 
created later.4 
The idea of sustainable development was born in the context of 
ecological and economic interdependency. In 1980 – as the result of 
cooperation of more UN agencies –, the World Conservation 
Strategy was accepted, which served to redefine environmentalism in 
the post-Stockholm era. The strategy recognized that environmental 
issues needed long-term actions and solutions, and environmental 
and developmental objectives were strongly bounded.5 The World 
                                                            
3 See http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documenti 
d=97&articleid=1503 [cit. 2014-01-04]. 
4 CARROLL, ELLIE: Twenty-five Years in the Making: Why Sustainable 
Development Has Eluded the U.N., And How Community-driven 
Development Offers the Solution, in Houston Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 32. Issue 2. (2010) 549. 
5 BRAGDON, SUSAN H.: The Evolution and Future of the Law of Sustainable 
Development: Lessons from the Convention on Biological Diversity, in The 
Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, Vol. 8. Issue 3. 
(1996) 423. As section 2 of the strategy says: “Humanity’s relationship with 
the biosphere (the thin covering of the planet that contains and sustains life) 
will continue to deteriorate until a new international economic order is 
achieved, a new environmental ethic adopted, human populations stabilize, 
and sustainable modes of development become the rule rather than the 
exception. Among the prerequisites for sustainable development is the 
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Charter of Nature had the same conclusion in 1982, which declared 
that natural resources should be exploited in a way that the optimum 
sustainable productivity could be achieved and maintained on a 
permanent level.6 
The four years between 1983 and 1987 were crucial from the 
perspective of creating the notion of sustainable development. In 
1983, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution Nr. 38/161., 
which set up the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (WCED) led by Gro Harlem Brundtland, Prime 
Minister of Norway.7 The main task of the commission was to make 
long-term propositions (to the year 2000 and beyond) for the UN 
about environmental strategies for achieving sustainable 
development and to promote interrelationships between people, 
resources, environment and development.8 The first meeting of 
                                                                                                                              
conservation of living resources.” World Conservation Strategy, 1980, 
International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, 
available at: http://data.iucn.org/dbtw-wpd/edocs/WCS-004.pdf [cit. 2014-
01-04]. 
6 DANAHER, JOHN: Protecting the Future or Compromising the Present?: 
Sustainable Development and the Law, in Irish Student Law Review, Vol. 
14. Issue 1. (2006) 118. 
7 Therefore, the commission is often referred to as the Brundtland 
Commission. Setting the Commission up was necessary because of the huge 
global changes in the world. Prior to 1983, the pollution had been 
continuously increasing, the overpopulation had been gathering speed and 
the scissor between poor and rich countries had been opening unstoppably 
wider. These problems could be caused by the industrialization of 
developed countries. However, they were not isolated problems because of 
global interdependency they required (and requires also nowadays) global 
solutions. No one could expect from the developing countries to give up 
their development because the developed countries in the “northern 
fortress” had been exploiting and partially destroying the Earth which could 
not bear any more developed countries. See BRUNDTLAND, GRO HARLEM: 
Taking Stock of Sustainable Development at 20: What We Have 
Accomplished and What Comes Next? in Pacific McGeorge Global 
Business & Development Law Journal, Vol. 21. Issue 2. (2008) 155. 
8 CARROLL: op. cit. 550. 
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WCED was held in 1984, and after 900 days of work (which 
included such environmental disasters like the 1986 Chernobyl 
catastrophe) the widely known report of the commission, entitled 
Our Common Future had been published in 1987. One of the greatest 
achievements of the report is to set up the first notion of sustainable 
development. The report says “humanity has the ability to make 
development sustainable to ensure that it meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs.”9 The two key factors of the notion are needs 
(primarily, the needs of poor people), for which unconditional 
priority should be ensured and the idea of limitations called upon by 
technological advancement and the society to maintain the ability of 
environment to satisfy the needs of humanity.10 
The notion of sustainable development does not explicitly cover 
the protection of the environment or the sparing, preserving and 
effective use of natural resources; however, it implicitly contains 
these meanings, as well, due to the fact that future generations can 
only receive natural resources of the Earth if contemporary 
generations use them effectively and economically.11 
                                                            
9 A/42/427, Our Common Future: Report of the World Commission on 
Environment and Development, From One Earth to One World, section 27., 
available at: http://www.un-documents.net/ocf-ov.htm#I.3 [cit. 2014-01-
05]. 
10 GELLÉRTHEGYI, ISTVÁN: A környezetvédelem nemzetközi 
szabályozásának fejlődése [The Development of the International 
Regulation of the Environmental Protection], in Pro Publico Bono Online 
TÁMOP Speciál, 2011. Available at: http://www.propublicobono.hu/pdf/ 
GELL%C3%89RTHEGYI%20ISTV%C3%81N%20A_k%C3%B6rnyezetv
%C3%A9delem%20...%201.pdf [cit. 2014-01-05]. 
11 The concept of sustainable development by the Brundtland Commission 
focuses on humankind. Therefore, Brundtland suggested investing itself in 
humanity through fighting off poverty and increasing the level of education 
and healthcare. See BUGGE, HANS CHRISTIAN – WATTERS, LAWRENCE: A 
Perspective on Sustainable Development After Johannesburg on the 
Fifteenth Anniversary of Our Common Future: An Interview With Gro 
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The next fundamental milestone in the history of sustainable 
development was the United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development (UNCED), or as commonly called, Earth Summit, 
held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, where 176 states gathered together.12 
The conference adopted – among other relevant documents – the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development and Agenda 21. In 
these documents member states emphasized that the idea of 
sustainable development is able to give a solution for social and 
economic crises in the world: opposition between north and south, 
unsustainable economies, climate change, lessening biodiversity, 
destroying rainforests and similar global cataclysms. This way the 
idea of sustainability pervaded the Convention on Biological 
Diversity and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, which were also signed in Rio. The Rio concept of 
sustainable development is strongly anthropocentric, which was 
openly opposed by the NGO Global Forum, – a conference held by 
non-governmental organizations at the same time as Earth Summit – 
and in the adopted Earth Charter they explicitly denied this human-
centric (or anthropocentric) approach. According to their opinion, 
humanity is not the center of life but a component of nature and 
Earth, only the part of these.13 
Half of the 27 articles of the Rio Declaration contain the words 
‘sustainable development’ but it did not give a new definition. From 
                                                                                                                              
Harlem Brundtland, in The Georgetown International Environmental Law 
Review, Vol. 15. Issue 3. (2003) 363-364. 
12 The early 1990’s brought an interesting and very intense debate about the 
connection of trade and environment protection. The effects of the work of 
Brundtland Commission and the forthcoming UNCED with the 
simultaneously running GATT revision made a fertile soil to ensure the 
implementation of environmental aspects in the economy and trade. In more 
detail see: HORVÁTHY, BALÁZS: Környezetvédelmi szempontok integrálása 
a WTO szabályozásába [The integration of environmental aspects into the 
regulation of WTO], in Állam és Jogtudomány, Vol. 54. Issue 3-4. (2013) 
98. 
13 BOSSELMANN, KLAUS: Rio+10: Any Closer to Sustainable Development? 
in New Zealand Journal of Environmental Law, Vol. 6. (2002) 302. 
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the “spirit of Rio” one can derive that the concept of sustainable 
development links together rich and poor countries through their 
common interests in maintaining an ecologically sustainable 
economic system because only this can ensure the needs of future 
generations. It tries to lay a bridge between environmentalism and 
economic growth.14 
As the corollary of the Earth Summit, the international 
regulation of environmentalism got a boost by the end of the 1990s; 
however, around the Millennium states realized that the aims of the 
Rio conference did not succeed, the world was still fighting against 
enormous poverty, unsustainable lifestyle and degradation of 
environment. In addition, the gap between rich and poor countries 
was getting wider. These problems called upon the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg in 2002, its main 
task was to strengthen the institutional background of sustainable 
development.15 Two relevant documents were adopted under the 
aegis of the conference – the Johannesburg Declaration and the Plan 
of Implementation –, which, on the one hand, reconfirmed the Rio 
obligations, on the other hand, emphasized societal aspects of 
sustainable development which founded the three-pillar model of 
sustainable development that stands on the economy, society and the 
protection of the environment.16 
Between 20 and 22 June 2012, the United Nations Conference 
on Sustainable Development (UNCSD) was held, which also referred 
to Rio+20 because it was also held in Rio de Janeiro, 20 years after 
                                                            
14 BRYNER, GARY C.: Policy Devolution and Environmental Law: Exploring 
Transition Towards Sustainable Development, in Environs, Environmental 
Law and Policy Journal, Vol. 26. Issue 1. (2002) 10. 
15 BEYERLIN, ULRICH: Strengthening International Governance for 
Sustainable Development: Expectations for the 2002 Johannesburg World 
Summit, in Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal, Vol. 5. Issue 1. (2002) 
1. 
16 This tendency was totally against the anti-anthropocentric ideology of the 
Earth Charter. For the Hungarian extending of the three-pillar model see 
footnote 65. 
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the Earth Summit, as a 20 years follow-up measure. The main aim of 
the conference was to bring the widest circle of international 
policymakers together again to shape how the world can reduce 
poverty, advance social equity and ensure environmental protection 
on an ever more crowded planet to get we want in the future. The 
conference focused on two themes: i) green economy in the context 
of sustainable development, poverty eradication and ii) institutional 
framework for sustainable development. Within these themes, seven 
priority areas were identified like decent jobs, energy, sustainable 
cities, food security and sustainable agriculture, water, oceans and 
disaster readiness. The main outcome document of the conference is 
entitled “The Future We Want”, within which member states 
renewed the commitment towards sustainable development and 
ensured the promotion of an economically, socially and 
environmentally sustainable future for our planet, and for present and 
future generations.17 The document contains 283 sections, and 
among many other points it details why green economy and green 
technology are important and how we can use them as tools to 
achieve sustainable development.18 
2. GREEN ECONOMY IN HUNGARIAN POLICIES 
2.1. Sustainable development as a constitutional requirement 
On 18th April 2011, the Hungarian Parliament adopted the new 
constitution, called Fundamental Law, which came into effect on 1st 
January 2012. It has more commitments towards green economy and 
the protection of the environment under the aegis of sustainability. 
The first part of the Fundamental Law is the National Avowal, which 
                                                            
17 This wording still refers to the definition of Our Common Future, as the 
Brundtland Commission defined sustainable development. 
18 The wording of The Future We Want is quite different from the previous 
texts, it uses an intellectual or emotional layer, concentrate on the individual 
activity. This is a key factor and alteration from the previous periods (where 
– more or less – the states recieved special duties and tasks). 
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says “We commit to promoting and safeguarding our heritage […] 
with all man-made and natural assets of the Carpathian Basin. We 
bear responsibility for our descendants; therefore we shall protect the 
living conditions of future generations by making prudent use of our 
material, intellectual and natural resources.” This statement refers to 
the definition of sustainable development created by the Brundtland 
Commission. The legal nature of the National Avowal is 
controversial; however, Article R (3) of the part entitled Foundation 
prescribes that provisions of the Fundamental Law shall be 
interpreted in accordance with the National Avowal. This way it has 
legally binding nature (as an interpretative tool). 
Article P, however, means a clear commitment towards 
sustainable development: “Natural resources, in particular arable 
land, forests and the reserves of water, biodiversity, in particular 
native plant and animal species, as well as cultural assets shall form 
the common heritage of the nation; it shall be the obligation of the 
State and everyone to protect and maintain them, and to preserve 
them for future generations.” This provision ennobles environmental 
protection to a constitutional value. Through Article 30. (3), it gets 
an institutional protection from the Deputy of Commissioner of 
Fundamental Rights whose duty is to protect the interests of future 
generations. 
From the aspect of human rights, Article XXI. (1) creates an 
obligation to recognize and ensure right to everyone to a healthy 
environment. The right for healthy environment is different from the 
other classic human rights and social rights because it has a special 
subject what makes it a typical third generation human right. 
However, it does not mean that it would be a mere state aim or 
declaration without legal binding. The right for healthy environment 
is primarily an individual protection of legal instrument, videlicet a 
special human right which determining side is the objective legal aid. 
According to the interpretation of the Constitutional Court [Decision 
28/1994. (V. 20.)], the right for healthy environment means a state 
obligation to take the necessary provisions in order to protect the 
environment. However, the level of protection is not arbitrary, legal 
protection cannot be reduced just increased. The only exception is 
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when reducing is inevitable for the protection of other human rights 
but proportionality is always a condition.19 
The last relevant provision in the Fundamental Law is Article 
38. (1), where the Parliament declared that management and 
protection of national assets shall aim at serving public interest, 
meeting common needs and preserving natural resources, as well as 
taking the needs of future generations into account. This sentence 
establishes the financial background and obligation to enforce 
environmental protection. 
2.2. National Sustainable Development Strategy 
As described above, it is now understandable how environmentalism 
became more and more important and how the issues of green 
economies and green technologies had come into the center of 
sustainable development. The commitments in the aforementioned 
legally binding treaties and non-binding declarations were taken onto 
international level, most of it as soft law instruments but the 
execution of these commitments demands global, regional and local 
actions. The network of thousands of local actions – coordinated on 
regional and global levels – is only able to achieve the appointed 
developmental goals. The commitments in Fundamental Law are in 
harmony with these legal documents; however, they make a clear 
obligation to enhance the legal regulation. The results of these 
obligations are numerous strategies and action plans, the most 
important of them are introduced in this paper. 
In the last seven years there were more strategies and action 
plans in Hungary (under different governments) which focused on 
the accomplishment of these developmental goals through regulating 
and facilitating the use of green technologies. 
The first remarkable step was the National Sustainable 
Development Strategy (shortly NSDS), adopted in June 2007. The 
strategy is a long-term framework that integrates more domestic 
sectors, so it is coherent with the goals of sectoral strategies and 
                                                            
19 SÁRI, JÁNOS – SOMODY, BERNADETTE: Alapjogok [Fundamental Rights], 
2008, Osiris, Budapest, 317-322. 
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programs. NSDS consists of four main parts: i) the first is an 
introductory part about the concept of sustainable development, ii) 
the second is the analysis of the contemporary situation, iii) the third 
contains the priorities, goals and tasks, and iv) the fourth is about the 
overarching tasks and means of implementation. 
From the scope of green economy, the analysis of the domestic 
processes and measures has two core elements: environment and 
economy. Within the part of environment, the current situation of air 
pollution, land use, state of soil, surface waters, drinking water, 
wastewater, waste, man-made environment, natural values, 
biodiversity and climate change were analyzed. The analysis 
identified urgent and serious problems only in a few areas. One of 
these is that apart from large towns and main transport junctions, air 
pollution has diminished but motorization has increasing impacts. 
The proportion of the areas withdrawn from agricultural use and built 
up has substantially increased in the previous decade.20 There are 
also worried words concerning man-made environment which 
condition has permanently been declining and historical architectural 
values of Hungary are particularly endangered. Increasing problems 
are caused in municipalities by rising emissions of certain air 
pollutants from transport congestions, the increase of noise and 
vibration loads, as well as the shortage of green areas.21 
After 1990, the structure of economy has changed, which 
resulted in the degradation of heavy industries and mining. This 
tendency has a huge beneficiary impact on the environment, the later 
increasing volume of industries – because of economical and 
industrial modernizations and new environmental regulations – did 
not bring such a big pollution like it had been before 1990, and 
previous environmental threats had ceased. The general goal of 
                                                            
20 The agricultural land shrank by 300 000 hectares between 1994 and 2004. 
See Nemzeti Fenntartható Fejlődés Stratégia [National Sustainable 
Development Strategy], June 2007, Government of the Hungarian Republic, 
20., available at: http://www.nfft.hu/dynamic/national_sustainable_develo 
pment_strategy.pdf [cit. 2014-01-07]. 
21 Ibid. 20-24. 
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segregating economic growth from increasing environmental loads 
was apparently accomplished.22 
The structure of the use of sources of energy has altered in 
Hungary since the change in the political system. Natural gas 
consumption has increased but the use of energy-efficient 
technologies has slowly increased. Hungary consumes significantly 
less per-capita but regarding the unit of GDP, it consumes 
significantly more energy than developed countries. The rate of use 
of renewable energy sources is low but shows increasing tendency. 
Before the adoption of NSDS in 2003, it had been 3,6 %, in 2005 in 
turn it was 5,2 %, comparing to the overall energy utilization. 
The analysis emphasizes that Hungarian progress is worthy of 
international recognition in the area of environmental protection in 
relation to transportation; however, it still goes together with an 
increasing rate of air-pollution. 
The analysis has a bad picture regarding green technologies. It 
says:  
Production and consumption of product and services 
meeting sustainability requirements began in Hungary after 
the change in political system in the mid-1990’s, but no 
material progress has been observed to date, despite the fact 
that Hungary has substantial reserves for organic farming, 
given its good agricultural resources and indigenous 
livestock varieties. The low level of environmental 
awareness among residents and the low incomes of large 
groups of the population (leading to a price-sensitive 
consumer behavior) coupled with large supplies of cheap 
mass product prevent environment-friendly product from 
becoming more popular and from making up increasing 
proportions of product available in shops.23 
The institutional framework for eco-friendly products and services 
was created by the domestic environmental policy but without 
                                                            
22 Ibid. 24. 
23 Ibid. 28. 
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significant resources the results were not realized. However, as 
NSDS says, it was the same situation in most European countries. 
The final relevant statement in this field is that prices of natural 
resources do not sufficiently reflect their scarcity and the cost of their 
ecological impacts.24 
NSDS defines eleven priorities that are necessary to fight 
against the identified tendencies which undermine sustainable 
development. Connecting to green economy, the fourth priority is the 
protection of natural values, the fifth is combating climate change, 
the sixth is sustainable water management, the eighth is the 
strengthening of sustainable production and consumer habits, the 
ninth is the transformation of energy economy in Hungary, and the 
eleventh is sustainable economic regulation. The fourth, fifth and 
sixth pertain to the preservation of the carrying capacity of the 
environment and the eighth, ninth and eleventh pertain to the 
development of the economy.  
It is a core aim to preserve the viability of natural ecosystems. 
This requires the preservation of biological diversity (see the Rio 
Convention) and the sustainable use of natural resources. Five fields 
of action were identified. Firstly, it is necessary to actively protect 
our natural values, which can be done through proper environmental 
regulation, horizontal and zonal programs built upon each other. 
Secondly, there is a need to integrate the actors of economy with 
legal tools, especially in agriculture, spatial development, tourism, 
mining, hunting and fisheries. Thirdly, institutional protection should 
be strengthened by sufficient resources. The fourth factor is the 
change of lifestyle and attitude of society in order to strengthen 
environmental awareness and encourage people to adapt to 
                                                            
24 In everyday political communication household overhead reduction is a 
key factor (it could be pivotal in the elections). But reducing the price of 
electricity, water, gas and heating reflects the scarcity of these resources 
less and less, which could lead to an unsustainable waste because people 
often cannot esteem cheaper things, especially when they took it axiomatic 
that these services will last indefinitely because in a democracy it is their 
basic right. 
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sustainable modes of life.25 And the fifth field of action is the active 
contribution of the society, which requires permanent institutional 
communication.26 
Climate change has effect on various fields; therefore, actions 
against it demand harmonized steps in many fields. The main 
objective is to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases into the 
atmosphere and to prepare for and adapt to the impact of changing 
weather patterns and climate. The reduction of gases involves green 
technology in many areas like energy consumption, construction 
patterns, transport needs and industrial activities. On the one hand, 
changes in these fields could reduce the emission of greenhouse 
gases and on the other hand, they could facilitate the sustainable use 
of non-renewable natural resources and encourage the use of 
renewable resources.27 
Sustainability goals relating to waters include economical and 
value preserving ways of water management and preservation of 
waters for future generations. These goals involve water-saving and 
pollution-free green technologies of water use which are able to 
maintain the quantitative balance in artificial water circulation.28 
Amongst the economical priorities, the first important step in 
the scope of this paper is the improvement of sustainable production 
and consumer habits. The basic statement of this part is the 
obligatory necessity of reducing the needs of natural resources in the 
field of production and consumption. This can be achieved with eco-
efficient technologies and investments into ecological innovations. 
These factors not only help the maintenance of environmental 
sustainability but the achievement of competitive advantage, as well. 
Eco-efficient technologies are able to ensure the satisfaction of needs 
for consumer goods at lower environment cost. The change in the 
structure of economy is only one side of the coin, the other one is the 
change of consumer habits. In my opinion, this is a more difficult 
                                                            
25 See supra note why realizing this aim would be so hard. 
26 National Sustainable Development Strategy, 38-40. 
27 Ibid. 40-41. 
28 Ibid. 41. 
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task. Such kind of consumer patterns should be spread which have 
lower needs for material input and energy. These can only be 
achieved with long-term supporting programs and adequate tax-
management, and eco-efficient technologies should be promoted 
within public procurement procedures, as well. With the appropriate 
financial support the R&D&I sector can be shepherded towards the 
ecological way. It goes without saying that proper waste-
management and recycling with green technologies are necessary to 
reduce environmental loads, as promoted measures say at NSDS.29 
Energy issues are not only matters of supply and environment 
but of serious national security and competitiveness, as well. The 
strategy suggests altering energy management regime in a way that it 
enables reducing the emission of greenhouse effect gases and hunger 
for energy should be fed from local renewable energy sources. Of 
course, energy management has a huge impact on the 
aforementioned areas as well because economy and ecology have a 
strong interdependency. Green technology has in important role in 
energy management. Firstly, the energy-cost of production can only 
be reduced with cleaner and newer technologies. Secondly, energy-
efficiency can be improved with primer, local energy sources30 
instead of power from the grid, what generates great losses through 
multiple conversations. Thirdly, better heat insulation and more 
energy-efficient household machines can reduce household and 
communal energy consumption. Fourthly, the need for energy in the 
private and public transport sector can be diminished with eco-
friendly technologies, especially with new types of fuel like second 
generation bio-fuels, GTL fuels produced from biogas, experimental 
hydrogen fuel. The EU aims at increasing the share of bio-fuels to at 
least by 10 % by 2020 in transport.31 
                                                            
29 Ibid. 43-44. 
30 For example geothermal heating, ground heat pumps, solar energy 
collectors, biomass utilization. 
31 Nemzeti Fenntartható Fejlődés Stratégia [National Sustainable 
Development Strategy], 46-47. 
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The previously introduced elements of sustainability would only 
be utopian ideas without proper regulations and obligatory forces. 
Regulation is the tool for reaching sustainability aims. As it was 
previously outlined, taxation is one of the most important tools. “The 
transformation of the taxation policy must be guided by the 
requirement that burdens should be focused on material and energy 
intensive activities, those that deteriorate the environment and harm 
human health. This could shift the production and consumption 
towards the less energy and material intensive modes.”32 In the 
support policy open and covert support of polluting and harmful 
activities must be terminated and ecologically acceptable and 
socially useful activities should be supported as strong as possible. 
The strategy promotes the wide-spread use of the word “eco-
efficiency” where ‘eco’ refers to both economically and ecologically 
efficient methods. This represents the integration of 
environmentalism and economy under the scope of sustainable 
development, as it was conceptually created in the early 1990s (see 
above). NSDS tries to create balance between governmental 
intervention and corporate self-regulation; therefore, it promotes the 
spread of responsible enterprise concept which is the cheapest and 
ecologically safest solution. The creation of conditions to spread this 
concept requires long-term thinking but results will appear. 
2.3. New Széchenyi Plan 
The Government of Hungary adopted the so-called New Széchenyi 
Plan33 (shortly NSZP), the Development-policy Program of 
Recovery, Renewal and Ascension on 14th January 2011. The main 
objective of NSZP is to strengthen Hungarian competitiveness and 
                                                            
32 Ibid. 50. 
33 The name of the plan refers to István Széchenyi (1790-1860), a 
Hungarian politician, theorist and writer, often called as the Greatest 
Hungarian. With his political and economical thoughts he determined the 
age of reforms in the 1820s, 1830s and 1840s. His ideas became huge 
successes which ascended the contemporary Hungary into the elite of the 
European countries. 
Review on the Role of Green Technologies in Hungarian Policies 
Concerning Sustainability 
205 
ascension of the economy. This is an answer to the financial-
economic crisis which has affected Hungary as well in the last six 
years. NSZP is a tool for distribution of domestic and European 
Union supports. At the time of writing this paper, a calculator on the 
official website of NSZP showed that the amount of payments got 
from the EU was more than 5.000 billion Hungarian Forint (cca. 16 
billion Euro). 
The following figure shows the system of NSZP: 
 
 
1. Figure: New Széchenyi Plan, 2011, Budapest, 27. 
The highlighted box shows the important part of NSZP from the 
perspective of this paper. 
Four priorities are identified within the Green-economy 
Development Program:  
1. green energy; 
2. energy-efficiency; 
3. green-education; 
4. green R&D&I. 
These priorities include more sublevels. 
1. The basic principle of this program is the recognition of the 
need to change from non-renewable fossil energy-sources to 
alternative, renewable, principally green and clean energy-sources. 
This will be the basic of a new and sustainable economic model. The 
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Renewable Energy Road Map,34 envisaged by 2020, includes a 20% 
average rate of utilizing renewable energy-sources in the EU, which 
inclined the Hungarian government to create this action plan on a 
domestic level to reach the goals defined by the EU and undertaken 
by Hungary, which is at least 14,65 %.35 
The planned use of renewable energy-sources has multiple 
pillars like biomass, biogas, bio-fuels, geothermic and thermal 
energy, solar, water, and wind energy. 
The subprograms of the green energy development focus on 
green transport,36 energy-efficient lighting upgrade, supporting the 
production of decentralized renewable and alternative energy, 
agricultural energy,37 waste industry,38 and green sample projects.39 
In order to reach these goals, NSZP suggests more tools which are 
mainly connected to the creation of a more efficient and rational 
support and tender system, simplification of official authorization 
processes and capacity building.40  
2. NSZP identifies low energy-efficiency as one of the main 
obstacles to leave economic depression behind. Half of the flats in 
Hungary are non-conform to modern insulation and heating 
requirements. In the case of public buildings, this rate is even worse. 
                                                            
34 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament, 848, 10. 1. 2007. 
35 Új Széchenyi Terv [New Széchenyi Plan], 2011, Budapest, 107-109. 
Available at: http://www.mnvzrt.hu/data/cms576186/Uj_Szechenyi_ Terv 
.pdf [cit. 2014-01-22]. 
36 The aim of this subprogram is the modernization of public transport not 
only through the production of alternative fuels but through the 
improvement of infrastructure and production of alternatively powered 
vehicles, as well. 
37 The energetic or miscellaneous utilization of renewable commodity and 
by-products originating from agriculture. 
38 The energetic or miscellaneous utilization of agricultural and communal 
waste. 
39 Introduction of know-how’s and good practices, supporting the complex 
projects of Hungarian innovative technologies. 
40 Új Széchenyi Terv [New Széchenyi Plan], 114-115. 
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Energy-import dependency in Hungary is very high, which makes a 
more urgent matter to reduce unreasonable energy-waste. 40% of the 
overall consumed energy is used in buildings, from which two-third 
goes for heating and cooling. CO2 emission in the buildings is much 
higher than in the industry, transport or agriculture. Building energy 
is one of the main priorities in the EU, as well. Saved energy, what is 
called “Negajoule” by the European Commission, is the biggest 
energy resource nowadays. NSZP takes into account that building 
energy-efficiency issues mainly affect the poor and underprivileged 
groups of society, which circumstance integrates energy-efficiency 
programs into the targets of economic development and social 
policies.41 
The tools of the improvement of energy-efficiency are the same 
as in the previous section: in the first place, it is emphasized that 
sufficient tender-management, capacity and administration are 
crucial. This includes an applicant-friendly attitude (easy and logical 
processes, less rigorous methods) and wide tender portfolios which 
suit different needs. The predictability is, or should be an important 
factor in the world of tenders. Applicants should know the date of 
publication of tenders, the application deadlines (which are often too 
short) and the announcement of results in advance.42 In numbers, the 
desired objective by the year of 2020 is at least 60% energy saving of 
investments in average, and 25 kWh/m2/year energy consumption in 
new built buildings. NSZP takes the adequacy of Directive 
2010/31/EU of the European Parliament and the Council (19th May 
2010) on the energy performance of buildings into account, which 
requires measures from member states to reach minimum energy 
performance in most buildings. Article 9 obliges members to ensure 
that by December 2020, all new buildings shall be nearly zero-
energy buildings and after 31st December 2018, new buildings 
                                                            
41 Ibid. 131-134. 
42 Ibid. 134-145. 
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occupied and owned by public authorities shall be nearly zero-energy 
buildings.43 
3. The third priority focuses on education and employment. The 
green-employment subprogram aims at generating 150-200 thousand 
new sustainable jobs in the green-economy and launching green 
public work programs for the less qualified workforce. These tasks 
can be carried out with different supporting measures which enhance 
green investments, especially in the field energy-efficiency.44 
The green-education subprogram aims at creating quality-
oriented education of industrial, agricultural and energetic experts in 
the scope of green technologies. This requires short term (1 year) 
programs, mid-term (1-3 years) skilled workmen, MSc programs and 
long-term (3-5 years) BSc and PhD programs.45 
The third subprogram is the green view-form subprogram which 
only consists of a few soft-measures to increase the green-
consciousness of people with PR and advertisement tools.46 
4. The above-mentioned fields are based on high-quality 
knowledge, therefore, green R&D&I is a crucial base to build up 
other green programs. The rate of innovation in the proportion of 
GDP is lower than the European average. By 2020, Hungary should 
reach the 2% R&D&I rate of GDP, which is 20% in the field of 
green innovation. NSZP gives a list about support-worthy energetic 
innovations. These are connected to the defined priorities in energy 
and energy-efficiency programs, so the core issue is to change 
exhaustible natural resources to renewable resources like biomass, 
water, wind, solar and geothermic energy, and to reduce the 
environmental loads with CO2 emission reducing technologies or 
                                                            
43 In the use of the Directive nearly-zero energy buildings mean the 
calculated or measured amount of energy needed to meet the energy 
demand associated with a typical use of buildings which includes, inter alia, 
energy used for heating, cooling, ventilation, hot water and lighting. 
44 Új Széchenyi Terv [New Széchenyi Plan], 141-145. 
45 Ibid. 146. 
46 Ibid. 147-149. 
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invent new – environmentally less harmful – technologies in water 
management and public transportation.47 
2.4. National Environmental Technology Innovation Strategy 
2011-2020 
On 6th September 2011, the Government adopted Decision No. 
1307/2011 on National Environmental Technology Innovation 
Strategy (NETIS) for the period of 2011-2020. NETIS – as the 
previous strategies – also recognizes the need for change because of 
the multiple global crises related to food, fuel, freshwater and 
finance. The basic idea of NETIS is the strong connection between 
innovation and green growth. As it says, “innovation has an 
important role in generating employment, enhancing productivity 
growth through knowledge creation and diffusion in the post-crisis 
context”. 
NETIS is supposed to be the crucial framework to achieve the 
goals of the EU 2020 Strategy, especially, the Innovation Union 
initiative. The adoption of the strategy aims at shifting towards green 
economy through environmental technological innovation. In the 
scope of NETIS, those environmental technologies mean solutions 
which are associated with lower environmental loads, rather than 
traditional existing processes. These include technologies and 
processes which care with pollution, less polluting and less 
resources-demanding products and services, and methods and 
structural innovations which make resource-utilization more 
efficient.48 
NETIS focuses on three main issues around product 
technologies, process technologies, process technologies and know 
how procedures and organizational and managerial procedures. The 
strategy is a mix of different policies, shown by the following table: 
                                                            
47 Ibid. 151-154. 
48 Nemzeti Környezettechnológiai Innovációs Stratégia, [National 
Environmental Technology Innovation Strategy], 2011, Ministry of Rural 
Development, Budapest, 4. 
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Vision and Objectives Policy tools – measures 
 Foster environmental 
industry, technology, 




 Paradigm shift: from end-
of-pipe approach to 
prevention, 
 Increase effectiveness, 
 Decrease primary 
material use, 
 Increase reuse/recycling, 
improve resource-efficient 
services 
Greening governance - increase internal 
government cooperation including authorities 
and local governments, 
Legal tools: Innovation friendly legal system 
(e.g. simplification of administrative 
procedures, pressure to comply with legal 
requirements, extension of producers’ 
liability) 
Economic instruments: 
1. Green tax system; 
2. Green public procurement; 
3. Supporting environmentally friendly 
subsidies (removing environmental 
harmful ones). 
Social tools: raising awareness, improving 
green education, management and 
consultancy 
1. table49 
NETIS takes the three pillar system of sustainable development 
into account and recognizes that complex issues demand complex 
answers which involve the harmonization of many different policies 
like social, economical and legal policies. 
NETIS has nine improvement directions with detailed targets 







49 Source: ILLÉS, ZOLTÁN (ed.): National Environmental Technology 
Innovation Strategy, 2012, Ministry of Rural Development, Budapest, 8. 
Available at: http://kornyezettechnologia.kormany.hu/download/b/4f/50 
000/NETIS_English.pdf [cit. 2014-01-26]. 










efficiency, decrease of 
environmental loads. 
Nanotechnology, biotechnology, 
use of photonics, bio-based 
products, advanced materials. 
Air 
Decrease air pollution 
made by transportation 
and households. 
Improving public transport 
vehicles and traffic control, 




the organic content of 
waste, reducing waste 
production, less 
hazardous waste, 
selective collection of 
waste. 
Low-waste technologies, 
separately collected waste 
processing, usage of waste as 
secondary raw materials. 
Water 
Decreasing specific 
water use in industry 
and agriculture, waste 
water recycling, 
ensuring high quality 
drinking water supply. 
Water-efficient key 
technologies, water-saving 
agricultural technologies, iron 
and manganese removal 




pollution in settlements, 
vibration protection. 
Noise barriers, noise and 
vibration reducing traffic 









Building materials from 
renewable sources, usage of 
secondary raw materials and 




Efficient use of different 
renewable energy 
resources. 
Heat pump energy use, waste 
heat capturing, heat energy 
recovering system, geothermal 
energy use, solar energy in 
households, biomass, small wind 
turbines, efficient energy 
storage, photovoltaic 
technologies. 




Remediation of polluted 
compartments (soil, 
water) and monitoring, 
giving priority to the 
green remediation. 
Bioremediation, innovative 





soil protection, more 
efficient water use, 
decreasing the use of 
pesticides, reducing soil 
pollution and waste 
production. 
Eco-friendly technologies, 
organic farming technologies, 
efficient use of nutrients, 
irrigation and water recycling 
technologies, biological agents 
with integrated pest 
management, waste energy 
recovery, usage of geothermal 
energy. 
2. table50 
2.5. National Rural Strategy 2012-2020, and the Darányi Ignác 
Plan  
On 21st March 2012, the Government adopted the National Rural 
Strategy (shortly NRS) and its implementation plan, the Darányi 
Ignác51 Plan (Government Decision Nr. 1074/2012 (III. 28.). These 
action plans hold a lot of different subsystems with different aims 
and tools together in order to help the elevation of the Hungarian 
agriculture. The situation of agriculture and rural development is a 
very complex issue which requires societal, demographical, 
educational, geographical, economical and of course, technological 
interventions, as well. The overall objective of NRS is to increase the 
population carrying capacity and population holding capacity. The 
overall objective consists of three horizontal aspects: sustainability, 
territorial and societal cohesion, and city-country connection. These 
                                                            
50 Source: ILLÉS: op. cit. 10-14. 
51 The name of the plan refers to Ignác Darányi (1849-1927), a Hungarian 
lawyer, agrarian, minister. He was member in the Hungarian Scientific 
Academy. In his political career Darányi worked always for the boosterism 
of the Hungarian agriculture. 
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involve more strategic aims like the preservation of natural values 
and resources (this one serves the sustainability aspect), multicolor 
and vivid agricultural production, food security and food safety 
(these two serve the territorial and societal cohesion), growing 
employment in the rural sector and enhancing the quality of rural 
lifestyle (these serve the city-country connection). NRS divides the 
abovementioned strategic aims to seven strategic fields. Two of them 
are worth to emphasizing: the protection and sustainable use of 
natural values and resources, and the improvement of the quality of 
rural environment. These connect to sustainability through the first 
strategic aim. On the lowest level, NRS consists of 42 national 
strategic programs and 8 regional development programs to achieve 
these comprehensive goals. Some of them refer to green economy 
and green technology, what is worth a short view within the scope of 
this paper. 
NRS takes the foreseeable three pillar model of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) into account. The second pillar is the 
sustainable use of natural resources which suggests that innovation 
should serve “green growth”, namely to reduce environmental loads 
and adapt to the consequences of climate change.52 The first program 
which serves greening is the Soil-protection and Natural Resource 
Management Program. This requires new technologies which are 
able to prevent or reduce the effects of soil-degradation factors, 
ensure fertility of the soil with natural resources, increase reservoir 
capacity of the soil and reduce unnecessary waste of natural 
resources.53 
                                                            
52 At the end of 2013, CAP 2014-2020 was adopted which is “greener” than 
the previous ones and aims at a more sustainable EU agriculture. See: 
Overview of CAP Reform 2014-2020, in Agricultural Policy Perspectives 
Brief, No. 5. (2013), published by the European Commission. See http:// 
ec.europa.eu/agriculture/policy-perspectives/policy-briefs/05_en.pdf, [cit. 
2014-01-27]. 
53 Nemzeti Vidékstratégia [National Rural Strategy], 2012, Ministry of 
Rural Development, Budapest, 65. 
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The Protection and Restoration of Natural Resources, Territories 
and Ecosystem Services Program focuses on the maintenance of 
biodiversity.54 It is crucial to continue and improve the existing 
plant-variety and animal species preservation programs and the fight 
against invading species.55 
The Water Resource and Water Quality Protection Program 
aims at preserving the quantity and quality of one of our most 
important renewable but vulnerable natural resources: water. It 
demands advanced technologies which can reduce the waste of 
water. It is also important to reduce nitrate load originating from 
agriculture, which requires individual Nitrate Action Plan. Hungary 
is rich in thermal water; therefore, we have to take care of it with 
water-saving and energy-efficient methods of exploitation.56 
Within the frame of Drinking Water Quality Improvement 
Program, it is an objective to reduce arsenic, boron, nitrite, fluoride, 
ammonium, iron, and manganese concentration. Besides, upgrading 
drinking water network is also necessary to prevent secondary water 
quality degradation.57 
The Waste Water Program innervates used water sparing, the 
utilization of grey water58 and the use of water-free technologies.59 
The Air Quality Protection and Noise Reduction Program aims 
at spreading energy-efficient eco-friendly transport methods and 
infrastructure, both in private and public transportation. It is also 
necessary to use greener heating systems and cleaner heating fuels 
which are also energy-efficient. It is desired to significantly reduce 
                                                            
54 The Earth Summit in 1992 shows the strong connection of biodiversity 
and sustainable development. 
55 Nemzeti Vidékstratégia [National Rural Strategy], 66-67. 
56 Ibid. 68. 
57 Ibid. 69-70. 
58 Used water is created by hand washing or vegetable washing. It is not 
infectious like waste water, therefore, it is suitable for washing, watering the 
garden or flushing the toilet. 
59 Nemzeti Vidékstratégia [National Rural Strategy], 70. 
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air-pollution, noise and stink loads of agricultural fields, especially in 
animal farms.60 
Finally, a few words about Waste Management Program. Like 
the previous strategies, this one also urges the increasing amount of 
recycling and the settling of modern waste management facilities. 
Biomass which cannot be used as a by-product any more could be 
used in biogas or/and composting establishment to reutilize it.61 
2.6. Jedlik Plan, National Strategy for the Protection of Intellectual 
Property 
On 23rd September 2013, the Government adopted the Jedlik62 Plan 
with Decision Nr. 1666/2013., which is the first comprehensive 
governmental strategy focusing on intellectual property. It defines 
mid-term objectives for the years of 2013-2016. The Jedlik Plan 
prescribes more than one hundred measures along the forty action 
directions. The Jedlik Plan has four pillars: industrial property law, 
copyright law, the use of IP in the service of national sectoral 
policies and institutional issues. 
The Jedlik Plan has more horizontal connection points with 
other sectoral policies. For example, the New Széchenyi Plan 
identifies knowledge as an outbreak point of the Hungarian 
economy. Amongst the sources of economic growth, one of the most 
important ones is innovation, which can give a huge competitive 
advantage in the current financial-economic depression. 
The abovementioned strategies foster green innovation in the 
field of agriculture and also regarding the protection of the 
environment. They operate with more efficient tenders and tax 
regulations to enhance the volume of innovations. However, 
nowadays, the costs of innovations are huge and these tools are not 
                                                            
60 Ibid. 71. 
61 Ibid. 72. 
62 The name of the plan refers to Ányos Jedlik (1800-1895), Hungarian 
scientist, inventor, Benedictine. He researched mainly the electricity, many 
of his inventions connect to electric power. Jedlik invented the soda water 
machine as well. 
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sufficient to pay off the costs. The best tool for investors what can 
promise extra profit with the biggest chance is intellectual property 
law. The different types of protection provide exclusive rights to the 
rightholder, which can make innovations profitable in long term, as 
well. 
The third pillar – the use of IP in the service of national sectoral 
policies – introduces the connection of green economy and industrial 
property under chapter 4.3.2. It lays down the basic concept that 
amongst global crises (climate change, increasing energy hungry, 
unpredictable change of energy price) sustainable (energy-efficient) 
development can only be maintained through the protection of 
natural resources, the preservation of biodiversity and the full 
exploitation of renewable resources. Such an economy is necessarily 
a green economy.63 
Relevant fields of green economy from the aspect of industrial 
property are the followings: 
1. alternative energy sources; 
2. innovations in the field of environment protection industry; 
3. environmental innovations in agriculture; 
4. innovation connecting to waste management. 
This list matches the focus points of the previously introduced 
strategies, which makes an inseparable bond between the different 
action plans. The Jedlik Plan emphasizes two types of protection 
which serve these innovations the best: patents that protect the 
innovation itself, and trademarks which help visualizing these 
innovations on the market. Utility models could also be useful tools; 
however, the number of granted utility models worldwide and 
domestically is significantly less than the number of granted patents, 
it is not a widespread form of protection, except in China. This could 
be the reason why it is not mentioned within this part. 
                                                            
63 Jedlik Terv, Nemzeti Stratégia a Szellemi Tulajdon Védelmére, 2013-2016 
[Jedlik Plan, The National Strategy for the Protection of Intellectual 
Property], 187-188. Available at: http://www.sztnh.gov.hu/jedlik-terv/Jed 
lik-terv.pdf [cit. 2014-01-28]. 
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The Jedlik Plan investigates domestic patent applications of 
green innovations between 2007 and 2012, which fits to the scope of 
this paper. In this period, the number of patent applications grew 
from 74 to 122. Significant growth was experienced in the field of 
wind energy, building insulation, recycling and agriculture. 
However, in these five years there were not any green patent 
applications connecting to vehicles or incineration, and bio-fuels 
were also underrepresented fields, however, these were important 
strategic points in all strategies. Unfortunately, the number of 
trademark applications in the 40. class of the Nice Agreement 
classification which refers to green energy, was continuously 
decreased.64 
Regarding new technologies, the timeframe between invention 
and the entry to market is quite important. The midsection is 
represented with the time of patent application process which varies 
case by case but in average it lasts 2,5 years, which is pretty good in 
international comparison. Many intellectual property authorities have 
special processes for the examination of green-patents, which can 
shorten the length of application process even with a year.65 
The volume of licensing and the effectiveness of right 
enforcement would also be an important indicator regarding the 
current situation of green technologies; however, Hungarian 
Intellectual Property Office (HIPO) does not have sufficient data to 
analyze these. It is not mandatory to apply patent and trademark 
licenses to the registry; therefore, HIPO cannot have full and 
authentic information. They have no data about right enforcement 
either because there was not any special investigation in the green 
economy sector. 
An important connection point between HIPO and the New 
Széchenyi Plan is that a positive examination result about the novelty 
and inventive step published by HIPO during the patent application 
process means an advantage in tenders of the New Széchenyi Plan.66 
                                                            
64 Ibid. 189-190. 
65 Ibid. 192. 
66 Ibid. 191. 




In the last years more national strategies were accepted which in 
some ways are connected to sustainable development and foster the 
use of more and more green technology to make the whole economy 
greener. These serve to protect the environment, which is one of the 
core dimensions of sustainable development. On the one hand, in the 
background of these strategies we find obligations from international 
law, and on the other hand, there are direct national obligations 
originating from the Fundamental Law, as described above. 
The most suitable branch of law which can provide an effective 
intervention tool for the state is administrative law. Private law 
cannot really differentiate between green technologies or other 
technologies; it protects all intellectual creations the same way and 
provides the same rights to exploit these rights. However, 
administrative law gives a more direct state-control mechanism. As it 
has previously been written, the main equipment of encouraging 
innovation to move towards greening is the proper regulation of 
taxation and tendering operations. The socialist planned economy 
has a bad taste in the mouth, and after the change of political regime 
in the 1990s, it was not a popular idea to centrally plan the flow of 
the economy but after the EU accession this kind of economy control 
got a new impetus. Now, the state does not intervene directly but 
through tax and tender regulations it can indirectly affect the 
economy to reach the desired economic ways. The methods in a 
capitalist free economy are different than in the past regimes but the 
state-will for a central planning is the same. 
Strategies were accepted quite frequently, year by year and there 
is a big overlap amongst them from the scope of fostering green 
economy. This raises the question whether previous strategies were 
really efficient or not. Or, for what else do we need newer ones? Are 
these plans able to determine the ways of economy? The number of 
patent applications is a good indicator of measuring the volume of 
high-profile green innovations. As the Jedlik Plan shows, in a few 
sectors of green innovation (like wind energy, energy storing, heat 
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insulation, waste management) considerable improvement can be 
observed. However, some industries like biomass or geothermic 
energy, vehicles or CO2 emission reduction are almost unchanged. 
Despite of these numbers, in Hungary, geothermic and biomass 
energy production have, or should have the biggest role. The total 
amount of biomass is 350-360 million ton, of which only 10% is 
used for energetic goals. However, this low rate of utilization gives 
the 92% of our renewable energy production.67 The question is why 
we cannot acknowledge the results of innovation in such an 
important energy industry field or in other lagging industries. One 
reason could be the extremely costly and time-consuming researches 
which cannot reach patentable status in a few years. In this case, 
frequent surveys can check the progress and it will be clear whether 
only time is necessary or something else is needed to make 
successful initiatives. A negative fact is that public-financed research 
centers (typically universities) have an extremely low intellectual 
property protection activity, which hampers economic exploitation of 
potential innovations. The Jedlik Plan identifies other unfavorable 
factors like the generally low intensity of R&D&I activity, the lack 
of sufficient capital of small and medium sized enterprises, the 
absence of result obligations for patenting in calling for tenders and 
the lack of presence of using intellectual property valuation 
methods.68 
On 28th March 2013, the Parliament adopted Decision Nr. 
18/2013. on National Sustainable Development Framework Strategy 
for the period of 2012-2024. The strategy is different than the 
previous one. NSDS was more pragmatic; it defined core priorities 
and fields that need to be improved. This new strategy has a more 
                                                            
67 CSÁK, CSILLA – JAKAB, NÓRA: Magyar Nemzeti Jelentés a 
mezőgazdaságról és a fenntartható fejlődés követelményéről [Hungarian 
National Report on the Agriculture and the Requirement of Sustainable 
Development], in Agrár- és Környezetjog, No. 12. (2012) 67-68. 
68 Jedlik Terv [Jedlik Plan], 190. 
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theoretical approach about sustainable development,69 and rather 
gives a report about the current situation and takes care of 
institutional relations. The separate analysis of this strategy was 
unnecessary because it did not define any detailed directions above 
the natural commitment next to green economy and preservation of 
resources, rather just defined declarations and referred to the core 
points of the New Széchenyi Plan Green Economy Development 
Program. However, the report about the current situation does not 
prove any progress in greening. After 7 years from the adoption of 
NSDS, this new strategy diagnoses the overuse of natural resources, 
their quantity is lowering and their quality is demoting. Many 
problems afflict the environment which makes lifestyle worse and 
the environment poorer. Biological diversity is reducing, the 
resistance of ecological systems is irreversibly damaged and the 
ecosystem is exhausted.70 The solution is to foster green innovation 
in order to create greener technologies to spare the environment and 
reduce its exploitation to take time for regeneration. However, the 
solution was the same years ago as well but as the current report 
shows, result did not appear and the processes did not turn or slow 
down. This makes the efficiency of the different strategies 
questionable. Partial successes were recorded; however, the global 
picture remained unchanged. It can occur that it is just the question 
of time but perhaps more radical tools will be needed to reach 
                                                            
69 The biggest change is the different thinking about sustainable 
development. The strategy gives an additional pillar to the classical three-
pillar system. Next to the environment, economy and society, the fourth 
core factor is the human in itself. An adequate number of healthy people 
with useful knowledge is the most important resource of the nation, 
therefore, we cannot allow to drop behind the poorest people and lose their 
abilities. In my opinion, humans and societal dimensions cannot be 
separated so strict because the community of humans gives the society; they 
are in a part-whole relationship. See further in Nemzeti Fenntartható 
Fejlődés Keretstratégia 2012-2024 [National Sustainable Development 
Framework Strategy 2012-2024], published in Parliament Decision Nr. 
18/2013 (III. 28.). 
70 Ibid. Annex 1. row E3. 
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sustainability. The best mark of recognition of bad tendencies is the 
pessimistic title of the Parliament decision which adopted the 
Framework Strategy: The national concept of transition towards 
sustainability. Longer transitional period means more distant 
sustainability. We can just hope that Hungary will not give up its 
sustainability goals and it will not be stuck in the transition for 
decades. 
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László KNAPP 
Diverging Approaches of the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court Concerning the Position of EU 
Law in the Domestic Legal Order1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Like in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, after the 
political change in the late 1980s, a Constitutional Court has been 
established in Hungary, as well [Act XXXII of 1989 entitled the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court with competences similar to the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Federal Constitutional Court)].2 
In the course of the 1990s, after Hungary submitted its application 
for EU membership, it had to face cases, which concerned the 
                                                            
1 This paper has been firstly published as second part of the following 
study: HORVÁTHY, BALÁZS – KNAPP, LÁSZLÓ: The Relationship between 
the Hungarian and the EU Legal Orders, in SMUK, PÉTER (ed.): The 
Transformation of the Hungarian Legal System 2010-2013, 2013, Complex, 
Budapest, 51-68. 
2 It’s worth to quote Zdeněk Kühn’s description on the situation in the post-
communist countries after the collapse of the previous political system: “At 
most, national constitutional courts, viewing themselves primarily as 
guardians of national constitutions and following the lead of the German 
archetype, might pursue their national judicial politics, show themselves as 
the ultimate guardians of national sovereignty and delineate the limits of the 
ECJ’s competence in the way the German Federal Constitutional Court did 
in its Solange II and Maastricht decisions.” KÜHN, ZDENĚK: The 
Application of European Law in the Member States: Several (Early) 
Predictions, in German Law Journal, Vol. 6. No. 03. (2005) 572. 
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harmonization of the Hungarian legal order with the European law, 
as a precondition for the accession of the country. 
The relation between the national and the EU law has been 
subject to the Hungarian Constitutional Court’s decision after the 
accession of Hungary on 1 May 2004. The judgments dealt with 
particular problems in the relation of the two legal orders. In line 
with these, this study is intended to draw, if not a complex approach, 
but the main elements of the Court’s practice. 
2. EUROPEAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT PRIOR TO 
HUNGARY’S ACCESSION 
Long before Hungary’s EU accession the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court formulated an early approach concerning the relationship 
between the EU law and the law of the Member States. Decision 
4/1997 of the Constitutional Court (hereinafter: CC) dealt with the 
constitutionality of ex post facto review of national laws 
promulgating international treaties. According to the opinion of the 
Court, although if “there is no specific regulation concerning this – 
due to the universality of constitutional review – constitutional courts 
examine the constitutionality of them in exactly the same way as in 
the case of domestic review.”3 
The Constitutional Court reflected the current developments in 
Europe, regarding the relation between international law and 
domestic legal systems and the role of the law of the “European 
integration.” At this point, the Court laid down no clear difference 
between international and European/Community law. Instead of 
doing so, it emphasized the latter’s role of making a change from the 
often dualist approach in the European states to a monist-adoption 
concept.  
It is noteworthy to quote the full reasoning of the Court 
concerning the position of EU law in the Members States’ legal order 
                                                            
3 Point II. 7. 
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and the competences of the constitutional courts connecting to that.4 
It generally emphasized, that “even those members of the EU which 
still follow the transformation system (e.g. Germany, one of the 
founding members, Italy, and the Scandinavian countries, which 
subsequently joined to the European Union) apply the law of the 
European Union directly, without transformation, and they ensure 
priority (sic!)5 over national law with the exception of the 
Constitution.6 As a result of this, the constitutional courts exercise 
their competence regarding constitutional examination concerning 
international treaties (international law) and the decisions of 
international organizations – due to the adoption system – 
automatically becoming the part of the domestic law.” 
After that, like in many other cases, the Court referred to the 
practice of the German Federal Constitutional Court, making no 
difference between the ex post facto review of EU related and non-
EU related international treaties of the Karlsruhe Court. It concluded 
its examination with the following: “from these decisions, the 
following position becomes clear: the German Federal Constitutional 
Court, besides its “naturally” exercising constitutional power 
concerning ex post facto review – especially with regards to the 
European Union treaties – must not give up any part of its task to 
protect the Constitution; this function extends to every way of 
exercising sovereignty under the Grundgesetz (Basic Law [for the 
Federal Republic of Germany]). On this basis, the Constitutional 
Court – besides examining the law promulgating a treaty – retains 
the submission to the EU law under constant control.” The 
aforementioned unclear statement gave reason for the jurisprudence 
to suppose a possible future approach to EU law. The mere fact that 
it has not clearly acknowledged the EU legal order, as an 
                                                            
4 See BLUTMAN, LÁSZLÓ – CHRONOWSKI, NÓRA: Hungarian Constitutional 
Court: Keeping Aloof from European Union Law, in Vienna Online Journal 
of Constitutional Law. Vol. 5. No. 3. (2011) 331–332.  
5 Emphasis added – L. K. 
6 Act XX of 1949 The Constitution of the Republic of Hungary (not in 
force). 
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autonomous one, separate from international law, made it 
presumable that the Court will follow a hard-line defending position 
if favour of the national constitution, similarly to the German Federal 
Constitutional Court.7 
Regarding the Hungarian Constitutional Court’s attitude 
towards EU law, Decision 30/1998 CC is of dual nature. On the one 
hand, it is provided with a more detailed clarification concerning the 
relationship between the EU and the Member State’s law; on the 
other hand, Hungarian legal order is appeared in a rather self-
standing manner. 
According to Hungary’s Europe Agreement8 – and the 
Government Decree promulgating the decision of the Association 
Council on several executive norms of the Europe Agreement9 – the 
Hungarian Competition Authority had to follow, in competition 
matters falling within the scope of the Europe Agreement, not only 
                                                            
7 Ernő Várnay summarizes in his paper the prevailing opinion in the 
jurisprudence of that time. VÁRNAY, ERNŐ: Alkotmánybíróság és az 
Európai Unió joga [Constitutional Court and the Law of the European 
Union], in Jogtudományi Közlöny, Vol. 62. No. 10. (2007) 431. According 
to Mihály Ficsor, although the Constitutional Court seems to recognize the 
sui generis character of EU law, it might not make a difference between this 
and the international law. FICSOR, MIHÁLY: Megjegyzések az európai 
közösségi jog és a nemzeti alkotmány viszonyáról II. [Remarks on the 
Relationship Between European Community Law and the National 
Constitution II.], in Magyar Jog, Vol. 44. No. 9. (1997) 528. In Janos 
Volkai’s opinion it is presumable that the Court will follow the German 
Federal Constitutional Court, causing conflict between Community law and 
Hungarian law after the accession. VOLKAI, JANOS: The Application of the 
Europe Agreement and European Law in Hungary: The Judgment of an 
Activist Constitutional Court on Activist Notions, in The Jean Monnet 
Working Papers, No 8. (1999) Available at: http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jean 
monnet/archive/papers/99/990801.html [cit. 2014-03-10]. 
8 Act I of 1994 on the promulgation of the Europe Agreement signed in 
Brussels on 16 December 1991 establishing an association between the 
Republic of Hungary and the European Communities and their Member 
States (not in force). 
9 Government Decree 230/1996 (not in force). 
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the criteria inherent the EU law and practice of the EU competition 
authorities existing at the time of signing the Agreement, but also the 
adopted norms and the legal practice of the mentioned authorities 
established thereafter. 
Unlike Decision 4/1997 CC, Decision 30/1998 CC contains a 
more precise description of the doctrines of EU law. Concerning the 
subject matter of the case, the principle of direct application has been 
emphasized, differentiating Union law from international law. While 
international treaties become part of national law through, for 
example, confirmation and promulgation or confirmation and 
incorporation, such a transformation is not necessary in the case of 
Union law. 
Although the Court recognized the approximation of Hungary’s 
present and future legislation to Community law, as it has explicitly 
been undertaken by the country under Article 67 of the Europe 
Agreement, it referred to the fact that Hungary is not a member of 
the EU yet, and considering this, the “Community’s internal law” is 
still foreign law in respect of the application of it. 
The main point in the Constitutional Court’s reasoning in this 
case was that before the country’s accession, the principle of direct 
application does not govern position in the Hungarian legal system, 
and the Europe Agreement can be regarded as a treaty under 
international law. According to Art. 2 para. (1) of the Constitution, 
“the Republic of Hungary is an independent democratic state 
governed by the rule of law”, and as such, its authorities cannot be 
bound – without violating its sovereignty – by norms and practice of 
another public order, namely the European Union. 
Concerning the EU accession procedure of the country, the 
same point gained greater importance stipulating that “the Parliament 
may not amend the Constitution in a disguised manner by adopting 
or promulgating an international treaty.” This argumentation has led 
to the amendment of the Constitution with the Europe Clause,10 the 
                                                            
10 Art. 2/A. (1) By virtue of treaty, the Republic of Hungary, in its capacity 
as a Member State of the European Union, may exercise certain 
constitutional powers jointly with other Member States to the extant 
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authorizing provision for the EU accession.11 For the sake of an 
incontestable political legitimacy, a binding referendum has been 
held one year before Hungary’s accession. 
3. EUROPEAN LAW AND HUNGARIAN LAW IN THE PRACTICE OF 
THE HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AFTER THE 
ACCESSION 
The first case the Constitutional Court had to deal with was on the 
implementation of transitional provisions in order to avoid the 
misuse of the EU agricultural export refund measures. Regulations 
1972/2003/EC12 and 60/2004/EC13 intended to prevent the 
accumulation of surplus stocks of certain agricultural products 
reflecting the price differences between the old and new Member 
States and countries outside the EU. 
                                                                                                                              
necessary in connection with the rights and obligations conferred by the 
treaties on the foundation of the European Union and the European 
Communities (hereinafter referred to as ‘European Union’); these powers 
may exercised independently and by way of the institutions of the European 
Union. (2) The ratification and promulgation of the treaty referred to in 
paragraph (1) shall be subject to a two-thirds majority vote of the 
Parliament. 
11 See BLUTMAN – CHRONOWSKI: op. cit. 332.; HORVÁTHY, BALÁZS: Az 
uniós és a magyar jogrendszer metszéspontjairól [On the Points of 
Intersection of Union and Hungarian Law], in SZIGETI, PÉTER (ed.): 
Leviatán. Tomus V. 2007, Universitas-Győr, Győr, 27. 
12 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1972/2003 on transitional measures to 
be adopted in respect of trade in agricultural products on account of the 
accession of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia, OJ L 293 (11 November 
2003). 
13 Commission Regulation (EC) No 60/2004 of 14 January 2004 laying 
down transitional measures in the sugar sector by reason of the accession of 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, 
Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia, OJ L 9 (15 January 2004). 
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To fulfil the requirements laid down by the aforementioned 
Regulations, the Hungarian Parliament adopted the act “on measures 
related to the accumulation of commercial surplus stocks of 
agricultural product” (hereinafter Surplus Act). The Surplus Act 
introduced tax provisions for operators involved in speculation trade 
movements stockpiling certain agricultural products.  
In its Decision 17/2004 CC, the Constitutional Court based its 
jurisdiction on the examination of the Hungarian law implementing 
the EU Regulations, without prejudice to the latter’s content. On the 
one hand, the Court dealt with pure Hungarian legal issues, since it 
declared unconstitutional the definition of possible taxpayers, and the 
method that the determination of tax provisions has been delegated to 
executive decrees. 
On the other hand, it also examined measures of double nature. 
The two Regulations have been published in the Official Journal in 
November 2003 and January 2004 (and modified in February and 
April 2004). In line with these, the Surplus Act contained provisions, 
which concerned the procedure of the tax payment, e.g. that its basis 
is the inventory of 1 May, the daily average of the stocked products 
in the previous years had to be taken into consideration or Section 5 
prescribing that transactions, which occurred after 1 January 2004 
are not to be considered for the reduction of stock. Due to their 
retrospective character, those provisions have been declared 
unconstitutional, which practically repeated the measures of the two 
Regulations. 
Quoting Decision 30/1998 CC, it stated that before Hungary’s 
accession, without implementing EU law, there is no obligation for 
the direct application of EU legal measures. But the question arose, 
how Hungarian legislators could have passed a non-retroactive 
implementing act in cases of Regulations dating from the end of 
2003 and the beginning of 2004? Furthermore, according to the 
petition, the principle of legal certainty has also been violated with 
the presumption that traders would make use of the EU refund 
measures maliciously, although stocking had not been forbidden by 
the Hungarian law before the Regulations have been adopted and 
implemented into the domestic law. 
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In its reasoning, the Court emphasized several times, that the 
subject of its examination was the adopted Hungarian act, not the 
Regulations themselves. Finally, it declared the aforementioned 
provisions unconstitutional – judging the constitutionality of the EU 
Regulations in an indirect manner.14  
In the next relevant decision, the Constitutional Court repeated 
its reasoning on the relationship between EU secondary legislation 
and Hungarian law.15 Act XXIV of 2004 on Firearms and 
Ammunition has been adopted as an implementing measure of 
Directive 91/477/EEC on control of acquisition and possession of 
weapons.16 The petitioner stated that the sellers’ duty to keep the 
buyers’ record for a certain period violates the right for data 
protection laid down in the Constitution.  
The Court formulated, that concerning the directives and the 
secondary EU legislation in general, the obligation has arisen for the 
Member States that they have to implement them in line with their 
own legislation procedure. It quoted the key element from its 
reasoning in 17/2004 CC, that “the question about the provisions 
challenged in the petition concerns the constitutionality of the 
Hungarian legislation applied for the implementation of the EU 
regulations (here: directives) rather than the validity or the 
interpretation of these rules.” 
László Blutman and Nóra Chronowski pointed out that the 
requirement of adequate transposition could be derived from certain 
                                                            
14 Márton Varju and Flóra Fazekas described the paradox situation with the 
following: “While the jurisdiction to examine the compatibility of EU 
measures with domestic constitutional principles was not taken up by HCC 
[Hungarian Constitutional Court], arguably by examining the 
constitutionality of the domestic act stemming directly from the 
Commission Regulations, in an indirect manner the HCC passed a judgment 
on the constitutionality of the Regulations.” VARJU, MÁRTON – FAZEKAS, 
FLÓRA: The Reception of European Union Law in Hungary: The 
Constitutional Court and the Hungarian Judiciary, in Common Market Law 
Review, Vol. 48. No. 6. (2011) 1956. 
15 Decision 744/B/2004 CC. 
16 OJ L 256 (13 September 1991). 
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sections of the Constitution.17 With the establishment of the postulate 
of the “harmony18 between Union law and domestic law follows 
from the Constitution itself or jointly form the Constitution and the 
Accession Treaty, then it would open up the possibility of treating 
the conflict between a transposing and implementing domestic norm 
and Community law as – at least – a formal violation of the 
Constitution.”19 
Reflecting the ratification procedure of the Constitutional 
Treaty, Decisions 58/2004 CC and 1/2006 CC dealt with a 
referendum initiative against the “Constitution for Europe”. The 
argumentation of the petitioners was based on the status of the 
                                                            
17 Art. 2/A, Art. 6 para. (4) and Art. 7 para. (1) of the former Constitution: 
Art. 2/A: see above.; Art. 6 (4) The Republic of Hungary shall take an active 
part in establishing a European unity in order to achieve freedom, well-
being and security of the peoples of Europe.; Art. 7(1) The legal system of 
the Republic of Hungary accepts the generally recognized principles of 
international law, and shall harmonize the country’s domestic law with the 
obligations assumed under international law. 
Now Art. E and Q (3) of the Fundamental Law of Hungary (adopted on 18 
April 2011, entered into force on 1 January 2012): 
Art. E (1) In order to achieve the highest possible measure of freedom, well-
being and security for the peoples of Europe Hungary shall contribute to the 
achievement of European unity. (2) In order to participate in the European 
Union as a Member State, and on the basis of an international treaty, 
Hungary may, to the extent necessary to exercise the rights and fulfil the 
obligations set out in the founding treaties, exercise some of its 
competences deriving from the Fundamental Law jointly with other 
Member States, through the institutions of the European Union. (3) The law 
of the European Union may stipulate generally binding rules of conduct 
subject to the conditions set out in paragraph (2). (4) The authorisation for 
expressing consent to be bound by an international treaty referred to in 
paragraph (2) shall require the votes of two-thirds of all Members of 
Parliament.; Art. Q (3) Hungary shall accept the generally recognised rules 
of international law. Other sources of international law shall become part of 
the Hungarian legal system by publication in rules of law. 
18 Emphasis added - L. K. 
19 BLUTMAN – CHRONOWSKI: op. cit. 341. 
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document, namely it is not a simple modification of the earlier 
Founding treaties, but as a new international treaty, it will replace 
them. 
The Court accepted that the Act of Accession declared only the 
existing acquis to be binding for the new Member States. Although 
the Treaty has been signed by the Hungarian Prime Minister; until it 
is not “empowered” by the Parliament, it is still possible to initiate a 
referendum on it, since it is a question within the competence of that 
legislative body – a prerequisite for initiating referenda in Hungary.  
A petition was submitted again, but in line with the aforesaid 
reasoning. It was rejected again, since the Parliament has already 
ratified the Constitutional Treaty with Parliament Resolution 
133/2004. 
The conception of the Court concerning the EU Founding 
treaties has been clarified in Decision 1053/E/2005 CC. According to 
the petitioners Hungary failed to comply with the obligations 
resulting from the free movement of services of the EC Treaty, when 
it maintained the restrictive provisions of the Acts on Gambling 
Operations (Act XXXIV of 1991) and Business Advertising Activity 
(Act LVIII of 1997), concerning the purchase, organization and 
advertising activities connected to gambling coming from abroad.  
As against the argumentation of the petitioners, the Court 
pointed out, that the Constitution’s Europe Clause contains only the 
place of the Union law in the Hungarian legal order, and no concrete 
obligation to legislate is stemming from the mentioned provision. 
Therefore, there is no reason to determine unconstitutionality due to 
the legislator’s omission in the given case, since a mere conflict 
between EU law and Hungarian law does not establish 
unconstitutionality. 
On the other hand, concerning the position of EU law in the 
national legal order of Hungary an important statement has been 
stipulated: despite their international origin, the Constitutional Court 
does not intend to treat the Founding treaties as international 
treaties.20 
                                                            
20 Point III. 2. 
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Until that point, the following scheme could have been drawn: 
those EU connected legal acts could be judged by the Court that fall 
within the competence of the Hungarian legislator, i.e. implementing 
measures and unratified treaties.21 Regarding a substantive conflict 
between the two legal orders, the Court continuously refused to 
examine it. 
This has been reaffirmed in Decision 61/B/2005 CC on data 
transferring issues concerning preliminary ruling procedures: “The 
jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court is laid down by Section 1 of 
the Act on the Constitutional Court. The cited provision contains no 
competence authorizing the Constitutional Court to examine 
collision with Community law. Pursuant to the rules of Community 
law, this question falls within the competence of the organs of the 
European Community, finally the European Court of Justice.”22 
Additionally, the character of the Europe Clause has been examined. 
According to the Court, it determines the position of Union law in 
the Hungarian legal system, but it is based on a closed, introspective 
logical structure, without any reference to the features of EU law.23 
As the previous decisions have shown, the Constitutional Court 
did not provide with a complex, well-built system concerning the 
relationship between Union law and Hungarian law, but the sui 
generis character of the former one could be concluded after the 
aforementioned decisions. But a new approach was drawn in 
Decision 72/2006 CC. 
The subject matter of the case was the presumed 
unconstitutionality of several labour law provisions, especially 
measures of the Labour Code (Act XXII of 1992) and the Act on the 
                                                            
21 VINCZE, ATTILA: Az Alkotmánybíróság esete az Unió által kötött 
nemzetközi szerződésekkel [The Constitutional Court’s Case with the 
International Treaties Concluded by the Union], in Európai Jog, Vol. 8. No. 
4. (2008) 27. 
22 Translation by BLUTMAN – CHRONOWSKI: op. cit. 337. 
23 Explaining this, Márton Varju and Flóra Fazekas emphasized that “the 
constitutional status of EU law in domestic law is approached solely on the 
basis of Section 2/A.” VARJU – FAZEKAS: op. cit. 1949. 
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Status of Public Employees (Act XXXIII of 1992). The petition 
claimed that the current Hungarian regulation violates EU law, since 
the Parliament omitted to enact an implementing measure on 
Directive 2003/88/EC concerning certain aspects of the organization 
of working time.24 The petitioner pointed out, that the Founding 
treaties of the European Communities, which are treaties under 
international law, are the legal basis of the Directive.  
The Court replied it with the following argumentation:  
“The Constitutional Court has established in Decision 
1053/E/2005 CC that the Founding and Amending treaties of the 
European Communities are not considered treaties under 
international law in respect of establishing the competence of the 
Constitutional Court, and these treaties – being primary sources of 
law – and the Directives – being secondary sources of the law – are 
as Community law part of the internal law (sic!),25 since Hungary 
has been a Member State of the European Union since 1 May 2004. 
With regard to the competence of the Constitutional Court, 
Community law is not considered international law as specified 
under Art. 7 para. 1 of the Constitution. In the petition aimed at the 
examination of collision with a treaty under international law, the 
petitioner has not referred to any treaty under international law other 
than the Directive.” 
Attila Vincze revealed that there is a discrepancy regarding the 
“EU law as internal law” concept. On the one hand, if it is internal 
law, there is no further obstacle to review its constitutionality in line 
with competence provisions of the Act on the Constitutional Court. 
On the other hand, it contravenes the sui generis character of EU law, 
which has been established in the previous decisions.26 
Soon after its adoption, the Court had to narrow down this 
concept in Decision 32/2008 CC, making itself able to judge on the 
content of the arrest warrant agreement between the EU, Iceland and 
                                                            
24 OJ L 299 (18 November 2003). 
25 Emphasis added - L. K.  
26 VINCZE: op. cit. 27-28. 
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Norway27 (hereinafter EUIN Agreement). Although the EU Treaty 
provided the EU with express treaty-making competence in the field 
of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters,28 since it 
concerned such sensitive criminal law principles as nullum crimen 
sine lege or ne bis in idem with the possible consequence of affecting 
the application of national criminal rules, it has been concluded as a 
mixed agreement with the Member States as parties in it. 
To establish its competence, the Constitutional Court had to 
modify the conception on EU Treaties laid down in its earlier 
decisions. According to them, Hungarian laws promulgating EU 
related international treaties fall within the competence of the Court, 
until the “empowerment” of the Parliament (58/2004 CC and 1/2006 
CC), after it, it is considered not international but Union law 
(1053/E/2005 CC) – which became internal law (72/2006 CC), but 
outside the jurisdiction of the Court (61/B/2005CC). 
Since the Hungarian Parliament has already adopted an act 
promulgating the EUIN Agreement, it should have been 
characterized as EU law. To solve this, the Court introduced a new 
differentiation among EU related treaties. On the one hand, it 
referred the opinion of the EU itself, according to which, this kind of 
treaties are “international treaties regulated by the rules of 
international law.” Reflecting its own previous practice, on the other 
hand, it laid down, that “since it does not change any of the 
competences of the European Union or the European Communities 
regulated in the so-called Founding and Amending treaties, but it 
establishes obligations in the relation of the individual Member 
                                                            
27 Council Decision 2006/697/EC of 27 June 2006 on the signing of the 
Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and 
the Kingdom of Norway on the surrender procedure between the Member 
States of the European Union and Iceland and Norway. OJ L (31. October 
2006). 
28 Art. 38. TEU – VINCZE: op. cit. 30. According to Art. 38. TEU, 
“Agreements referred to in Article 24 [under Title V: Provisions on a 
Common Foreign and Security Policy – L. K.] may cover matters falling 
under this title.” 
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States and Iceland and Norway.” And since it is not a Union legal 
norm, it falls outside the scope of Art. 2/A of the Constitution, 
therefore it is to be considered as an international treaty and because 
of this constitutional review by the Court is possible. 
Similarly to the case of the Constitutional Treaty, the Court had 
to deal with petitions concerning the Treaty of Lisbon. Decision 
61/2008 CC was about a referendum initiative intending to reject the 
“binding force” of the modifying treaty for Hungary. The Court has 
repeated its argumentation from Decisions 58/2004 CC and 1/2006 
CC that a referendum is possible until the treaty is “empowered” by 
the Parliament. Like in 1/2006 CC, it rejected the petition referring to 
the fact that the Parliament has already promulgated the Treaty by 
Act CLXVII of 2007 (hereinafter Promulgating Act). 
In Decision 143/2010 CC the Court had to deal with the very 
substance of the Treaty of Lisbon. According to the petitioner it 
jeopardizes the existence of the Republic of Hungary as an 
independent state governed by the rule of law. Before responding to 
the petition, the Court defined the status of the Lisbon Treaty, 
continuing to reshape the position of EU law in the Hungarian legal 
order started in Decision 32/2008 CC.  
The question arose whether an ex post facto review of the 
Promulgating Act is possible or not. The Court established its 
competence to examine it due to the international law origin of that 
Treaty. This reasoning could be considered as a return to Decision 
4/1997 CC, since it contains a rather dualist approach to EU law. It is 
considered to be more problematic that it contravenes the doctrine of 
EU law as sui generis legal order stipulated in the earlier judgments, 
and the logic of Decision 72/2006 CC, where it stated that EU law 
becomes part of the internal legal order.29 
                                                            
29 László Blutman concluded that “the Treaty of Lisbon (and therefore the 
Founding treaties in general), according to this, prevail through the 
implementing act as international treaties in the domestic law [translated by 
L. K.].” BLUTMAN, LÁSZLÓ: Milyen mértékben nemzetközi jog az Európai 
Unió joga a magyar alkotmányos gyakorlatban? [To What Extent Can 
European Law Be Considered as International Law in the Hungarian 
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Although the Court has established a competence to review the 
content of the Promulgating Act, in line with 4/1997 CC, it also laid 
down that in case of unconstitutionality, it shall have no effect on the 
obligations assumed by the Republic of Hungary, and the legislature 
should find a proper solution to ensure the harmony between 
European Union and Hungarian law. 
Partially giving up its – so far introspective – approach, the 
Court stated that albeit it has no competence for substantive 
interpretation of EU law, there is no obstacle to referring to and 
quoting the concrete norms of the Lisbon Treaty, as they are facts. 
Answering the petition, the Court laid down, that the Treaty does not 
establish a European ‘superstate’. Although it has gained legal 
personality to become “stronger and more efficient”, but the 
governments continue to conduct and control it. Besides its legal 
status, three constitutional novelties have been introduced,30 namely 
a of wider control mechanism for the national parliaments, the 
citizens’ initiative as a further step to secure the rule of law involving 
the European citizens and the Charter of Fundamental Rights as a 
“collection of legally binding guarantees” of the citizens’ rights. 
Another international treaty was subject to its most recent 
decision concerning the position of EU law in the Hungarian legal 
order,31 namely the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (hereinafter Fiscal 
Compact). The Government petitioned the Constitutional Court to 
interpret the new Europe Clause of the Fundamental Law to decide 
whether the Fiscal Compact is to be considered as an international 
treaty under Article E (2) where two-thirds majority voting is 
required in the Parliament for the ratification or, as for other 
international treaties, simple majority voting is sufficient. 
                                                                                                                              
Constitutional Practice?], in KOVÁCS, PÉTER (ed.): International Law – A 
Quiet Strength, Le droit international, une force tranquille (Miscellanea in 
memoriam Géza Herczegh), 2011, Szent István Társulat – Pázmány 
University Press, Budapest, 296–297. 
30 Listed by VARJU – FAZEKAS: op. cit. 1954. 
31 Decision 22/2012 CC. 
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The aforementioned paragraph of the Fundamental Law 
authorizes Hungary to exercise competences jointly with other 
Member States or through the institutions of the European Union. 
According to its reasoning, the Court cannot decide on the nature of 
the given Treaty, but the legislative power exercising the state’s 
sovereignty has to clarify the Fiscal Compact’s character. Although 
being self-restrictive in this case, the Court drew attention to certain 
elements (the states will sign it as Member States of the EU, it will 
establish new competences for the Union institutions), which let the 
legislature assume the Court’s opinion. 
4. CONCLUSION  
The practice of the Hungarian Constitutional Court is rather 
introspective concerning the relation between the two legal orders. 
As it has been examined, it set out different approaches regarding 
this issue, continuously refusing to provide with a complex, logically 
closed analysis on the relation between the Union and Hungarian 
law. The Court considers its competences as being restricted by two 
powers that it does not want to touch. On the one hand, it has not 
interpreted EU law, since it belongs to the competences of the 
European Court of Justice. Since this relation affects Hungary’s 
sovereignty as an independent state, the Court left the decision on the 
competence transfer to the legislation, on the other hand. It should 
define how far the common and/or joint exercise of competences 
shall extend. This self-restraint in law and practice regarding EU 
related matters is not unique among the Member States and indeed, it 
fits well into the broad picture of constitutions of the Eastern 
European EU Members. In this regard, it is worth to quote András 
Sajó’s view, in which this tendency among the aforementioned 
countries including Hungary is explained by the strong pro-
independence public sentiment and historical grounds, i.e. that these 
countries are newly recognized nation-states that have regained their 
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sovereignty in recent times after the fall of communism and the 
political transition.32 
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EU Training Mission in Mali – 2013 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In 2013, after the “Arab spring”, disturbing news about armed 
conflict in Northern Africa reached the international community 
again. An ethnic (more like tribal) conflict, with a virtually powerless 
government and a violent coup evolved into civil war where the 
ever-present terrorist cells became suddenly active in the region and 
the conflict threatened with a humanitarian disaster – let alone the 
creation of a terrorist foothold in the neighbourhood of Europe. 
This study gives a brief insight into the events of the Malian 
conflict, its causes and its evolution; describes the EU – and 
particularly the French – approach and in particular, it introduces the 
training mission, its goals, agenda, progress and results. Since the 
study focuses on the training mission and the strategy of the 
European Union regarding the conflict, it applies an approach from 
the angle of the Common Security and Defense Policy. 
2. THE ROLE OF THE MISSION 
The European Union Training Mission (EUTM) in Mali is a venture 
of a military training organised, financed and led by forces of 
member states of the European Union. Due to the recent events in 
Mali, this country in the Sahel region1 has become a nest of high 
insecurity: Tuareg rebels, joined by Islamic terrorist groups have 
taken over the northern part of the country, with the aim of forming 
                                                            
1 A large region south of the Sahara desert, stretching across Northern 
Africa. 
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an independent, Islamic country. It took several months and a foreign 
intervention to solve the crisis. The goal of the mission is to help 
rebuild the Malian armed forces, thus, contributing to the restoration 
of public order in the country and the region, eliminating the threat 
of terrorist presence and alleviating concerns for Europe in 
humanitarian issues. 
The European Union’s objective in Mali is to support Malian 
efforts in order to:  
1. fully restore constitutional and democratic order through the 
implementation of road-map adopted on 29 January by the 
National Assembly;  
2. help the Malian authorities to fully exercise their sovereignty 
over the whole of the country;  
3. neutralise organised crime and terrorist threats.2 
3. THE EVENTS 
As a “spill-over effect” of the “Arab spring”, in the so-called region 
of Azawad, in northern Mali, several Tuareg military groups claimed 
for greater independence from the Malian government via organising 













2 EU Training Mission in Mali, Common Security and Defence Policy. 
Available at: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/ 
eutm-mali/pdf/factsheet_eutm-mali_en.pdf [cit. 2013-11-06]. 
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1. Figure Tuareg populated area 
On 22 March 2012, several officers of the Malian army, declaring 
that the actual government was incapable of treating the Tuareg 
uprise in the north, managed to perform a coup d’état and took over 
control in Bamako.3 They suspended the constitution but promised 
that after dealing with the rebels they would welcome a new, 
democratically elected government. 
Despite the takeover, the situation escalated. Approximately two 
weeks later, on 6 April, the organization of revolters, the MNLA 
(Mouvement National pour la Libération de l’Azawad, Azawad 
National Liberation Movement), supported by a radical Islamic 
group, managed to occupy the northern region of Mali (see on the 
map);4 after occupying three neighbouring towns and driving out the 
Malian army, they declared the independence of Azawad.5 Neither 
the surrounding, nor the leading nations recognised the sovereignty 
                                                            
3 Coup d’Etat au Mali : le couvre-feu est décrété, in LaMonde, available at: 
http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2012/03/22/les-mutins -maliens-disen 
t-avoir-renverse-le-president-toure_1673677_3212.html [cit. 2013-11-06]. 
4 Source: http://www.globalsecurity.org [cit. 2013-11-06]. 
5 Mali Tuareg rebels declare independence in the north, in BBC News, 
available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17635437 [cit. 2013-
11-06]. 
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of the newly born “state”; what is more, tensions rose promptly, 
concerning the security of the region and thus, that of Europe. 
Consequently, the overall situation rapidly deteriorated; 
thousands of people fled their homes, seeking asylum in the 
neighbouring countries (e.g. Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Niger), 
further aggravating the food crisis in the Sahel region,6 the West 
African regional body (called ECOWAS) imposed a full trading 
embargo on Mali and froze its funds in its central bank (member 
countries use a common currency). 
The aforementioned radical Islamic group, Ansar Dine 
(“Defenders of Faith”) imposed strict Sharia, Islamic common law in 
Azawad; what is more, during the following months, they 
successfully ousted Tuareg rebels who were forced to retreat from 
most of the region at the end of June.7 
The government of Mali asked for military intervention in order 
to recapture the northern parts of the country. On 11 January 2013, 
François Hollande, President of France announced that they were 
going to aid the Malian armed forces to restore their authority over 
the occupied region.8 By the beginning of February, the combined 
French, ECOWAS and Malian forces managed to drive the Islamists 
out of Azawad; on the other hand, Tuareg separatists continued to 
fight their former allies; although, they were reported to have 
performed attacks against the Malian army, as well.9 On 18 June 
2013, the Malian government and the Tuareg rebels signed a peace 
                                                            
6 Mali’s Conflict Refugees – Oxfam Briefing Paper, 1 
7 Trouble in Timbuktu as Islamists extend control, in The Telegraph, 
available at: ttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindian 
ocean/ mali/9365390/Trouble-in-Timbuktu-as-Islamists-extend-control.html 
[cit. 2013-11-06]. 
8 France confirms military aid in Mali, in Euronews, available at: 
http://www.euronews.com/2013/01/11/france-pledges-milit ary-aid-in-mali/ 
[cit. 2013-11-06]. 
9 Five Malians killed in ambush blamed on Tuareg army, in Globalpost, 
available at: http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130322/five-
malians-killed-ambush-blamed-tuareg-army [cit. 2013-11-06]. 
EU Training Mission in Mali – 2013 
246 
deal in Ouagadougou, concerning an immediate ceasefire and 
governmental return to the Tuareg-held city of Kidal.10 
During autumn, a one-week tension threatened with the return 
of hostilities in the country; on 26 September, the MNLA cancelled 
their participation in the peace deal, complaining that the government 
had failed to keep their end of the agreement; after that the Malian 
authorities released 23 insurgents, on 5 October the separatists 
announced that they were willing to rejoin the peace process.11 
On 11 August, presidential elections were held, with the victory 
of Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta.12 
4. THE LAUNCH OF EUTM MALI 
During the events elaborated above, Malian armed forces proved to 
be unable to handle the dangerous situation caused by the combined 
forces of the separatists and Islamic extremists. An effort was needed 
to modernise the Malian army; furthermore, this mission fits into the 
global approach of the European Union, outlined in the Strategy for 
Security and Development in the Sahel.13 
After the official request from the Malian government, and in 
accordance with United Nation Security Council resolutions 
                                                            
10 Mali and Tuareg rebels sign peace deal, in BBC News, available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-22961519 [cit. 2013-11-06]. 
11 Tuareg rebels rejoin peace process in northern Mali, in Reuters, available 
at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/06/us-mali-rebels-idUSBRE99 
500020131006 [cit. 2013-11-06]. 
12 Présidentielle au Mali: Soumaïla Cissé reconnaît sa défaite et félicite 
Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, in Les Voix du Monde, available at: http://www 
.rfi.fr/afrique/20130813-presidentielle-mali-soumaila-cisse-reconnait-defai 
te-felicite-ibrahim-boubacar-keit [cit. 2013-11-06]. 
13 European Union External Action Service, Strategy for Security and 
Development in the Sahel. Available at: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/africa/ 
docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf [cit. 2013-11-06]. 
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(S/RES/207114 and S/RES/208515), the European Union decided to 
start a new military mission within the framework of Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).1617 
The mission was launched on 17 February 2013, after a meeting 
in Brussels, where foreign ministers of the European Union and the 
Malian Foreign Office Minister, Hubert Coulibaly met each other 
and decided to immediately begin the training of the Malian army. 
The European Council appointed Brigadier General François 
Lecointre from France as the commander of the EU mission.18 The 
Council set up the headquarters of the mission in the capital, 
Bamako. 
Earlier, on 8 February, an advance team consisting of 70 
members arrived in Bamako; with the Malian authorities whose task 
was to finalise the system for providing advice to the chain of 
command and prepare the setting-up of the headquarters and the 
arrival of the trainers for the mission in Bamako.19 
                                                            
14 UN Security Council Resolution 2071 (2012). Available at: http://www 
.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/ RES/2071 [cit. 2013-11-06]. 
15 UN Security Council Resolution 2085 (2012). Available at: http://www 
.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbo l=S/RES/2085(2012) [cit. 2013-
11-06]. 
16 BAREA, JUAN CARLOS CASTILLA: The Malian Armed Forces Reform and 
the Future of EUTM, in Instituto Espanol de Estudius Estratégicos, 
Documento de Opinión, 2013. Available at: http://www.ieee.es/ 
en/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/2013/DIEEEO93-2013_EUTM_Mali_ 
CastillaBarea_ENGLISH.pdf [cit. 2013-11-06]. 
17 HAESEBROUCK, TIM: Katarina Engberg: The EU and Military Operations: 
A comparative analysis, in Journal of Contemporary European Research, 
Vol. 9. Issue 5. (2013) 770. 
18 EU training mission in Mali established, 5428/13. Brussels, 17 January 
2013. Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/ 
pressdata/EN/fora ff/134748.pdf [cit. 2013-11-06]. 
19 Advance party of EUTM Mali arrives in Bamako, A 72/13. Brussels, 8 
February 2013. Available at: http://www.eutmmali.eu/wp-content/upl 
oads/2013/02/Advance-party-of-EUTM-Mali-arrives-in-Bamako-Press-re 
lase12.pdf [cit. 2013-11-06]. 
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The official launch of the mission was announced on 20 
February in Bamako with the participation of General Démbélé 
(Chef d’État-Major Général des Armées, CEMGA; Joint Chief of 
Staff), General Camara (Minister for Defense, Mali) and General 
Lecointre. General Lecointre and Démbélé signed a technical 
arrangement which set the responsibilities and obligations of the 
Malian and European forces.20  
5. PARTICIPANTS OF THE MISSION AND THE ROLE OF FRANCE 
In EUTM Mali, 23 European countries decided to take part and 
contribute to the adequate training of the Malian forces: France 
(being the leading nation in the training mission, as well), Spain, 
Germany, Belgium, United Kingdom, Czech Republic, Poland, Italy, 
Sweden, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, 
Slovenia, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Luxembourg, Romania, 
Portugal and the Netherlands. 
The role of France is special in the mission: with more than 200 
soldiers deployed, they contribute the most to the success of the 
programme. However, this is not surprising: since EUTM Mali and 
the military intervention (Opération Serval) share the same goal – 
free the northern region and restore the integrity of the country – it is 
obvious that the two missions are aligned in the same strategy of 
France. 
At the same time, one has to underline that EUTM Mali is about 
training and giving advice and they do not take part in the combat 
operations carried out in Azawad – the role of the programme is to 
enable Malian “official” armed forces to keep order after the 
departure of the intervening French troops and to be able to avoid 
similar events in the future. 
The mission – so far – has had two commanders; the first is 
General François Lecointre who led the training mission until August 
                                                            
20 Conférence de presse à Bamako, available at: http://www.eutmmali.eu 
/?p=201 [cit. 2013-11-06]. 
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2013. Having 25 years military experience21 and serving on different 
crisis venues (first Gulf War, Djibouti during the civil war, Rwanda 
and Somalia), he was an adequate choice for a mission dealing with a 
crisis situation in Africa. On 1 August, the command was passed 
onto General Bruno Guibert who has been in charge of the command 
of EUTM Mali ever since. According to his professional history, 
General Guibert also has experience in military actions in Africa, 
especially in Chad, the Central African Republic, Rwanda and the 
Ivory Coast. Since France has taken a major role in the mission, it is 
hardly surprising that both commanders are of French nationality. 
The role of France is special in this whole crisis management. 
Since their economic interests in Northern Africa go back to the 
colonial era (uranium interests in the neighbouring Niger, for 
example), the French government reacts sensitively to all incidents in 
the region; given that the European Union showed “no appetite”22 for 
a combat operation under EU flag, President Hollande decided to 
prevent the further escalation of the conflict, taking action swiftly, 
thus enabling the multinational African forces to carry out their 
mission under UNSC Resolution 2085 in order to bring stability to 
the region. 
6. THE TRAINING 
Whereas the headquarters are at the capital, the training itself takes 
place at Koulikoro base, cca. 60 kilometres from Bamako. 550 troops 
were sent to train the Malian armed forces; out of these about 150 are 
trainers – the rest of the contingent provide support and serve as a 
protective force in the mission. Besides the mentioned French troops 
(207), Germany provided 71 soldiers, Spain contributed with 54, the 
                                                            
21 See General François Lecointre’s CV at: http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/ 
missions_operations/eutm-mali/ cv/cv_gal_lecointre_en.pdf [cit. 2013-11-
06]. 
22 COOLSAET, RIK – BISCOP, SVEN – COELMONT, JO: Mali: Another 
European Intervention without the EU? in Security Policy Brief, No. 42. 
(2013) 1. 
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UK with 40, the Czech Republic with 34, Belgium sent 25 and 
Poland 20.23 
General Lecointre was quite straightforward about the overall 
condition of the to-be-trained forces: the Malian army possessed 
poor and “heterogeneous” equipment, donated by richer nations over 
the last 20 years; “(...) the bigger issue however is the army’s lack of 
a clear hierarchy and chain of command, with little team spirit.”24  
2. Figure The region of Koulikoro25 
After the first coordinative training for the trainers at the end of 
March,26 the basic formation began on 2 April 2013 – when the first 
                                                            
23 Mali crisis: EU troops begin training mission, in BBC News, available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21998398 [cit. 2013-11-17]. 
24 EU troops begin Mali training mission, in Globalpost, available at: 
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130402/eu-troops-begin-
mali-training-mission-0 [cit. 2013-11-17]. 
25 Source: http://www.alimaong.org [cit. 2013-11-17]. 
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official Malian battalion arrived at Koulikoro (see on the map). 
Consisting of 600 people, this battalion was the first unit which took 
part in the training carried out by the European EUTM Mali 
instructors.27 According to the plans, the training would last for 10 
weeks and comprise several different phases. The battalion officially 
named itself “Waraba”, which means “lion” in the local Bambara 
language; its chief is Malian Lieutenant Colonel Yacouba Sanogo. 
Before any particular training session, the battalion was 
evaluated during a series of tests in order to obtain information about 
the soldiers’ general physical condition, technical knowledge and 
their capacity to command.28 The initial results were positive, 
meaning that the majority of the battalion had the basics required to 
begin the training. 
Three weeks of individual and group infantry training followed 
the evaluation, when on 29 April the EUTM Mali entered into a new 
phase: special training. This phase took 4 weeks and each special 
training module was carried out by different instructors from 
different EU countries:29 
1. Armoured light cavalry: Italy and Slovenia; 
2. Artillery: Great Britain; 
3. Engineering: Germany; 
4. Commando: Spain; 
5. Logistics: Poland; 
6. Elite snipers: Hungary; 
7. Communication: Greece; 
8. Aerial control: Italy. 
Besides physical and tactical exercises, the battalion also followed 
courses on international humanitarian law. Lessons were held for an 
                                                                                                                              
26 La formation des formateurs, available at: http://www.eutmmali.eu/? 
p=423 [cit. 2013-11-17]. 
27 Arrivée du premier bataillon Malien, available at: http://www.eutm 
mali.eu/?p=444 [cit. 2013-11-17]. 
28 Evaluation du bataillon WARABA, available at: http://www.eutmmali 
.eu/?p=584 [cit. 2013-11-17]. 
29 Le combat en localité, available at: http://www.eutmmali.eu/?m=20 
1305&paged=2 [cit. 2013-11-17]. 
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hour every week and were adapted to the audience. During these 
sessions, soldiers discussed real matters concerning humanitarian 
issues, such as “protection of children in armed conflict situation.”30 
Besides that, several United Nations organizations also took part in 
the humanitarian law courses (e.g. United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, United Nations Office in Mali, United 
Nations Population Fund Agency, UNICEF), aiding EUTM Mali 
with the main objective to “make the Malian soldiers understand and 
increase their sensibility towards human rights and to the obligations 
of soldiers in a conflict facing the civil population, women, children, 
civilian captives and war prisoners.”31 
The training of the “Waraba” battalion ended with a final 
exercise in the region of Koulikoro where both the Commander of 
the mission, General Lecointre and the Joint Chief of Staff, General 
Dembélé were present; the aim of the event was to attest the 
operational capacity of the battalion. The unit contains 715 members 
organised into different companies: three infantry and several special 
units in the fields of cavalry, artillery and engineering. The battalion 
met the requirements and was put under the command of the Malian 
Army.32 On 22 June, the battalion left the Koulikoro training camp 
and headed towards the northern part of the country to be deployed 
for the first time in the city of Gao.33 
On 9 July, the second battalion, appointed by the Malian state, 
began its training cycle in Koulikoro. The unit was to be commanded 
by Lieutenant-Colonel Samaké and consisted of three infantry 
companies, reinforced by a fourth company of specialized support 
                                                            
30 Le Droit International Humanitaire, available at: http://www.eutmma 
li.eu/?p=858 [cit. 2013-11-17]. 
31 Premières conclusions sur la formation au DIH, available at: http://www. 
eutmmali.eu/?m=201305 [cit. 2013-11-17]. 
32 « Doumba »: exercice de synthèse pour les Waraba, available at: http://w 
ww.eutmmali.eu/?p=1061 [cit. 2013-11-17]. 
33 EUTM Mali: Départ du bataillon Waraba, available at: http://www. 
eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eutm-mali/news/20130723 
_fr.htm [cit. 2013-11-17]. 
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units.34 After the evaluation of the soldiers two weeks of infantry 
training and a following special training took place. The battalion, 
named Elou (“elephants” in the language of tamashek) finished their 
training officially on 14 September35 they left the training camp on 
28 September. The 700 men and 60 vehicles joined the first battalion 
in Gao and – similarly to their predecessors – was accompanied by a 
French detachment of operational assistance.36 
The third battalion arrived at the Koulikoro base on 30 
September. The unit was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel 
Sangaré; the 720 soldiers who came from the training centre of the 
Malian armed forces mainly from Markala, completed by elements 
coming from all Mali.37 The name of the third battalion is “Sigi”, 
meaning “Buffalo” in Bambara language. The training is currently 
taking place at the training centre. 
7. RECEPTION 
The overall support of the programme has been great so far, many 
prominent representatives visited the training camp: the German 
Minister of Defense, Thomas de Maizière; the European Union’s 
Special Representative for the Sahel region, Michel Reveyrand de 
Menthon; the Swedish Minister of Defense, Madame Karin Enström; 
the Spanish Minister of Defense, Pedro Morenés Eulate; twice the 
Malian Minister of Defense and Veteran Combatants, Yamousssa 
Camara; the Spanish Ambassador, Jose Maria Matres Manso; Jean-
                                                            
34 Le second bataillon malien entame sa formation à Koulikoro, available at: 
http://www.eutmmali.eu/?p=1135 [cit. 2013-11-17]. 
35 Cérémonie de fin de formation du bataillon Elou, available at: http://www 
.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eutm-mali/news/20130914 
_news_fr.htm [cit. 2013-11-17]. 
36 Départ du bataillon «Elou», available at: http://www.eutmmali.eu/?p 
=1540 [cit. 2013-11-17]. 
37 Arrivée du 3e bataillon malien à Koulikoro, available at: http://www.eutm 
mali.eu/?p=1579 [cit. 2013-11-17]. 
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Yves Le Drian, the French Minister of Defense and the Belgian 
Minister of Defense, Pieter de Crem. 
As a token of appreciation for his work, General Lecointre was 
elevated to the rank of Commander of the National Order of Mali on 
31 July.38 
On 14 October, during a ceremony held in the main 
Headquarters of the EUTM Mali mission in Bamako, the imposition 
of the European medal for the security and defence policy took 
place; all personnel of the mission was near to the completion of 
their deployment. The event was chaired by the Deputy Commander 
of the mission, the Spanish Colonel, called Felix Eugenio Garcia 
Cortijo.39 EUTM Mali officers were honoured by the Malian 
Minister of Defence and Veteran Combatants and were appointed as 
knights of the National Order of Mali.40 
A considerable emphasis was placed upon the acceptance of the 
mission among the local populace, as well. The European 
servicemen of the mission EUTM led a series of actions for the 
benefit of the population of the city. On 25 October, in co-operation 
with the local authorities, Colonel Testard, accompanied with 
trainers of the mission visited four public schools to distribute school 
effects to children living there. The initiative went on with the 
projection of a cartoon to the children of a school situated in the 
outskirts of the city. These two actions were greeted by the teaching 
profession and the authorities of the city. A new distribution of 
school kits took place on Monday, 28 October in four other schools 
of Koulikoro. Altogether, more than 600 school kits were distributed 
to the children.41 
                                                            
38 Le général Lecointre élevé au rang de Commandeur de l’Ordre National 
du Mali, available at: http://www.eutmmali.eu/?p=1198 [cit. 2013-11-18]. 
39 Cérémonie de remise de la médaille de la politique européenne de 
sécurité et de défense, available at: http://www.eutmmali.eu/?p=1632 [cit. 
2013-11-17]. 
40 Officers of EUTM Mali honored, available at: http://www.eutmmali.eu/? 
p=1085 [cit. 2013-11-17]. 
41 Mission EUTM Mali: aide à la population malienne, available at: 
http://www.eutmmali.eu/?p=1669 [cit. 2013-11-18]. 
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
If we want to give a thorough opinion on the success of EUTM Mali, 
we would not find ourselves in an easy situation. The fact itself that 
the mission has successfully trained three battalions and is currently 
under the process of training more is a huge result, without any 
doubts. On the other hand, forming a solid judgement of the mission 
now would be quite difficult, since it is currently an ongoing one, set 
to be finished in the end of May 2014. However, in my opinion we 
can still make some conclusions of the experiences. 
The mission is widely considered to be a success; former 
commander, General Lecointre even advises that the mandate should 
be prolonged in order to train the whole of the Malian armed forces. 
Foreign experts have already welcomed the idea that instead of 
spending large amount of money on keeping order in occupied 
territories (e.g. the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan), it is much 
more profitable to train, thus, enable “domestic” forces to cope with 
the internal security issues after leaving the area. This measure also 
makes it possible to prevent that paramilitary forces occupy a part of 
the country (it was substantially due to the inability of regular forces 
that Ansar Dine was able to gain influence and set a foothold in 
Azawad) – and of course, trained Malian forces will be suitable to 
take part in the combat against international terrorism. Due to the 
consequences of the “Arab spring”, the Maghreb region is also 
exposed to the security dangers of the transition process (e.g. in 
Libya until the present day there are grave atrocities in spite of the 
democratic change after the civil war or, to provide a more recent 
example, we could mention the civil war-torn Syria as well) so the 
modernised army will probably play a crucial role in maintaining 
internal security and fending off terrorist threats. 
Although, – fortunately – the “real” test has been “postponed” 
(the radical Islamic forces had been driven out of the region by 
French troops by the time the Waraba battalion arrived at the city of 
Gao) it is nevertheless an important mission for the trained forces to 
preserve the fragile tranquillity and protect the population in the 
northern region. We can also see that the peace process can become 
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unstable as the result of even the slightest tensions; the Tuareg issue 
will require a political solution but in the meantime it is advisable to 
be prepared for possible incidents similar to the one happened in the 
last years. 
It is worth emphasizing that, the policy of the European Union 
can set an example for further crisis management in international 
conflicts. The EU recognised that long-lasting effects of social and 
economic development are strongly correlated with internal security 
and there is no other effective force to maintain that like a domestic 
one. In my opinion, it is also important to communicate properly 
towards European citizens why hundreds of millions of euros are 
spent for an African region and why it is beneficial for the 
community, as well. 
The emphasis on international humanitarian law is also a 
remarkable feature of the programme – besides social responsibility 
actions carried out by the trainers, it is also crucial that Malian 
soldiers respect human rights; this way the population can feel that 
armed forces fight for them and they are not exposed to harassment 
or more severe incidents. The efforts to increase the popularity of the 
foreign forces can also play an important part in the pacification of 
the region; the transparency of the goals of the international coalition 
can prevent the Islamists to recreate a base by convincing the local 
population to support them; a generally great problem encountered 
while fighting terrorists. 
In sum, it can be concluded that it is a welcomed idea to give a 
helping hand in restoring public order via enabling local forces to 
combat challenges. However, significant caution will be needed in 
the near future in order to stabilize the political climate of the 
country. Democracy must take roots in the governing principles of 
Mali, otherwise trained soldiers can be easily “redirected” to fight 
other causes instead of protecting the population by maintaining 
public order. International organizations, the UN and the European 
Union should continue to monitor the rebuilding process in the Sahel 
region. 
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Beziehungsgewalt – Der Vergleich der Ungarischen 
und Österreichischen Regelung 
1. VORWORT 
„Den Prozess der Misshandlung kann man 
kennenlernen. Daher kann man ihn 
erkennen, verhindern und durch 
entschlossene Eingriffe stoppen…“1 
Die Gewalt in der Familie ist erst in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. 
Jahrhunderts zu einem Gegenstand der Aufmerksamkeit geworden, 
doch das Leben einer Familie, ihre inneren Konflikte sind in dem 
Schutz der Privatsphere geblieben. Danach hat die Misshandlung in 
der Familie eine immer größere Aufmerksamkeit auf sich gezogen. 
Zuerst ist man gegen die Misshandlung von Kindern vorgegangen, 
dann ist die häusliche Gewalt gegen Frauen in den Vordergrund 
gekommen. So ist das Thema durch die Kriminalisierung von 
Beziehungsgewalt eine aktuelle Frage geworden. Doch, “Es ist 
unbestreitbar, dass die Gewalt in der Familie, das Leiden und die 
Auslieferung der Opfer von nichts begründet werden können, macht 
es nicht ertragbar, außerdem sind solche Maßnahmen nötig, die 
diesen unannehmbaren Qualen vorbeugen oder beseitigen helfen 
                                                            
1 MORVAI, KRISZTINA: Terror a családban, A feleségbántalmazás és a jog 
[Terror in der Familie, das Frau-Missbrauch und das Recht],1998, Kossuth 
Verlag, Budapest, 6. 
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können.“2 Die selbständige Erscheinung des Tatbestands 
„Beziehungsgewalt“ kann für die Rechtsanwender in Bezug auf die 
Bewertung der Beziehungsgewalt als ein Phänomen einen 
Ansatzpunkt bedeuten, auch wenn das Strafgesetzbuch den Begriff 
des Verbrechens nicht bestimmt, aber der Rechtsanwender kann 
während der Aufstellung des Tatbestands die Faktoren verwenden, 
die während der Forschung als begriffliche Elemente erschienen 
sind. Diese Straftat werde ich in Bezug auf die Anwendung der 
durch die Hilfswissenschaften des Strafrechts gebildeten Definition 
bestimmen. Während der Untersuchung der häuslichen Gewalt 
müssen wir auf die Typologie, auf die Faktoren, die zur Gewalt 
führen und auch auf die Ursachen achten, die ein wichtiger Teil der 
Studie ist. Dabei ist es notwendig, die ungarische Regelung mit 
einem seit längerer Zeit funktionierenden System vergleichen, und 
solche Regeln anzuwenden, die mit der historischen Entwicklung 
von Ungarn, der Situation der häuslichen Gewalt in Ungarn und 
ihrer beruflichen und wissenschaftlichen Vorgeschichte vereinbart 
werden können. Deswegen werde ich im Folgenden die 
österreichische und ungarische Regelung miteinander vergleichen. 
2.BEGRIFF, TYPEN 
In diesem Kapitel werde ich die Beziehungsgewalt definieren. Es ist 
nicht einfach, denn unabhänging von der Bezeichnung geht es um 
die Gewalt in der Familie, die mehrere Typen hat. 
                                                            
2 HERCZOG, MÁRIA: A családon belüli erőszak kutatásának előzményei – 
családi viszonyok vizsgálata Magyarországon [Die Vorgeschichte der 
Forschung der häuslichen Gewalt - die Überprüfung von 
Familienbeziehungen in Ungarn], in VIRÁG, GYÖRGY (Hg.): Családi 
iszonyok – A családi erőszak kriminológiai vizsgálata [Familienrepulsionen 
- die kriminal Überprüfung der Familiengewalt], 2005, KJK-KERSZÖV, 
Budapest, 53. 
3 Gesetz Nr. C. aus dem Jahre 2012. üder das Strafgesetzbuch (StGB). 
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Die Typen sind: Die Gewalt gegen Frauen, Männer, die in 
einem Haushalt lebenden Angehörigen, und die Zulassung der 
Misshandlung von Kindern. Ein anderer Grund für die Schwierigkeit 
der Definierung ist, dass sich der Paragraph 212/A3 des Strafgesetz-
buches, meiner Ansicht nach, nicht auf alle Typen der Erschienung 
bezieht. 
Deswegen werde ich die Beziehungsgewalt mit der Definition 
von Marianne Schwander bestimmen, „Häusliche Gewalt liegt vor, 
wenn eine Person in einer bestehenden oder einer aufgelösten 
familiären oder partnerschaftlichen Beziehung in ihrer körperlichen, 
sexuellen oder psychischen Integrität verletzt oder gefährdet wird 
und zwar entweder durch Ausübung oder Androhung von Gewalt 
oder durch mehrmaliges Belästigen, Auflauern oder Nachstellen.“4 
Was die Form der Gewalt angeht gibt es: (1) Physische Gewalt, (2) 
Sexuelle Gewalt, (3) Psychische Gewalt, (4) Soziale Gewalt, (5) 
Ökonomische Gewalt. 
(1) Physische Gewalt: umfasst Schlagen mit und ohne 
Werkzeuge, Beißen, Würgen, Fesseln, Gegenstände nachwerfen, 
tägliche Angriffe bis hin zu Tötungsdelikten. 
(2) Sexuelle Gewalt: der Täter von unerwünschten sexuellen 
Aktivität zwang die Opfer, dazu gehören Vergewaltigung, 
                                                            
3 Paragraph 212/A (1) Die der Elternteil seines kindes ist und zur Zeit der 
Kommission oder früher auf Beleidigung von die Person, die mit ihm in 
einer gemeinsame Haushalt lebt oder der Gehörende einer Person die in 
der Haus lebt, ehemalige Ehepartner, ehemalige Lebensgefährte, Pfleger, 
Pfegebefohlene, Vormund oder Münde regelmässig: 
a) zeigt eine demütigende, gewaltsame Verhalten, die das menshliche 
Würde schwierig beleidigt,  
b) matriale Güter, die zu der Rund der gemeinsame Wirtschaft oder 
gemeinsame Vermögen gehören stehlt und der Verletzte hat deswegen 
eine schwierige Notwendigkeit; Es wird wegen Vergehen durch 2 Jahre 
lange Freiheitsstrafe gestraft, wenn es keine schwierige verbrechen ist. 
4 SCHWANDER, MARIANNE: Das Opfer im Strafrecht: seine Stellung 
allgemein und hinsichtlich spezifischer Straftatbestände, http://www.krim 
.unibe.ch/unibe/rechtswissenschaft/isk/content/e663/e104289/e104308/e104
309/files164022/Folienset24und31Oktober2012_ger.pdf [cit. 2013-10-12]. 
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Zwang zur Prostitution, Vergewaltigung mit Objekt, induzierte 
Abtreibung mit Gewalt. 
(3) Psychische Gewalt: „umfasst sowohl schwere Drohung, 
Nötigung, Freiheitsberaubung, Auflauern nach einer Trennung 
(Stalking), als auch Formen, die für sich allein keine 
unmittelbare Bedrohung darstellen, die aber in ihrer Summe als 
Gewaltausübung bezeichnet werden müssen. Dazu gehören 
diskriminierende Gewalt wie Missachtung, Beleidigung, 
Demütigung, Erzeugen von Schuldgefühlen, Einschüchterung 
oder Beschimpfung.“5 
(4) Soziale Gewalt: der Opfer wird im gesellschaftlichen Leben 
durch den Täter beschränkt und unter strenger Kontrolle 
gehalten. 
(5) Ökonomische Gewalt: Zwang zur Arbeit, wie auch die 
alleinige Verfügungsmacht über finanzielle Ressourcen durch die 
Partnerin oder den Partner. 
3.URSACHEN 
Die soziologischen Forschungen haben gezeigt, dass sich die 
Beziehungsgewalt in breiten Gesellschaftsschichten befindet, aber 
die weniger gebildeten und ärmeren Schichte der Gesellschaft sind 
von den Gewaltdelikten öfter betroffen, als die besser gebildeten, 
unter finanziell besseren Bedingungen lebenden Menschen. Es ist 
wichtig zu sehen, dass „die biologischen, genetischen und seelischen 
Unterschiede zwischen den Geschlechtern (...) die Familien-
verhältnisse, die Normen der Umwelt (...) die soziologische 
Situation und andere zahllose Ursachen in Bezug auf das Verhältnis 
zwischen den Geschlechtern“6 von großer Bedeutung sind. 
                                                            
5 Ibid. 
6 TAMÁSI, ERZSÉBET: A családon belüli erőszak vizsgálatának története 
[Das Geshichte der Überprüfung der Gewalt in der Familie], in VIRÁG, 
GYÖRGY (Hg.): Családi iszonyok – A családi erőszak kriminológiai 
vizsgálata [Familien Abschauen – Die kriminologische Überprüfung der 
Gewalt in der Familie], 2005, KJK-KERSZÖV, Budapest, 43. 
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Als erste Ursache der Beziehungsgewalt müssen wir die 
schlechte finanzielle Lage erwähnen, denn es verursacht oft 
Konflikte zwischen den Partnern in einer Beziehung. Demzufolge 
kommt die Beziehungsgewalt in Familien öfter vor, in denen die 
Partner die Konfliktsituationen schwer oder gar nicht behandeln 
können.  
Als zweite Ursache müssen wir die Arbeitslosigkeit erwähnen, 
die mit den finanziellen Umständen zusammenhängt. Einerseits kann 
die Arbeitslosigkeit auch als eine Konfliktquelle bezeichnet werden, 
andererseits kann der hohe Stand der Arbeitslosigkeit die Erhöhung 
der Beziehungsgewalt voraussagen. 
Die dritte Ursache ist die niedrige Bildung, die sowohl von der 
Seite des Täters als auch von der des Opfers als ein Risikofaktor 
erscheinen kann. Eine empirische soziologische Untersuchung hat 
auch gezeigt, dass „die häusliche Gewalt am häufigsten die im 
Haushalt tätigen, arbeitslosen, niedrig gebildeten, religiösen, 
provinziellen Frauen gefährdet.“7 
Als vierte Ursache können wir die Abhängigkeit des Täters 
betrachten. Hier können wir die Drogen-, Alkoholabhängigkeit oder 
Spielleidenschaft erwähnen. Die Abhängigkeit „ist die Quelle fast 
jedes Konfliktes in der Familie, sie kann sogar als ein mit großer 
Wahrscheinlichkeit auftretender Beweggrund bezeichnet werden.“8 
Ein Beweis dafür ist das Ergebnis einer Statistik, in der die befragten 
Frauen, die von ihren alkoholsüchtigen Partnern regelmäßig 
misshandelt wurden, ein Verbrechen gegenüber ihren Partnern 
ausgeübt haben, waren selbst alkoholabhängig. 
Es muss festgestellt werden, dass die Beziehungsgewalt nicht 
nur die Manifestation einer kriminellen Handlung ist, sondern auch 
das Ergebnis der schlechten Konfliktbehandlung in der Beziehung, 
                                                            
7 Ibid. 45. 
8 WINDT, SZANDRA: A rokonok sérelmére elkövetett bűncselekmények 
jellemzői [Die Merkmalen der Verbrechen, die gegen verwandten behen], in 
VIRÁG, GYÖRGY (Hg.): Családi iszonyok – A családi erőszak kriminológiai 
vizsgálata [Familien Abschauen – Die kriminologische Überprüfung der 
Gewalt in der Familie], 2005, KJK-KERSZÖV, 264. 
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wo alle Familienmitglieder in irgendeiner Form betroffen sind. 
Deshalb ist es notwendig, während der Behandlung des Problems 
nicht nur die Konsequenzen sondern auch die Vorgeschichte der 
Gewalt zu untersuchen. 
4. DIE URSACHEN DES GESCHICHTLICHEN VERGLEICHS 
In diesem Kapitel können wir darauf eine Antwort bekommen, 
warum der Vergleich der ungarischen und österreichischen Regelung 
gründlich ist. Bevor die Beziehungsgewalt als selbstständiger 
Tatbestand in das Strafgesetzbuch aufgenommen wurde, waren die 
zwei Regelungen nicht so unterschiedlich. Ein gutes Beispiel dafür 
ist das V. Gesetz vom Jahr 1961., das im Vergleich zu den Anfängen 
die einzelnen Gewaltdelikte in der Familie in breiteren Rahmen 
umfasst hat. Solche Verbrechen waren, „Straftat gegen Jugendliche 
274. § (1) Die Person, die die körperliche, seelische oder moralische 
Entwicklung der Minderjährigen gefährdet, ist mit einer 
Freiheitstrafe bis zu drei Jahren zu bestrafen. (2) Wenn eine Straftat 
mit größerem Ausmaß nicht Zustande kommt, muss die volljährige 
Person auch bestraft werden, die die Minderjährigen zum 
Verbrechen oder zu einer unzüchtigen Lebensweise bewegt, oder die 
Absicht hat, sie dazu zu bewegen.“9 An dieser Stelle kommt der 
Begriff „Die Unterlassung der Verpflichtung zur Fürsorge“ ins 
Strafgesetzbuch, 275. § (1) Die Person, die ihre in dem Gesetz 
geregelten und von der Behörde vorgeschriebene fürsorgliche 
Verpflichtung aus eigener Schuld nicht erfüllt, wird mit einer 
Freiheitsstrafe bis zu einem Jahr oder mit Erziehungsarbeit bestraft. 
Die Person, die durch einen rechtlichen Bescheid des Gerichts, auch 
ohne die Festsetzung der Vaterschaft, zu der Versorgung des Kindes 
verpflichtet ist und diese Verpflichtung aus eigener Schuld nicht 
erfüllt, muss auch bestraft werden. (3) Die Strafe ist eine 
                                                            
9 Gesetz Nr. V. aus dem Jahre 1961. über die Ungarische Volksrepublik 
Strafgesetzbuch. 
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Freiheitsstrafe bis zu drei Jahren, wenn der Täter a) rückfällig ist; b) 
oder seine fürsorgliche Verpflichtung wegen seiner unzüchtigen 
Lebensweise nicht erfüllt hat; c) wegen der Unterlassung seiner 
Verpflichtungen die Versorgten zur Entbehrung ausgesetzt hat. (4) 
Wegen der Unterlassung der Verpflichtung zur Fürsorge kann die 
Person nicht bestraft werden, wenn er bis zur Fällung des Urteils 
ersten Grandes seine Verpflichtungen erfüllt hat.“ Das IV. Gesetz 
vom Jahr 1978 hat die Formulierungen des vorherigen 
Strafgesetzbuches in vollem Maße interpretiert. Ähnlicherweise hat 
das österreichische Strafgesetzbuch durch ähnliche Bestände die 
Frage geregelt, wie zum Beispiel die Verletzung des 
Unterhaltspflichtes (1) Wer sich einer gesetzlichen Unterhaltspflicht 
entzieht, so daß der Lebensbedarf des Unterhaltsberechtigten 
gefährdet ist oder ohne die Hilfe anderer gefährdet wäre, wird mit 
Freiheitsstrafe bis zu drei Jahren oder mit Geldstrafe bestraft. (2) 
Wer einer Schwangeren zum Unterhalt verpflichtet ist und ihr diesen 
Unterhalt in verwerflicher Weise vorenthält und dadurch den 
Schwangerschaftsabbruch bewirkt, wird mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu 
fünf Jahren oder mit Geldstrafe bestraft.10 
Obwohl die Beispiele zeigen, dass die Gewalt in der Familie seit 
langem ein Problem ist, konnte eine Volksinitiative erst im Jahr 2010 
erreichen, dass dieses Verbrechen als selbständiger Bestand in das 
Strafgesetzbuch aufgenommen wurde. Meiner Meinung nach haben 
sich die Straftatbestände in dem Strafgeseztbuch auf alle Straftaten 
bezogen, die zu dem Begriff „Gewalt in der Familie“ gehören, aber 
wegen der Einstellung der Gesellschaft sollte dieses Verbrechen zur 
Geltung kommen. Wir konnten Vorschläge darüber lesen, dass der 
Tatbestand der seelischen Misshandlung in das Strafgesetzbuch 
aufgenommen werden sollte, aber sie wurden von den Rechtgsebern 
abgelehnt, mit Bezug darauf, dass es schwer bezeugt werden könne. 
Die Frage der Gewalt in der Familie ist problematisch. Einerseits 
gibt es keinen einheitlichen Begriff, anderseits ist die Einstellung der 
Gesellschaft immer noch negativ. Drittens ist es auch aufgrund der 
Anordnungen der Polizeipräsidenten zu sehen, dass es eine große 
                                                            
10 Österreichische StGB. 170. §. 
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Zahl von Straftaten umfasst, deshalb ist es schwer festzustellen, wie 
die Gewalt in der Familie definiert werden kann, und auch wenn es 
gelingt, kann es vorkommen, dass er die gewünschte Wirkung nicht 
erreichen kann. Deswegen sollte diese Straftat meiner Meinung nach 
nicht in dem Strafgesetzbuch geregelt werden. Wie Lenke Fehér 
schrieb “In der EU, als ein effizientes und nachahmenswertes 
Beispiel, wird generell das durch das Duluth-Modell geschaffene und 
auch in der Praxis gut funktionierende österrechische Modell 
vorgezeigt.“11 Deswegen könnten wir meiner Meinung nach gegen 
die Täter durch die Anwendung der österreichischen Regelung viel 
effizienter auftreten. Die österreichische Reform legt einen großen 
Wert auf die Forschung und formuliert die folgenden 
Grundprinzipien. 1. Die Gewalt in der Familie ist kein privates oder 
familiäres Problem, sondern eine öffentliche Angelegenheit. 2. Der 
Anspruch der Bedrohten an Sicherheit ist vorrangig. 3. Die Suche 
nach Lösungen geschieht in dem Bewusstsein, dass die Gewalt nicht 
durch einzelne Situationen hervorgerufen wird, sondern ihre Wurzeln 
sind in der Beziehung zu finden. 4. Der Anspruch an Null- Toleranz. 
5. Die Betonung der Verantwortung des Täters. 6. Die Notwendig-
keit der holistischen Annäherung, die sich auf mehreren Institutionen 
beruht.12 Dafür gibt es auch Beispiele, dass der Begriff Gewalt in der 
Familie in dem Strafgesetzbuch geregelt wird, aber meiner Ansicht 
nach würde das Verbrechen solcher Art nur durch dessen Regelung 
in einem eigenen Tatbestand zur Geltung kommen. Das könnte zu 
der positiven Einstellung der Gesellschaft und der Behörde führen. 
Außerdem könnten die schon existierenden Hilfsorganisationen 
gegen dieses Verbrechen viel effizienter auftreten. Ich halte es für 
wichtig, diese Regelung laut der österreichischen Regelung zu 
                                                            
11 FEHÉR, LENKE: Családon belüli erőszak – nemzetközi dokumentumok és 
gyakorlat [Der Gewalt in der Familie – international Dokuments und 
Praktikum], in VIRÁG, GYÖRGY (Hg.): Családi iszonyok - A családi erőszak 
kriminológiai vizsgálata [Familien Abscheuen – Die Kriminilogische 
Untersuchung des Gewalt in der Familie], 2005, KJK-KERSZÖV, 
Budapest, 102. 
12 Ibid. 102. 
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regeln, denn es legt Grundprinzipien fest, die gefolgt werden sollten 
und von dem derzeitigen ungarischen System in Form einer gut 
funktionierenden Ordnung implementiert werden könnten. 
5.DIE ÖSTERREICHISCHE UND UNGARISCHE REGELUNG 
Obwohl das österreichische Strafgesetzbuch keinen selbstständigen 
Tatbestand in Bezug auf die Beziehungsgewalt enthält, wurde dieses 
Verbrechen in das ungarische Strafgesetzbuch aufgenommen. Das 
Strafgesetzbuch bestraft die Gewalt in der Familie durch mehrere 
Tatbestände. Zuerst können wir uns mit solchem Tatbestand in dem 
Dreizehnten Abschnitt treffen, in dem Fall von Strafen gegen die 
Sexuelle Selbstbestimmung im Rahmen des Sexuellen Missbrauchs 
von Schutzbefohlenen.13 Das bezieht sich auf Personen unter 18 
                                                            
13 StGB. 174. § – Sexueller Mißbrauch von Schutzbefohlenen: 
(1) Wer sexuelle Handlungen 
1. an einer Person unter sechzehn Jahren, die ihm zur Erziehung, zur 
Ausbildung oder zur Betreuung in der Lebensführung anvertraut ist, 
2. an einer Person unter achtzehn Jahren, die ihm zur Erziehung, zur 
Ausbildung oder zur Betreuung in der Lebensführung anvertraut oder im 
Rahmen eines Dienst- oder Arbeitsverhältnisses untergeordnet ist, unter 
Mißbrauch einer mit dem Erziehungs-, Ausbildungs-, Betreuungs-, Dienst- 
oder Arbeitsverhältnis verbundenen Abhängigkeit oder 
3. an seinem noch nicht achtzehn Jahre alten leiblichen oder 
angenommenen Kind vornimmt oder an sich von dem Schutzbefohlenen 
vornehmen läßt, wird mit Freiheitsstrafe von drei Monaten bis zu fünf 
Jahren bestraft. 
(2) Wer unter den Voraussetzungen des Absatzes 1 Nr. 1 bis 3 
1. sexuelle Handlungen vor dem Schutzbefohlenen vornimmt oder 
2. den Schutzbefohlenen dazu bestimmt, daß er sexuelle Handlungen vor 
ihm vornimmt, um sich oder den Schutzbefohlenen hierdurch sexuell zu 
erregen, wird mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu drei Jahren oder mit Geldstrafe 
bestraft. 
(3) Der Versuch ist strafbar. 
(4) In den Fällen des Absatzes 1 Nr. 1 oder des Absatzes 2 in Verbindung 
mit Absatz 1 Nr. 1 kann das Gericht von einer Bestrafung nach dieser 
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Jahren. Außerdem bestimmt der Gesetzgeber den Begriff 
Misshandlung von Schutzbefohlenen in dem Siebzehnten Abschnitt 
über die Straftaten gegen die körperliche Unversehrtheit. Dieses 
Verbrechen bezieht sich auf Personen, die minderjährig sind, oder 
die sich wegen ihrer Behinderung oder Krankheit nicht verteidigen 
können. Das Strafgesetzbuch legt einen höheren Wert auf den 
Schutz von Jugendlichen und Personen, die sich nicht verteidigen 
können. Das ungarische Strafgesetzbuch versuchte die Zahl der 
möglichen Opfer und die Formen der Gewalt solcher Art durch die 
Kriminalisierung des Tatbestands von Beziehungsgewalt zu 
mindern. Der Tatbestand enthält nicht den Begriff der seelischen 
Gewalt, denn die Beweisführung dieses Verbrechens problematisch 
sein kann.  
Obwohl das österreichische Strafgesetzbuch nicht den 
Tatbestand der Beziehungsgewalt enthält, regelt ein eigenes Gesetz, 
das Gewaltschutzgesetz, den Schutz gegen die Gewalt in der 
Familie. Das Gesetz verordnet, dass das Gericht im Interesse der 
verletzten Person verschiedene Maßnahmen treffen kann. Die 
Maßnahmen umfassen die Tätigkeiten, die die körperliche 
Unversehrtheit, Gesundheit, Freiheit der Person verletzt. Der Richter 
kann verbieten, dass der Täter in das mit dem/der Verletzten 
gemeinsam benutzte Haus tritt oder mit dem/der Verletzten 
kommuniziert oder ihn/sie trifft. Das Problem mit diesen 
Maßnahmen ist, dass sie nur in dem Fall verwendet werden können, 
wenn sie das rechtliche Interesse des Täters nicht verletzt. Das 
rechtliche Interesse muss nicht berücksichtigt werden, wenn der 
Täter den Verletzten mehrmals belästigt oder sein Leben, 
körperliche Unversehrtheit schwierig bedroht, bzw. das Leben oder 
das Vermögen der mit dem Verletzten in einem Haushalt lebenden 
Person gefährdet. Der Richter kann außer den erwähnten 
Maßnahmen verordnen, dass der Täter an einer Behandlung 
teilnimmt, die bei der Bekämpfung der Alkoholabhängigkeit oder 
seelischen Krankheiten hilft. In dem Gewaltschutzgesetz sind solche 
                                                                                                                              
Vorschrift absehen, wenn bei Berücksichtigung des Verhaltens des 
Schutzbefohlenen das Unrecht der Tat gering ist. 
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Fälle zu finden, wo der Täter und der/die Verletzte langfristig in 
einem zusammen geführten Haushalt gelebt haben, aber der Täter 
muss das Haus verlassen, auch wenn er der Inhaber ist. In diesem 
Fall steht ihm Schadenersatz zu, wenn das Gericht es gerecht 
findet.14 Im Vergleich dazu ist der Tatbestand der Beziehungsgewalt 
in der ungarischen Regelung am 30. Juni 2013. in Kraft getreten, 
und dadurch wurde er in dem Strafgesetzbuch als selbständiger 
Tatbestand definiert. Das ungarische Rechtssystem schützt die Opfer 
der Beziehungsgewalt durch das im Jahre 2009. geschaffene LXXII. 
Gesetz, das sich auf die Gewalt unter Angehörigen bezieht und 
gegenüber dem Täter eine Wegweisung anordnen kann. Diese 
Regelung ist sehr ähnlich zu der des österreichischen 
Gewaltschutzgesetzes. Das ungarische Gesetz erwähnt auch eine 
einstweilige Wegweisung, die in dem österreichischen Gesetz als 
Wegweisung oder bzw. Betretungsverbot bezeichnet ist. Das wird in 
beiden Fällen von der Polizei erlassen. Laut der österreichischen 
Rechtsordnung kann es für 2 Wochen angeordnet werden, und um 2 
Wochen verlängert werden. In der ungarischen Regelung gilt es nur 
für 72 Stunden. Im Fall der ungarischen Rechtsordnung muss man 
einen privaten Vorschlag einreichen, um mit der Prozedur beginnen 
zu können. Laut der österreichischen Regelung wird das 
Betretungsverbot von der Behörde angeordnet. Außerdem regeln 
beide Rechtsordnungen das Institut von einstweiliger Anordnung, 
die in dem österreichischen Gesetz einer vorläufigen Maßnahme 
entspricht. Die Einstweilige Verfügung kann in dem Fall einer 
Prozedur, die von Amts wegen oder auf Antrag eingeleitet wird, von 
dem Gericht erlassen werden. „16. § (1) Die einstweilige 
Wegweisung wird angeordnet, wenn man aufgrund aller Umstände, 
insbesondere der Tatsachen, die von dem Opfer und dem/der 
Gewalttäter/in beschrieben wurden, des Verhaltens des/der 
Gewalttäters/in und des Opfers, und andere Signale, die eindeutig 
                                                            
14 Gewaltschutzgesetz 2. § (5) Der Täter kann von der verletzten Person 
eine Vergütung für die Nutzung verlangen, soweit dies der Billigkeit 
entspricht. 
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auf die Ausübung der Gewalt zwischen den Angehörigen 
hinweisen.“15 
Die einstweilige Wegweisung gilt vorerst 30 Tage. In dem 
österreichischen Gesetz, „Die EV muss am Bezirksgericht Ihres 
Wohnsitzes beantragt werden. Sie können den Antrag schriftlich 
oder am Amtstag mündlich einbringen. Eine EV kann beantragt 
werden, wenn körperliche Gewalt oder Drohungen mit Gewalt 
vorliegen und dadurch das Zusammenleben oder das Zusammen-
treffen mit der Gewalt ausübenden Person unzumutbar ist. Auch bei 
psychischer Gewalt kann eine EV beantragt werden, wenn dadurch 
die psychische Gesundheit erheblich beeinträchtigt wird. Alle 
Personen, die in ihrem Wohnbereich und/oder in ihrem persönlichen 
Lebensbereich Gewalt erleiden, z.B. durch den Ehemann, Lebensge-
fährten, Ex-Partner, Freund oder Ex-Freund, Vater oder durch eine 
andere Person. Ein Familienverhältnis mit dem Gefährdeten ist keine 
Voraussetzung.)“16 Die vorläufigen Maßnahmen können, im 
Gegensatz zu der ungarischen Regelung, in dem Fall von seelischer 
Gewalt verwendet werden und diese Frist ist auch länger, denn es 
kann an Orten außer des Wohnortes höchstens für 1 Jahr angeordnet 
werden, die verlängert werden kann. Also es kann auf Grund der 
Gesagten festgestellt werden, dass die zwei Regelungen auch trotz 
des Mangels des Tatbestands in dem österreichischen Gesetz sehr 
ähnlich sind. Der Unterschied kann in Bezug auf den Zeitraum 
festgelegt werden, und laut der österreichischen Regelung wird die 
Prozedur in dem Fall dieser Gewaltdelikten unabhängig von ihrer 
Gewichtigkeit immer von Amts wegen eingeleitet. Im Gegensatz 
dazu verlangt die ungarische Regelung einen privaten Antrag als 
notwendige Vorbedingung für den Beginn des Verfahrens in dem 
Fall eines Verbrechens von geringer Wichtigkeit. 
                                                            
15 Gesetz Nr. LXXII. aus dem Jahre 2009. über wegen der Gewalt zwischen 
den Verwandten anwendbarer Verhalten. 
16 LOGAR, ROSA: Recht auf Schutz und hilfe für opfer von Gewalt, 2009, 
Manz Crossmedia, Wien, 4. 




Es kann also festgestellt werden, dass die Beziehungsgewalt ein 
bedeutendes gesellschaftliches Problem unserer Zeit ist, deswegen 
musste der Rechtsgeber eine Lösung auf dieses Problem finden. Die 
Lösung war die Kodifikation des Tatbestands von Beziehungsgewalt 
im Strafgesetzbuch, die meiner Meinung nach die entsprechende 
Wahl ist, denn der selbständige Tatbestand dem Rechtsanwender für 
der Schutz der Opfer eine einheitliche Struktur sichern kann. 
Außerdem ergänzt das LXXII. Gesetz vom Jahr 2009 über die 
Wegweisung aufgrund der Gewalt den Tatbestand Beziehungs-
gewalt, die eine bedeutende Übereinstimmung mit der österreichi-
schen Regelung zeigt. Der Tatbestand der Beziehungsgewalt umfasst 
nicht die seelische Gewalt, deren Fassung in den Tatbestand wäre 
meiner Meinung nach wegen der Schwierigkeiten der Beweis-
führung unmöglich. Es ist wichtig festzustellen, dass wir nicht nur in 
dem Bereich der rechtlichen Regelung nach Lösungen suchen, und 
uns auf den Schutz der Verletzten konzentrieren sollen, sondern wir 
sollen auf die Verbesserung der Konfliktbehandlung der Täter auch 
einen großen Wert legen. Den Umständen entsprechend, die im 
Zusammenhang des Verbrechens ans Licht kommen, kann eine 
Behandlung oder eine Therapie dem Täter bei der Prävention von 
Aggressionen und Konfliktüberwindung helfen. Meiner Ansicht 
nach können die Aufgaben im Zusammenhang mit der Kriminal-
prävention in Bezug auf die Gewalt in der Familie, die in der 
Ordnung 32/2007 des Landes-Polizeihauptmannschaftes formuliert 
sind, eine gute Richtung sein, um gegen die Beziehungsgewalt in der 
Familie effektiv auftreten zu können, denn es hebt die informierende 
Rolle der Polizei bei der Vorbeugung der Beziehungsgewalt hervor.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Due to certain changes in the economy and society that have taken 
place in the last couple of decades, we meet the concept of 
globalization as a factor of relevance and thematic influence in 
scientific discourse, political debates, and even daily life. The 
phenomenon called globalization; or rather tendencies at work 
behind it have become a permanent point of reference – just like 
“information-based society”. These “popular” buzzwords, however, 
have been overused to some extent in the past few years. According 
to József Veress’ opinion, both promoters and critics of 
“globalization” use this word to describe a conglomeration of 
phenomena that is not simply false but it is the very source of 
comprehension failures.1 Globalization itself has no universal, 
“legitimate” definition accepted across the board, and certain authors 
have not yet managed to reach consensus on even a minimum of 
standard issues2. 
Nevertheless, a few tropes of globalization can be identified and 
mapped relatively easily. In this essay, the author is intended 
enumerate these and give a brief description of each of them. Thus, it 
is worth mentioning that the following tropes will be analyzed: 
                                                            
1 VERESS, JÓZSEF (ed.): Gazdaságpolitika a globalizált világban [Economic 
Policy in the Globalized World], 2009, Typotex Kiadó, Budapest, 157. 
Veress’s opinion is an economy-based approach. 
2 TÖRÖK, GÁBOR: Globalizáció – kereskedelmi jog [Globalization – 
Commercial Law], in Prudentia Iuris Gentium Potestate. Ünnepi 
tanulmányok Lamm Vanda tiszteletére [Prudentia Iuris Gentium Potestate. 
Essays in Honour of Vanda Lamm], 2010, MTA Jogtudományi Intézete, 
Budapest, 485. 
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establishment and traits of the network state; peculiarities of relations 
between transnational capitalist corporations and nation states; 
question of the “borderless world”; and adoption of demands of the 
neoliberal economic political worldview as a state ideology. 
2. THE MOST IMPORTANT TRAITS OF THE NETWORK STATE 
It was Manuel Castells who coined the term “network state” and first 
analyzed its most important attributes; he did his research on the 
crisis of the classic nation state as a process spurred on by the rise of 
the information society, and the changes leading to and triggered by 
the emergence of “postnational” network state.3 His thesis is that 
following the obsolescence of the Westphalian paradigm, the nation 
state is no longer the sole source of authority. And on top of this, 
nation states have the unsavory task of legitimizing “governing 
processes” above each nation. By our time, nation states are rivalled 
by, among others, corporate, communication, and criminal networks, 
international organizations, supranational military corporations, non-
governmental organizations, religions, and even certain social 
movements.4 This enumeration – while not being exhaustive – can be 
set in parallel to Malcolm Bull’s “list”, who gave the following 
answer when asked to list the rivals on nation states: civilizations, 
intergovernmental relations, NGO-s, churches, international 
organizations, academic networks, drug cartels, and al-Kaida, as 
well.5 
The main attribute of nation states is that within the framework 
on global capitalism, while they can be expected to survive for a long 
time, they will be degraded to the level of nexus points for other, 
                                                            
3 CASTELLS, MANUEL: Az identitás hatalma. Az információ kora. Gazdaság, 
társadalom és kultúra. II. kötet [The Power of Identity, The Information 
Age: Economy, Society and Culture Vol. II.], 2006, Gondolat – Infonia, 
Budapest, 416. (Translators: Berényi Gábor and Rohonyi András). 
4 Ibid. 417. 
5 BULL, MALCOLM: Kell egy kis államszünet? [States of Failure], in 
Fordulat, Vol. 6. (2009) 176.  
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wider power structures. They meet other players in the “global 
arena” very often and this situation often forces them to yield, as 
these new players are often successful in demolishing the reputation 
of the state. “Nation states can retain their decision-making 
capabilities but, since they have become part of network of powers 
and counter-powers, they are dependent on a wider context of 
authority and influence. (...) We need to conceptualize the new 
power structure, beyond the framework of the powerless nation state, 
as an ability to supervise global instrumental networks based on 
specific identity or, from the point of view of global networks, an 
ability to suppress any identity in order to accomplish supranational 
instrumental goals.”6 
Thus, nation states can be said to have been “trapped” in 
networks and they cannot free themselves from this trap without a 
compromise. Without a doubt, the traditional, Bodinian sovereignty 
of nation states7 is becoming more and more malleable; and in 
parallel to this the state is forced to revise its concept of authority 
that has been predominant for centuries. Wolfgang Sachs is 
ultimately right in stating that the Westphalian system, the construct 
of area-limited sovereign nation state has to be completely 
deconstructed within the process of globalization.8 In 21st century 
conditions the world and within it each nation state is becoming both 
the subject and object of feedback loops and interdependence – 
isolation, small “refuges of sovereignty” has ceased to be the guiding 
principle of international relations.9 
                                                            
6 CASTELLS: op. cit. (2006) 417-418. 
7 BODIN, JEAN: Az államról [About the State], 1987, Gondolat Kiadó, 
Budapest, 115-122. 
8 SACHS, WOLFGANG: Fejlődés: Egy eszme tündöklése és bukása 
[Development: The Rise and Decline of an Ideal], in SCHEIRING, GÁBOR – 
BODA, ZSOLT: (ed.): Globalizáció és fejlődés. Kritikai fejlődéstanulmányok 
szöveggyűjtemény [Globalization and Development. Critical Development 
Studies Reader], 2011, Védegylet – Új Mandátum Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 
69. 
9 GALLÓ, BÉLA: A globalizáció „világrendje”. Nemzetközi politikai 
viszonyok az ezredfordulón [The “World Order” of Globalization. 
International Political Relations at the turn of the Millennium], in CSÁKI, 
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The state cannot ignore the triumph of information-based 
production,10 spurred on by the lightning-speed advancement in 
communication and other technologies, the financial worldwide web 
has gained tremendous influence, and its online interface literally 
blurs borders and circumspects nation states. Thus, this network is 
capable of directing global financial processes independently of 
national borders and state authorities,11 which makes the financial 
transaction mechanism, instead of the real economy, the “lord” 
above international economic matters. 
In conclusion we can state that Castells does not deny public 
state authority, only dissolves it in the concept of the network state, 
as in his view the only truly sustainable form of political 
management (government) is the network state, that is, a 
conglomerate entity containing nation states, international 
organizations, cooperations of nation states, regional and local 
governing bodies, and non-governmental organizations.12 This entity 
is authorized to discuss, manage and solve global, national, and local 
issues. So, nation states are still players in the global arena, it is just 
that they are no longer “sovereign subjects” or main forces – instead, 
they have been transformed into formidable but no longer all –
powerful strategic players. 
                                                                                                                              
GYÖRGY – FARKAS, PÉTER (ed.): A globalizáció és hatásai. Európai 
válaszok [Globalization and Its Effects, European Answers], 2008, Napvilág 
Kiadó, Budapest, 62.  
10 CASTELLS, MANUEL: A hálózati társadalom kialakulása. Az információ 
kora. Gazdaság, társadalom, kultúra. I. kötet [The Rise of the Network 
Society., The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture Vol. I.], 
2005, Gondolat-Infonia, Kalocsa, 52. (Translator: Rohonyi András) 
11 FORGÁCS, IMRE: Európa elrablása 2.0. Adalékok a pénzügyi válságok 
politikai gazdaságtanához [The Ravishment of Europe, Version 2.0. 
Contributions to the Political Economy of the Financial Crises], 2012, 
Gondolat Kiadó, Budapest, 14. 
12 CASTELLS: op. cit. (2006) 424. 
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3. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND 
THE STATE 
Transnational corporations (TNCs) have become seriously powerful 
entities with actual influence. Simai defines transnationalisation as a 
process starting from the decision centres of international 
corporations growing independent of national interests, where 
transactions within national economies are subordinated to the 
interests of global corporations, thus, certain areas of national 
production and service sectors are integrated into global corporate 
systems.13 Due to the huge concentration of production and capital, 
the global spread and significant presence of TNC-s in peripheral and 
semi-peripheral states, and the growing role of financial speculation, 
the economical maneuverability of national governments is 
obviously decreasing and becoming internationalized. Older 
economic management systems (and Keynesian solutions in 
economic policy) are being consciously weakened and even the 
complete relegation of certain economic policy functions into the 
hands of international organizations is possible.14 
Early precursors of the phenomenon of global capitalism have 
already been identified in the seminal work of Rudolf Hilferding 
written during the World War I.; as he defined certain cartels and 
trusts as power conglomerates which can utilize actual power and 
authority – even stronger than the state itself.15 Karl Kautsky in 1915 
also painted the picture of a “Utopian” world where the role of the 
state is usurped by executive committees of monopoly corporations – 
                                                            
13 SIMAI, MIHÁLY: Kihívások, alternatívák és útvesztők a globalizálódó 
világban [Challenges, Choices and Mazes in the Globalising World], in 
BAYER, JÓZSEF – LÉVAI, IMRE (ed.): Globalizációs trendek. Tanulmányok. 
[Trends of Globalizations. Studies], 2003, MTA Politikai Tudományok 
Intézete, Budapest, 62.  
14 FARKAS, PÉTER: Röviden a globalizáció fogalmáról [On the Concept of 
Globalization in Brief], in CSÁKI – FARKAS: op. cit. 16.  
15 SZIGETI, PÉTER: Az út maga a cél. Társadalomelméleti tanulmányok 
[Destination is the Way. Theories of Social Studies], 1995, MTA Politikai 
Tudományok Intézete, Budapest, 288.  
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he called this phenomenon “ultraimperialism”. “Ain’t it possible that 
the current imperialist policy would be replaced by a new, 
ultraimperialist one; that said, will not the constant internal 
competition of national financial capital be made obsolete by an 
internationally incorporated financial capital, which unites to enslave 
the world? Such a new era of capitalism is at least conceivable.”16 
Such statements do not even seem so ridiculous nowadays. 
According to statistical data, the commercial profit of the top 200 
transnational companies in the world exceeded the ¼ of the total 
GDP of the world in 1999; the commercial profit of these TNC-s is 
larger than the GDP of all other countries; also in 1999, it exceeded 
eighteenfold the entire yearly income of the poorest part of the 
world’s population, who shall live on 1 dollar a day (this refers to 
about 1.2 billion people). The 82 American corporations that made it 
into the top 200 supported the candidates of the 2000 election with 
33 billion dollars, which is the same amount as two thirds of 
Hungary’s GDP.17 And there is this: the top 200 global corporations 
realized 3046 billion dollars turnover in 1982, which made up 24% 
of the world’s entire production (12 600 billion dollars) at that time. 
By 1992, sales value has reached 5862 billion dollars, which meant 
26.8% of the world’s entire production at the time.18 
TNCs do not consider national interests when they exist and do 
their businesses. They operate in areas of production, services 
(especially communication, information, banking and insurance 
services), and sales – and infiltrating these areas, they actually 
practice a “global” company policy.19 Today, the formerly popular 
aphorism from Charles E. Wilson, “whatever is good for General 
                                                            
16 KAUTSKY, KARL: Die Neue Zeit, No. 5, April 30, 1915, 144.  
17 CSÉFALVAY, ZOLTÁN: Globalizáció 1.0. [Globalization Version 1.0], 
2004, Nemzeti Tankönyvkiadó, Budapest, 211-212. 
18 KHOR, MARTIN: Globalization and the South. Some Critical Issues. in 
UNCTAD Discussion Papers, No. 147. (2000), UNCTAD, Genova, 4.  
19 SZENTES, TAMÁS (ed.): Fejlődés. Versenyképesség. Globalizáció. I. Kötet 
[Development. Competitiveness. Globalization. Vol. 1.], 2005, Akadémiai 
Kiadó, Budapest, 69. 
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Motors is good for America”,20 cannot be regarded as obvious truth. 
In the interpretation of Nye and Kenohane, transnational companies 
react to the absence of global government21 by creating their own 
“forms of government” (the example mentions airlines and alliances 
between IT companies established in order to gain advantages on the 
market). Thus, the most significant standardization processes take 
place in the private sector.22 
States have to aim for establishing and maintaining good 
relations with transnational corporations – not in the least because 
these companies have a huge potential for creating jobs –, but there 
should be a globally effective regulative system as well, which, 
based on national labour jurisdiction, would supervise and guarantee 
a framework of rules applicable to the employees of TNCs and, on 
the other hand, representatives of TNCs acting as employers. A 
prerequisite of using such a system, of course, is an agreement 
between the states, transforming the thus constructed code of law 
into national legal order. In the absence of this, the author would 
deem a directive necessary issued by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) which lays down the minimal guaranteed rules 
and has full validity regarding all transnational corporations. 
4. THE BORDERLESS WORLD 
The phenomenon of the so-called “borderless world”23 is inextricably 
                                                            
20 LYKE, H. JOHN: The Impotent Giant. How to Reclaim the Moral High 
Ground of America’s Politics, 2008, IUniverse, Bloomington, 186.  
21 STIGLITZ, JOSEPH E.: A globalizáció és visszásságai [Globalization and Its 
Discontents], 2003, Napvilág Kiadó, Budapest, 39. (Translators: Gavora 
Zsuzsanna and Orbán Gábor)  
22 NYE, JOSEPH S. – KEOHANE, ROBERT O.: Introduction, in NYE, JOSEPH S. 
– DONAHUE, JOHN D. (ed.): Governance in a Globalizing World, 2000, 
Visions of Governance for the 21st Century – Brookings Institution Press, 
Cambridge – Washington, 22.  
23 CLARK, IAN: A “Borderless World?”, in FRY, GREGG – O’ HAGAN, 
JACINTA (ed.): Contending images of World Politics, 2000, London, 
Macmillan. 
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tied to regionalization and the marginalization of traditional national 
sovereignty. Kenichi Ohmae in a comment about the obsolescence of 
the nation state concept actually urged to get rid of this concept 
altogether and replace it with something else. In his view this would 
be a category called “regional state”. According to this view, 
regional states are physical area units that constitute natural 
economic entities in the borderless global economy, therefore, they 
are not necessarily defined by national borders. His examples of such 
regional states are the North of Italy, Baden-Württemberg, Wales 
and the Silicon Valley. In these cases, population rate is completely 
irrelevant, the point is what sort of a role the given economic unit 
plays in the global economy.24 
David Held, in his classic about globalization, mentioned a few 
phenomenons that modern states have to face during their daily 
operation. These include the increasing necessity of accomplishing 
traditional state tasks through utilizing international cooperation, and 
the increasing intensity of inter-state integration.25 
The image of the borderless world, by the way, has mostly 
economic connotations. Under the control of global regulative 
powers that favor the neoliberal model such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), the thought of globalization being necessary 
has gradually gained wide acceptance. The globalization of markets 
needed a framework of unified regulations for international 
commerce. The new players have totally twisted the traditional 
argument that economic relations relied upon regarding trade and 
monetary relations between sovereign nation states.26  
For the first time after World War II, global international 
organizations appeared, which not only established general goals for 
                                                            
24 OHMAE, KENICHI: End of Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies, 
1996, HarperCollins, London, 80-89. 
25 HELD, DAVID: Political Theory Today, 1991, Stanford University Press, 
Stanford, California, 196-235. 
26 CSÁKI, GYÖRGY: A nemzetközi gazdaságtan és a világgazdaságtan 
alapjai [International Economics and the Fundamentals of the World 
Economy], 2011, Napvilág Kiadó, Budapest, 177.  
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the states but also developed codes of behavior and guiding 
mechanisms – in such important areas as finance and world trade.27 
At first, the slogan of “borderless trade” was mostly propagated by 
the USA: the ideal of “free trade” was officially embraced by the 
Clinton administration.28 This free trade, i.e. the dissolution of 
obstacles imposed by the state upon the flow of trade relationships 
and assets was regarded as a significant step towards a unified 
worldwide economy. By and large, the ideological basis for this was 
the “Washington Consensus” which contained the goal of 
eliminating all barriers from foreign trade.29 With the neoliberal-
monetarist economic policy gaining momentum and with the 
intensifying of globalization, states were gradually losing influence 
over policies of commerce, which phenomenon manifested itself in 
the quickening of the liberalization process. While during the era of 
welfare states even the GATT operated as an organization more 
sensitive towards national interests,30 with the demolition of the 
welfare state and “global free trade” becoming widespread and also 
the appearance of the WTO, this liberalization process really started 
to affect national policies of economy and trade, confining them 
within stifling borders.31 
Of course, the borderless world has more than economic factors 
to contribute to sg. Signs of this are the mechanisms that increase 
border permeability (like the agreement of the European Council 
                                                            
27 SIMAI, MIHÁLY: A világgazdaság a XXI. század forgatagában. Új trendek 
és stratégiák [The World Economy in the Turbulent 21st Century. New 
Trends and Strategies], 2007, Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 50. 
28 BÍRÓ, GÁSPÁR: Demokrácia és önrendelkezés a 21. század elején 
[Democracy and Self-Determination at the Beginning of the 21st Century], 
2003, Rejtjel Kiadó, Budapest, 75.  
29 SZIGETI, PÉTER: Világrendszernézőben. Globális „szabad verseny” – a 
világkapitalizmus jelenlegi stádiuma [Exploring World Systems. Global 
“open competition” – The Current Stage of World Capitalism], 2005, 
Napvilág Kiadó, Budapest, 133.  
30 CSÉFALVAY: op. cit.106-107. 
31 GEORGE, SUSAN: A WTO. Korlátlan világkereskedelem vagy szolidáris 
globalizáció? [The WTO. Untrammeled World Trade or Solid 
Globalization?], 2003, Napvilág Kiadó, Budapest, 9-10. 
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about making it easier for neighbouring regions to cooperate with 
each other), “open border” agreements (like Schengen), and 
connections reaching across borders (financial transactions and the 
world wide web).32 We need to see that this phenomenon is two-
faced, as most of the products of state legislations are still area-
bound, extraterritorial laws are not very common. Thus, it is futile 
for the global economy to question the structure of territorially 
defined political units because its very existence depends upon 
them.33 
5. NEOLIBERALISM AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN ECONOMIC 
POLICY 
On the late 1970s emergence and later total dominance of the 
monetarist (neoconservative/neoliberal) orthodoxy had defeated the 
“welfare state project” which had been relatively successful for 
decades, Galbraith clearly stated that the monetarist offensive, both 
in the USA and in several Western European countries, was aimed 
against the post-WWII economic policy supported by a relatively 
wide societal consensus and underpinned by civil legitimacy.34 These 
forces realized the ideology of Friedrich August Hayek and Milton 
Friedman, with their doctrinaire confidence based on the thesis of 
“cleansing the market”: according to this principle, flexible prices 
enable the economy to stabilize itself35 and the state has a function 
only in places where market integration is impossible. Belonging to 
this circle, one can find the so-called “empirical libertarians”36 for 
whom individual freedom and market mechanisms have absolute 
                                                            
32 BÍRÓ: op. cit. 76.  
33 CLARK: op. cit. 88. 
34 FORGÁCS: op. cit.88. 
35 BISHOP, JOHN D.: Adam Smith’s Invisible Hand Argument, in Journal of 
Business Ethics, Vol. 14, No. 3. (1995), 165-180; PALLEY, THOMAS I.: 
Milton Friedman: The Great Laissez-faire Partisan, in Economic & Political 
Weekly, Vol. 41., No. 49. (2006), 5041-5043.  
36 BARR, NICHOLAS: A jóléti állam gazdaságtana [Economics of the 
Welfare State], Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 2009, 92.  
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value, while – following Hayek’s teachings – striving for social 
justice is a superfluous and harmful effort. Hayek argues that if we 
fight for equality that will decrease, or even eliminate freedom.37 
According to his opinion, only the market is able to secure personal 
freedom and create economic profits. Believing in social justice and 
thus state intervention in economic policy, he admits, “necessarily a 
step closer to a totalitarian system.”38 
Friedman used even more concise language when he stated that 
“the influence of the state has to be curbed. Its main obligation 
should be to defend our freedom against both foreign, hostile powers, 
and our own fellow citizens: to protect law and order, to enforce 
private contracts, and to strengthen the competitive market.”39 These 
theories only differ from the ideal of the “night-watchman state” 
(which grants the state only negative functions)40 in that they have 
allowed the state (as a last resort and in a very limited way) to 
execute some redistributive measures on certain public properties in 
order to ameliorate poverty.41 
These statements were then taken to the extreme by the so-
called New Right, which urged an obviously market-friendly, “anti-
statist” policy. After the paradigm shift conducted by Margaret 
Thatcher (1979) and Ronald Reagan (1980), these demands also 
received governmental patronage from the dawn of the 1980s. It was 
at this time that an ideology became dominant that, within the 
framework of neoliberal policies of economy and development, 
proclaimed the primacy of market processes, drastic reduction of 
socioeconomic state intervention, and integration into an 
                                                            
37 HAYEK, FRIEDRICH AUGUST: Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. 2. The 
Mirage of Social Justice, 1976, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 67.  
38 Ibid. 68.  
39 FRIEDMAN, MILTON: Capitalism and Freedom, 1962, University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 2-3.  
40 TAKÁCS, PÉTER (ed.): Államelmélet I. [The Theory of the State. Vol. 1.], 
2009, Szent István Társulat, Budapest, 256. 
41 BARR: op. cit. 95.  
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international economy.42  
The objectives of the Washington consensus (between the IMF, 
the World Bank and the American Department of Finance)43 served 
as a theoretical basis for these processes (besides Hayek and 
Friedman). These prefer fiscal discipline, tighter budgets, reduction 
of tax benefits, financial liberalization, export-friendly currency 
exchange rates, demolition of obstacles in the way of international 
trade, easy entry of foreign operational capital, privatization, and 
total economic deregulation.44 
Due to this directive or policy of “structural correction” 
enforced by global regulative powers – mainly the IMF and the 
World Bank –, nearly the whole planet has become a laboratory for 
the neoliberal “experiment” – after the collapse of the bipolar world 
order, even in the post-socialist areas, as well. “Everywhere, it has 
promoted the policy of liberalization, deregulation and privatization 
and the central role of market spontaneity as opposed to national 
regulation, and thus it has contributed greatly to the global economic 
openness of national economies, and also the widening and 
deepening of mutual interdependencies.”45 Thus, the neoliberal 
consensus means that they generally reject the keynesian 
undertakings and want to achieve “rendering the state empty by 
putting more and more of its functions into private hands.”46 
Notwithstanding the abovementioned “mainstream” view, it is 
worth admitting that even within the neoliberal dogmas’ sphere of 
influence, not everyone considers state intervention in the same way. 
Besides the very popular interpretative canon of the 
“retreating/suppressed state”, another way of argumentation 
appeared which talks about the redesigning of state tasks and 
competences. Governments do not conform to the doctrine of the 
                                                            
42 SCHEIRING, GÁBOR – BODA, ZSOLT: Lehet más a fejlődés [Development 
Can Be Different], in SCHEIRING – BODA: op. cit. 10. 
43 STIGLITZ: op. cit. 34.  
44 SZIGETI: op. cit. 133-134. 
45 SZENTES: op. cit. 70.  
46 CROUCH, COLIN: The terms of the neoliberal consensus, in The Political 
Quarterly, Vol. 86. No. 4. (1997), 357, 359.  
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smaller state, even though they do this in order to establish a 
business-friendly atmosphere and to attract foreign working capital. 
Wacquant convincingly argues that the institutional structure which 
enables the market to dominate is, after all, determined by the state. 
According to this insight, neoliberalism is not an economic project 
but a political one, which does not mean the deconstruction (or 
“dying off”) of the state but its reorganization. Although, 
neoliberalism does reject collectivist economic policies (such as 
Keynesian and Socialist practices) but also argues in favor of the 
“night watchman state”. “Neoliberalism wants to reform and remodel 
the state, so that it will actively support and facilitate the ongoing 
political project of installing the markets.”47 
In addition to all this, in the scientific literature of recent years 
new concepts appeared which reject neoliberalism. The background 
to this was that people realized: “the Washington consensus is not a 
collection of global, politically and emotionally neutral laws, but a 
conglomerate of selfish interests clad in the appearance of scientific 
validity, which has crippled the nation’s economy, increased poverty, 
and created an enormous burden of debts”.48 One stripe of this 
criticism called Governing the Markets, is led by Robert Hunter 
Wade49 and is based on the notion that, taking the Southeast Asian 
model as an example, the outlines of a state can be drawn which 
firmly stays within the framework of capitalism and serves the 
purpose of long-term growth but still actively participates in 
economic life. Wade says that the existence of state-coordinated 
industrial policy and programs can contribute to the economic 
growth of developing countries, or even can be a necessity for them. 
The author also briefly has to mention another notion developed 
from Wade’s research results: the example of the Developmental 
State and the Neo-keynesian economic paradigm, which are answers 
and challenges to monetarism. 
                                                            
47 WACQUANT: op. cit. 20.  
48 RÓNA, PÉTER: Előszó [Prologue], in SCHEIRING – BODA: op. cit. 8.  
49 WADE, ROBERT HUNTER: Governing the Markets. Economic Theory and 
the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization. 2003, Princeton 
University Press, New Jersey. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
The tropes of globalization most often concern the marginalization of 
traditional nation state sovereignty. The author is quite certain about 
think that opposing neoliberal statements which have been treated as 
unquestionable dogmas for decades, there are new theories gaining 
ground which predict a new kind of role for the state. Based on these, 
a worldview can be constructed which unites the forces of the 
market, civil society, and the state, under the auspices of democratic 
pluralism and within the framework of a regulated market, by 
placing civil society first, state second, and market institutions third 
in an order of priority. Since the state can be even a catalyst of 
growth in the future if it concentrates its efforts on efficiency, keeps 
in mind the criteria of good government, gives priority to the values 
of democracy, constitutionality, and human rights, and retains its 
socially legitimized license to correct the failures of the market. 
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Meinungsfreiheit vs. Würde der Gemeinden: Ein 
Einblick in das ungarische Recht 
1. EINFÜHRUNG 
Die Verteidigung der Würde der Gemeinden als eine potenziale 
Begrenzung der Meinungsfreiheit ist schon seit der Veränderung des 
politischen Systems ein regelmäßig zurückkehrender Tagesordnung-
spunkt in dem ungarischen politischen Leben und generierte 
zeitweise heftige Diskussionen. In den letzten 20 Jahren der 
Demokratie versuchte das Parlament mehrmals die der Gemeinde-
verteidigung dienenden straf- und zivilrechtlichen Mittel auszudehn-
en, aber bislang nur mit wenig Erfolg. Die Ursache der Erfolglosig-
keit kann aus mehreren Aspekten beleuchtet werden. Der wichtigste 
ist, dass diese Bestrebungen immer auf die unverhält-nismäßige 
Begrenzung der Meinungsfreiheit hindeuten, und somit den 
rechtsstaatlichen Prinzipen nicht entsprechen. 
Die Verteidigung der Gemeinde konsolidierte sich also auf einer 
Stufe, die auch in der Praxis ziemlich gut funktionierte. Heutzutage 
sind aber Wandlungen in diesem neuralgischen Themenkreis zu 
beobachten. Das ungarische Grundgesetz und dessen Modifizierung-
en, sowie das im letzten Jahr in Kraft getretene neue Strafgesetzbuch 
und das neue Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch wird diese Tendenz ändern. 
Das alles stellt Veränderungen von solchem Ausmaß dar, dass die 
Grenzen der Meinungsfreiheit zugunsten der Verteidigung der 
gemeindlichen Würde deutlich ausgeweitet werden können. 
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2. DAS RECHT AUF LEBEN UND AUF MESCHENWÜRDE UND DIE 
MEINUNGSFREIHEIT 
Das Recht auf Leben und auf Menschenwürde, sowie das Recht auf 
freie Meinungsäußerung wurden schon im 18-19. Jahrhundert, in der 
ersten Welle des Menschenrechtes anerkannt. „Überhaupt von da an 
tauchte der Gedanke auf, dass diese zwei Grundrechte in Kollision 
stehen könnten, und dementsprechend in eine Rangfolge gebracht 
werden müssten, was den Kodifikatoren des Strafgesetzbuchs 
Kopfzerbrechen bereitete.“ In dieser Frage waren sich die ungarisc-
hen Rechtswissenschaftler schon vor dem Entwurf des sogenannten 
Csemegi Kodex (1878) einig: Die Menschenwürde als Grundlage der 
konstitutionellen Ordnung – sowohl auf der individuellen als auch 
auf der gemeindlichen Ebene – muss gegenüber dem Missbrauch der 
Meinungsfreiheit verteidigt werden.1 
Die herausragende Bedeutung der Menschenwürde reicht in der 
ungarischen Auffassung also Jahrhunderte zurück. Heutzutage ist die 
Menschenwürde einem jeden Menschen, einfach aufgrund seines 
menschlichen Wesens gebührender, besonderer moralischer und 
rechtlicher Status, ein über das Recht stehender Wert, aufgrund 
dessen jeder Mensch verlangen kann in seinem Rang respektiert zu 
werden. Es handelt sich also um eine minimale Anerkennung, die 
garantiert, dass niemand als menschliches Wesen bestritten wird. 
Aus diesem Recht lassen sich auch weitere Grundrechte ableiten. 
Auf diese Art und Weise kann man das Recht auf Leben und auf 
Menschenwürde als Mutterrecht und die Herkunft des Selbstbe-
stimmungsrechts nennen.2 Die Wichtigkeit des Rechts auf Leben und 
auf Menschenwürde zeigt weiterhin, dass jene auf der Spitze des 
Grundrechtskatalogs eines jeden Staates stehenden, unteilbaren, 
                                                            
1 BÁRÁNDY, GERGELY: A gyűlöletbeszéd Magyarországon [Die Hassredein 
Ungarn], 2009, Scolar Kiadó, Budapest, 52. 
2 VerfGs-Urteil 23/1990. (X. 31.). 
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generellen menschliche Grundrechte sind.3 Ungarn bildet keine 
Ausnahme, da dieses Recht den ersten Platz in der Hierarchie des 
ungarischen Verfassungsgerichtsgebrauchs belegt. 
Der andere Schwerpunkt des Themas ist das Mutterrecht der 
Kommunikationsrechte, die Meinungsfreiheit. Die Gesellschafts-
kommunikation kommt durch die Kommunikationsrechte zustande, 
die die Teilnahme des Individuums an dem gesellschaftlichen und 
politischen Leben begründen. Gerade deswegen braucht man die 
freien Strömungen der Gedanken auf dem „Markt der Meinungen“, 
so hält man diese Rechte berechtigterweise für die schätzens-
wertesten Freiheitsrechte der modernen Demokratien und Rechts-
staaten.4 Ohne das Recht der freien Meinungsäußerung existierte 
keine demokratische Staatsordnung, deshalb wird die Meinungs-
freiheit gleichermaßen wie das Recht auf Leben und auf Menschen-
würde in allen internationalen rechtlichen Dokumenten als ein 
Grundrecht von enormer Wichtigkeit anerkannt. Alles in Betracht 
ziehend hat das Verfassungsgericht (Alkotmánybíróság, VerfG) sein 
eigenes Meinungsfreiheitsbild im Urteil 30/1992. (V. 26.) heraus-
gearbeitet. Neben dem Entwurf des Prinzips der „Inhaltsneut-ralität“ 
hat das Gericht das Recht der freien Meinungsäußerung als 
Mutterrecht bestimmt.5 
3. FREIHEIT VS. WÜRDE 
In dem öffentlichen Bewusstsein müssen diese beiden – in 
obenangeführter Weise – gegensätzlichen Grundrechte nebenein-
                                                            
3 HORVÁTH, DÓRA: Véleménynyilvánítás szabadsága kontra gyűlöletbeszéd 
[Meinungsfreiheit contra Hassrede], in Studia Iuvenum Iurisperitorum, Nr. 
2. (2004), 41-70. 
4 SZÉKELY, LÁSZLÓ: Magyar sajtó és médiajog [Ungarisches Presse- und 
Medienrecht], 2007, Dialóg Campus Kiadó, Budapest-Pécs, 29. 
5 KOLTAY, ANDRÁS: A véleménynyilvánítás szabadsága. Fogalmi tisztázás 
az Alkotmány 61. §-hoz [Die Meinungsfreiheit. Begriffsklärung zu § 61. 
der Verfassung], in Századvég, Nr. 48. (2008), 77-104. 
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ander und einander ergänzend funktionieren. Wenn jemand die 
erwähnten Rechte missbraucht, und damit dem subjektiven Recht der 
Anderen schadet, soll die gesetzgebende Gewalt darauf reagieren.6 
Das Kuriosum dieses Themas resultiert eben daraus, dass das VerfG 
gemäß dem Recht auf Leben und auf Menschenwürde in der 
Hierarchie der Grundrechte just die Meinungsfreiheit auf den 
zweiten Platz rangierte. Beim Kollidieren dieser zwei Grundrechte 
Grundrechte ist es nicht überraschend, dass es besonders schwer ist, 
eine verfassungsmäßige Lösung zu finden. Sogar nach langem 
Kopfzerbrechen und der tiefgründigen Analyse des konkreten Falls 
ist es nicht einfach, zu solchen Fragen Stellung zu nehmen. Die 
Mannigfaltigkeit und die Pikanterie dieser nicht selten krassen 
Rechtsfälle begründen die Wichtigkeit der Erwägung und die 
sorgfältige Untersuchung der Umstände. Deswegen kann man nicht 
wirklich generelle Prinzipien ausgestalten, die Lehre der vorherigen 
Fälle kann nur eine helfende Hand reichen, um die neuen Probleme 
zu lösen. 
Infolge der Position in der Rangfolge der Grundrechte hat die 
Meinungsfreiheit im Kampf gegen die Menschenwürde gute 
Chancen. Diese privilegierte Lage bedeutet nicht, dass die 
uneinschränkbar wäre, aber lediglich aufgrund ihres Inhalts darf 
noch keine Meinung eingeschränkt werden. Bei Meinungsein-
schränkungen muss immer irgendein erheblich zwingendes Recht 
oder Interesse vorliegen, der Inhalt und die Umstände der Äußerung 
gemeinsam rechtfertigen die Einschränkung. Anhand dieser Kriterien 
kann man mittels vier Werte die Grenzen der Meinungsfreiheit 
setzen. Auf der Spitze der zu verteidigenden Werte befinden sich die 
Interessen des Staates (verfassungsmäßige Ordnung, innere- und 
äußere Sicherheit, Verteidigung der Staatsgeheimnisse), denen 
folgen die Interessen der Gesellschaft (öffentliche Sittlichkeit, 
öffentliche Sicherheit, öffentliche Ruhe), die Interessen der 
einzelnen gesellschaftlichen Gruppen (Verteidigung gegen die 
rassische-, ethnische-, religiöse- und sexuelle Diskriminierung) und 
die Interessen des Individuums (Verteidigung des guten Ansehens, 
                                                            
6 BÁRÁNDY: op. cit. 20. 
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der Ehre, den persönlichen Daten, der Privatsphäre).7 Die 
Verteidigung schützt vor allem die Freiheit der Ansicht, der Kritik, 
der Beurteilung, einschließlich ihrer extremistischen Form, aber sie 
erstreckt sich nicht auf die Fälschung der Fakten.8 Infolge dessen 
kann man nur gegen solche Äußerungen Retorsionen anwenden, die 
die Menschenwürde harsch beleidigen. Wenn die Frage der 
Einschränkung der Meinungsfreiheit auftaucht, kann man in der 
Regel nicht nur gegen sondern auch für die Einschränkung moralisch 
begründete Argumente stellen. Aus sittlichem Grund kann man also 
weder die enge noch die weite Interpretation der Meinungsfreiheit 
mit voller Überzeugungskraft unterstützen.9 
Auf der Seite der Menschenwürde sieht das anders aus. Aus 
dem Verfassungsgerichtsgebrauch lässt sich folgern, dass die 
Menschenwürde eigentlich ein „Jolly Joker“ in dem Kartenblatt der 
Menschenrechte ist, da sie als subsidiäres Grundrecht (und Mutter-
recht) sowohl vom Verfassungsgericht als auch von allen anderen 
Gerichten jederzeit aufgerufen werden kann. Selbst wenn die 
Verfassungkein explizit erwähntes Grundrecht enthält, kann die 
Beleidigung eines Grundrechtes festgestellt werden.10 Demzufolge 
wurde der Kreis der Fälle bezogen auf die Beleidigung der 
Menschenwürde noch mehr ausgedehnt, wodurch die Meinungs-
freiheit eingeschränkt wird. Daneben muss man bedenken, dass die 
Menschenwürde nur im Zusammenhang mit dem Recht auf Leben 
und als Einheit mit ihr uneinschränkbar ist (z. B. Verbot der 
Todesstrafe, Abortusfrage, Euthanasie).Wenn sie sich davon löst, 
sind die einzelnen, aus ihr abzuleitenden Rechte einschränkbar.11 Die 
                                                            
7 HALMAI, GÁBOR: A véleményszabadság határai [Die Grenzen der 
Meinungsfreiheit], 1994, Atlantisz Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 276-277. 
8 VerfGs-Urteil 36/1994 (VI. 24.). 
9 KOLTAY, ANDRÁS: A szabadság méltósága [Die Würde der Freiheit], in 
Századvég, Nr. 49. (2008) 145-153. 
10 VerfGs-Urteil 8/1990 (IV. 23.). 
11 KOLTAY, ANDRÁS: Az emberi jogok, az emberi méltóság és az 
alkotmányos rend védelme a magyar médiaszabályozásban [Schutz der 
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Legitimation der Einschränkung hängt in jedem Fall im Wesentlich-
en von der verursachten oder verursachbaren Beleidigung ab, die 
durch den gegebenen Ort, Zeitpunkt und die Umstände bestimmt ist. 
Im Lichte dieser Aspekte müssen die Gesetzgeber und die 
Rechtsanwender sorgfältige Erwägungen anstellen, sofern in einem 
konkreten Fall die Beleidigung der Würde der Gemeinden auftaucht. 
Das Recht ist also – gerade zwecks der Behütung der Freiheit und 
der Menschenwürde – zu einem ewigen Ausbalancieren der gegen-
überstehenden Interessen gezwungen. 
4. WÜRDE DER EINZELNE UND WÜRDE DER GEMEINDEN? 
Bevor ich das Thema weiterführe, muss ich noch eine andere 
wichtige Frage klären: Was versteht man unter Würde der 
Gemeinden? Die Würde des Einzelnen und die Würde der 
Gemeinden sind schwer mit Rechtsbegriffen zu definieren. Das 
VerfG konnte diese Definitionen auch nicht ausarbeiten, obwohl es 
zahlreiche Kennzeichen und Funktionen bestimmt hat. In der 
ungarischen Rechtsordnung benutzen des Weiteren lediglich einige 
Verfassungsgerichtsurteile den Ausdruck „Würde der Gemeinde“. 
Damit hat das VerfG ihre Existenz anerkannt, und betrachtet sie als 
zu schützenden Wert.12 
Es ist auch wichtig zu erwähnen, dass IstvánKukorelli das Recht 
der Gemeinden auf Menschenwürde nicht anerkennt. Nach seiner 
Sondermeinung bezüglich des VerfG-Urteils 14/2000. (V. 12.) kann 
die Würde nur an Einzelne gebunden sein, so kann nicht von 
Verteidigung der Gemeinden die Rede sein, da die Würde 
                                                                                                                              
Menschenrechte, der Menschenwürde und des Verfassungsrechts in der 
ungarischen Medienregelung], in In Medias Res, Nr. 1. (2012), 37-66. 
12 KOLTAY, ANDRÁS: A közösségek méltóságának védelme [Die 
Verteidigung der Würde der Gemeinden], in Iustum Aequum Salutare, Nr. 
1. (2005) 147-169. 
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ausschließlich an Einzelne gebunden ist.13 Der Gesetzgeber bezieht 
sich jedoch auf etwas Anderes. Die Würde der Einzelnen der 
Gemeinde die miteinander straff verbunden sind, hat einen solchen 
Ausdruck, der nur und ausschließlich dadurch existiert, dass die 
gegebene Person zur gegebenen Gemeinde gehört. Das heißt, die 
persönliche Würde des Gemeindemitgliedes existiert durch die 
Zugehörigkeit zur gegebenen Gemeinde, und deren Eigenschaft ist 
ebenso verteidigungswürdig. 
Die Gemeinde als Entität kann man als eine solche 
Personengesamtheit definieren, deren Mitglieder zusammengehören, 
die sich aber anders fühlen als andere Menschen. Die 
Gemeindemitglieder halten das Bewusstsein der Verinnerlichung und 
Differenzierung zusammen, außerdem verfügen sie über innere 
Normen und Werteordnung, die sie durchsetzen und zur Geltung 
bringen können. Die Gemeindemitgliedschaft ist manchmal ein 
individueller Entschluss (Religion), aber Charaktergebende 
Merkmale sind oft von Geburt an bestimmend (nationale-, ethnische 
Zugehörigkeit, sexuelle Orientierung).14 
„Eine weitere Frage ist die Relevanz der Größe der Gemeinde, 
da man sagt: Je größer die Gemeinde, desto schwächer die 
zusammenhaltende Kraft. Das hängt aber nicht unbedingt von der 
Größe ab. Eine Familie als Gemeinde bleibt nicht immer zusammen, 
während sich in einer Kirchengemeinde auch unter Fremden 
Bindungen erkennen lassen.“15 
Zusammenfassend lässt sich feststellen, dass der Grund der 
Gemeindemitgliedschaft eine solche Eigenschaft sein muss, die ein 
markanter Charakterzug der Persönlichkeit des Menschen ist, der per 
                                                            
13 VerfGs-Urteil 14/2000 (V. 12.): Die Sondermeinung von István 
Kukorelli. 
14 BÁRÁNDY: op. cit. 28-29. 
15 KOLTAY, ANDRÁS: A szólásszabadság alapvonalai – magyar, angol, 
amerikai és európai összehasonlításban [Die Grundzüge der Meinungs-
freiheit – im ungarischen, englischen, amerikanischen und europäischen 
Vergleich], 2009, Századvég Kiadó, Budapest, 549. 
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se verteidigungswürdig ist, wodurch eigentlich auch die 
Verteidigung der Gemeinde begründet ist. 
5. DIE RECHTSVERTEIDIGUNG DER WÜRDE DER GEMEINDEN 
5.1. Die Gemeinden in dem Grundgesetz 
Die in Ungarn laufenden, die Menschenrechte, d. h. unter anderem 
die Rechte der Gemeinden betreffenden Änderungen haben die im 
ersten Januar 2012 in Kraft getretene neue Verfassung, das 
Grundgesetz (Alaptörvény) eingeleitet, das schon seine fünfte 
Änderung durchlief. Gleichermaßen wie im deutschen Grundgesetz 
ist im ungarischen Grundgesetz die Menschenwürde dominant. Im 
eingefassten „Nationales Glaubensbekenntnis“ (Nemzeti Hitvallás) 
benennt die Menschenwürde den Grund des menschlichen Wesens. 
Entsprechend Artikel II. des Kapitels „Freiheit und Verantwortung“ 
wird die Unverletzlichkeit der Menschenwürde deklariert, die jedem 
Menschen gebührt, sogar als Nummer eins in der Liste der 
Grundrechte. 
Die die Meinungsfreiheit angehenden konstitutionellen sowie 
gesetzlichen Bestimmungen haben sich am stärksten geändert.16 
Artikel IX. Absatz (1) deklariert das Recht auf freie Meinungs-
äußerung, Absatz (2) „anerkennt die Freiheit und Vielfarbigkeit der 
Presse und schützt sie, außerdem garantiert er die Bedingungen der 
freien Auskunft, die für die öffentliche Meinungsbildung in der 
Demokratie erforderlich ist.“ 
Als „Neuigkeit“ erscheint die Meinungsäußerungsschranke 
gemäß Absatz (4): „Die Ausübung der Meinungsfreiheit darf nicht 
mit der Beleidigung der Menschenwürde einhergehen.“ Der Schutz 
der Menschenwürde war natürlich ohnehin anerkannt, aber diese 
Schranke erscheint schon explizit in dem Text des Grundgesetzes. 
                                                            
16 SMUK, PÉTER: Ostrom vagy felújítás alatt? A véleményszabadság új 
határai [Offensive oder Reform? Die neuen Grenzen der Meinungsfreiheit], 
in Közjogi Szemle, Nr. 2. (2013) 25-34. 
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Gemäß der Begründung der vierten Änderung ist das notwendig, 
damit verfassungsmäßige Grundlagen geschaffen werden können, 
bei Verletzung der Würde der Gemeinden gegen Hassrede mit 
zivilrechtlichen Sanktionen vorgehen zu können. 
Aus dieser Annäherung ist der sich ausgesprochen auf die 
Verteidigung der Gemeinden richtende Absatz (5) zu verstehen: „Die 
Ausübung der Meinungsfreiheit darf nicht mit der Beleidigung der 
Würde der ungarischen Nation, der nationalen-, ethnischen-, 
rassischen- oder religiösen Gemeinden einhergehen. Diese Gemein-
demitglieder sind – im gesetzlichen Rahmen – berechtigt, gegen 
solche Gemeinde beleidigenden Meinungsäußerungen ihre Anrechte 
vor Gericht durchzusetzen.“ Der vorherige Verfassungsgerichts-
gebrauch hat nämlich klar gemacht, dass auf gesetzlicher Ebene nicht 
für das wirksame Auftreten zugunsten der Ausdehnung der 
Verteidigung der Gemeinden garantiert werden kann.17 Deswegen 
wünscht der Gesetzgeber – wie das Beispiel zeigt – diese 
Verteidigung mit der Änderung des Grundgesetzes zu legitimieren. 
Die konstitutionelle Grundstellung lässt sich also wie folgt 
formulieren: Die Menschenwürde und die Meinungsfreiheit genießen 
eine erhöhte Position im System der Grundrechte, aber in einigen 
Fällen müssen sie sich vor der Menschenwürde neigen. Weiterhin 
taucht die Frage auf, ob Absatz (4) des Artikels IX. als Neuerung 
bewertet werden kann, da nach der wortwörtlichen Interpretation 
dieses Absatzes die Menschenwürde in jedem Fall über die 
Meinungsfreiheit stehen sollte, deren Einschränkung überhaupt nicht 
in Frage kommen dürfte. In der ungarischen Auffassung ist das aber 
nicht die eigentliche Bestrebung, sondern die Verteidigung der 
Würde der Gemeinden.18 
5.2. Strafrechtliche Aspekte 
Die seit 2010 laufenden öffentlich-rechtlichen Änderungen haben 
selbst den Bereich des Strafrechts nicht unberührt gelassen. Das neue 
                                                            
17 Gesetzesvorlage T/9929 über die vierteÄnderung des Grundgesetzes von 
Ungarn. AusführlicheBegründung. 
18 SMUK: op. cit. 25-34. 
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Strafgesetzbuch (Büntető Törvénykönyv, StGB) ist am ersten Juli 
2013 in Kraft getreten, und mischte die der Gemeindenverteidigung 
dienenden Satzungen auf. 
Die unten geschilderten Straftatbestände bedeuten ohne 
Ausnahme die strafrechtlichen Einschränkungen der Meinungs-
freiheit um die Verteidigung der Menschenwürde der Gemeinden. 
Fast alle dieser Straftatbestände befinden sich im Kapitel der 
Straftaten gegen die öffentliche Ruhe, und zwar nicht zufällig, da 
durch das geschützte Rechtsobjekt in jedem Fall die Erhaltung der 
öffentlichen Ruhe, das Interesse der Wahrung des gesellschaftlichen 
Friedens ist, neben dem die Respektierung der Würde der 
Gemeinden erscheint. 
5.2.1. Die Hassrede 
Die häufigste Form der Beleidigung der Würde der Gemeinde ist die 
Hassrede. Laut GáborHalmai „gehören zu dieser Abteilung der 
Kommunikation solche Reden, durch die der Redner – meistens von 
Vorurteilen oder gerade von Hass geleitet – über rassische, 
ethnische, religiöse oder sexuelle Gemeinden oder über deren ein-
zelne Mitglieder im Zusammenhang mit ihrer Gemeindemit-
gliedschaft solche Meinungen ausdrückt, die Hass gegen die 
Gemeindemitglieder wecken können.“19 Ergänzend kann man ein 
weiteres Begriffselement benennen, und zwar die Furcht einflößende 
Fähigkeit der Rede.20 
Die umfassende ungarische Rechtsordnung betrachtend man hat 
den Eindruck, dass der Hass „selten wie ein weißer Rabe“ in der 
Welt des ungarischen Rechts ist.21 Der Ausdruck „Hassrede“ taucht 
                                                            
19 HALMAI, GÁBOR: Kommunikációs jogok [Kommunikationsrechte], 2002, 
Új Mandátum Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 114. 
20 KOLTAY: op. cit. (2009) 509. 
21 FÖLDESI, TAMÁS: A gyűlölet és a büntetőjog (A Janus arcú 
gyűlöletbeszéd) [Der Hass und das Strafrecht (Die Hassrede mit dem 
Janusgesicht)], in LACZKÓ SÁNDOR – DÉKÁNY ANDRÁS (Hg.): Lábjegyzetek 
Platónhoz - A gyűlölet [Fußnoten zu Platon - Der Hass], 2008, Pro 
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nicht in der ungarischen Rechtsordnung auf, darunter versteht man 
vor allem – gleichermaßen wie im deutschen Recht – die Straftat der 
Volksverhetzung. Der Text der StGB lautet wie folgt: „Wer vor 
großer Öffentlichkeit a) gegen das ungarische Volk, b) gegen 
irgendeine nationale, ethnische, rassische, religiöse Gruppe, oder c) 
gegen die einzelnen Gruppen der Bevölkerung – besonders hinsicht-
lich auf Behinderung, sexuelle Identität, sexuelle Orientierung – zum 
Hass aufstachelt, wird wegen Straftat mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu drei 
Jahren bestraft.“22 Die einzige Änderung ist die Benennung der 
Behinderung, der sexuellen Identität, der sexuellen Orientierung als 
gruppenbildenden Aspekt. Diese Gruppen waren aber ohnehin schon 
geschützt, deren Erwähnung ist lediglich als Gestus gegenüber den 
Betroffenen zu werten. 
An dieser Stelle muss kurz die Auffassung des VerfGs 
bezüglich der Hassrede erwähnt werden, da die Gesetzgeber schon 
mehrmals versucht hat den Begriff dieser Straftat im Namen der 
Verteidigung der Gemeinden auszudehnen. Das VerfG „spielte“ in 
vier prinzipiell signifikanten Urteilen „herunter“, was bei der 
Pönalisierung welcher Täterverhalten als verfassungswidrig gilt. So 
befand das VerfG die Bestrafung folgender Täterverhalten für 
verfassungswidrig: Nutzung beleidigender und erniedrigender 
Expressionen; Verübung zu Anstiftung von sonstigen Hass 
geeigneter Taten; Anstiftung zum Hass oder Aufforderung zu 
Gewaltmaßnahmen; Nutzung und Verbreitung von Ausdrücken in 
großer Öffentlichkeit bzw. Körperbewegungen, die an eine 
Willkürherrschaft oder eine Idee einer Willkürherrschaft erinnern 
oder sie andeuten, die geeignet sind die Gemeinde in ihrer Ehre zu 
kränken. Die Begründung der Nichtigerklärung dieser Täterverhalten 
war hauptsächlich, dass sie keine offenbare und anwesende Gefahr 
(„clear and present danger“) darstellen, das heißt, den 
gesellschaftlichen Frieden nur abstrakt gefährden und deren 
                                                                                                                              
Philosophia Szegediensi Alapítvány - Magyar Filozófiai Társaság, Szeged, 
262-272. 
22 Gesetz Nr. C. 2012 über das Strafgesetzbuch. § 332. Közösség elleni 
uszítás. 
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Pönalisierung die Meinungsfreiheit disproportional einschränkten. 
Außerdem waren manche zu abstrakt definiert oder senkten die 
konstitutionell anerkannte Strafbarkeitsschwelle.23 
Zusammenfassend lässt sich feststellen, dass die Pönalisierung 
der Hassrede sich in Ungarn auf einer festen Ebene stabilisierte, die 
alle lockernden Versuche des Gesetzgebers überstand. Sogar das 
neue StGB ließ diesen Straftatbestand unberührt, obwohl András 
Sajó ist der Meinung, dass nach dem Gebrauch des Europäischen 
Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte manche der erwähnten Täter-
verhaltene verteidigungsunwürdig sind.24 
5.2.2. Leugnung der Sünden der nationalsozialistischen und 
kommunistischen Regime 
Die öffentliche Leugnung der Sünden der nationalsozialistischen und 
kommunistischen Regime – genauso wie im deutschen Recht – 
gehörten zu dem Straftatbestand der Volksverhetzung, aber in dem 
neuen StGB wurde diese Straftat getrennt geregelt, die lautet 
folgendermaßen: „Wer vor großer Öffentlichkeit den von national-
sozialistischen oder kommunistischen Regimen begangenen 
Völkermord oder andere Maßnahmen gegen die Menschlichkeit 
leugnet, in Zweifel zieht, verharmlost, oder billigt, wird wegen 
Straftat mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu drei Jahren bestraft.“25 
Der erst vor ein paar Jahren eingeleitete Straftatbestand hat 
bereits der Probe des VerfGs standgehalten. Auf der Änderung der 
kurzlebigen Holocaustleugnung „war die Tinte kaum getrocknet“, als 
am 4. August 2010 Béla Biszku, ehemaliger hochrangiger Politiker 
der Ungarischen Sozialistischen Arbeiterpartei- (Magyar Szocialista 
Munkáspárt, MSZMP) in der Fernsehsendung „Öffentliche Rede“ 
(Közbeszéd) des Kanals Dunaden ungarischen Volksaufstand 1956 
                                                            
23 VerfGs-Urteile 30/1992. (V. 26.) 12/1999 (V. 21.), 18/2004 (V. 25.) und 
95/2008 (VII. 3.). 
24 SAJÓ, ANDRÁS: A faji gyűlölet igazolása büntetendő [Die Rechtfertigung 
des Rassismus ist zu bestrafen], in Fundamentum, Nr. 4. (2004), 21-34. 
25 Gesetz Nr. C. 2012 über das Strafgesetzbuch. § 333. A nemzetiszocialista 
vagy kommunista rendszerek bűneinek nyilvános tagadása. 
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als Gegenrevolution, nationale Tragik bezeichnete und behauptete, 
dass die nach der Revolution angefangenen Prozesse keine 
Schauprozesse seien und wegen begangener Taten begonnen hätten. 
Die Staatsanwaltschaft der Budapester Bezirke I. und XII. hat Biszku 
wegen öffentlicher Leugnung der Sünden der nationalsozialistischen 
und kommunistischen Regime angeklagt. Laut der Anklageschrift hat 
Biszku die Sünden der kommunistischen Regime in der oben 
erwähnten Sendung vor großer Öffentlichkeit verharmlost.26 
Aber im Februar 2011 hat der Richter des Biszku-Prozesses den 
Prozess ausgesetzt, da er den anzuwendenden Straftatbestand für 
verfassungswidrig hielt und sich für deren Verfassungskontrolle 
einsetzte. Laut des VerfGs-Urteils ist „die Leugnung der Sünden des 
Nationalsozialismus und Kommunismus ein Missbrauch der 
Meinungsfreiheit, die nicht nur die Würde der Gemeinden der Opfer 
tief verletzt, sondern auch die für sie Solidarität zeigenden und sich 
für demokratische Werte engagierenden Staatsbürger.“ Um dieses 
Engagement aufrechtzuerhalten, braucht man andererseits ein 
wirksames Auftreten gegen demokratische Ideen in Frage stellende 
Äußerungen. Drittens können diese Straftaten die öffentliche Ruhe 
stören, die der Straftatbestand schützt. Alle dieser konstitutionellen 
Werte beachtet ist diese strafrechtliche Einschränkung der 
Meinungsfreiheit verfassungsmäßig.27 
5.2.3. Verwendung der Symbolen der Willkürherrschaften 
Im ungarischen Recht ist die Verwendung willkürherrschaft-
licher Symbole auch per se strafbar. Das vorherige StGB hat die 
bloße Verwendung von solchen Symbolen strafbar gemacht. Nur die 
Verwendung populärwissenschaftlicher, wissenschaftlicher, künstler-
ischer und bildungsrelevanter Ziele bildete Ausnahme.28 Das VerfG 
rechtfertigte diese Strenge vor allem mit der besonderen historischen 
Situation Ungarns, und mit der Notwendigkeit der Festigung der 
                                                            
26 http://www.mabie.hu/node/618 [cit. 2013-10-26]. 
27 VerfGs-Urteil 16/2013. (VI. 20.). 
28 Gesetz Nr. IV. 1978. über das Strafgesetzbuch. § 269/B. Önkényuralmi 
jelképek használata. 
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Demokratie. Daneben löst die Verwendung dieser Symbole 
Bedrohungsgefühl und auf konkreten Erfahrungen basierende Angst 
aus.29 Jedoch war der Straftatbestand problematisch, da dadurch die 
harmlosen, für die Störung des öffentlichen Friedens nicht 
geeigneten Verhalten auch strafbar waren, und analog zu den 
„Verhetzungsurteilen“ verfassungswidrig.30 
Dieses „stille Gewässer“ schien der Fall eines Politikers, Attila 
Vajnai aufzumischen, der bis nach Straßburg gelang. Vajnai hat den 
roten Stern auf einer legalen politischen Veranstaltung getragen. Er 
wurde wegen Verwendung eines willkürherrschaftlicher Symbols 
verurteilt, aber der Europäische Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte hat 
Ungarn kondemniert, da Vajnai den roten Stern trug, der seit 
Jahrhunderten als Symbol der Arbeiterbewegung galt. Außerdem 
stellte das Gericht fest, dass dieses Verbot angesichts der vielfältigen 
Bedeutung des roten Sterns zu weitverbreitet ist.31 
Trotz des Falles blieb der fragliche Straftatbestand unberührt, 
aber 2012 unterzog ihn Vajnai selbst einer Verfassungskontrolle in 
Bezug auf die disproportionale Einschränkung der Meinungsfreiheit 
und auf sein erwähntes Straßburger Urteil. Anhand des Urteils 
revidierte das VerfG seinen früheren Standpunk und stellte die 
Verfassungswidrigkeit des Straftatbestandes fest. Laut der Entscheid-
ung des VerfGs dürften die Symbole der Willkürherrschaften 
durchaus verboten werden, da diese die Menschenwürde verletzen 
können, und im Gegensatz zur Werteordnung des Grundgesetzes 
stehen. Das Verbot in dem StGB ist aber zu weitläufig, „da es nicht 
differenziert, sondern anordnet, die Verwendung der Symbole im 
Allgemeinem zu bestrafen.“ Man müsste den Nutzungszweck der 
Symbole, die Weise der Verübung und deren Wirkung beachten. 
Sonst gelten solche Verhalten als bestrafbar, deren Pönalisierung die 
Meinungsfreiheit disproportional einschränkt.32 
                                                            
29 VerfGs-Urteil 14/2000. (V. 12.). 
30 István Kukorelli meinte in diesem Fall sollte man auch den „clear and 
presentdanger“- Maßstab anwenden. 
31 http://www.jogiforum.hu/hirek/18357 [cit. 2013-10-27]. 
32 VerfGs-Urteil 4/2013 (II. 21.). 
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Im Sinne des obigen Urteils wurde der in dem neuen StGB mit 
ungeändertem Text eingegebenen Straftatbestand vor seinem 
Inkrafttreten annulliert. Der neue Text lautet also wie folgt: „Wer ein 
Hakenkreuz, ein SS-Zeichen, ein Schützenkreuz, einen Hammer und 
eine Sichel, einen fünf zackigen roten Stern oder diesen darstellende 
Symbole in einer Weise, die geeignet ist, den öffentlichen Frieden zu 
stören – besonders die Würde der Gemeinden der Opfer oder deren 
Gnadenrecht zu verletzen – a) verbreitet, b) vor großer Öffentlichkeit 
verwendet, oder c) öffentlich ausstellt, sofern keine schwerere 
Straftat erfüllt ist, wird wegen Vergehen mit Freiheitsentzug 
bestraft.“33 Diese Formulierung impliziert die vorherigen 
rechtfertigenden Umstände und definiert die Vollführungs-
bedingungen des Deliktserfolgs. 
5.2.4. Verunglimpfung der Staatssymbole 
Die Verunglimpfung der Staatssymbole ist ein weiterer, auch im 
deutschen Recht bekannter Straftatbestand, der die strafrechtliche 
Verteidigung der Staatssymbole sichert. Bei Hoheitsabzeichen und 
Staatssymbole betreffenden Delikten werden europaweit ähnliche 
wie die ungarischen Sanktionen angedroht, nichtsdestotrotz meinte 
IstvánKukorelli, dass der Text des vorherigen StGBs gewissermaßen 
problematisch war. Ihm zufolge sollte das VerfG in seinem sich mit 
diesem Straftatbestand befassenden Urteil die Vorrangigkeit der 
Meinungsfreiheit, der Freiheit der Wissenschaft und der Kunst 
deklarieren, da die Staatssymbole betreffenden negativen 
Äußerungen, wissenschaftliche Kritiken, verblüffende Darstellungen 
die Gesellschaft nicht per se gefährden.34 
Aber Kukorellis Ansicht scheint sich im neuen StGB zu zeigen, 
da statt der Formulierung „andere solche Taten begehen“ die 
Wendung „auf andere Weise verunglimpft“ benutzt wird. Die derzeit 
geltende Satzung lautet also folgendermaßen: „Wer vor großer 
                                                            
33 Gesetz Nr. C. 2012. über das Strafgesetzbuch. § 335. Önkényuralmi 
jelkép használata. 
34 VerfGs-Urteil 13/2000 (V. 12.). Parallele Begründung von István 
Kukorelli. 
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Öffentlichkeit die Hymne, die Flagge, das Wappen von Ungarn oder 
die Heilige Krone beleidigende oder erniedrigende Ausdrücke nutzt, 
bzw. sie auf andere Weise verunglimpft, sofern keine schwerere 
Straftat erfüllt ist, wird wegen Vergehen mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu 
einem Jahr bestraft.“35 Die Verunglimpfung schließt die negative 
Meinung oder Darstellung und die Kritik offenbar nicht mit ein, so 
lässt sich der Kreis der Striktion des Täterverhaltens feststellen. 
Daneben wurde der Kreis der zu verteidigenden Staatssymbole der 
Werteordnung des Grundgesetzes entsprechend mit der Heiligen 
Krone ergänzt. 
5.2.5. Sonstige Delikte gegen die Menschenwürde 
Der Vollständigkeit halber muss man kurz die Straftatbestände 
erwähnen, deren geschütztes Rechtsobjekt das gesellschaftliche 
Interesse an der Verteidigung der Menschenwürde ist, da deren 
Anwendungsbereich im Sinne von Absatz (5) des Artikels IX. des 
Grundgesetzes auf die Würde der Gemeinden ausdehnbar wäre. Dies 
bedeutet, dass es konzeptionell möglich ist, Verleumdung, 
Beleidigung und Verunglimpfung des Andenkens der Verstorbenen36 
gegen eine ganze Gemeinde zu begehen. Obwohl die aufgeführten 
Delikte im Sinne von § 231 nur auf Strafantrag strafbar sind, 
anerkennt der ominöse Artikel des Grundgesetzes das Recht der 
Gemeinden, wegen Beleidigung ihrer Menschenwürde ihre Anrechte 
vor Gericht durchsetzen zu können. 
Das bedeutet quasi freien Spielraum für die Rechtsanwender, 
um mildere – einst als verfassungswidrig bezeichnete – Formen der 
Hassrede zu sanktionieren. Eine solche Verschiebung des 
Gerichtsgebrauchs könnte auch zur disproportionalen Einschränkung 
der Meinungsfreiheit führen. 
                                                            
35 Gesetz Nr. C. 2012 über das Strafgesetzbuch. § 334. Nemzeti jelkép 
megsértése. 
36 Gesetz Nr. C. 2012 über das Strafgesetzbuch. § 226-228. Rágalmazás, 
Becsületsértés, Kegyeletsértés. 
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5.3. Zivilrechtliche Aspekte 
Die intensive Tätigkeit des Gesetzgebers der letzten Jahre hat sich 
dem Bereich des Zivilrechts auch nicht entzogen. Am 15. März 2014 
wird das neue Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch (Polgári Törvénykönyv, BGB) 
in Kraft treten, das bemerkenswerte Änderungen in Bezug auf die 
Verteidigung der Persönlichkeitsrechte der Gemeinden enthält. Das 
Parlament hat die Verfassungsmäßigkeit des Gesetzes – wie bereits 
darauf hingewiesen – nachträglich durch die Änderung des Grund-
gesetzes gesichert.37 
Das noch geltende BGB § 75 schützt im Allgemeinen die in 
dem § 76 mit offener Taxation aufgeführten Persönlichkeitsrechte. 
Im Falle ihrer Beleidigung kann die verletzte Partei aufgrund des 
BGBs § 84 Rechtsschutz für sich beanspruchen. Obwohl die 
Beleidigungen mit der Zugehörigkeit zu einer Gruppe korrelieren, 
stehen sie nicht unter direktem Verbot, aber das lässt sich aus der 
sonst geschützten Menschenwürde ableiten. Falls ein Gemein-
demitglied in Bezug darauf einen Prozess anstrengt, kann sich der 
Täter einfach mit der Erklärung rechtfertigen, mit seinem Verhalten 
die gegenüberstehende Partei nicht absichtlich beleidigt zu haben. 
Demgegenüber deklariert das neue BGB auch den generellen 
Schutz der Persönlichkeitsrechte, die aber schon ausgesproch-
enermaßen aus der Menschenwürde abgeleitet sind.38 Der § 2:45 
bestimmt den zivilrechtlichen Begriff der Beleidigung und der 
Verletzung des guten Ansehens und der § 2:50 regelt das 
Gnadenrecht. Die Gemeinden betreffende wichtigste Änderung ist 
jedoch Absatz (5) des § 2:54: „Jedes beliebige Mitglied der 
Gemeinde ist berechtigt im Falle einer wegen seiner Zugehörigkeit 
zur ungarischen Nation, bzw. zu irgendeiner nationalen, ethnischen, 
                                                            
37 2007 hat das Parlament schon versucht die zivilrechtliche Verteitigung 
der Gemeinden zubegründen, aberdas VerfG hat diese Gesetzvorlage 
annulliert [VerfGs-Urteil 95/2008 (VII. 3)]. Die Lehre aus diesem 
Urteilziehend hat das Parlament die neuen Satzungen begründet und 
formuliert. 
38 Gesetz Nr. V. 2013 über das Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch. § 2:42. A személyi-
ségi jogok általános védelme. 
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rassischen oder religiösen Gemeinde, die als markanter Charakterzug 
seiner Persönlichkeit gilt, die Gemeinde vor großer Öffentlichkeit 
schwer beleidigende oder in der Ausdrucksweise ungerechtfertigt 
kränkende Rechtsverletzung innerhalb einer ab der Rechtsverletzung 
gerechneten Ausschlussfrist von dreißig Tagen sein Persönlich-
keitsrecht geltend zu machen. Jedes beliebige Mitglied der Gemeinde 
kann mit Ausnahme der Überlassung des durch Rechtsverletzung 
erreichten Vermögensvorteils jede Sanktion der Verletzung der 
Persönlichkeitsrechte geltend machen.“ 
Im neuen BGB wird also die Konstruktion der den Einzelnen 
„überstrahlenden“ Beleidigung anerkannt. Die zugehörigen 
Sanktionen (§ 2:51-53) orientieren sich an der vorherigen Regelung, 
so lässt sich weiterhin über von Zurechnungsfähigkeit unabhängigen 
Sanktionen und über Haftpflicht reden. Neben diesen erscheint das 
Bußgeld für Beleidigungen als eine wesentliche Neuerung, die im 
Falle der immateriellen Beleidigungen vonnöten ist. Weiterhin im 
Sinne von Absatz (4) ist der Staatsanwalt berechtigt ohne Autorisier-
ung durch den Beleidigten Klage zu erheben, falls die Verletzung des 
Persönlichkeitsrechts auf das öffentliche Interesse prallt. 
6. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Es konnte gezeigt werden, dass diese Bestrebungen des Gesetzgebers 
trotz der erfolgslosen Bemühungen und der annullierten 
Gesetzvorlagen um die Verstärkung der Verteidigung der Würde der 
Gemeinden nicht abgebrochen wurden. Es zeigt, dass die Regelung 
der Verteidigung der Gemeinden in den letzten Jahren bemerken-
swert aufgewirbelt wurde. Aber diesmal wurde das Grundgesetz – 
vorsorglich – zwecks der Neutralisierung des Verfassungsgerichts-
gebrauchs geändert. Diese Zwecke scheinen die Abrogation der vor 
dem Inkraftreten des Grundgesetzes getroffenen Entscheidungen des 
VerfGs durch die vierte Änderung zu vollziehen. 
Die Verwirklichung dieser Bestrebungen und an dieser 
orientierende „Feinabstimmung“ des Grundgesetzes dürfen aber 
nicht ausreichen, um sie in ihrer derzeitigen Form dauerhaft zu 
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befestigen. Die früheren Urteile des VerfGs schützten nämlich die 
fürsorglich gezeichneten konstitutionellen Grenzen der 
Meinungsfreiheit, deren Nichtberücksichtigung in bestimmten Fällen 
zur Disproportionalität der seit Neuestem anwendbaren strafrecht-
lichen und zivilrechtlichen Sanktionen führt. 
Zuerst lässt sich feststellen, dass die Leugnung der Sünden der 
nationalsozialistischen und kommunistischen Regime nicht befriedi-
gend geregelt wurde. Wie das VerfGs-Urteil 16/2013 (VI. 20.) – 
ganz richtig – erklärte, schützt die Satzung auch die öffentliche 
Ruhe, und die in ihr implizierten Verhalten können zur Erregung 
öffentlichen Ärgernisses prädestiniert sein. Aber dieses Kriterium 
befindet sich nicht in dem Straftatbestand. Außerdem soll der 
Gerichtsgebrauch bezüglich der Verleumdung, der Beleidigung und 
der Verunglimpfung des Andenkens der Verstorbenen auftauchenden 
Problemen klar reagieren, und zwar mit der Nichtanerkennung des 
Prinzips der „überstrahlenden“ Beleidigung aus dem Bereich des 
Strafrechts. Außerdem ist es erwähnenswert, dass davon unabhängig 
auch die Einzelnen im Zusammenhang mit ihrer Zugehörigkeit zu 
einer Gruppe mit dazu geeigneten Äußerungen in ihrer Ehre gekränkt 
oder beleidigt werden können. 
Die neue Satzung des BGBs hat auch ihre Fehler. Das 
Rechtfertigungsverbot fehlt unveränderlich aus dem Gesetzestext, so 
bleibt der Zweck von Absatz (5) des § 2:54 unerfüllt. Ein weiterer 
bemerkenswerter Fehler, der zur neuen Regelung gehört, ist, dass der 
Begriff der Gemeinde zwar breitgefächert ist – die ungarische 
Nation, die auf die Anerkennung der Rechte der Gemeinden in 
Mehrheit hinweisen könnte, benennt –, aber sie ist nicht exakt genug 
definiert und nicht alle Gruppen der Bevölkerung werden bedacht. 
Das brennendste Problem ist aber, dass die Möglichkeit der 
parallelen Klageerhebungen nicht ausgeschlossen wird,39 es wird 
lediglich versucht mit einer Ausschlussfrist von dreißig Tagen die 
Zahl solcher Klagen zu reduzieren. Schließlich verletzt der Absatz 
(4) das Selbstbestimmungsrecht des Einzelnen. 
                                                            
39 Allerdings scheint die letzte Änderung der Zivilprozessordnung dieses 
Problem zulösen. 
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Tamás SZENTGYÖRGYVÁRI 
Anfangszeiten der Selbständigen Gesetzlichen 
Regelung Bezüglich der Wohnlage der Ausländer in 
Ungarn  
1. MIGRATIONSPROZESSE AN DER JAHRHUNDERTWENDE 
1.1. Nötigkeit der Regelung der Einwanderung 
Die Regelung der Einwanderungsfrage und die Schaffung unseres 
ersten selbständigen Fremdenpolizeigesetzes können mit dem 
Ministerpräsidium von Kálmán Széll verbunden werden. Die 
Regierung wollte 1903 durch die Unterbreitung eines umfassenden 
Gesetzpaketes die Regelung der anscheinend immer größer 
werdenden Einwanderung lösen. Das Parlament hat den 
Gesetzantrag1 über die Wohnmöglichkeit der Ausländer in den 
Ländern der ungarischen Krone mit den Anträgen über die 
Grenzpolizei,2 die Auswanderung3 und die Reisepassfrage4 
                                                            
1 1903. évi V. törvénycikk a külföldieknek a magyar korona országai 
területén való lakhatásról [Gesetzartikel V/1903 über die Wohnlage der 
Ausländer in den Ländern der ungarischen Krone], eigene Übersetzung 
http://www.1000ev.hu/index.php?a=3&param=6873 [cit. 2013-09-07]. Es 
wurde am 11. März 1903 sanktioniert. Es wurde am 14. März 1903 im 
„Landesgesetzblatt“ veröffentlicht. 
2 1903. évi VIII. törvénycikk a határrendőrségről [Gesetzartikel VIII/1903 
über die Grenzpolizei], eigene Übersetzung http://www.1000ev.hu/index. 
php?a=3&param=6876 [cit. 2013-08-07]. 
3 1903. évi IV. törvénycikk. a kivándorlásról [Gesetzartikel IV/1903 über 
die Auswanderung], eigene Übersetzung http://www.1000ev.hu/index 
.php?a=3&param=68762 [cit. 2013-08-07]. 
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zusammen behandelt. Welche Gründe konnten im Hintergrund dieser 
Gesetzgebungsarbeit stehen, welche Fragen der Migrationsprozesse 
wollten die Politiker damit beantworten? Aufgrund der parlament-
arischen Interventionen vom Januar 1903 wird uns eine Reihe von 
Verwaltungs- und Sicherheitsproblemen mit der Ein-wanderung 
verbunden bekannt. 
Der Gesetzvorschlag wollte damit die Einwanderung regeln, 
strenger machen und erfassen: „damit sich kein Ausländer im 
Bereich des Landes ohne Anmeldung und Wissen der zuständigen 
Ämter aufhalten kann, damit der Ausländer verfolgt und beim Bedarf 
entfernt werden kann, bevor er noch dem Staat irgendwelchen 
Schaden verursachen würde.“5 
Bei der Diskussion der Frage hat das größte Problem bedeutet, 
dass über die ungarische Auswanderung relativ genaue Daten zur 
Verfügung gestanden haben, was man von der Anzahl und 
Zusammensetzung der Einwanderer nicht behaupten kann. Bei der 
Diskussion des Gesetzvorschlages wurde die sich darauf beziehende 
pejorative Feststellung auch mehrmals erwähnt:  
„.. es ist abnormal, was auch heute herrscht, dass wir über die 
Anzahl der sich in unserem Land aufhaltenden Ausländer gar keine 
Ahnung haben.“6 
„Über das Ausmaß der Einwanderung behaupten der geschätzte 
Vortragende und selbst der Bericht, dass es nicht festgestellt werden 
kann, wir haben darüber keine Information.“7 
Die statistische Aufstellung war in dieser Zeit nicht 
entsprechend. Über die Verteilung der Nationalität und Konfession 
                                                                                                                              
4 1903. évi VI. törvénycikk az utlevélügyről [Gesetzartikel VI/1903 über die 
Reisepässe], eigene Übersetzung http://www.1000ev.hu/index.php 
?a=3&param=6874 [cit. 2013-08-07]. 
5 179. országos ülés 1903. január 9-én, pénteken, in Az 1901-1906. évi 
országgyűlés képviselőházának naplója, X. kötet [179. Landessitzung vom 
9. Januar 1903, Freitag, Tagebuch des Abgeordnetenhauses des Parlamentes 
von 1901-1906, Band X], 1902, Atheneum, Budapest, 203. 
6 Ibid. 203. 
7 Ibid. 208. 
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der Landesbewohner haben zwar genaue Daten zur Verfügung 
gestanden, aber über die Anzahl der eingesiedelten Ausländer gab es 
keine genaue Datenerfassung. 
Für die Abgeordneten hat die Definierung und Identifizierung 
der ausländischen Einwanderer auch ein Problem bedeutet, dass 
kommt folgendermaßen aus den Reden hervor: 
„Ein Teil der Einwanderer stammt aus Russland, die durch 
Galizien in unser Land kommen, ihr Großteil bleibt in Österreich, die 
»Schlacke« kommt zu uns, vielleicht weist Österreich sie zu uns aus. 
Aber den Großteil der Ausländer machen die Österreicher aus. Wenn 
aber die solchen österreichischen Landesangehörigen von den 
österreichischen Behörden aus dem Land mit der Vorwand 
ausgewiesen werden, dass sie nicht genug Geld haben, um mit der 
Eisenbahn in ihre Gemeinden abgeschoben werden zu können, 
nimmt man von ihnen an der Grenze einfach Abschied, aber sie 
kommen auf einem Umweg zurück ins Land und unsere 
Verwaltungsbehörden können mit dem Verfahren neu beginnen.“8 
Die Vision der übertriebenen Einwanderung aus Galizien, die 
uns aus den parlamentarischen Reden bzw. der zeitgenössischen 
Presse bekannt geworden ist, lassen auch mehrere Faktoren ahnen. 
János Gyurgyák hat es auf zwei Hauptgründe zurückgeführt. 
Einerseits darauf, dass die Zeitgenossen den Umzug der östlichen 
Juden von der Einwanderung nicht unterscheiden konnten. 
Andererseits schien die Urbanisation des heimischen Judentums und 
die interne Migration so, als wäre es eine externe Einsiedlung ins 
Land.9 János Gyurgyák macht uns aber aufgrund seiner Recherchen 
darauf aufmerksam, dass „die demographischen Daten eindeutig 
                                                            
8 179. országos ülés 1903. január 9-én, pénteken, in Az 1901-1906. évi 
országgyűlés képviselőházának naplója, X. kötet [179. Landessitzung vom 
9. Januar 1903, Freitag, Tagebuch des Abgeordnetenhauses des Parlamentes 
von 1901-1906, Band X], 1902, Atheneum, Budapest, 205. 
9 GYURGYÁK, JÁNOS: A zsidókérdés Magyarországon: Politikai 
eszmetörténet [Judenfrage in Ungarn: Politische Ideengeschichte], 2001, 
Osiris, Budapest, 76-77. 
Anfangszeiten der Selbständigen Gesetzlichen Regelung Bezüglich der 
Wohnlage der Ausländer in Ungarn 
316 
beweisen, dass sich die Einwanderung der östlichen Juden nach 
Ungarn in der Zeit vom Dualismus wesentlich vermindert hat.“10 
In der Zeit vom Dualismus unterscheiden sich drei Gruppen des 
in die Städte strömenden ungarischen Judentums. Die erste Gruppe 
kam aus den heimischen Großgutzentren, sie waren die Mieter und 
Aufkäufer landwirtschaftlicher Produkte der damaligen Kammer- 
und Gutswirtschaften. In die zweite Gruppe können die Personen 
eingestuft werden, die in erster Linie durch ihre Geschäfts-
beziehungen hergesiedelt sind, sie stammen aus den tschechisch-
mährischen Provinzen bzw. aus Österreich und Ostpreußen. Die 
dritte Gruppe bestand aus den Bürgern des zerfallenen Polens und 
der Ukraine bzw. kam aus der Richtung der galizischen Provinz des 
Habsburgreiches.11 Diese letzte Gruppe lässt sich durch ihre 
Halbbauerlebensform bezüglich ihrer Kultur und Lebensführung von 
den anderen zwei Gruppen unterscheiden. Mit dieser letzten Gruppe 
waren die von Stereotypen oft nicht freien Behauptungen 
verbunden.12 
Der Notar László Nyegre, der Vortragende des parlament-
arischen Vorschlags hat in seiner parlamentarischen Rede bezüglich 
der konkreten Maßnahmen Folgendes hervorgehoben: „Sehr 
geschätztes Hohes Haus, wenn wir diesen abnormalen Zustand 
betrachten, so können wir zweifellos feststellen, dass wir diese Lage 
lösen müssen; wir müssen es durch solche Gesetzgebungsmaß-
nahmen lösen, die einerseits in dem eigenen Interesse des Staates, 
das Prinzip Salusreipublicae13 vollständig sichern, andererseits den 
                                                            
10 Ibid. 78.  
11 CSORBA, LÁSZLÓ: A tizenkilencedik század története [Die Geschichte des 
neunzehnten Jahrhunderts], 2000, Pannonica Kiadó, Budapest, 233. 
12 „Ich würde unter den galizischen Juden mehr anständige Leute finden, als 
unter den Raubmördern und Anarchisten, die aus Rumänien zu uns 
kommen, weil wir die Raubmörder nicht ausgeben. Jene Individuen halte 
ich für viel gefährlicher als die galizischen Juden, obwohl diese auch 
gefährlich genug sind.“ 181. Landessitzung vom 12. Januar 1903, Montag. 
KN 252. 
13 Bedeutung von Salusreipublicae (Supremalexesto): das Heil der Republik 
ist das höchste Gesetz. 
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Freiverkehr durch keine überflüssigen Störungen hindern, keine 
erworbenen Rechte betreffen und keinen Grund auf die Retorsion 
seitens ausländischer Staaten geben.“14 
Obwohl die Abgeordneten darüber Bescheid wussten, wie 
streng die Vereinigten Staaten, sogar die australischen Kolonien und 
die einzelnen Nachbarstaaten die Einwanderungsfrage behandeln, 
haben sie lieber als liberal zu bezeichnende Maßnahmen über die 
Regelung der Einwanderung erbracht. 
1.2. Die Frage der Auswanderung 
„Ich glaube, dass die andere Absicht dieses Gesetzvorschlages ist, 
die Zwangsauswanderung zu beschränken“15 – wie der Abgeordnete, 
Ödön B. Solymossy bei der parlamentarischen Diskussion die 
Anwesenden darauf aufmerksam gemacht hat. Er hat bemerkt, dass 
die Auswanderer16 in ein paar Jahren zu Einwanderer werden. Die 
Fassung des Gesetzes IV/1903 stimmt mit dieser Denkweise 
vollständig überein, nach der sich die Bezeichnung Auswanderer 
nicht auf eine Person bezieht, die das Land verlässt, um sich 
anderswo zu niederlassen, sondern auf eine Person, „die zwecks 
dauerhaften Lebenserwerbs auf unbestimmte Zeit ins Ausland 
fährt.“(§ 1) 
Diese Auffassung wird von den Fachliteraturforschungen im 
Zusammenhang mit der Auswanderung und dann mit der 
Rückwanderung sowie von den statistischen Daten von 1905-1915 
                                                            
14 179. országos ülés 1903. január 9-én, pénteken, in Az 1901-1906. évi 
országgyűlés képviselőházának naplója, X. kötet [179. Landessitzung vom 
9. Januar 1903, Freitag, Tagebuch des Abgeordnetenhauses des Parlamentes 
von 1901-1906, Band X], 1902, Atheneum, Budapest, 202. 
15 179. országos ülés 1903. január 9-én, pénteken, in Az 1901-1906. évi 
országgyűlés képviselőházának naplója, X. kötet [179. Landessitzung vom 
9. Januar 1903, Freitag, Tagebuch des Abgeordnetenhauses des Parlamentes 
von 1901-1906, Band X], 1902, Atheneum, Budapest, 213. 
16 1903. évi V. törvénycikk a külföldieknek a magyar korona országai 
területén való lakhatásról [Gesetzartikel IV/1903], eigene Übersetzung 
http://www.1000ev.hu/index.php?a=3&param=68762 [cit. 2013-08-07]. 
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auch bestätigt. Während der Zeit des Dualismus haben cca. 2,3 - 2,4 
Millionen Auswanderer Amerika und Rumänien als Reiseziel 
gewählt. Die Forscher betrachten die Gerissenheit und 
Überschuldung der Bauerhöfe als Hauptgrund der Auswanderung. 
Die am meisten betroffenen Gebiete waren die nordöstlichen 
Komitate und ihre Nachbarregionen. Die Mehrheit der auswandern-
den Bauer hat die Auswanderung als vorübergehend betrachtet, ihr 
Ziel war nämlich, sich mit dem in Amerika verdienten Geld später 
um ihre Lebenshaltung zu Hause zu finanzieren. Ein Viertel der 
Auswanderer ist wirklich zurückgekehrt.17 
In der Zwischenzeit hat der Kongreß der Vereinigten Staaten 
das Einwanderungsgesetz strenger gemacht, 1891 wurden die 
Personen, die an gefährlichen Krankheiten litten, die Polygamen, die 
Personen mit unmoralischem Verhalten und die Vorbestraften 
ausgeschlossen. Diese Maßnahme hat noch nicht die Reduzierung 
der Anzahl der Einwanderer sondern die Sicherung einer gesunden, 
anstellbaren Arbeitskraft erzielt. Das Einwanderungsgesetz von 1893 
hat die sofortige Anmeldung der eingeschifften ausländischen 
Passagiere beim logistischen Einwanderungsoffizier vorgeschrieben, 
um sie nach ihrem Status fragen und von den Ärzten des 
Marinehospitaldienstes untersuchen lassen zu können. 1903 wurde 
die Liste der Einwanderer18 mit den Epileptikern, Berufsbettlern, 
Kupplern, Anarchisten und den Anwendern politischer Gewalt 
reduziert. 
Herr Loránt Hegedűs hat bei der Prüfung der ungarischen 
Auswanderungspolitik des Dualismus schon 1899 festgestellt: „Die 
Lage schaut bei uns wirklich so aus, dass wir überhaupt kein 
Einwanderungsgesetz haben, wobei auch schon Dänemark ein 
                                                            
17 CSORBA, LÁSZLÓ: op. cit. 426. sowie die Daten von 1905-15: Er wanderte 
aus Amerika ins Territorium des ungarischen Reiches vor der Trianonzeit: 
247 193 Personen. Sehen Magyar Statisztikai Szemle, 1938, 38. 
18 PUSKÁS, JULIANNA: Az Egyesült Államok bevándorlási politikája (1890-
1990) [Die Einwanderungspolitik der Vereinigten Staaten (1890-1990)], in 
Régió – Kisebbség, Politika, Társadalom, Vol. 4. Nr. 4. (1993), http://epa. 
oszk.hu/00000/00036/00015/pdf/10.pdf [cit. 2013-09-15]. 
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Gesetz darüber erbracht hat (15. Mai 1875), unabhängig davon, wie 
unbedeutend diese Frage dort ist. Wir haben ebenso kein Gesetz, das 
die Auswanderung selbst betreffen würde und von der Regelung der 
Auswanderung, usw. handeln würde, insgesamt gibt es nur den 
Gesetzartikel L/1879 über die Regelung der ungarischen Staatsbür-
gerschaft und den Gesetzartikel XXXVIII/1881 über die Regelung 
der Auswanderungsagenten direkt als eine Art von Regelung, das ist 
aber wenig.“19 Der Gesetzartikel XXXVIII/1881 handelt davon, wer 
Auswanderungsagent sein kann, aber bei den Auswanderern werden 
nur diejenigen erwähnt, denen die Auswanderung verboten wird. Der 
Gesetzartikel XXXVIII/1181 über die Auswanderungsagenten regelt 
streng die Agententätigkeit.20 Das war einerseits nötig, weil die 
deutschen Schiffgesellschaften einen enorm hohen Geschäftsgewinn 
erworben haben, andererseits haben ihre Agenten die Bewohner mit 
falschen Versprechungen gelockt. 
Wir müssen mit der Feststellung von László Csorba 
einverstanden sein: „Die Wahl des Wohnortes und der Lebens-
unterhaltung haben die Entscheidungsträger in einer Periode, die in 
Bezug auf die bürgerlichen Freiheitsrechte als liberal bezeichnet 
werden kann, nur die Regelung und nicht die administrative Ver-
hinderung des Prozesses als eigene Aufgabe betrachtet.“21 Eine 
ähnliche Denkweise hat auch der 1903 angenommene Auswander-
ungsgesetzartikel Nr. IV bestimmt. Nach den Bestimmungen der Be-
gründung des Auswanderungsgesetzes22 sollen die gesetzlichen 
                                                            
19 HEGEDŰS, LORÁNT: A magyarok kivándorlása Amerikába [Ungarische 
Auswanderung nach Amerika], 1899, Budapest, 52-53. 
20 1881. XXXVIII. tc. a kivándorlási ügynökségekről [Gesetzartikel 
XXXVIII/1881 über die Auswanderungsagenten], eigene Übersetzung 
http://www.1000ev.hu/index.php?a=3&param=5995 [cit. 2013-11-20]. 
Siehe dazu PÁLVÖLGYI, BALÁZS: A magyar kivándorlási politika kezdetei 
(1881-1903) [Anfangszeiten der ungarischen Auswanderungspolitik (1881-
1903)], in Jogtörténeti Szemle, Vol.12. No. 4. (2010) 27-34. 
21 CSORBA: op. cit. 427.  
22 Az 1902. évi május hó 19-ére hirdetett Országgyülés Képviselőházának 
irományai, Hiteles kiadás [Begründung zum Gesetzvorschlag über die 
Auswanderung, Schriften des Abgeordnetenhauses des für 19. Mai 1902 
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Maßnahmen von dem Grundprinzip ausgehen, dass die 
Auswanderung nicht ganz aufgehoben werden kann, weil es gegen 
das Freizügigkeits- und Selbstbestimmungsrecht stoßen würde. 
Wir erhalten in der Begründung eine Erklärung auch darauf, 
dass im Zusammenhang mit der Anzahl der Auswanderer keine 
verwendbaren Daten zur Verfügung gestanden haben, weil die 
Einwanderungsdaten der Vereinigten Staaten die Einwanderer im 
Zeitraum von 1899-1901 nicht nach ihrer Heimat sondern nach ihrer 
Nationalität erfasst haben.23 
2. REGELUNG ÜBER DIE WOHNLAGE DER FREMDEN IN UNGARN 
VOR DER ERBRINGUNG DES GESETZES V/1903 
2.1. § 15 vom Gesetzartikel XXII/1886 
Zunächst lohnt es sich, den Vorschlag von Dániel Irányi zu 
erwähnen, der als Mitglied der Unabhängigkeitspartei 1885 im 
Abgeordnetenhaus einen Gesetzvorschlag eingereicht hat. Bei der 
parlamentarischen Diskussion des Gesetzes V/1903 hat der 
Vortragende des Themas auch darauf hingewiesen und hervor-
gehoben, dass die Grundidee des Vorschlages richtig war, da sie die 
Zuständigkeit für die Verwaltung der Zuzugs- und Niederlassungs-
bewilligung nicht mehr den Gemeinden sondern dem Vizegespan 
zugeordnet hat. Der Gesetzvorschlag wurde aus der Tagesordnung 
gelöscht, weil der damalige Innenminister, Kálmán Tisza die 
Angelegenheit in Bezug auf die Revision des Gemeindegesetzes 
lösen wollte.24 Der § 15 vom Gesetzartikel XXII/1886 hat die 
                                                                                                                              
angekündigten Parlamentes, beglaubigte Ausgabe, Band XXIII.], 1902, 
Pesti Könyvnyomda-Részvény-Társaság, Budapest, 401-414. 
23 Die überseeische Auswanderung hat sich 1901 aufgrund der Quelle Nr. 
22 auf 70 911 erhöht. 
24 179. országos ülés 1903. január 9-én, pénteken, in Az 1901-1906. évi 
országgyűlés képviselőházának naplója, X. kötet [179. Landessitzung vom 
9. Januar 1903, Freitag, Tagebuch des Abgeordnetenhauses des Parlamentes 
von 1901-1906, Band X], 1902, Atheneum, Budapest, 206.  
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Einwanderungsfrage geregelt, aber die Mängel der Vollstreckung 
haben auch in diesem Fall zu einer ungeregelten Lage der Ausländer 
auf dem Territorium vom Königreich Ungarn geführt. 
Der Gesetzartikel von 1886 hat den Angehörigkeitserwerb der 
Ausländer kurz und bündig bestimmt. „Dank der korrekten Regelung 
oder vielleicht, weil wenige Ungarn als neue Heimat gewählt haben, 
hat die Innenregierung nach den Fakten mit der Ausdeutung vom § 
15 wenig Problem gehabt.“25 
Der § 15 lautet wie folgt: „Der Ausländer kann in der Gemeinde 
wohnen, sich niederlassen und in den Gemeinden-verband 
aufgenommen werden.“ 
Der Begriff des ständigen Wohnens wurde eingeführt und die 
Bedingungen der Erteilung der Zuzugsgenehmigung wurden auch 
festgelegt. „Wer in einer Gemeinde ständig ansässig werden will, 
soll er es anmelden und wenn er bestätigt, dass er sich und seine 
Familie ohne Belastung der Gemeinde dauerhaft unterhalten kann, 
kann dessen Zuzugsgenehmigung nur im Falle des wohlbegründeten 
Verdachtes seiner Immoralität abgelehnt werden – durch Sicherung 
der Möglichkeit auf die Selbstbestätigung. 
Wenn der Ausländer nach 3 Monate übersteigendem Aufenthalt 
in einer Gemeinde trotz der Aufforderung des Magistrates seine 
Wohnabsicht innerhalb von, in der Aufforderung angegebenen 8 
Tagen nicht anmeldet, begeht er eine Kontravention, die von dem 
Verwaltungsamt mit einer Geldstrafe von max. 300 HUF 
(Ungarischen Forint) zu bestrafen ist; und wenn er trotz der 
Aufforderung seine Wohnabsicht nicht anmeldet oder wenn er keine 
Zuzugsgenehmigung erhält und den Ort trotzdem nicht verlassen 
will, kann er durch die Polizei abgeschoben werden. 
Eine Wohnabsicht ist zu ahnen, wenn sich der Ausländer 3 
Monate lang in der Gemeinde aufhält.“ 
Der nächste Schritt in Bezug auf die Niederlassung des 
Ausländers ist der Erwerb der Niederlassungserlaubnis: „Eine 
                                                            
25 POMOGYI, LÁSZLÓ: Szegényügy és községi illetőség a polgári 
Magyarországon [Armenwesen und Gemeindeangehörigkeit in dem 
bürgerlichen Ungarn], 2001, Osiris, Budapest, 63. 
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Niederlassungserlaubnis kann jemand bei Erfüllung der 
Bedingungen in Bezug auf die Staatsbürger beantragen, wenn er 
seine zweijährige ständige Wohnung und sein moralisches 
Wohlverhalten bestätigt hat.“ 
Auch Ausländer sollen die Gemeindeangehörigkeit endgültig 
erwerben, da alle Staatsbürger in die Zuständigkeit einer Gemeinde 
fallen sollen. „Die Aufnahme in den Gemeindeverband kann jemand 
nur beim Bestehen einer Indigenatszustimmung erwerben und die 
Gemeinde kann ihm die Aufnahme anbieten bzw. das Indigenat 
erteilen, wenn er im Land schon 5 Jahre lang gewohnt hat.“26 
2.2. Die Rolle der Gemeindeangehörigkeit 
Die Gemeindeangehörigkeit wurde von dem offenen kaiserlichen 
Befehl vom 24. April 1859 eingeführt. Er ist auf den ungarischen 
Territorien im Sinne der Verordnung des Innenministeriums, Nr. 
7863/1869. nicht verbindlich in Kraft getreten.27 
In der österreichischen Regelung wurde der Begriff der 
„Gemeindeangehörigkeit“ neben der Staatsbürgerschaft als 
wichtigste rechtliche Bestimmung des Individuums betrachtet. Die 
Gemeindeangehörigkeit hat für ihre Bürger in der jeweiligen 
Gemeinde den störungsfreien Aufenthalt gesichert, das hat sich aber 
auf die sogenannten „Fremden“ nicht bezogen; das konnte 
hauptsächlich bei Armut oder kleinerer Kriminalität dahinführen, 
dass Letztere aus der Gemeinde abgeschoben wurden. Die 
Bezeichnung „Einheimische“ konnte nur ab 1901 nach vieljährigem 
Aufenthalt in einem Ort als Bedingung erworben werden, so haben 
sich bei den großen Einwanderungen des 19. Jahrhunderts die 
ursprünglich zum Großteil übereinstimmenden Geburts-, 
Aufenthalts- und heimischen Gemeinden immer mehr voneinander 
                                                            
26 1886. évi XXII. törvénycikk a községekről [Gesetzartikel XXII/1886 über 
die Gemeinden], eigene Übersetzung http://www.1000ev.hu/index.php 
?a=3&param=6215 [cit. 2013-11-11]. 
27 POMOGYI: op. cit. 15. 
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entfernt. Die Gemeindeangehörigkeit überging von dem Mann auf 
die Frau und die Kinder.28 
„Die Rechtsform der Zugehörigkeit zu der Gemeinde ist die 
Gemeindeangehörigkeit. Nur die persönliche Verbindung zwischen 
dem Individuum und der Gemeinde, die von dem Wohn- und 
Aufenthaltsort unabhängig ist. Alle Staatsbürger müssen zu einem 
Gemeindeverband gehören. Jeder kann nur zu einem 
Gemeindeverband gehören. Die Gemeindeangehörigkeit kann durch 
Geburt, Adoption, Ehe oder durch oder ohne Ansiedlung auch durch 
die entschlossene Aufnahme in den Gemeindeverband erworben 
werden. Das Gemeindegesetz enthält ausführliche Bestimmungen 
(§§ 5-18) bezüglich der Gemeindeangehörigkeit und deren 
Erwerb.“29 
Zur Prüfung des Heimatrechtsverhältnisses als Ganze scheint 
die Vorstellung der Maßnahmen der Epoche, die außer des als Essay 
bezeichneten Zeitintervalls fallen, auch nötig zu sein. Wir sollen 
über die Gemeindeangehörigkeit wissen, dass sie ganz bis 194830 
gültig war. Nach László Pomogyi war bis 1921 der Besitz der 
ungarischen Staatsbürgerschaft die Bedingung des Erwerbs der 
Gemeindeangehörigkeit, wobei es nach 1921 eben umgekehrt war.31 
Das Vertrag von Trianon hat die Gemeindeangehörigkeit zu einem 
der Grundinstitute des ungarischen öffentlichen Rechtes gemacht, 
dadurch, dass es als ausschließliche Vorbedingungen der 
Anerkennung der Staatsbürgerschaft die Bestätigung der 
                                                            
28 In der Zeit der Jahrhundertwende war nur 38,0 % der Stadtbevölkerung in 
Wien heimatzuständig nach Wien, also 62% galt als „fremd“. JOHN, 
MICHAEL – LICHTBLAU, ALBERT: Bécs, a befogadó város [Schmelztiegel 
Wien] in História, Vol. 16. Nr. 5-6. (1994), http://www.tankonyvtar. 
hu/hu/tartalom/historia/94-056/ch18.html [cit. 2013-09.10]. 
29 MAGYARY, ZOLTÁN: Magyar közigazgatás [Ungarische Verwaltung], 
1942, Királyi Magyar Egyetemi Nyomda, Budapest, 305. 
30 1948. évi LXI. törvénycikk a községi illetőség megszüntetéséről 
[Gesetzartikel LXI/1948 über die Aufhebung der Gemeindeangehörigkeit], 
eigene Übersetzung http://www.1000ev.hu/index.php?a=3&param=9732 
[cit. 2013-10-12]. 
31 POMOGYI: op.cit. 62. 
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Gemeindeangehörigkeit erwünscht hat. Dieser Fehler des 
Friedensvertrags von Trianon hat zu schwierigen Störungen 
geführt.32 Der § 24 des Gesetzes XVII/1922 hat ausgesagt, dass in 
der Frage, ob die Gemeindeangehörigkeit einer Person am Tag des 
Inkrafttretens des Friedensvertrages von Trianon auf dem infolge des 
Friedensvertrages von Trianon abgerissenen Bereich Ungarns war, 
und seit wann und ob sie auf dieser Grundlage im Sinne der Artikel 
61 und 62 des Friedensvertrags von Trianon ihre ungarische 
Staatsbürgerschaft verloren hat, beschließt der Innenminister in 
erster und gleichzeitig letzter Instanz. 
Die Gemeindeangehörigkeit der Person, die sich über die 
Aufrechterhaltung bzw. den Rückerwerb ihrer bisherigen 
ungarischen Staatsbürgerschaft aufgrund des Artikels 63 des 
Friedensvertrages oder über den Erwerb der ungarischen 
Staatsbürgerschaft aufgrund des Artikels 64 des Friedensvertrages 
erklärt (optiert) hat und von der Feststellung der ungarischen 
Staatsbürgerschaft an aufgrund der Optierungserklärung bis zum Tag 
des Inkrafttretens des vorliegenden Gesetzes aufgrund des 
Gesetzartikels XXII/1886 in einer inländischen Gemeinde noch 
keine Angehörigkeit erworben hat – beschließt der Innenminister in 
erster und gleichzeitig letzter Instanz.33 
Die Verordnung des Innenministeriums Nr. 167.335/1922 über 
die Vollstreckung der Staatsbürgerschafts- und Angehörigkeits-
bestimmungen regelt, dass die Feststellung der im Zeitpunkt des 
Inkrafttretens des Friedensvertrages, d. h. am 26. Juli 1921 
bestehenden Gemeindeangehörigkeit auch in dem Fall in die 
Zuständigkeit der inländischen Behörde fallen solle, wenn die 
betroffene Gemeinde aufgrund des Friedensvertrages auf einem, von 
                                                            
32 POMOGYI: op.cit. 64. 
33 1922. évi XVII. törvénycikk az 1922/23. költségvetési év első hat 
hónapjában viselendő közterhekről és fedezendő állami kiadásokról 
[Gesetzartikel: XVII/1922 über die in den ersten sechs Monaten zu 
zahlenden öffentlichen Lasten und zu deckenden Staatsausgaben des 
Verwaltungsjahres 1922/23], eigene Übersetzung http://www.1000ev.hu/ 
index.php?a=3&param=7528 [cit. 2013-10-12]. 
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Ungarn abgerissenen Gebiet liegt und dadurch schon unter 
Fremdhoheit kam. 
Zoltán Magyary betont, dass „die praktische Bedeutung der 
Angehörigkeit fast vollständig aufgehoben wurde, weil unsere neuen 
Rechtsnormen im Rahmen eines Verwaltungsverfahrens nicht die 
zuständige Gemeinde sondern den Wohnort als Grundlage nehmen 
(Verordnungsnummer: 6000/1931. M. E). Das ist einerseits begründ-
et, weil sich die Leute auf ihrem Wohnort und nicht in der eventuell 
davon abweichenden zuständigen Gemeinde aufhalten, andererseits 
weil die Feststellung des Wohnortes eine Tatfrage und die 
Angehörigkeit eine Rechtsfrage ist und so ist die Entscheidung des 
Wohnortes viel einfacher und schneller.“34 
2.3. Die Wohnverhältnisse der Ausländer regelnde Verordnungen 
Die Wohnverhältnisse der Ausländer haben neben dem schon 
erwähnten Gesetzartikel XII/1886 § 15 die 1888 erlassene 
Verordnung des Innenministeriums, Nr.: 54 091, die aufgrund deren 
erstellten Komitatsstatuten, die 1885 erlassene „Abschieberegelung“ 
vom Innenministerium, Nr.: 9389 geregelt.35 
Die 1888 unter der Nr. 54 091 erlassene Verordnung des 
Innenministeriums hat sich bezüglich des Gesetzartikels XXII/1886, 
Abschnitt 15 über den Aufenthalt der Ausländer mit der Erfassung 
der sich in Gemeinden (Klein- und Großgemeinde, Stadt mit 
geordnetem Rat) aufhaltenden Ausländer beschäftigt. Es hat 
vorgeschrieben, dass die Statuten der Gemeinden in Bezug auf die 
Ausländer auch ergänzt werden müssen.  
Im Zusammenhang mit der Wohnfrage der Ausländer soll die 
Schieberegelung des Innenministeriums aus dem Jahre 1885 erwähnt 
werden. Die Abschiebung hat die Zuweisung in die zuständige 
Gemeinde bedeutet – in bestimmten Fällen durch Zwang. Diese 
Maßnahme konnte außer der Strolche, Arbeitsscheuen, Bettler, die 
                                                            
34 MAGYARY: op. cit. 305.  
35 WETZEL, TAMÁS: A bevándorlás kérdése Magyarországon [Einwander-
ungsfrage in Ungarn], http://www.publikon.hu/userfiles/File/wetzel_ 
vfinal.pdf [cit. 2013-10-12]. 
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unerlaubt gebettelt haben, Prostituierten, die gegen die Vorschriften 
gestoßen haben, ehemaliger Häftlinge auch bei Ausländern 
angewendet werden. Die Abschiebung war eine vorbeugende 
Polizeiverordnung, der die Auffassung zu Grunde gelegen hat, dass 
das primäre Subjekt der Sorge und Haftung für das Individuum die 
Gemeinde ist.36 
„Die Rechtsordnung schreibt vor, dass keiner, gegen den kein 
Abschiebebescheid aufgrund einer regelmäßigen Verhandlung durch 
die zuständige Behörde erstellt wurde, abgeschoben werden kann. 
Sobald der Abschiebebescheid erbracht wurde, ist die Feststellung 
der Gemeindeangehörigkeit die Hauptaufgabe der Abschiebebehörde 
…“37 Die Zuweisung in eine Gemeinde hatte zwei Arten: die erste 
war die Zuweisung durch einen Zwangsreisepaß, die andere war die 
Anwendung der Abschiebung bei den in Bezug auf den öffentlichen 
Frieden und die Staatssicherheit gefährlichen Individuen, Streunern 
und Fremden. 
Sogar den Ausländern stand die Freiheit des Aufenthaltes, der 
Niederlassung, der Vereingründung, Versammlung und Wohnortän-
derung zu, aber ihre Freiheit war im Vergleich zu der Freiheit der 
Einheimischen auf einigen Bereichen nicht gleich gesichert. Die 
Ausländer konnten nämlich vom Landesterritorium auf dem 
Gerichts- und Verwaltungsweg auch ausgewiesen werden.38 
                                                            
36 SZIKINGER, ISTVÁN: Rendvédelmi jog a dualizmus korszakában [Das 
Ordnungsschutzrecht in der Dualismuszeit, geschichtliches Ruhe-
schutzheft], in Acta Historiae Preasidii Ordinis, Vol. 22. Nr. 26. (2012), 
http://epa.oszk.hu/02100/02176/00012/pdf/EPA02176_rendevedelem_tor 
teneti_fuzetek_2012_26_141-157.pdf [cit. 2013-11-03]. 
37 1885-ös 9389. számú Belügyminiszteri körrendelet, in Magyarországi 
Rendeletek Tára, 1885., Magyar Királyi Belügyministerium, Budapest, 165. 
[Zirkularverordnung des Innenministers aus dem Jahre 1885, Nr.: 9389 
Ungarisches Verordnungsblatt], 1885, Budapest, 165. 
38 KMETY, KÁROLY: A magyar közigazgatási jog kézikönyve [Ungarisches 
öffentliches Recht], 1926, Grill Károly Könyvkiadó Vállalata, Budapest, 
94-95. 
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3. GESETZ V/1903 – MIT BESONDERER RÜCKSICHT AUF DIE 
PRÜFUNG DER POLIZEIBEHÖRDE 
Die Abgeordneten haben den § 15 des schon mehrmals erwähnten 
Gesetzartikels XXII/1886 aus zwei Gründen nicht für geeignet 
gehalten und es hat auch die Begründung des Gesetzes enthalten: 
„1. die für den Erwerb der Zuzugsgenehmigung bestimmten 3 
Monate sind zu lang, um überprüfen zu können, ob der 
Ausländer der Gemeinde oder dem Staat Schaden verursacht hat 
und seine Ausweisung ist auch schwieriger, da er sich während 
dieser Zeit schon sozusagen eingenistet hat; 
2. die Kontrolle der Ausländer, diese ausgezeichnete 
Staatsaufgabe weist das Gesetz an die Gemeinden, wobei – 
hauptsächlich die Stadtobrigkeiten der Klein- und 
Großgemeinden für die Staatsinteressen – oft kein Gefühl, keine 
genügende Fähigkeit zu der Erfüllung dieser Aufgabe haben, da 
– wie es die Erfahrungen zeigen –, die Erfassung der Ausländer 
in vielen Gemeinden, besonders an der nordöstlichen Grenze des 
Landes, wo Fremde massenhaft wohnen und die Kontrolle erhöht 
wichtiger ist, mangelhaft ist und so überhaupt nicht dem Ziel 
dient.“39 
Die Begründung hat festgestellt, dass diese Lage durch die 
Revidierung der einschlägigen Maßnahmen des Gemeindegesetzes 
gelöst werden könnte. Das wurde aber mit Bezug auf die 
Schwierigkeiten (das Problem könnte nur mit der Lösung des ganzen 
Gemeindewesens behandelt werden) und die lange Zeitdauer 
abgelehnt. So bewies sich die Erschöpfung eines Sondergesetzes als 
sinnvollster Weg, da nur dieses geeignet schien, die Wohnlage der 
                                                            
39 Az 1902. évi november hó 5-ére hirdetett Országgyülés Főrendiházának 
irományai [Begründung zum Gesetzvorschlag über die Wohnlage der 
Ausländer auf den Bereichen der Ungarischen Krone in Schriften vom 
Magnatenhaus des zum 5. November 1902 angekündigten Parlamentes, 
Beglaubigte Ausgabe, Band IV], 1903, Pesti Könyvnyomda-Részvény-
Társaság, Budapest, 288-292. 
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gefährlichen Ausländer auf dem Bereich des ungarischen Staates zu 
kontrollieren.  
Die wichtigste Forderung war bei Zielerreichung dieses 
Systems, dass die bestimmte lokale Behörde über die Ankunft des 
Ausländers unverzüglich Bescheid kriegen musste, um dessen 
Kontrolle vom Anfang an üben zu können und zwar ohne Betreffen 
der Prinzipien des freien Verkehrs und der Freizügigkeitsfreiheit, 
dadurch konnte die lokale oder beim Bedarf die zentrale Behörde 
auch die genaue Erfassung der Ausländer besitzen.40 
Die Abgeordneten haben sich die Kontrolle der Ausländer auf 
zweierlei Art vorgestellt. Nach der einen Vorstellung wären die 
Grenzübergänger schon beim Grenzübergang kontrolliert gewesen, 
nach der anderen Version hätte man es innen, auf dem 
Landesterritorium, auf dem Aufenthaltsort der Fremden durch-
geführt. Diese Denkweise hat an der Jahrhundertwende zu der 
Herausbildung der spezifischen Organisationsstruktur der Fremden-
polizei geführt. Obwohl bei der parlamentarischen Diskussion die 
Möglichkeit der Verfolgung des amerikanischen Musters mehrmals 
erwähnt wurde, nach dem die Ausländer schon an der Landesgrenze 
kontrolliert werden müssten, wurde die Organisation der Fremd-
polizei auf den als Problemfall geltenden rumänischen und nörd-
lichen und nordöstlichen Gebieten errichtet.41 Im Hintergrund der 
Entscheidung stand die Auffassung der liberalen politischen Elite, 
die das Prinzip der Unbeschränktheit bezüglich der Freizügigkeit 
vertreten hat. Diese Denkweise kann aus der Hinsicht der Folgezeit 
modern und reformerisch betrachtet werden. 
Nach der Übersicht der Vorgeschichte des Gesetzes V/1903 
prüfe ich die Bestimmungen des Gesetzes, die sich mit den als 
Fremdpolizei dienenden lokalen Behörden beschäftigen. Da, wie es 
bei der parlamentarischen Diskussion auch von Ferencz Buzáth 
festgestellt wurde: „die wichtigste Maßnahme des Gesetzvorschlages 
zweifellos der Artikel 14 ist, nach dem ab nächstes Jahr bezüglich 
                                                            
40 Ibid. 288-289. 
41 In dieser Periode gab es zwischen den österreichischen Erbbundesländern 
und dem Königreich Ungarn keine Kontrolle an der Grenze. 
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der Wohnlage in den Gemeinden und der Aufnahme in den 
Gemeindeverband nicht die Obertheit der Gemeinden sondern die 
den Oberstuhlrichter vertretende Behörde in den Klein- und 
Großgemeinden und in Städten mit geordnetem Rat und in den 
königlichen Freistädten die vorgehende Polizeibehörde beschließen 
wird.“42 
Die Abgeordneten haben sowohl in der allgemeinen Begründ-
ung als auch bei der parlamentarischen Diskussion mehrmals auf die 
Erfolglosigkeit der von den Gemeinden bisher geübten Kontrolle 
hingewiesen. Deshalb hat das Gesetz die Kontrolle der Ausländer auf 
die Polizeibehörde erster Instanz übertragen. Der § 14 zählt diese 
Polizeibehörden bezüglich der Gemeinden auf. Das Gesetz enthält 
auch, dass Einspruch gegen die Endbeschlüsse der Behörden statthaft 
ist, was aus den allgemeinen Prinzipien des Verwaltungsrechtes 
kommt. 
Aus dem Bericht der Verwaltungskommission43 erhalten wir 
eine Erklärung auf die unbedeutende „Discretionarius-Befugnis der 
Polizeibehörde“.44 Die Kommission betont, dass diese Frage auf 
polizeilichem Weg so gelöst werden kann, wenn ein umfangreiches 
Discretionariusrecht damit verbunden ist. Ohne entsprechende Mittel 
kann das gewünschte Ergebnis nicht erreicht werden. Die 
Berichtersteller machen uns auch darauf aufmerksam, dass die 
Vollstreckung des Gesetzes neue Lasten auf die Verwaltung legt. 
Gleichzeitig wurden aber die Aufstellung der Grenzpolizei und deren 
behördliche und Polizeigerichtsbarkeitsbefugnis positiv beurteilt. 
                                                            
42 Buzáth hat zwar darin die Verletzung der Gemeindenautonomie entdeckt 
und in Bezug darauf den Gesetzvorschlag abgelehnt. KN 206. 
43 1901. évi október 24-ére hirdetett Országgyűlés Képviselőházának 
Irományai, XX. kötet [Schriften des Abgeordnetenhauses des zum 24. 
Oktober 1901 angekündigten Parlamentes, Band XX], 1903, Athenaeum, 
Budapest, 40. 
44 Diskrezionale Befugnis: der Rechtsanwender hat die Möglichkeit, die 
Bedingungen seiner Entscheidung zu bestimmen, ohne irgendeiner Regel in 
dieser Hinsicht entsprechen zu sollen. 
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4. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Zusammengefasst kann festgestellt werden, dass zwei Bedingungen 
bezüglich der entsprechenden Lösung in Erfüllung gehen sollen, um 
die Wohnlage der Ausländer kontrollieren zu können. Die eine ist: 
die Erschaffung der selbständigen gesetzlichen Regelung, die zweite 
ist: die Errichtung solcher Organisationen, deren Zuständigkeit genau 
geregelt ist. 
„Unter den, im § 14 des Gesetzes stehenden Ämtern sind zu 
verstehen: 
1. in Ungarn: 
a) in den Klein- und Großgemeinden der Oberstuhlrichter; in den 
Gemeinden Ujpest und Rákospalota der Hauptmann des Bezirks 
Ujpest der hauptstädtischen Landespolizei vom Königreich 
Ungarn; 
b) in den Städten der Polizeihauptmann; 
c) in der Hauptstadt Budapest das Rat in Bezug auf die §§§ 3, 4, 
5 und § 7, der Hauptmann oder der Stellvertreter der 
hauptstädtischen Landespolizei vom Königreich Ungarn in 
Bezug auf den § 10; 
2. in Kroatien-Slawonien die politische Behörde erster Instand 
gemäß den dort gültigen Gesetzen. 
3. in den behördlichen Bereichen der Grenzpolizei der 
Grenzpolizeihauptmann; gegen den Endbeschluß dieser 
Behörden ist bei den Oberbehörden ständig Einspruch 
statthaft.“45 
                                                            
45 1903. évi V. törvénycikk a külföldieknek a magyar korona országai 
területén való lakhatásról [Gesetzartikel V/1903 über die Wohnsituation der 
Ausländer in den Gebieten der Ungarischen Krone], eigene Übersetzung 
http://www.1000ev.hu/index.php?a=3&param=6873 [cit. 2013-09-07]. 
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Máté TRENYISÁN 
Spezielle Regelungen der Arbeitgeberhaftung für 
Schäden – Ausnahmen von der 
Verschuldensunabhängigen Haftung 
1. EINFÜHRUNG 
In meinem früheren Schreiben sollte durch kritische Analyse der 
neuen Regelungen über die Befreiung des Arbeitgebers von der 
Schadenersatzpflicht und durch Verwendung der Erfahrungen der 
früheren Gerichtspraxis versucht werden, im Gebiet der manchmal 
schwerfälligen Methodik der Rechtsverfolgung Fortschritte zu 
erzielen1. Die Bedeutung der Forschungen in diesem Thema wird 
durch dessen Aktualität, durch die bedeutenden konzeptionellen 
Änderungen in Bezug auf das Thema sowie durch die Umsetzung der 
neuen Rechtsinstitute auf dem Gebiet der arbeitsrechtlichen Haftung 
für Schäden unterstrichen. Nicht zuletzt wird dies auch durch die 
Tatsache bestätigt, dass einen bedeutenden Teil der 
arbeitsrechtlichen Streitigkeiten die Schadenersatzprozesse 
                                                            
1 TRENYISÁN, MÁTÉ: A kármegosztás és a munkáltató kárfelelősség alóli 
mentesülésének szabályai az új Munka Törvénykönyvében – tekintettel a 
bírói gyakorlatra [Regeln der Schadensverteilung und der Befreiung des 
Arbeitgebers von der Schadenshaftung in dem neuen Arbeitsgesetzbuch – 
mit Rücksicht auf die Gerichtspraxis], in KÁLMÁN, JÁNOS (Hg.): Quot 
Capita, Tot Sententiae, A Batthyány Lajos Szakkollégium Tanulmánykötete 
[Studiensammlung des Fachkollegiums Lajos Batthyány], 2013, Batthyány 
Lajos Szakkollégium, Győr, 233-249. 
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ausmachen, d.h. auch die praktische Bedeutung des Themas ist 
erheblich. 
Dieses Schreiben, in dem die Ausnahmefälle von der objektiven 
Haftung des Arbeitgebers unter die Lupe genommen werden, ist als 
eine Fortführung meiner oben genannten früheren Arbeit anzusehen. 
Strukturell betrachtet besteht meine Analyse aus zwei Hauptein-
heiten. Im ersten Kapitel werden die Natur und die grundlegenden 
Bedingungen der objektiven Schadenshaftung des Arbeitgebers 
dargestellt. Im zweiten Teil werden die speziellen Ausnahmefälle 
von der objektiven Haftung erörtert. Im Rahmen dessen analysiert 
das Schreiben die Haftung des Arbeitgebers für Schäden, die in den 
Betrieb eingebrachten Sachen eingetreten sind, sowie die leichteren 
Haftungsregeln bezüglich Arbeitgeber mit begrenzten Finanzmitteln. 
2. DIE OBJEKTIVE HAFTUNG DES ARBEITGEBERS FÜR SCHÄDEN 
GEMÄß DEM NEUEN ARBEITSGESETZBUCH 
Das Haftungssystem im ungarischen Arbeitsrecht wurde im Gesetz 
Nr. I von 2012 (im Weiteren: ArbG) – ähnlich wie in dem alten 
Arbeitsgesetzbuch von 1992 – so ausgestaltet, dass die unterschied-
liche Position der Subjekte des Arbeitsverhältnisses und ihre 
unterschiedliche Lage in Bezug auf die Geltendmachung von 
Ansprüchen berücksichtigt werden können. Auf dieser 
Unterscheidung basierend kann die Haftung des Arbeitnehmers dann 
festgestellt werden, wenn er seine sich aus dem Arbeitsverhältnis 
ergebenden Pflichten schuldhaft verletzt, während der Arbeitgeber 
für die mit dem Arbeitsverhältnis verbundenen Schäden 
verschuldensunabhängig haftet. Die Haftung des Arbeitgebers für 
Schäden setzt also kein Verschulden voraus, die reine 
Schadenszufügung im Zusammenhang mit dem Arbeitsverhältnis 
begründet die Haftung. Diese aus Sicht des Arbeitgebers 
außerordentlich streng geltende Regelung stützt sich auf mehrere 
akzeptable Gründe.  
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Als erstens ist hervorzuheben, dass eine der wesentlichen 
Pflichten des Arbeitgebers die Schaffung der Bedingungen einer 
gesunden und sicheren Arbeitsverrichtung ist.2 In diesem 
Zusammenhang kann also die Argumentation akzeptabel sein, nach 
der diese strenge objektive Haftung darauf abzielt, dass der 
Gesetzgeber den Arbeitgeber – im Sinne der Erfüllung seiner 
Pflichten als Arbeitgeber zur Ausgestaltung einer entsprechenden 
Organisation und zur Anwendung einer derartigen Technologie 
veranlasst, die das Leben, die körperliche Unversehrtheit der 
Arbeitnehmer, sowie die Sicherheit ihrer sonstigen Vermögenswerte 
garantiert. 
Daneben kann auch der präventive Zweck angenommen 
werden, d.h. die Arbeitgeber haben größeren Wert auf die 
Vorbeugung von Unfällen und Erkrankungen zu legen.3 Es ist 
nämlich von erheblicher Bedeutung, dass sich die Arbeitgeber dafür 
einsetzen, die erforderlichen Maßnahmen zwecks Vorbeugung der 
eventuellen Schadensereignissen zu treffen. 
Im Folgenden werden die grundlegenden Voraussetzungen für 
die Haftung des Arbeitgebers für Schäden durch interpretierende 
Analyse der obigen Elemente erörtert. Als erstens werden das 
Bestehen des Arbeitsverhältnisses, sodann die Kausalität, schließlich 
die Elemente des Schadenseintrittes dargestellt. Das rechtswidrige 
Verhalten – als Haftungsvoraussetzung – ist im Falle des Arbeit-
gebers irrelevant, da der Arbeitgeber für jede mit dem Arbeits-
verhältnis verbundene und einen Schaden verursachende Tätigkeit 
haftet, indem seine Haftung verschuldensunabhängig ist. 
2.1. Das Arbeitsverhältnis 
Gemäß § 166 ArbG haftet der Arbeitgeber für Schäden, die im 
Zusammenhang mit einem Unfall oder Erkrankung 
(Gesundheitsschädigung) seiner Arbeitnehmer eingetreten sind, falls 
der Schadenseintritt mit dem Arbeitsverhältnis in Verbindung steht. 
                                                            
2 § 51 Abs. 4 ArbG. 
3 Stellungnahme Nr. 29 des arbeitsrechtlichen Kollegiums des Obersten 
Gerichtshofs. 
Spezielle Regelungen der Arbeitgeberhaftung für Schäden – Ausnahmen 
von der Verschuldensunabhängigen Haftung 
337 
Dementsprechend setzt die arbeitsrechtliche Haftung für Schäden 
grundsätzlich das Bestehen eines Arbeitsverhältnisses sowie einen 
Zusammenhang zwischen dem Schaden und dem Arbeitsverhältnis 
voraus. Das Bestehen des Arbeitsverhältnisses – als Voraussetzung – 
ist ein gemeinsames Tatbestandselement sowohl bei der Arbeitgeber-
, als auch bei der Arbeitnehmerhaftung. 
Hinsichtlich des Bestehens des Arbeitsverhältnisses ist diejenige 
Vorschrift des ArbG von Bedeutung, nach der der Tag des Beginns 
des Arbeitsverhältnisses in dem Arbeitsvertrag festzulegen ist. 
Mangels dessen gilt der auf den Abschluss des Arbeitsvertrages 
folgende Tag als Beginn des Arbeitsverhältnisses.4 Der Tag des 
Beginns des Arbeitsverhältnisses ist aus dem Grunde von Bedeutung, 
weil sofern das Schadensereignis vor diesem Tag oder nach 
Beendigung des Arbeitsverhältnisses eintritt, so kann die Haftung 
des Arbeitgebers grundsätzlich nicht festgestellt werden. Allerdings 
ist es zu betonen, dass der Zeitpunkt der Schadenszufügung und der 
des Schadenseintrittes nicht unbedingt zusammenfallen und daher 
auch solche Situationen entstehen können, wo der Schaden während 
des Bestehens des Arbeitsverhältnisses verursacht wird, während das 
Schadensereignis erst später, eventuell nach der Beendigung des 
Arbeitsverhältnisses eintritt. In solchen Fällen stellt die zwischen-
zeitliche Beendigung des Arbeitsverhältnisses der Feststellung der 
Haftung des Arbeitgebers kein Hindernis dar.5 Dementsprechend ist 
diejenige Frage relevant, wann der Schaden verursacht wurde. 
                                                            
4 § 48 ArbG. 
5 Einen solchen Fall stellt z.B. dar, wenn die Symptome der Erkrankung erst 
nach der Beendigung des Arbeitsverhältnisses auftreten. Da die Schäden aus 
einem Schadensereignis bei dem Arbeitnehmer in unterschiedlichen 
Zeitpunkten eintreten können, hat die Gerichtspraxis das Institut der sog. 
„stufenweisen Verjährung“ entwickelt. Dementsprechend verjähren die aus 
dem gleichen Schadensereignis stammenden unterschiedlichen Schäden 
(Einkommensverlust) selbstständig, d.h. die eventuelle Versäumung der 
Geltendmachung eines früher fälligen Anspruchs hat keinen Einfluss auf die 
Durchsetzbarkeit des anderen Anspruchs. 
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Merkwürdig in der Rechtsliteratur ist die Frage, wie derjenige 
Fall zu qualifizieren ist, wenn z.B. der Arbeitnehmer einen 
wirksamen Arbeitsvertrag abgeschlossen hat, in dem der 
Arbeitseintritt vereinbart wurde, jedoch kam es nicht zum Arbeits-
eintritt und das Schadensereignis sodann am Tag des Arbeitseintrittes 
während der Vorarbeiten oder der vorbereitenden Tätigkeiten eintritt. 
In diesem Fall ist es offensichtlich, dass das Schadensereignis im 
Zusammenhang mit der Arbeitsverhältnis eintritt, da mangels 
Arbeitsverhältnisses keine vorbereitenden Tätigkeiten verrichtet 
worden wären. Dennoch kam es nicht zum Arbeitseintritt und somit 
besteht theoretisch auch kein Arbeitsverhältnis. Sollte der Tag des 
Abschlusses des Arbeitsvertrags und der des Arbeitseintrittes nicht 
zusammenfallen, so kann die Haftung des Arbeitgebers für Schäden 
im Zeitraum zwischen dem Vertragsabschluss und dem Arbeits-
eintritt dann festgestellt werden, wenn der Schaden bei dem Arbeit-
nehmer während seiner Tätigkeit im Interesse der Förderung des 
Arbeitseintrittes eingetreten ist.6 Ansonsten haftet der Arbeitgeber 
für die vor dem Arbeitseintritt eingetretenen Schäden gemäß den 
entsprechenden Vorschriften des bürgerlichen Rechtes. 
Darüber hinaus ist es aus Sicht der Beurteilung von keiner 
Bedeutung, ob es um eine Haupt- oder Nebenerwerbstätigkeit, bzw. 
um eine Voll- oder Teilzeitarbeit geht. Gleichermaßen kann 
festgestellt werden, dass der zivilrechtliche Scheinvertrag auch zum 
wirksamen Entstehen eines Arbeitsverhältnisses führen kann. 
Ebenfalls ist die Frage von grundlegender Bedeutung, bei wem 
die Beweislast im Falle der Haftung für Schäden liegt, da der 
Zusammenhang mit dem Arbeitsverhältnis eine Frage der Beweis-
führung ist. Nach den allgemeinen Regeln wird die Beweislast unter 
gemeinsamer Berücksichtigung des ung. BGB und des ArbG so 
gestaltet, dass der Arbeitnehmer zu beweisen hat, dass der Schaden 
bei ihm im Zusammenhang mit seinem Arbeitsverhältnis eingetreten 
ist, sowie dass der Schaden eingetreten ist – d.h. er wurde geschädigt 
–, während der Arbeitgeber von der Haftung befreit werden kann, 
                                                            
6 LEHOCZKYNÉ KOLLONAY, CSILLA: A magyar munkajog II. [Das 
ungarische Arbeitsrecht II.], 1998, Kulturtrade Verlag, Budapest, 70. 
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falls er sich erfolgreich auf eine der Befreiungsgründe beruft. Anstatt 
des relevanten Grundes des Schadens ist in der Regel hinreichend, 
den Zusammenhang mit dem Arbeitsverhältnis zu beweisen. Diese 
Regel ist aus dem Grunde wichtig, weil diese die Vermutung 
begründet, dass das Schadensereignis in Verbindung mit dem 
Arbeitsverhältnis entstanden ist.7 Diese Lösung überwindet auch den 
Beweisnotfall des Arbeitnehmers als der schwächeren Partei. Davon 
bildet lediglich die rechtliche Beurteilung sonstiger Erkrankungen 
eine Ausnahme, wo die Beweislast in Bezug auf die relevante 
Kausalität bei dem Arbeitnehmer liegt. Der Arbeitnehmer hat den 
Zusammenhang der Schädigung mit dem Arbeitsverhältnis 
mindestens nachweislich zu machen.8 In dem Fall ferner, wenn der 
Arbeitgeber seine Haftung für Schaden wegen Betriebsunfall 
anerkannt hat, erstreckt sich diese bei dem Bestehen der Kausalität 
auch auf den Betrag des Krankengeldes, stehe es dem Arbeitnehmer 
wegen mit dem Betriebsunfall verbundener Erwerbsunfähigkeit oder 
wegen arbeitsbezogener, später aufgetretener Erkrankung zu.9 In der 
Praxis ist es oftmals schwierig, Grenzlinien zwischen den mit dem 
Arbeitsverhältnis zusammenhängenden und nicht zusammen-
hängenden Schadensereignissen zu ziehen. Die Kausalität ist auf-
grund der gemeinsamen Bewertung sämtlicher wesentlichen Um-
stände festzustellen.10  
Zusammenfassend lässt sich also sagen, dass der 
Zusammenhang der Schadensverursachung mit dem Arbeits-
verhältnis weit auszulegen ist, so umfasst dies sämtliche Abschnitte 
des Arbeitsverhältnisses von der Errichtung des Arbeitsverhältnisses 
ganz bis zu dessen Auflösung, und ggf. kann sich auch auf die vor 
dem Arbeitsantritt, d.h. vor dem Arbeitsbeginn verursachten Schäden 
erstrecken. 
                                                            
7 GYULAVÁRI, TAMÁS (Hg.): Munkajog [Arbeitsrecht], 2013, ELTE Eötvös, 
Budapest, 379. 
8 Urteil des ung. Obersten Gerichtshofes Nr. BH2007.23. 
9 Urteil des ung. Obersten Gerichtshofes Nr. EBH2008.1802. 
10 Urteil des ung. Obersten Gerichtshofes Nr. BH2006.228. 
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2.2. Kausalität 
Über das Bestehen des Arbeitsverhältnisses hinaus setzt die Haftung 
voraus, dass das Schadensereignis im Kausalzusammenhang mit dem 
Arbeitsverhältnis erfolgt. Dieser Kausalzusammenhang kann nicht 
nur ein unmittelbarer sondern auch ein mittelbarer Zusammenhang 
sein.11 Das zweite Element ist also der (kausale) Zusammenhang mit 
dem Arbeitsverhältnis. Bereits in dieser Hinsicht gibt es einen 
Unterschied zwischen den für den Arbeitnehmer und den Arbeit-
geber maßgebenden Regelungen, weil während der Arbeitgeber für 
den im Zusammenhang mit dem Arbeitsverhältnis eingetretenen 
Schaden haftet, so wird die Haftung des Arbeitnehmers bei der 
schuldigen Verletzung seiner aus dem Arbeitsverhältnis stammenden 
Verpflichtung festgestellt. Dabei ist es festzustellen, dass die Haftung 
des Arbeitgebers auch hier eine engere Kategorie bedeutet, weil die 
Schadensverursachung im Zusammenhang mit dem Arbeitsverhältnis 
praktisch sämtliche im Rahmen des Arbeitsverhältnisses eingetreten-
en Schäden umfasst (sofern keine Befreiungsgründe bestehen), 
gegenüber der Haftung des Arbeitnehmers, bei dem die Haftung nur 
im Falle einer schuldigen Pflichtverletzung festzustellen ist.  
Der Begriff „im Zusammenhang mit dem Arbeitsverhältnis“ 
umfasst also – gemäß der Stellungnahme Nr. 29 des arbeits-
rechtlichen Kollegiums des Obersten Gerichtshofs – im Falle des 
Arbeitgebers nicht nur die tatsächliche Arbeitsverrichtung, sondern 
auch die sog. vorbereitende Arbeitsverrichtung vor dem Arbeits-
beginn, sowie das Schadensereignis, das während der Tätigkeiten im 
Zusammenhang mit den persönlichen Bedürfnissen (Essen, Umkleid-
ung, Körperpflege) eintritt. Es ist oft der Fall, dass der Arbeitnehmer 
während der Fahrt zur Arbeitsstelle oder von dort nach Hause einen 
Unfall erleidet. Für die sich daraus ergebenden Schäden haftet der 
Arbeitgeber lediglich dann, wenn der Schaden während der 
Beförderung mit einem durch den Arbeitgeber betriebenen (bzw. mit 
                                                            
11 Urteil des ung. Obersten Gerichtshofes Nr. BH2005.443.  
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dessen eigenen) Fahrzeug eintritt.12 Der Zusammenhang des Unfalls 
mit dem Arbeitsverhältnis ist aufgrund der gemeinsamen Bewertung 
sämtlicher wesentlicher Beweismittel zu bestimmen.13  
Aufgrund der früheren Regelung gehörten nach der Gerichts-
praxis zu den im Zusammenhang mit dem Arbeitsverhältnis 
entstandenen Schäden nicht nur diejenigen, die während der 
Durchführung der Arbeitsaufgaben eingetreten sind, sondern auch 
die Schäden, die während der nach objektiver Beurteilung im 
Interesse des Arbeitgebers ausgeübten Tätigkeiten eingetreten sind.14 
Dementsprechend wurde die Haftung auch dann erweitert, wenn der 
Arbeitnehmer durch eine Entsendung im Ausland oder an einer 
Fortbildung war. In diesem Fall hatte der Arbeitgeber zwar keinen 
Einfluss auf die ausländischen Umstände, dennoch hat der Arbeit-
nehmer im Interesse des Arbeitgebers daran teilgenommen, so war 
seine objektive Haftung für die zu dieser Zeit eingetretenen Schäden 
feststellbar.15 Dabei ist hervorzuheben, dass meiner Meinung nach 
diese Praxis in Zukunft nicht nachhaltig wird, weil der Arbeitgeber 
gemäß der neuen Regelung von der Haftung befreit wird, wenn das 
Schadensereignis durch einen nicht unter seinen Kontrollbereich 
fallenden Umstand verursacht wurde, der nicht beseitigt werden 
konnte, bzw. nicht vorzusehen war. In diesem genannten Fall hatte 
der Arbeitgeber keinerlei Einfluss auf die ausländischen Umstände, 
so lagen diese vermutlich außerhalb seines Kontrollbereiches, 
weswegen er von der Haftung vermutlich befreit wird. Nach meinem 
Standpunkt kann die Haftung des Arbeitgebers auch des Weiteren 
festgestellt werden, wenn der Arbeitnehmer während der 
Körperpflege in der Dusche ausrutscht, oder wenn er nach 
                                                            
12 In sonstigen Fällen gilt der Unfall als ein betrieblicher Verkehrsunfall 
gemäß den Rechtsvorschriften der Sozialversicherung. 
13 Urteil des ung. Obersten Gerichtshofes Nr. BH2006.228. 
14 ROMÁN, LÁSZLÓ: A munkajog alapintézményei 3. [Grundlegende 
Rechtsinstitute des Arbeitsrechtes 3.], 1997, Institutiones Juris, Pécs, 44. 
15 FÉZER, TAMÁS (Hg.): A kártérítési jog magyarázata [Kommentar zum 
Schadenersatzrecht], 2010, Complex, Budapest, 21. 
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Anweisung des Arbeitgebers an einer Sportveranstaltung teilnimmt 
und dabei verletzt wird.16 
Der Kontrollbereich des Arbeitgebers beschränkt sich nicht auf 
die Niederlassung des Arbeitgebers; der Zusammenhang zwischen 
dem Arbeitsverhältnis und dem den Schaden verursachenden 
Umstand kann auch im Falle einer Arbeitsverrichtung außerhalb der 
Niederlassung bestehen. In diesem Fall kann allerdings der 
Arbeitgeber von der Haftung vermutlich erfolgreich befreit werden, 
wenn er beweist, dass der Schaden durch einen außerhalb seiner 
Kontrolle liegenden Umstand verursacht wurde.  
Die Tätigkeit des Arbeitnehmers, die er zwar an seiner 
Arbeitsstelle, jedoch zu seiner Privatzwecken verrichtet und die nicht 
zu seinen Arbeitsaufgaben gehört, kann nicht als eine „im 
Zusammenhang mit dem Arbeitsverhältnis stehende“ Tätigkeit 
betrachtet werden.17 Auch dann besteht keinen Zusammenhang mit 
dem Arbeitsverhältnis, wenn die Schäden in einem Arbeiter-
wohnheim eintreten.18 Anschließend begründet auch das während der 
Ausübung einer nicht genehmigten nebenberuflichen Tätigkeit 
(„Gestümper“) eingetretene Schadensereignis nicht die Haftung des 
Arbeitgebers.19 
Ebenfalls im Bereich der Kausalität stellt sich die Frage, wie die 
bereits bestehenden Gesundheitsschäden des Arbeitnehmers, die 
unabhängig von dem erlittenen Unfall sind, berücksichtigt werden 
sollen. Gemäß Stellungnahme Nr. 30 des arbeitsrechtlichen 
Kollegiums des Obersten Gerichtshofes: „wenn der Gesundheits-
zustand, die Körperbehinderung und die körperlichen Gegebenheiten 
des Arbeitnehmers nicht zur Erwerbsfähigkeitsverminderung mit 
Lohnverlust geführt haben, und der Lohnverlust des Arbeitnehmers 
auf die im Zusammenhang mit dem Arbeitsverhältnis eingetretene 
Verletzung seines Lebens, seines Gesundheitszustandes oder seiner 
Gesundheit zurückzuführen ist, haftet der Arbeitgeber gemäß § 174 
                                                            
16 Urteil des ung. Obersten Gerichtshofes Nr. BH2005.368. 
17 Urteil des ung. Obersten Gerichtshofes Nr. MFV.I.10 804/2000/3. 
18 Urteil des ung. Obersten Gerichtshofes Nr. BH1993.263. 
19 Urteil des ung. Obersten Gerichtshofes Nr. BH2002.331. 
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des alten ArbG (aus dem Jahre 1992) für den vollen Schaden 
unabhängig von dem Prozentsatz der sich aus der genannten 
Verletzung ergebenden Erwerbsfähigkeitsverminderung des Arbeit-
nehmers.“ Dementsprechend beeinflusst die natürliche Erwerbsfähig-
keitsverminderung weder die Kausalität noch die Höhe des 
Schadenersatzes, ferner liegt diese grundsätzlich auch nicht der 
Teilkausalität zugrunde. Ausgenommen hiervon ist der Fall, wenn 
die natürliche Gesundheitsschädigung den Arbeitnehmer bereits von 
vornherein – auch vor dem Eintritt des Schadensereignisses – bei der 
Erfüllung seines Arbeitsbereiches beschränkt hat.20 
Zusammenfassend lässt sich also feststellen, dass der Ausdruck 
„im Zusammenhang mit dem Arbeitsverhältnis“ nicht eindeutig 
einen genau begrenzten oder begrenzbaren Bereich bedeutet, sondern 
diese Bedingung kann im Falle der während dem Bestehen des 
Arbeitsverhältnisses eingetretenen Schäden quasi irgendwann erfüllt 
werden.  
2.3. Schadenseintritt 
Der Schaden ist ein in Geld ausdrückbarer materieller, bzw. 
immaterieller Nachteil, der im Vermögen des Geschädigten eine 
Wertverminderung bedeutet, oder seine Lebensführung, bzw. seine 
Persönlichkeitsrechte verletzt. Dementsprechend kann der Schaden 
materiell oder immateriell sein. Wie früher dargestellt, wird die 
Haftung des Arbeitgebers für Schäden wesentlich strenger geregelt, 
als die seiner Arbeitnehmer, und der Arbeitgeber ist verpflichtet, 
nicht nur die eingetretenen Sachschäden, sondern auch den 
Einkommensverlust – in erster Linie bei einer Gesundheits-schädig-
ung –, die als sonstigen Schäden abzurechnenden Kosten, die 
Schäden der Angehörigen, den Betrag sonstiger regelmäßiger 
Einkommen außerhalb des Arbeitsverhältnisses und den immateriel-
len Schaden zu erstatten. Dabei ist zu betonen, dass dies nicht mehr 
zu den Voraussetzungen der Haftung gehört, sondern viel mehr zu 
                                                            
20 PÁL, LAJOS – LŐRINCZ, GYÖRGY – KOZMA, ANNA – PETHŐ, RÓBERT: Az 
új Munka Törvénykönyvének magyarázata [Kommentar zum neuen 
Arbeitsgesetzbuch], 2012, HVG-ORAC, Budapest, 263. 
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deren Umfang. Voraussetzung für die Haftung ist also der Eintritt 
des tatsächlichen Schadens.  
Der immaterielle Schaden stammt aus der unmittelbaren oder 
mittelbaren Verhinderung der Verwirklichung, bzw. Geltend-
machung einzelner Persönlichkeitswerte, d.h. der Nachteil erscheint 
nicht in dem Vermögen des Geschädigten, sondern in seinen 
Persönlichkeitsrechten, bzw. Persönlichkeitswerten.21 Obwohl die 
arbeitsrechtlichen Vorschriften die Geltendmachung von immateriel-
len Schäden erst ab dem 1. Januar 1980 ermöglicht haben, hat das 
Verfassungsgericht – bezugnehmend auf seinen Beschluss Nr. 
12/1991. (IV.11), nach dem das Schadenersatzsystem aus dem 
Gerichtspunkt des Geschädigten als ein einheitliches System 
betrachtet werden müsse – den Zeitpunkt der Anwendbarkeit des 
immateriellen Schadenersatzes – übereinstimmend mit den Regel-
ungen des BGB – auf den 1. März 1978 gesetzt.22 Daneben möchte 
ich auf den Zusammenhang des Arbeitsverhältnisses, die Kausalität 
und den immateriellen Schaden auch hinweisen, nach dem: der 
immaterielle Schadenersatz dem Arbeitnehmer in dem Fall zusteht, 
wenn er solche Tatsachen beweist, aufgrund deren die immaterielle 
Schädigung des Arbeitnehmers im Kausalzusammenhang mit dem 
Verhalten des Arbeitgebers festgestellt werden kann. 
3. AUSNAHMEN VON DER VERSCHULDENSUNABHÄNGIGEN 
HAFTUNG 
Von den gesetzlich bestimmten strengen Haftungsvorschriften gibt 
es in gewissen Fällen und in einem vom Gesetz vorgesehenen, sowie 
durch die Gerichtspraxis entwickelten engen Bereich einige 
                                                            
21 FERENCZ, JÁCINT: Kár érte? A munkáltatói kárfelelősség változása 
[Schaden erlitten? Änderungen in der Arbeitgeberhaftung für Schäden], in 
VEREBÉLYI, IMRE (Hg.): Az állam és jog alapvető értékei a változó 
világban, 2012, Széchenyi István Egyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Doktori 
Iskola, Győr, 227. 
22 LEHOCZKYNÉ KOLLONAY: op. cit. 72. 
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Ausnahmen. Der Gesetzgeber will die Arbeitgeber in diesen 
Ausnahmefällen nicht von der Haftung befreien, sondern ermöglicht 
die Minderung der verschuldensunabhängigen Haftung. In diesem 
Teil des Artikels werde ich als erstens die Regelung des alten ArbG 
von 1992 mit der des neuen ArbG in Hinsicht auf die Haftung für die 
in den Betrieb eingebrachten Sachen vergleichen. Während dieser 
Analyse werde ich auch die fortlebende Gerichtspraxis unter die 
Lupe nehmen. In dem zweiten Teil dieses Kapitals werde ich die 
besonderen Haftungsvorschriften des alten ArbG von 1992 in Bezug 
auf die Arbeitgeber mit begrenzten Finanzmitteln erläutern. Ich halte 
die Erörterung dieser letzteren, heutzutage bereits historischen 
Regelung für wichtig, weil nach meinem Standpunkt die in dem 
neuen ArbG vorgesehene Regelung, nach der „das Gericht den 
Arbeitgeber aufgrund von besonders zu berücksichtigenden 
Umständen teilweise vom Schadenersatz befreien kann“, die 
Manifestation des auf einen ähnlichen Zweck gerichteten 
Gesetzgeberwillens darstellt. 
3.1. In den in den betrieb eingebrachten Sachen eingetretenen 
schaden 
Die Haftung des Arbeitgebers war vor 1992 in Hinsicht auf die in 
den Betrieb eingebrachten Sachen nur dann verschuldensunabhängig, 
wenn der Schaden in den im Umkleideraum oder Schließfach des 
Arbeitgebers oder an einem durch ihn bestimmten Ort angelegten 
Sachen eingetreten war, ferner falls solche Kleidungsstücke oder 
persönliche Ausröstungsgegenstände geschädigt wurden, die der 
Arbeitnehmer auch während der Arbeitsverrichtung regelmäßig bei 
sich gehalten hat, sowie falls der Schaden bei einem solchen Unfall 
eingetreten war, für den der Arbeitgeber zu haften hatte.23 Es kann 
also eindeutig festgestellt werden, dass die Regelung, die die 
Haftung des Arbeitgebers für Schäden, die in den in den Betrieb 
eingebrachten Sachen des Arbeitnehmers eingetretenen sind als 
                                                            
23 KISS, GYÖRGY: Munkajog [Arbeitsrecht], 2005, Osiris, Budapest, 284. 
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verschuldensunabhängig erklärt hat, hat sowohl die Regelung als 
auch die Rechtsanwendung deutlich vereinfacht.24 
Gemäß ArbG hat der Arbeitgeber zwar verschuldensunabhängig 
zu haften, jedoch um dies zuvorzukommen, kann er vorschreiben, 
dass die Arbeitnehmer die in den Betrieb eingebrachten Sachen in 
einem Schließfach unterbringen oder diese anmelden müssen. Die 
zur Fahrt zur Arbeit oder zur Arbeitsverrichtung nicht benötigten 
Sachen können nur mit der Genehmigung des Arbeitgebers 
eingebracht werden.25 Sofern der Arbeitgeber die Unterbringung der 
Sachen in einem Schließfach oder deren Anmeldung vorschreibt und 
der Arbeitnehmer diese Vorschriften verletzt, haftet der Arbeitgeber 
nur für die vorsätzliche Schadenszufügung. Dementsprechend ist die 
Befreiung des Arbeitnehmers von der Haftung möglich, aber nur in 
dem Fall, wenn er beweist, dass der Arbeitnehmer die auf die 
Unterbringung (Bewahrung) oder auf die Anmeldung der Sachen 
maßgebenden Vorschriften verletzt hat.26 
Eine bedeutende Änderung im Vergleich zum alten ArbG von 
1992 ist unbedingt zu hervorzuheben, weil diese sogar auch die 
Modifizierung der Stellungnahme Nr. 22 des arbeitsrechtlichen 
Kollegiums des Obersten Gerichtshofs zur Folge haben kann. Gemäß 
ArbG können die zur Fahrt zur Arbeit oder zur Arbeitsverrichtung 
nicht benötigten Sachen nur mit der Genehmigung des Arbeitgebers 
in den Betrieb eingebracht werden.27 Diese von den früheren 
Regelung abweichende Vorschrift untersagt von Gesetzes wegen, 
dass der Arbeitnehmer freiwillig zur Arbeitsverrichtung unnötige 
Sachen bei sich hält. In diesem Fall liegt es also im eigenen 
Ermessen des Arbeitgebers, ob er die Einbringung der Sachen in den 
Betrieb erlaubt oder nicht.28 Sofern der Arbeitgeber die Genehmig-
ung nicht erteilt, und der Arbeitnehmer die Sache trotzdem in den 
                                                            
24 § 176 Abs. 1 und 2 des alten ArbG von 1992 und § 168 Abs, 1 und 2. 
25 § 168 Abs. 2 ArbG. 
26 Urteil des ung. Obersten Gerichtshofes Nr. BH1997.502.  
27 § 168 Abs. 2 ArbG. 
28 Dies kann natürlich auch nicht unbegrenzt sein, weil die Anforderung der 
bestimmungsgemäßen Rechtsausübung auch hier als eine Grenze gilt. 
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Betrieb einbringt, und diese dort geschädigt wird, haftet der 
Arbeitgeber nur dann, wenn der Arbeitnehmer beweist, dass die 
Schadenverursachung vorsätzlich war. Bei Ausübung dieses Rechtes 
des Arbeitgebers gilt ausschließlich die Erfüllung der Anforderung 
der bestimmungsgemäßen Rechtsausübung als eine Schranke. 
Im Falle eines Schadens in Sachen, die in eine kulturelle, Sport- 
oder sonstige Veranstaltung der Arbeitnehmer oder einer Gruppe der 
Arbeitnehmer eingebracht wurden, seien sie Eigentum der 
Arbeitnehmer oder des Arbeitgebers, hängt die Bestimmung der für 
die Schadenshaftung des Arbeitgebers maßgebenden Rechts-
vorschrift davon ab, ob die Schadensverursachung mit dem Arbeits-
verhältnis verbunden war.29 In der arbeitsrechtlichen Rechtspraxis 
gab es lange keine einheitliche Beurteilung in Bezug auf die Frage, 
welche materiell-rechtliche Rechtsvorschrift für den Ersatz des 
Schadens an Sachen maßgebend ist, die in eine kulturelle, Sport- 
oder sonstige Veranstaltung der Arbeitnehmer oder einer Gruppe der 
Arbeitnehmer eingebracht wurden, seien sie Eigentum der 
Arbeitnehmer oder des Arbeitgebers. Sofern keine der oben 
genannten Veranstaltungen unter den Begriff Arbeitsverhältnis fällt, 
so sind die Regelungen des ArbG über die Arbeitgeberhaftung für 
Schäden auf die Geltendmachung der Schadenersatzpflicht aus dem 
erfolgten Schadensereignis auch dann nicht anwendbar, wenn der 
Schaden durch den einen Arbeitnehmer des Arbeitgebers verursacht 
wurde. Ebenfalls können die Vorschriften des Arbeitsrechtes auch in 
dem Falle nicht angewendet werden, wenn der Schadensverursacher 
eine Person ist, die an der Veranstaltung teilgenommen hat, aber mit 
dem Arbeitgeber nicht im Arbeitsverhältnis steht.  
Es können auch solche Fälle geben, wenn der an der 
Veranstaltung teilnehmende, das Gebiet des Arbeitgebers betretene 
Arbeitnehmer einen Sachschaden in der Weise erleidet, dass das 
Schadensereignis in irgendeiner Form im Zusammenhang mit dem 
                                                            
29 Stellungnahme Nr. 22 des arbeitsrechtlichen Kollegiums des Obersten 
Gerichtshofs. 
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Arbeitsverhältnis eingetreten ist.30 In diesem Fall ist der Schaden im 
Zusammenhang mit dem Arbeitsverhältnis entstanden, für den die 
Haftung des Arbeitgebers schon festzustellen ist. Ähnlich zu diesem 
Fall sind die Vorschriften des ArbG über die Schadenersatzpflicht 
gegenüber dem Arbeitnehmer anzuwenden, wenn der Arbeitnehmer 
den Schaden zwar im Zusammenhang mit der Veranstaltung 
verursacht hat, an der Veranstaltung hat er aber nach Anweisung des 
Arbeitgebers d.h. im Zusammenhang mit seinem Arbeitsverhältnis 
teilgenommen. Sofern der Arbeitnehmer den Schaden nicht in dieser 
Eigenschaft verursacht hat, sind die Vorschriften des ung. BGB über 
Haftung für außervertraglich verursachten Schäden maßgebend. 
Darüber hinaus – vermutlich auch gemäß der neuen Rechts-
praxis – hat auch der Arbeitnehmer für seine eigenen in den Betrieb 
eingebrachten Sachen Sorge zu tragen. Bei Versäumen dieser 
Sorgepflicht ist die Haftung des Arbeitgebers nicht festzustellen.31 
Dies ist dann von Bedeutung, wenn die Sache nicht ausdrücklich mit 
der Arbeitsverrichtung verbunden ist, am Arbeitsplatz kein Schließ-
fach zu finden ist, und der Arbeitgeber keine die Einbringung von 
eigenen Sachen beschränkenden oder verbietenden Vorschriften 
erlassen hat. 
3.2. Arbeitgeber mit begrenzten Finanzmitteln 
Im alten Arbeitsgesetzbuch von 1992 wurde im Bereich der 
Haftungsregelung bis zum 1. Januar 2010 ein Unterschied unter den 
Arbeitgebern aufgrund ihrer Leistungsfähigkeit gemacht. Demnach 
hat der Arbeitgeber, der als Privatperson weniger als zehn 
Arbeitnehmer in Haupttätigkeit beschäftigt hat, für die dem 
                                                            
30 Z.B. wenn der Pförtner des Arbeitgebers während der Veranstaltung den 
Schlüssel des Arbeitnehmers ausgibt, und danach der dort aufgehängte 
Mantel des Arbeitnehmers aus seinem Zimmer gestohlen wird oder wenn 
die persönlichen Vermögensgegenstände der Arbeitnehmer in den durch 
den Arbeitgeber auch zu dieser Zeit zu bewachenden Umkleideräumen 
angelegt, und von dort gestohlen werden. 
31 Urteil des ung. Obersten Gerichtshofes Nr. BH1981.209. 
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Arbeitnehmer zugefügten Schäden – abweichend von den allgemein-
en Regeln – beim Verschulden gehaftet.32 
Grund für die spezielle Regelung war, dass die geringeren 
Ressourcen und Organisation der Arbeitgeber mit begrenzten 
Finanzmitteln die Anwendung der grundsätzlich strengen verschul-
densunabhängigen Haftung nicht ermöglicht haben.33 Es ist jedoch 
zu betonen, dass trotz der Obigen diese Regelung selbstverständlich 
nicht zur Folge hatte, dass diese Arbeitgeber weniger an den 
Arbeitsschutz- und Sicherheitsvorschriften gebunden gewesen 
waren. 
Die Anwendung der leichteren Haftungsregelungen für 
Arbeitgeber mit begrenzten Finanzmitteln war durch zwei Kriterien 
bedingt. Einerseits ist hervorzuheben, dass sich diese Begünstigung 
ausschließlich auf Privatpersonen, und auf keine Wirtschafts-
gesellschaften oder sonstigen wirtschaftlichen Organisationen mit 
Rechtspersönlichkeit in Arbeitgeberposition bezogen hat. Anderer-
seits war die Anzahl des beschäftigten Personalbestandes auf zehn 
beschränkt, wobei die Voraussetzung bezüglich dieser Zahlangabe 
auch zum Zeitpunkt der Schadenszufügung erfüllt werden musste. 
Was die Beweisführung angeht, waren der Schadenseintritt und 
dessen Zusammenhang mit dem Arbeitsverhältnis gemäß den 
allgemeinen Regeln durch den Arbeitnehmer zu beweisen, während 
der Arbeitgeber dagegen beweisen konnte, dass er so vorgegangen 
ist, wie im gegebenen Fall allgemein erwartet.34 Der Arbeitgeber 
konnte sich von der Haftung ausschließlich dann befreien, wenn er 
den Mangel seines Verschuldens erfolgreich bewiesen hat, da das 
Verschulden des Arbeitgebers vermutet wurde. 
György Kiss hat diese Regel an mehreren Stellen für 
problematisch erklärt. Nach seinem Standpunkt sei die Regel sowohl 
aus rechtsdogmatischer als auch aus rechtspolitischer Sicht strittig 
gewesen. Kiss betonte, dass in der Praxis gerade die größeren 
                                                            
32 § 175 Abs. 1 des alten ArbG von 1992. 
33 PÁL, LAJOS – RADNAY, JÓZSEF – TALLIÁN, BLANKA: Munkajogi 
Kézikönyv [Handbuch für Arbeitsrecht], 2007, HVG-ORAC, Budapest, 306. 
34 § 175 Abs. 2 des alten ArbG von 1992. 
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Arbeitgeber sind diejenigen, die für die Schaffung einer gesunden 
und sicheren Arbeitsverrichtung effektiver und exakter Sorge tragen. 
Dementsprechend reduziert diese Regel die Haftung gerade 
derjenigen Arbeitgeber, bei denen der Schaden mit höherer 
Wahrscheinlichkeit eintreten wird. Ferner hat er bedauert, dass selbst 
die Tatsache, dass die Arbeitgeber mit begrenzten Finanzmitteln 
weniger Arbeitnehmer beschäftigen, kann die Minderung der 
Haftung nicht rechtfertigen. Schließlich hat Kiss auch auf einen 
Konstruktionsfehler hingewiesen. Nach dem alten Arbeitsgesetzbuch 
kann nämlich als Arbeitgeber nur eine rechtsfähige Person fungieren. 
Durch diese Voraussetzung wird die Anwendung des Ausdruckes 
„Arbeitgeber, als Privatperson“ unbegründet, da es im Sinne des 
Gesetzes keinen rechtlichen Grund für die Differenzierung 
hinsichtlich ihrer Rechtslage gibt.35 Die Regelung war also an 
mehreren Stellen kritisiert, bevor das Verfassungsgericht die 
Bestimmung mit Wirkung vom 31. Dezember 2009 aufgehoben 
hat.36 
                                                            
35 KISS: op. cit. 281. 
36 Beschluss des Verfassungsgerichtes Nr. 41 von 2009 (27. März): In 
seiner Begründung hat das Verfassungsgericht erst dazu Stellung 
genommen, ob die in § 174 des alten ArbG erwähnten Arbeitgeber mit 
denjenigen Arbeitgebern als Privatperson verglichen werden können, die 
(gemäß § 175 des alten ArbG) höchstens zehn Arbeitnehmer in 
Haupttätigkeit beschäftigen, bzw. ob einen Unterschied zwischen 
Arbeitgebern als Privatperson und denen als nicht Privatperson gibt. Nach 
Standpunkt des Verfassungsgerichtes gab es keinen vernünftigen Grund 
dafür, warum die Regelung über die Verschuldenshaftung gerade auf diese 
Arbeitgeber angewendet werden sollte. Aufgrund des Obigen hat das 
Verfassungsgericht festgestellt, dass die Differenzierung zwischen den 
Arbeitgeberhaftungsmodellen aufgrund der rechtlichen Form und der 
Anzahl des in Haupttätigkeit beschäftigten Personals i.H. v. zehn nicht auf 
einem vernünftigen verfassungsrechtlichen Grund beruht. Gemäß Antrag 
hat das Verfassungsgericht sodann auch untersucht, ob die Regelungen in § 
175 des alten ArbG über die Verschuldenshaftung des Arbeitgebers 
diskriminierend für diejenigen Arbeitnehmer waren, die von einem 
Arbeitgeber als Privatperson mit höchstens zehn Arbeitnehmern in 
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In den letzten Jahren gab es zur Anwendung dieser Regelung 
keine Möglichkeit mehr, da das Verfassungsgericht diese Vorschrift 
des alten Arbeitsgesetzbuches aufgehoben hat. Die Tatsache, dass 
diese Regelung Gegenstand meiner Forschungen ist, ist auf einen 
sehr wichtigen Grund zurückzuführen. Ich bin teilweise mit der 
Kritik von György Kiss einverstanden, und zwar damit, dass eine 
derartige Differenzierung zwischen den Arbeitgebern auch damit 
nicht begründet ist, dass zahlreiche EU Richtlinien unter ihren 
Grundprinzipien deklarieren, dass bei der Umsetzung der einzelnen 
Rechtsnormen der Europäischen Gesellschaft darauf geachtet werden 
soll, die Tätigkeit der Klein- und Mittelunternehmen dadurch nicht 
unmöglich zu machen, bzw. nicht zu erschweren. Es ist hingegen 
offensichtlich, dass die meisten Privatpersonen nicht über das 
erforderliche Finanzmittel zur Gründung eines Großunternehmens 
verfügen. Nach meinem Standpunkt wäre anlässlich dieser 
Unterschiede erforderlich, im Falle dieser Arbeitgeber gewisser-
maßen angemessen – vorzugehen. Die Rechtsprechung kann Klein- 
und Großunternehmen nicht gleich behandeln und auch nach der 
Formallogik kann es kaum erwartet werden, dass Klein- und Groß-
unternehmen im Bereich der Schadensvorbeugung mit gleicher 
Effektivität vorgehen. Diesen gesetzgeberischen Willen wieder-
spiegelt die Regelung in dem neuen Arbeitsgesetzbuch, welche als 
Novum zu betrachten ist und nach welcher das Gericht den 
Arbeitgeber bei Vorliegen von berücksichtigungswürdigen 
Umständen von der Schadenersatzpflicht teilweise befreien kann.37 
Dabei sind insbesondere die finanzielle Lage der Parteien, die 
Schwere der Rechtsverletzung und die Folgen der Erfüllung der 
Schadenersatzpflicht in Betracht zu ziehen. 
                                                                                                                              
Haupttätigkeit beschäftigt waren. Dabei hat das Verfassungsgericht 
festgehalten, dass der Schutz der wirtschaftlichen und finanziellen 
Interessen der Arbeitgeber die Differenzierung zwischen den Arbeitgebern 
als Privatperson mit höchstens zehn Arbeitnehmern in Haupttätigkeit und 
den anderen Arbeitgebern - aufgrund der Anzahl der in Haupttätigkeit 
beschäftigten Personals - aus verfassungsrechtlicher Sicht nicht rechtfertigt. 
37 § 167 Abs. 3 ArbG. 
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Auch der Kommentar zu dem Gesetz bestätigt die Auslegung 
gemäß dem gesetzgeberischen Willen, der betont, dass diese 
Regelung vor allem bei solchen Arbeitgebern mit begrenzten 
Finanzmitteln (insbesondere bei natürlichen Personen) angewendet 
werden kann, bei welchen ein hoher Schadenersatzbetrag die 
Aufrechterhaltung des Betriebes, bzw. – im Falle von natürlichen 
Personen – ihres Lebensunterhaltes unbegründet gefährden würde.38 
Aufgrund dessen kann also festgestellt werden, dass diese 
Arbeitgebergruppe nicht mehr als ein Ausnahmefall von der 
Hauptregel, also der verschuldensunabhängigen Haftung betrachtet 
werden kann, jedoch kann der in der früheren Regelung erkennbare 
gesetzgeberische Willen sein Ziel in Zukunft durch die 
Gerichtspraxis erreichen. 
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The International Development Cooperation by EU 
with Special Regard to Hungary 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Among the global problems of the 21st century, there is a significant 
one, which is the issue of the developing countries. The developing 
world as a definition firstly appeared in common after World War II, 
within the decolonization period.1 In the relation of the developing 
countries, this study refers to those ones which were liberated from 
the colonial and half colonial status, and whose backwardness can be 
traced back to their peripheral and dependent place in the economy, 
having weak, unequal relationships or not having any relationship 
with developed countries due to colonization. This system is 
described in the world-system theory as a center-half periphery or 
even a center-periphery contact.2 
Among countries of the developing world (according to 
commercial and development policy of the EU), more developed 
countries such as Argentina, Mexico, India and more underdeveloped 
ones like ACP countries (ACP being an English abbreviation of the 
                                                            
1 See HAGGARD, STEPHAN: Developing Nations and the Politics of Global 
Integration, 1995, Brookings Institution Press, Washington and LEYS, 
COLIN: Politics and Change in Developing Countries, 2011, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
2 SZIGETI, PÉTER: Világrendszernézőben. Globális „szabad verseny” – a 
világkapitalizmus jelenlegi stádiuma [Exploring World Systems. Global 
“open competition” – The Current Stage of World Capitalism], 2005, 
Napvilág Kiadó, Budapest, 52-53. 
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words African, Caribbean and Pacific) can be listed.3 Of course, 
there is an essential difference among these counties regarding 
economic, social, welfare and religious fields.  
There are many factors, which contribute to the poverty and 
backwardness of developing countries. Among the reasons of 
poverty, it is worth emphasizing the lack of employment 
opportunities, full or partial unemployment, lack of qualifications 
which closely joins them as well as functional illiterateness.4 Other 
factors raising poverty are (1) conflicts among states, civil wars, their 
role in drug and arm commerce or international crime organizations,5 
and (2) the increasing number of natural disasters, therefore, bad 
state of the environment, (3) dramatically increasing number of 
population6 in the third world and therefore (4) states’ failures7 as 
well as debt trap. 
These above mentioned reasons together cause the 
disadvantageous state of developing countries; thus, it is essential 
that developed countries should intervene in improving their living 
standards, with their main objectives to reduce and eradicate poverty, 
                                                            
3 KOLLER, INEZ – GRÜNTH, ZOLTÁN: Az Európai Unió Fejlődő Országok 
Felé Irányuló Politikája [The European Union’s Policy in the Interest of the 
Developing Countries]. Available at: http://www.publikon.hu/application 
/essay/305_1.pdf [cit. 2013-10-07]. 
4 KONDOROSI, FERENC: A világ végveszélyben? A nemzetközi jog új kérdései 
[Is the World in Distress? The International Law’s New Questions], 2008, 
Magyar Közlöny Lap- és Könyvkiadó, 90. 
5 DEÁK, PÉTER (ed.): Biztonságpolitikai kézikönyv [Security Policy 
Handbook], 2007, Osiris, Budapest, 177-195.; DEÁK PÉTER: 
Biztonságpolitika a hétköznapokban [Security Policy in every days], 2009, 
Zrínyi kiadó, Budapest, 107-142. 
6 SIMAI, MIHÁLY: A szegénység globális problémái és a fejlesztési 
együttműködés [The Global Problems of the Poverty and the International 
Development Cooperation], in GÖMBÖS, ERVIN: A nemzetközi fejlesztési 
együttműködés a XXI. században [International Development Cooperation 
in tne 21st Century], 2005, Magyar ENSZ Társaság, Hunida Kht., 151. 
7 DEÁK: op. cit. 195-197. See FUKUYAMA, FRANCIS: Államépítés [State 
Building], 2005, Századvég, Budapest, 8-9. 
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increase living conditions and standards, develop the level of 
education, healthcare and economy, and integrate these countries into 
a higher international economy. The problems of developing 
countries are global problems, as well, because the unequal 
connection between local and global markets is getting closer and 
closer and we need a worldwide cooperation to solve them due to the 
reciprocal dependence in the global economy.  
The role of the European Union in helping the so-called third 
world is relatively significant, because the EU is a global character 
and has a significant economic power. More than the half of the aids8 
which are given to developing countries come from the Union and its 
member states. Among others, EuropeAid, the International 
Development Cooperation is the realization of this support.  
2. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION PROGRAMME 
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
2.1. Legal grounds of development cooperation 
The development policy is a cardinal and important part of the 
European Union’s foreign contacts. Since its establishment, the 
European Community has supported the development of the world’s 
different regions, among them mainly developing countries.9 
According to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(hereinafter: TFEU) Article 3 paragraph 5, the European Union 
contributes to the protection of the right of peace, security, 
sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and reciprocal 
                                                            
8 Európai Unió: Fejlesztési és együttműködési politika [The European 
Union: International Development Cooperation Policy], available at: 
http://europa.eu/pol/dev/index_hu.html [cit. 2013-06-04]. 
9 ARMELLE, DOUAUD: A fejlesztési politika általános áttekintése [The 
Ordinary Survey of the Developing Policy], available at: http://circa. 
europa.eu/irc/opoce/fact_sheets/info/data/relations/general/article_7253_hu.
htm [cit. 2013-06-04]. 
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respect among nations, free and honest commerce, liquidation of 
poverty and human rights, especially rights of children. 
Next to Articles 208-213 of the TFEU, the Agreement in 
Cotonou and different cooperation agreements (mainly with Asia and 
Latin-America), in Article 133 of the European Community Treaty 
on average preference system and cooperation agreement, it provides 
the legal ground of the development cooperation policy which can be 
found in Article 207 of TFEU. 
Article 208 of the TFEU lays down that the policy of the 
Union’s development cooperation should be carried out according to 
principles and goals of the Union’s foreign activity and this is 
interlinked with the policy of member states’ development 
cooperation. The main goal of the Union’s development policy is to 
decrease and gradually eradicate poverty. Moreover, general goals of 
the TFEU’s development policy provides three more obligations for 
the Union and its member states. Based on Article 208 paragraph 2 
(1), the Union and its member states discharge those obligations and 
consider those goals which are accepted by the United Nations and 
other international organizations having competence within these 
fields. Here, two standard documents regarding the international 
development cooperation shall be mentioned: Millennium 
Development goals which were accepted in 2000 and Declaration of 
Aid efficiency accepted by OECD/DAC10 in 2005 in Paris. 
According to Article 210 (2), the Union and its member states 
consult each other in the frame of international organizations and 
conferences, they harmonize the policy of development coordination, 
consult each other on their aid programs, they present it together and 
member states help realizing the Union’s aid programs if it is 
necessary. The third obligation of the Union and its member states is 
in Article 211, establishing (3) that the Union and its member states 
cooperate with third countries and international organizations if they 
are entitled to do so. 
To sum it up, it is worth highlighting that the Union’s 
development policy has five fundamental principles: (1) the principle 
                                                            
10 DAC: Development Assistance Committee. 
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of complementarity (the Union’s activity has to complement the 
development programs of member states), (2) the principle of 
coordination (presentation of the Union and member countries has to 
be coordinated), (3) the principle of coherency (the goals of the 
development policy have to be integrated into other EU policies), (4) 
the principle of geographical weighting (priority of backward 
countries), as well as (5) the principle of political conditions (aids are 
bound to democratic governments).11 
2.2. Millennium Development Goals 
In 2000, member states of the United Nations and most of the 
international organizations engaged themselves in the realization of 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which were created by 
them. Signers of the declaration endorsed the basic worth in the 
United Nations Charter and with the help of approving defined steps 
they engaged themselves in eradicating global poverty and creating a 
livable world.12 At the general meeting, member states launched 8 
extensive goals which would have to be realized by 2015, with 18 
partial goals and 48 indicators to realize the development and to be 
successful. The first 7 goals are about decreasing different forms of 
poverty, while the 8th goal is in connection with the tools of reaching 
the first seven ones.13 The first among the Millennium Goals is (1) to 
stop serious poverty and starvation, so the goal of member states is to 
decrease the number of people by half who live on less than one 
dollar a day and suffer from starvation. Other goals are (2) realizing 
all-embracing basic education, (3) equality of genders and rise of 
women, (4) decreasing children mortality, (5) improving mothers’ 
health care, (6) fighting against HIV/AIDS, malaria and other 
illnesses, (7) ensuring the sustainability of the environment and (8) 
building up global partnership in connection with the development. 
In the 8 main goals more partial goals and indicators were made up 
                                                            
11 HORVÁTH, ZOLTÁN: Kézikönyv az Európai Unióról [Handbook on the 
European Union], 2007, HVG-ORAC Lap-és könyvkiadó, Budapest, 532. 
12 KONDOROSI: op. cit. 92. 
13 Ibid. 92. 
The International Development Cooperation by EU with Special Regards to 
Hungary 
359 
such as decreasing children mortality by two thirds among children 
under 5, or stopping and turning back the spread of HIV/AIDS, 
malaria and other illnesses.14 
In order to ensure the goals, the European Union engaged itself 
in the aids paid by the member states of the EU saying that it would 
reach 0.7% of the GNI in member state level by 2015, with the 
intermediate goal that it was 0.56% by 2010. This GNI grant is not 
obligatory for new members because there is a huge difference in its 
development in the EU 15 and the 13 new members. The standard 
grants for them are 0.17% by 2010 and 0.33% by 2015.15 The set 
aims have not been fully realized. In 2011, 27 EU members gave 
0.42 % of the GNI to charity, which is a decrease from the 0.44% in 
2010 and it was also under the goals they set for the future. Hungary 
has improved from the fall in 2010. In 2011, the scale was 0.11 % 
GNI aid but Hungary did not manage to ensure the planned 0.17% 
GNI development support (similarly with many other EU member 
countries). 
The data of 2012 is not final but according to estimations, it 
shall be stated that the 1% aiding was only realized by Luxemburg. 
Otherwise, Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia have not 








14 Magyar ENSZ Társaság- Millenniumi Fejlesztési Célok [Hungarian UN 
Association: Millennium Development Goals], available at: http://www. 
menszt.hu/tudnivalok_az_egyesult_nemzetek_szervezeterol/millenniumi_fe
jlesztesi_celok [cit. 2013-06-04]. 
15 HORVÁTH: op. cit. 349. 
16 Official development assistance as share of gross national income, 
available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table& init=1 
&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tsdgp100 [cit. 2013-06-21]. 
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geo 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
EU (27 
countries) 0.34 0.42 0.41 0.37 0.40 0.42 0.44 0.42 0.39
(p) 
Belgium 0.41 0.53 0.50 0.43 0.48 0.55 0.64 0.54 0.47(p)
Bulgaria : : : 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.08(p)
Czech 
Republic 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12
(p) 
Denmark 0.85 0.81 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.88 0.91 0.85 0.84(p)
Germany 0.28 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.35 0.39 0.39 0.38(p)
Estonia 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11(p)
Ireland 0.39 0.42 0.54 0.55 0.59 0.54 0.52 0.51 0.48(p)
Greece 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.13(p)
Spain 0.24 0.27 0.32 0.37 0.45 0.46 0.43 0.29 0.15(p)
France 0.41 0.47 0.47 0.38 0.39 0.47 0.50 0.46 0.46(p)
Italy 0.15 0.29 0.20 0.19 0.22 0.16 0.15 0.20 0.13(p)
Cyprus 0.03 0.09 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.23 0.16 0.12(p)
Latvia 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.08(p)
Lithuania 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.13(p)
Luxem-
bourg 0.79 0.79 0.89 0.92 0.97 1.04 1.05 0.97 1.00
(p) 
Hungary 0.07 0.11 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.10(p)
Malta 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.25 0.23(p)
Netherlands 0.73 0.82 0.81 0.81 0.80 0.82 0.81 0.75 0.71(p)
Austria 0.23 0.52 0.47 0.50 0.43 0.30 0.32 0.27 0.28(p)
Poland 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09(p)
Portugal 0.63 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.27 0.23 0.29 0.31 0.27(p)
Romania : : : 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.08(p)
Slovenia 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.13(p)
Slovakia 0.07 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09(p)
Finland 0.37 0.46 0.40 0.39 0.44 0.54 0.55 0.53 0.53(p)
Sweden 0.78 0.94 1.02 0.93 0.98 1.12 0.97 1.02 0.99(p)
United 
Kingdom 0.36 0.47 0.51 0.36 0.43 0.51 0.57 0.56 0.56
(p) 
Iceland 0.18 0.18 0.27 0.27 0.47 0.35 0.29 0.21 0.22(p)
Norway 0.87 0.94 0.89 0.95 0.89 1.06 1.05 0.96 0.93(p)
Switzerlan
d 0.39 0.42 0.38 0.37 0.42 0.44 0.39 0.45 0.45
(p) 
Turkey 0.11 0.17 0.18 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.33(p)
:= no data p=provisional 
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2.3. International Development Cooperation’s uncertain future 
The Community’s development policy will have to face with several 
serious challenges in the future. The problems in the field of aiding 
efficiency are conspicuous, which means that in certain developing 
countries it can be questioned if they really need aids from EU. 
These countries are, for example, China, India, Mexico, Brazil and 
other countries which have a rapidly developing economy. For 
example, China became the world’s workshop in spite of the huge 
poverty in the last decades and that is why the number of indigents 
has been rapidly decreasing.17 This causes the second problem: some 
developing countries have not only become partner countries but also 
donors in international politics. The hard thing in connection with 
China is caused by using a different development policy that is why 
its aids are built upon neither political nor other conditions and this 
helps some autocrat systems to live on. However, this practice is in 
opposition with the EU’s development policy, which builds its aids 
upon democratic governments. Another problem is the Millennium 
Development Goals, which are the frames of the Union’s 
development policy, only insists the member countries until 2015 
and after that they lose their operation.18 The number of member 
states’ aiding willingness and opportunities decreased during the 
previous years due to the economic crisis; therefore, member states’ 
aiding should be strengthened and increased in the future in order to 
keep the success of the international development cooperation. 
                                                            
17 SZENT-IVÁNYI, BALÁZS: Az Európai Unió nemzetközi fejlesztési 
politikája előtt álló kihívások és válaszok [The Challenges and Answers the 
European Union’s International Development Cooperation has to Face 
with], in Köz-gazdaság, Vol. 8. No. 1. (2013) 228-229. 
18 Ibid. 228-229. 
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3. HUNGARY AS MEMBER OF THE DONOR COMMUNITY 
3.1. Development policy of Hungary 
The European Union’s international development policy was partly 
made final in 2000, in which principles of OECD19 DAC, the 
Millennium Development Goals of the United Nation and 
international programmes of world conferences organized in this 
topic such as rounds in Doha, Montererrey and Johannesburg were 
set. 
The problems in developing countries such as poverty and drug 
trade do not stay within their borders due to the effects of 
globalization. Our country is also at the mercy of these negative 
effects and having knowledge on this issue, Hungary also signed the 
Millennium Declaration of United Nations in 2000 with other 
members. Hungary, as member of the United Nations, OECD and the 
European Union, is intended to encourage developing countries, give 
humanitarian aid to disastrous places and decrease extreme poverty 
to a higher and higher degree.  
Since it joined the EU, Hungary has had to use the total law of 
the EU on the development cooperation contained in Articles 208-
213 of the EU Treaty as the part of acquis communautaire.20 
According to this, the EU’s main goal is to fight against poverty, 
moreover, according to community law, Hungary not only has to pay 
into the community’s budget but based on normativity, it also has to 
pay to EDF (European Development Found), which finances the 
activities of international development cooperation in ACP countries 
according to the Agreement in Contonou.21 Hungary had to take a 
                                                            
19 OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
20 A magyar nemzetközi fejlesztési együttműködési (NEFE) politika [The 
International Development Policy], available at: http://www.zpok.hu/img_ 
upload/f880a7b608b6eaa8411125e501dc0547/Magyar_NEFE_Politika.doc 
[cit. 2013-10-07]. 
21 Nemzetközi Fejlesztési Együttműködés: A globális problémák 
megoldásának hazai és nemzetközi szintje [International Development 
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long way to prepare for the donor role: develop the institution 
background and train suitable experts but it got help from CIDA 
(Canadian International Development Agency) and UNDP (United 
Nations Development Programme), as well. 
In Hungary, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for 
planning, coordinating and realizing the international development 
cooperation policy.22 The government, which was introduced on 29 
May 2010, has not changed the institutional background of the 
international development cooperation in spite of the reorganization 
in state administration, so these exercises belong to NEFEFO 
(International Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aiding 
Department, which is one of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ units).23 
According to the practice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it 
can be stated that partner countries are chosen by reason of strict and 
logical criteria because compared to foreign countries Hungarian 
Development Policy can only be supported by low financial means, 
so that is why Hungary should only choose a few countries as partner 
countries. The goal during the selection is that the chosen country 
has to be suitable for the cooperation terms of the donor community 
and international organizations, and has to ensure the balance 
                                                                                                                              
Cooperation: The Domestic and International Ground of the Global 
Problems], available at: http://www.globalisneveles.hu/index.php?option= 
com_content &task=view&id=7&Itemid=6 [cit. 2013-10-07]. 
22 TOMAJ, DÉNES: A nemzetközi fejlesztési együttműködés a szegénység 
csökkentése érdekében [The International Development Cooperation in the 
Interest of Reducing Poverty], Magyar ENSZ Társaság: Globális kihívások, 
millenniumi fejlesztési célok és Magyarország, 2008, ENSZ – Akadémia, 
45. 
23 Külügyminisztérium, Nemzetközi Fejlesztési Együttműködési és 
Humanitárius Segítségnyújtási Főosztály: Beszámoló Magyarország 2010. 
évi hivatalos nemzetközi fejlesztési és humanitárius segítségnyújtási 
tevékenységéről [Report of Hungary’s Official International Development 
and Humanitarian Activity in 2010], Budapest, 2011, 5. Available at: 
http://www.kormany.hu/download/1/2d/50000/beszamolo_magyarorszag_2
010_evi_nefe_tevekenysegerol.pdf [cit. 2013-05-20]. 
The International Development Cooperation by EU with Special Regards to 
Hungary 
364 
between general political, security policy and economic policy goals 
and the practice of development cooperation.24 
The partner countries of the Hungarian Development Policy can 
be divided into three main groups: (1) middle-term country strategy 
with Hungarians’ main partner countries like Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Moldova, Palestine, Serbia and Vietnam, (2) secondly, according to 
the international treaty, our country supports the development of 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and (3) thirdly unique projects with other 
partners.25 The main part of Hungarian aids goes to Serbia, 
Afghanistan and Ukraine, which is 37 % in connection with Serbia 
and 29% and 17% in connection with Afghanistan and Ukraine.26 
In order to successfully accomplish the responsibilities of 
joining the EU, Hungary had to encourage the public and the press. 
However, our country has to experience that the topic of 
international development is unpopular in Hungary, only 20% of 
Hungarians thinks that aiding poorer countries is important, which is 
less than 30% in East-European countries, while this rate is 74% in 
Cyprus, 69% in Sweden. The main part of the Hungarian population, 
nearly 43% think that the EU does not have to deal with international 
aiding at all.27 
The civil – non-governmental – organizations (NGOs) 
proceeded humanitarian activities in 76 countries such as Haiti, 
Afghanistan and Iraq in the last 5 years in spite of the negative 
attitude of public and withdrawing politics. 
                                                            
24 A magyar nemzetközi fejlesztési együttműködési (NEFE) politika [The 
International Development Policy], available at: http://www.zpok.hu/img_ 
upload/f880a7b608b6eaa8411125e501dc0547/Magyar_NEFE_Politika.doc 
[cit. 2013-10-07]. 
25 TOMAJ: op. cit. 46. 
26 See 30 milliárdot adunk szegény országoknak, available at: 
http://www.origo.hu/gazdasag/20130319-ceukutatas-101-mill io-euro-segel 
yt-adunk-a-szegeny-orszagoknak.html [cit. 2013-10-07]. 
27 Alig jut magyar segély külföldre, available at: http://hvg.hu/ itthon/2013 
0314_Alig_jut_magyar_segely_kulfoldre [cit. 2013-10-07]. 
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Hungary was encouraged by the world’s more developed states 
for many years but today, it gives 30 billion Hungarian forints aid 
(equivalent to cca. 100 Million EUR)28 to poor countries, which is 
acceptable in its economic situation. To realize the 0.33% 
Millennium Goals in connection with GNI, in the future Hungary 
should place development policy in the foreground in order to get 
suitable attention. The programme should be made popular in public 
because for a successful development policy it is important to get the 
public’s and press’ encouragement in this economic situation and 
with these restrictions. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Nowadays, globalization dominates in our world and that is why the 
dependence of states is getting higher and higher. Operating a 
worldwide program like the International Development Cooperation 
which is responsible for aiding developing countries is essential in 
this economic situation. It aims at decreasing poverty, developing 
education and health care, realizing equal rights, decreasing children 
mortality, realizing workplaces and solving several urgent problems. 
The Millennium Goals which were accepted by the UN-member 
countries in 2000 give the frame and the direction of operating the 
program, so the way of International Development Cooperation can 
clearly be seen. Although, only few member countries (which have 
excellent economic stability) have already realized the planned GNI 
aiding measurement which was 0.56% and 0.17% in 2010, the flown 
sum from the member countries is so huge that NEFE has become 
the most popular program in the world. 
                                                            
28 Ibid. 
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